

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:

FEB 2 7 2007

Freedom of Information/ Privacy Office

Mr. John Young CRYPTOME 251 West 89th Street Suite 6E New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act request of March 29, 2001, for information pertaining to the Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP), ZF011946W (#123F-06).
- b. Our letter of December 20, 2005, informing you we needed additional time to review the records, and informing you we were unable to comply with the statutory 20-day time limit in processing your request.
- c. Our letters of March 22, 2006 and January 30, 2007, informing you we were still reviewing the records you have requested and will respond to you once the review has been completed.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Central Index of Investigations and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request. We have located records pertaining to your request on ICIP, ZF011946W.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized and nine pages of records are denied in their entirety as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2(a)(2), 1.2(a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 12958, as amended. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552(b)(1). On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the file series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, Section 3.4, as amended, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. It is not possible to reasonably segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. The records are enclosed for your use. A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Since the release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

In addition, we have sanitized information that would reveal the identity of confidential sources. This information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(7)(D) of the FOIA. The significant and legitimate governmental purpose to be served by withholding is that a viable and effective intelligence investigative capability is dependent upon protection of confidential sources.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General John Defreitas, III, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

We have been informed by the FBI that their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the FBI constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Avenue, Northwest, Suite 11050, Washington, DC 20530-0001 within 60 days from the receipt of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or Information Appeal." Please cite FBI FOI/PA #429014 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We are forwarding a copy of this letter to the FBI (FOI/PA #429014).

During the processing of your request, information was disclosed which is under the purview of another government agency. This office has no authority to release this record and it is being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

Additionally, we are coordinating with other government agencies concerning the releasability of their information contained in the records. We will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

If you have any questions concerning this action, please feel free to contact this office at (301) 677-6410. Please refer to case #123F-06.

Sincerely,

Susan J. Butterfield

Director

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

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DOSSIER NO. ZFO119 Vols

As of $\frac{18 \text{ Sep } 85}{\text{(Date)}}$ all material included

in this file conforms with DA policies currently in effect.


(Signature) 18 Sep 85 (Date Signed)

Delmar Smith GS5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

Reviewed for Retertion
Criteria UP AR 381-10
Reviewer F. Grand Date 1997

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r	ACTION SHEET	LUILLI		TROL NUMBER	
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			DA	AMI-DOI-S	
Quarterly A	CIP Report		DATE		
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ACTION REQUIRED					
To provide	USofA with the third quarterly	ACIP report		ed Must be sufficien	the detailed to identify
	R RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, back recourse to other sources.)	ground and action takes	n or recommena	ea. Must be sufficien	my actuaca to tacking
1. BACKGROU	IND:				
	Memorandum dated 8 February 72, of Staff, US Army to provide q				
h. The	second quarterly report, which	contained a	specially	monupoted of	dditional
	as submitted to the Under Secre				
c. Writ	ten input from USAINTC for the	current quart	erly repo	ort is attac	hed at
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CURRENT ACIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ACIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	NUMBER OF SOURCES
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 February 72.	5
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	CANARY EFFORT	16 February 72	3
Fort Bliss, Texas (Language School)	CANCER PORCH	28 December 71	1
Fort Ord, California	CANDID FROLIC	21 December 71	` 2
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 February 72	3
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	GONDOLA STAR	16 February 72	2
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	GONG SILK	16 February 72	3
Philadelphia, Penn- sylvania (Electronics Command)	LANDLESS TIME	19 January 72	4
Washington, D.C. (Language School)	LANYARD MOOD	22 December 71	. 0
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Army War College)	LENIENT CLOUD	16 February 72	. 4
Presidio of Monterey, California	LENTIL MONKEY	26 O ctober 71	3
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TOTALS 11	11		30

Off-post Information

There were no instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians was collected off-post.

Classified by DAMI-DO

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR

INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1978







DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS

U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

ICDISO-OC

16 OCT 1972

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S) WASH DC 20310

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. Ltr, DAMI-DOI-S, 8 Mar 72, subject as above.
 - b. Ltr, ICDISO-OC, 18 Apr 72, subject as above.
- 2. (U) In compliance with reference a, above, the ACIP quarterly report for the period 1 July 30 September 1972 is forwarded herewith.
- 3.(U)(e) The following operational and administrative control measures remain in effect concerning all reported ACIP to assure compliance with DOD and DA policies relative to the acquisition of information on non-DOD affiliated personnel:
- a. Each ACIP is restricted to on-post target coverage of DOD affiliated personnel and utilizes employees or military personnel of the serviced command as sources. These constraints generally preclude the possibility of violations of current collection restrictions regarding non-DOD affiliated personnel.
- b. Sources are selected from a civilian/military work force only after detailed assessment. Generally, only long term employees or personnel of known reliability and proven loyalty are selected for recruitment.

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

- c. Each individual and/or source involved in the conduct or control of each ACIP is briefed on current policies and restrictions pertaining to the program and program associated activities as concerns persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD.
- d. ACIP reporting is scrutinized at each level of command to insure the acceptability of information provided or collected. Information of a questionable nature is not disseminated at the local level until a determination is made by this headquarters concerning the propriety of collection reporting and the information developed.

4. (C) Commanders of the facilities supported by the ACIP were queried in May 1971 concerning their recommendations relative to continuation of the program. Expressed desire for continuation was unanimous. To date, supported commanders' views remain unchanged and in view of this it is recommended that these programs be continued.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ll Incl Op Anal

Acting Assistant Adjutant General

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- 1. CANAL LOOP (OACSI approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Edgewood Arsenal, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five sources were used during this reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Personnel transfers have created a turbulence in both the project control officer and project liaison officer functions. It is anticipated that the operation will become more effective after permanent personnel assignments are made in the near future.

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- 2. CANARY EFFORT (OACSI approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Continuation is recommended because of the installation's sensitive mission with DOD as the Alternate National Command Post and the role assigned to USAINTC of executing the Alternate Joint Communications Center Counterintelligence Program. The commander of Fort Ritchie and the US Army element located within Site "R" desires the continuation of the ACIP.

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- 3. CANCER PORCH (OACSI approval 28 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute, Southwest Branch, Fort Bliss, TX
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One confidential source was approved during this reporting period for recruitment.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The Defense Language Institute has recommended that the operation continue despite the reduction in the number of Vietnamese language students trained at the Institute.

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




- 4. CANDID FROLIC (OACSI approval 21 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Fort Ord, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: One of the sources identified two military personnel assigned to Fort Ord and a USMA cadet who were allegedly members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) who distributed VVAW literature on a military post and who encouraged military personnel to attend VVAW meetings.
- e. Operational Status: Fort Ord is the only major US Army training center on the West Coast and is a major test site for Modern Volunteer Army concepts. Additionally, the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command is located on the post with field testing conducted at Hunter-Liggett Military Reservation. Disruption of these elements could have a serious adverse impact upon the mission of the Army in that area. As the site of the Pvt Billy Smith "fragging" court-martial, Fort Ord has become a focal point for dissident/subversive activity for both local groups as well as supporters of Angela Davis from the San Francisco area. Because of the foregoing factors, recommend that CANDID FROLIC be continued.

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- 5. CENTRAL TAXI (OACSI approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: HQ, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information which identified four potential security problem areas was obtained and passed to the serviced command for appropriate action.
- e. Operational Status: The full potential for this operation has not been achieved due to the frequent change of control personnel. This situation is expected to stabilize in the near future, resulting in subsequent improvement of the operation.

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- 6. GONDOLA STAR (OACSI approval 17 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were used during this reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: A turbulent project control officer and project liaison officer situation which exists as a result of USAINTC reorganization and ensuing personnel transfers has prevented the program from attaining maximum effectiveness. This particular situation is expected to be resolved during the next quarter and increased coverage of the installation will be accomplished. High priority tenant activities covered by the ACIP include the US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Land Warfare Laboratory, Human Engineering Laboratory and the Ballistic Research Laboratory.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON SEP - 5 1937 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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- 7. GONG SILK (OACSI approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information which identified three potential security problem areas was obtained through the sources and passed to the serviced command for action.
- e. Operational Status: Because of the sensitivity of the mission performed by Picatinny Arsenal and the US Army Munitions Command, it is recommended that the operation be continued. Due to the relatively new status of the personnel involved in the ACIP, its full potential has not been reached. Improvement in effectiveness is anticipated.

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
- 8. LANDIESS TIME (OACSI approval 19 Jan 72)
 - a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four confidential sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The relatively recent reactivation of sources and newly assigned personnel have prevented this operation from reaching its full potential. Improvement in effectiveness is anticipated.

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- 9. LANYARD MOOD (OACSI approval 22 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch, Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: No confidential sources were used during this reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Pending development of a more permanent source at this installation, conventional sources of information will continue activity to cover sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.

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- 10. LENIENT CLOUD (OACSI approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four confidential sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Due to the sensitivity of the installation itself and the large volume of classified material handled at the facility, recommend continuation of the operation.


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- 11. LENTIL MONKEY (OACSI approval 26 Oct 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch,
 Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Two individuals assigned as instructors at the DLIWC have been shown to possess weaknesses which could be exploited by hostile intelligence services.
- e. Operational Status: Faculty members of the DLIWC must be considered potential targets of hostile intelligence agencies which may be operating in the area of the DLIWC; especially with the establishment of a Soviet consulate in San Francisco and the loosening of restrictions on communications with the People's Republic of China. Three foreign language departments are now covered by confidential sources and two additional departments will be covered upon recruitment of two more sources.



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SUBJECT

Quarterly Report to USofA re: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

OFFICE SYMBOL DAMT-DOI-S

DATE 31 July 1972 SUSPENSE

ACTION REQUIRED

To provide USofA with the second quarterly report on ACIPs

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, background and action taken or recommended. Must be sufficiently detailed to identify the action without recourse to other sources.)

1. BACKGROUND:

- a. By memorandum dated 8 February 1972, the Under Secretary of the Army requested that the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army provide quarterly reports on ACIPs (BLUE TAB D). He further requested that the report for the period ending 30 June 1972 provide a full analysis of the program.
- b. The first quarterly report was submitted to the Under Secretary of the Army on 21 April 1972 (BLUE TAB C).
- c. Written input from USAINTC for the current quarterly report is attached at BLUE TAB B. Subsequent coordination between USAINTC and OACSI representatives amplified their input which resulted in the information outlined in the memorandum to the Under Secretary of the Army (BLUE TAB A). To date, ICF in the total of \$140.73 have been expended on these 11 ACIPs.
- 2. DISCUSSION: Memorandum to Under Secretary of the Army through Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, at BLUE TAB A provides required second quarterly report as desired by the USofA memorandum of 8 February 1972.
- 3. RECOMMENDATION: That Memorandum at <u>BLUE TAB A</u> be approved and signed.

(Continue on plain bond)

IMPLICATIONS	CINFO YES NO	PRIM PROGS	YES	NO 🗌	BUDGET	YES NO
	COORDINATIONS				APPRO	OVALS
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SHOW ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SIDE OR CONTINUATION SHEET

ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature

J. MARTINS, MAJ/57471

SPECIAL ACTIONS BR RECORDS COPY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71



AUG 1972

DAMI-DOI-S

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

- 1. Reference your memorandum of 8 February 1972, subject as cited.
- 2. The 11 ACIP operations reported to you in my 21 April 1972 memorandum, subject as above, remain in effect. No additional ACIP operations have been approved. A quarterly report of current operations is attached (TAB A). At TAB B is the evaluation you requested.
- 3. I do not believe we have yet had sufficient experience with this program under the new control limitations for a solid evaluation of its long-term merit. I will continue to submit quarterly reports to you on it, and will furnish you another evaluation at the end of the fourth quarter of operations under the new controls.

2 Incl as (CONFIDER AL) (sgd) Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.

PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR. Major General, GS ACofS for Intelligence

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CURRENT ACIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ACIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	NUMBER O
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 February 72	5
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	CANARY EFFORT	16 February 72	4
Fort Bliss, Texas (Language School)	CANCER PORCH	28 December 71	0
Fort Ord, California	CANDID FROLIC	21 December 71	1
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 February 72	3
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	GONDOLA STAR	16 February 72	3
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	GONG SILK	16 February 72	3
Philadelphia, Penn- sylvania (Electronics Command)	LANDLESS TIME	19 January 72	. 7
Washington, D.C. (Language School)	LANYARD MOOD	22 December 71	0
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Army War College)	LENIENT CLOUD	16 February 72	4
Presidio of Monterey, California	LENTIL MONKEY	26 O ctober 71	1
	-		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
TOTALS 11	11	•	31

Off-post Information

There were no instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians was collected off-post.

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Information obtained:

Useful information was obtained, but except for prior warning of demonstrations at Fort Ord, California, no positive statements on specific security weaknesses or immediate threats to the Army were developed in this quarter. Inasmuch as these operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness, negative reports in themselves are frequently of value to a commander in planning for the security requirements of a given installation or activity. The placement and access of current sources, and those under consideration, are such that the chances of detecting a developing security threat situation in a sensitive installation or unit are greater with these sources operating.

Continuance of operations:

The eleven ACIP operations are being continued for the original stated purposes.







Scope and Value: ACIP operations are defensive, on-post, security services, initiated at the request of a local commander. These operations are to provide commanders an intensified method of detecting internal security weaknesses and security threats to the supported command. Information is obtained from carefully selected sources who have on-post access to sensitive or critical defensive target areas. Activities to be covered are selected after joint discussions and agreements between the requesting commander and the supporting USAINTC element. Information is gathered through the use of both overt and covert sources who are selected from the DoD military or civilian workforce at the serviced installation. The primary values of ACIP operations are in the early warning and problem detection areas. The ultimate merit of the program cannot be assessed on a short term basis. Supported commands currently evaluate reported ACIPs as worthwhile security activities.

Number and placement of sources: To date, 31 sources have been recruited. (All sources were reactivated from operations which were in effect prior to curtailment of all ACIP operations in February 1971.) Continued recruitment and training of sources should produce, at a minimum, information for the supported command on personnel attitudes, possible disaffection, dissident activities and character weakness information of the type normally sought by foreign intelligence spotter personnel. During contacts, sources are debriefed, trained as necessary, and given specific guidance on future reporting objectives. In all cases, emergency contact procedures exist to insure rapid notification of significant information.

Adequacy of controls: DIRC inspections of Army intelligence field elements, plus inspections by OACSI and of DA field commands, show strict operational compliance with pertinent directives, keen awareness of DIRC investigative policies, and extreme caution about any acts which might cause criticism to the Army. In addition, the following control measures have been imposed upon USAINTC and subordinate field elements:

- a. The ACIP is restricted to on-post target coverage of DoD affiliated personnel utilizing employees of the serviced command as sources. These restraints reduce to a minimum the possibility of violations of current collection restrictions regarding non-DoD affiliated personnel.
- b. Sources are selected from the military/civilian workforce only after a long and detailed assessment. Normally only long-term employees of known reliability and loyalty are selected for recruitment.

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c. Each individual involved in the conduct or control of the ACIP is briefed on current policies and constraints pertaining to the program and activities as they concern persons and organizations not affiliated with the DoD.

No additional controls are recommended.

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AUTH Para 1-883 EDD 5200.1R





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

ICDISO-OC

17 JUL 1972

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program

(ACIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S) WASH DC 20310

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. Letter DAMI-DOI-S, 8 March 1972, subject as above.
 - b. Letter ICDISO-OC, 18 April 1972, subject as above.
- 2. (U) Forwarded herewith in compliance with reference a, above, is the ACIP quarterly report for the period 1 April 1972 30 June 1972.
- 3. (c) The following operational and administrative control measures remain in effect concerning all reported ACIPs to assure compliance with DoD and DA policies relative to the acquisition of information on non-DoD affiliated personnel:
- a. Each ACIP is restricted to on-post target coverage of DoD affiliated personnel and utilizes employees of the serviced command as sources. These constraints generally preclude the possibility of violations of current collection restrictions regarding non-DoD affiliated personnel.
- b. Sources are selected from a civilian/military work force only after long and detailed assessment. Generally, only long term employees of known reliability and proven loyalty are selected for recruitment. *

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ICDISO-OC

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

- c. Each individual and/or source involved in the conduct or control of each ACIP is briefed on current policies and restrictions pertaining to the program and program associated activities as concerns persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD.
- d. ACIP reporting is scrutinized at each level of command to insure the acceptability of information provided or collected. Information of a questionable nature is not disseminated at the local level until a determination is made by this headquarters concerning the propriety of collection reporting and informational products.
- 4. (4) (4) (4) (4) (5) (4) Commanders of the facilities supported by the ACIP were queried in May 1971 concerning their recommendations relative to continuation of the program. Expressed desire for continuation was unanimous. To date, supported commanders' views remain unchanged and in view of this it is recommended that these programs be continued.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ll Incl Op Anal DAVID L. BRUENING

CPT, MI
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

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ON: SEP OF 1997 NOT 1700 NO



- 1. CANAL LOOP (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact with five confidential sources formerly used in the program has been made. Four have been reactivated and regularly scheduled contacts effected. One former source has been transferred to another DoD installation and has been terminated.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Although regular contact has been established with all former sources, full utilization has been impeded by Army Intelligence personnel transfers and the requirement to train newly assigned personnel involved in source contact. Continuation of the ACIP CANAL LOOP is recommended because of the extreme sensitivity of the target installation.

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- 2. CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact with four confidential sources formerly used in the program has been made. All four sources have been reactivated and regularly scheduled contacts effected.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Although regular contact has been established with all former sources, full utilization has been impeded by Army Intelligence personnel transfers and the requirement to train newly assigned personnel involved in source contact. Continuation of ACIP CANARY EFFORT is recommended because of the installation's sensitive mission within DoD as the Alternate National Command Post; and the role of the ACIP in USAINTC' DA assigned mission of executing the Alternate Joint Communications Center Counterintelligence Program.

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ON SEP -5 1997

BY ODR USAINSCOM F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R



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3. CANCER PORCH: (OACSI Approval - 28 Dec 71)

a. Location: Defense Language Institute Southwest Branch, Fort

Bliss, TX


b. Confidential Source Utilization: None

c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None

d. Useful Information Obtained: None

e. Operational Status: The scaledown of US participation in the Vietnam War has effected a steady reduction in the mission of the DLISW Vietnamese Language School, and a resultant decrease in student input and instructor cadre. On 1 May 1972, this Command requested DLI Headquarters reassess their need for ACIP support at the Southwest Branch. DLI requested that ACIP coverage continue until an exact projection of future Vietnamese Language requirements could be made.

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




- 4. CANDID FROLIC: (OACSI Approval 21 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Fort Ord, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Regularly scheduled meetings were conducted with one confidential source during the reporting period. One other prospective source has been spotted and approved for recruitment.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Early warning was provided the Commanding General, Fort Ord, concerning the 29 April 1972 demonstration outside the main gate of Fort Ord, in support of Billy Dean Smith, and the 20 May 1972, Armed Forces Day March against the Presidio of Monterey.
- e. Operational Status: As the only major US Army training facility on the West Coast; a test post for the Modern Volunteer Army concept, and the site of the Billy Dean Smith "fragging" trial, Fort Ord remains the focal point for dissident and/or subversive activity from both local radicals and from revolutionary elements in the San Francisco area. CANDID FROLIC is providing the CG, Fort Ord, with early warning type information upon which he can plan preventive measures to preclude disruption of post activities. Recommend continuation of ACIP CANDID FROLIC.

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- 5. CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: HQS, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact with three confidential sources formerly used in the program has been effected. All three sources have been reactivated and regularly scheduled contacts effected.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Although regular contact has been established with all former sources, full utilization has been impeded by Army Intelligence personnel transfers and the requirement to train newly assigned personnel involved in source contact. Continuation of ACIP CENTRAL TAXI is recommended because of the extreme sensitivity of HQS, US Army Electronics Command and its supporting laboratories and the command's mission in the development and procurement of electronic warfare equipment and systems.

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
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- 6. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval 17 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact with four confidential sources formerly used in the operation has been effected. Three sources have been reactivated and regularly scheduled contacts effected. One former source has been terminated since a realignment of functions at the installation prevents his participation in the program.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Although regular contact has been established with all former sources, full utilization has been impeded by Army Intelligence personnel transfers and the requirement to orient and familiarize newly assigned personnel with the operation. Continuation of ACIP GONDOLA STAR is recommended because of the sensitivity of the installation and the mission of tenant units, which include US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Land Warfare Laboratory, Human Engineering Laboratory and the Ballistic Research Laboratory.

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- 7. GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact with three confidential sources formerly used in the operation has been effected. All three sources have been reactivated and regularly scheduled contacts reestablished.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Although regular contact has been established with all former sources, full utilization has been impeded by Army Intelligence personnel transfers and the requirement to train newly assigned personnel involved in source contact. Continuation of ACIP GONG SILK is recommended because of the sensitivity and criticality of the mission performed by Picatinny Arsenal and the US Army Munitions Command.


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
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




- 8. LANDLESS TIME: (OACSI Approval 19 Jan 72)
 - a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact with seven confidential sources formerly used in the operation has been established. All sources have been reactivated and regularly scheduled contacts effected.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Although regular contact has been established with all former sources, full utilization has been impeded by Army Intelligence personnel transfers and the requirement to train newly assigned personnel involved in source contact. Continuation of the ACIP LANDLESS TIME is recommended because of the sensitive mission performed by the facility and by the National Inventory Control Point, which provides worldwide materiel inventory management of the Army's communications-electronics systems.

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- 9. LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval 22 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch,
 Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, conventional and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Reporting under LANYARD MOOD is concentrated principally on classroom monitoring by language students, the majority of whom are servicemen assigned Army Intelligence. The school is currently between classes and new student rosters are being screened for potential student sources. Although the DLI branch schools are relatively non-sensitive installations, the target represented by the language students requires some form of coverage or monitoring as many of the servicemen are destined for sensitive assignments in Communist Bloc countries. Recommend continuation of ACIP LANYARD MOOD.

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- 10. LENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact with four confidential sources formerly used in the operation has been established. All four sources have been reactivated and regularly scheduled contacts effected.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Although regular contact has been established with all former sources, full utilization has been impeded by Army Intelligence personnel transfers and the requirement to orient and familiarize newly assigned personnel with the operation. Recommend continuation of ACIP LENIENT CLOUD because of the sensitive training mission of the War College and classified mission of the Army Alternate Command Element, a tenant activity of Carlisle Barracks.

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- 11. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval 26 Oct 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch, Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One confidential source was recruited during the reporting period. No confidential sources were utilized in the program prior to the 17 Feb 71 suspension.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: While little information of substantive value has been developed to date, confidential and overt sources of information will continue activity in support of coverage of sensitive targets designated by the supported commander. Suitability type information has been developed concerning an instructor who has made five trips to CSR since entering the United States in 1959.
- e. Operational Status: Reporting under LENTIL MONKEY is concentrated principally on classroom monitoring by language students, the majority of whom are servicemen assigned to Army Intelligence. Although the DLI branch schools are relatively non-sensitive installations, the target represented by the language students requires coverage as many of the servicemen are destined for sensitive assignments in Communist Bloc countries. Recommend continuation of ACIP LENTIL MONKEY.

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* **	ACTION SHEET				TROL NUMBER	<u>,</u>
Quarter1	y Report to US of A Re: A	aggress	ive Counter-	1	CE SYMBOL	SUSPENSE
intellig	ence Program (ACIP) Operat	.10115			April 1972	
Action Required To provi	de USofA with the initial	Quarte	rly Report or	n ACIP's		
MEMORANDUM FO	R RECORD. (Describe briefly the requireme recourse to other sources.)	nt, backgro	und and action taken	or recommend	ed. Must be sufficion	ently detailed to identify
	GROUND:					
Staff, A (TAB B).	By Memorandum dated 8 Feb army provide a Quarterly Re By note and referal slip of	eport of	n Aggressive	Counteri	intelligenc	e Programs
to the A	CSI and directed that requhis office (TAB C).	ired r	eports and re	ecommenda	itions be s	ubmitted
c. informat Memorand	By letter dated 8 Mar 72, ion to this office (TAB D) Λ_{VELLO}	OG USA in ac	INTC was form cordance with	mally tas n provisi	sked to pro lons of the	vide required US of A
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2. DISC report.	USSION: Memorandum to USc	fA thro	ough VCofS, A	Army at T	CAB A provi YELLOU'	des required
	MMENDATION: That memorand	um at	TAB A be appr	coved and	l signed.	
		(Continue	on plain bond)			
IMPLICATIONS	CINFO YES NO	PRIM PRO	GS YES	NO 🗌	1	ES NO
OFFICE	COORDINATIONS		PHONE		APPROVA	DATE
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ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)

MAJOR W. WEBB/78874



SHOW ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SIDE OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SPECIAL ACTIONS BR

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DISPATCHED (DTG)





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

8 MAR 1972

DAMI-DOI-S

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence

Program (ACIP) Operations

Commanding General
United States Army Intelligence Command
ATTN: ICDSO-O-S

Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

1. References:

a. Paragraph 4, DAMI-DOI-S Letter, dated 16 February 1972, Subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations.

b. Attached Memorandum from the Under Secretary of the Army, to the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, dated 8 February 1972, Subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations.

2. The Under Secretary of the Army Memorandum directs that quarterly reports be provided his office, commencing with the quarter ending March 31, 1972. USAINTC input for these reports should be forwarded so as to arrive at DAMI-DOI-S no later than the 10th working day of the month following the close of the calendar quarter which they cover.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

1 Incl as (SECKET) CHARLES W. ALLEN

Colonel, GS

Director of Operations

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosures

OF OFFI OLUMEN

1 0 FEB 1972

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON

10 February 1972

ACSI -

For action -- Please submit quarterly reports and recommendations thru me.

В. Р.

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DAMI-DOI-S

SUBJECT: Quaterly ACIP Report

- 1. USAINTC submitted their input for the quarterly ACIP report on 14 Apr 72. As result DAMI-DOI-S prepared the required package to forward their report to CSA.
- 2. On 17 Apr 72 Col IADOROSA, USAINTC called with request that USAINTC be allowed to expand their initial report. He explained that BG Epp did not get to see original reports prior to dispatch and was not happy with them when he finally did get to see them.
- 3. By letter ,undated, USAINTC provided DAMI-DOI-S with revised reports for each ACIP. Reports were received from USAINTC IN on 19 Apr 72. Per phoncon with Mr Arnold, USAINTC, I established the date of 18 Apr 72 as that which should be placed on the undated letter transmitting the reports received on 19 APR.

WALDO R WEBB MAJ GS

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21 APR 1972

DAMI-DOI-S

MEHORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

- 1. In your 8 February 1972 Memorandum, subject as cited, you requested quarterly reports on status of ACIP operations. Attached are reports on those operations in progress for the quarter ending 31 March 1972.
- 2. Your Memorandum accepted the fact that the closing date of the first quarter report would be too soon for any sound evaluation of these projects. This is borne out by attached reports. They indicate a cautious selection of potential confidential sources. Such a process is necessary for ACIF operations to provide the Army security threat information not obtainable through routine counterintelligence investigative and liaison work.

11 Incl as (CONFY ATIAL) (sgd) Phillip B. Davidson, Jr.

PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JEA Major General, GS ACOFS for Intelligence





ARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

18 APR 1972

ICDISO-OC

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence

Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S) WASH DC 20310

WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved

- 1. (U) Reference letter DAMI-DOI-S, 8 Mar 72, subject as above.
- 2. (U) Forwarded herewith in compliance with referenced letter is the quarterly report covering the period 1 Jan 72 31 Mar 72.
- 3. (ω) The following comments are submitted in order to better portray the role of the ACIP in enhancement of the security of the supported commands:
- a. The Aggressive Counterintelligence Program is a defensive, on-post security service initiated at the request of the local commander. It provides a monitoring or surveillance of sensitive or critical areas of a command which are selected or recommended for ACIP coverage by the serviced commander. This is accomplished through the use of both overt and covert sources of information, selected exclusively from the DoD civilian and military workforce at the serviced installation.
- b. The ACIP must be considered a long-range operation if it is to provide reliable, accurate and continuing access to information not obtainable through routine collection efforts.

4 (U)(c) Due to the lapse of time since the ACIPs were suspended, considerable effort and time is involved in the reactivation of approved ACIPs. ACIPs in the process of reactivation by this Command are subjected to continuous scrutiny to insure that they fall within the parameters of

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ICDISO-OC

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence

Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

current National level guidance and policy. All ACIPs are subject to continuing evaluation to determine their viability in support of accepted counterintelligence objectives.

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as (dupe)

JAMES R. WALDIE
Colonel, Infantry
Deputy Commander



Period Ending: 31 March 1972

WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved

- 1. (U) MICHIANE: LEWILL MORKEY (U)
- 2. (U) MCATION: Defense Language Institute, West Coast, Monterey, CA
- 3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 26 October 1971, per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, ambject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Progrem (ACIP)
 Operations.

4.(U)(C) BACKIBOURD:

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ACIP coverage of the Defense Language Institute, West Coast (DLINC) was initiated by letter DLINC, dated 11 September 1967, subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Support. Operation was suspended on 17 February 1971 in compliance to ACSI Memorandsm, dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Maison Officer in his regular contact with the installation security office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

- 5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS:
 - a. General: The Defense Language Institute, West Coast, conducts training in a variety of foreign languages for students from all the military services.

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b. Indicated Threat: Previous information developed through this ACIP revealed at least ten instances of instructors visiting communist blue countries and being contacted by foreign nationals. Two of these visits resulted in direct selicitation of information soncerning DLINC. Future reporting will determine whether or not a threat continues to exist at this installation.

- 6.(1(0) CONFIGURATIAL SCIENCES UTILIZED: None. The program was in the fritiation phase during this reporting period. One Confidential Source is to be recruited in April 1972. Additional sources for pencible inclusion into the operation are presently under assessment. All sources recruited will be civilian or military personnel assigned to the installation.
- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8.(U)(C) USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED: Review of personal records identify three individuals, all members of the faculty of the Czechoslovakian Language Department, Defense Language Institute, West Coast (DLIWC), Presidio of Montersy, California, as possible targets of hostile intelligence.
- 9.(U)(C) OPERATIONAL STATUS: Operation should be continued. Faculty members of DLIWC must be considered potentially lucrative targets of hostile intelligence agencies which may be operating in the California area; especially with the impending establishment of a USSR Consulate in San Francisco, California.



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Period Ending: 31 March 1972

WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved

1. (U) NICKNAME: CANDID FROLIC (U)


2. (U) LOCATION: Fort Ord, CA

3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 21 December 1971 per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U).

4.(U)C) COORDINATION: ACIP coverage of Fort Ord, CA was requested by the Commanding General, 26 November 1971 per letter AMNOR-B, HQS, Fort Ord, subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Support (U). Approval to initiate the program was contained in ACSI letter cited in paragraph three above. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his normal contact with the installation security/intelligence office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator, during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5(U) THREAT ANALYSIS: ACIP CANDID FROLIC was initiated to provide the Commanding General, Fort Ord with a substitute Special Counterintelligence Coverage to replace that formerly provided by GRADE PROGRESS, an Offensive Counterintelligence Operation currently under suspension. Fort Ord as the only major US Army training facility on the West Coast and as a test post for the Modern Volunteer Army is under constant, concerted attack by local anti-war and anti-Army civilian organizations. These organizations have extended their operations on-post under the legal guise of soldier counselling. An additional factor which contributes to the threat to the installation is the trial of PVT Billy Dean Smith, now in the Fort Ord Confinement Facility accused of the murder of two Army officers in Vietnam. Radicals and other groups have already given this impending event wide publicity and are attempting to characterize the trial as racial oppression. These efforts are expected to find adherents among the population of the Fort Ord complex who will undoubtedly attempt disruption either by outside direction or on their own initiative. Already, several off-post demonstrations, at the Fort Ord main gate, connected with this case have been conducted; a building which is being rehabilitated as a court room for the trial has been set afire and damaged by arsonist(s); and disruptive gatherings have been held on post to discuss and protest the trial.

6.(U)(G) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: None. The program was in the initiation phase during this first quarter. However, the first Confidential






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Source has been recruited and four others are under development. In addition, seven individuals are currently under assessment. Only DoD civilian and military personnel assigned the installation are recruited as confidential sources.

- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None.
- 8.(1)(e) USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED: During the reporting period, the following useful information was obtained through official liaison with local investigative agencies and through overt contact sources on the military installation. An Army chaplain's assistant is alleged to be assisting the MLP on-post at Fort Ord. In addition, a JAGC officer is alleged to have referred military personnel stationed at Fort Ord to PCS/MLP for legal counsel in obtaining discharges from the military service.
- 9.(()(C) OPERATIONAL STATUS: It is recommended that the operation be continued in order to provide the Commanding General, Fort Ord, with early warning information upon which to base counter-actions against local dissident/subversive organizations who, through recruitment of servicemen, have extended their operations onto the government facility.







Period Ending: 31 March 1972

WARNING HOTICE: Sensitive Secress and Rethods Involved

- 1. (U) ECCREAME: LAMPARD MOOD (U)
- 2. (U) INCATION: Defense Language Institute, East Coast, Anacostia Annex, US Naval Station, Washington, DC
- 3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 22 December 1971, per ACSI letter, DAMI-DOI-S, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligense Brogram (ACIP)
 Operations.

4.(U)(e) BACKGROUND:

ACIF coverage of Defense Language Institute, East Coast (DLI, EC) was initiated by letter request DLIEC, dated 16 November 1971, subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Support. It was suspended on 17 February 1971 by ACSI Memorandum dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. Information developed by the ACIF is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his regular contact with the installation security office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIF Coordinator during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS:

The Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch (DLIEC) conducts training in approximately 50 languages for an average student body of 1100, with responsibility for classroom training being placed upon civilian contract schools. No classified material is provided DLIEC instructors or students; therefore, there is no justification for the program exclusively to protect the security of the facility.

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The students reside at scattered locations throughout the Washington, DC area and the administrative control and supervision over them is decentralized among several headquarters.

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Most of the students are young, impressionable servicemen, subjected to minimum military control, who are encouraged to socialize with their instructors and to attend functions at the various embassies and legations in the Washington area. The instructors are principally alien employees of a civilian contrast school over whom DLIEC exercises virtually no administrative or supervisory control.

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6. (C) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: Spotting and assessing program
for the recruitment of Confidential Sources has been instituted.
The recruitment of sources will be limited to DoD civilians
and military personnel assigned to the school.

- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8. V(6) USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED: None. Sources have not been reactivated.
- 9. OPERATIONAL STATUS: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program
 LANYARD MOOD should be continued because of the extreme sensitivity of the personnel assigned the installation. Current activity centers around the recruitment of sources to assure coverage of sensitive areas designated by the responsible commanders.

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Period Ending: 31 March 1972

WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved

- 1. (U) MICKEAME: CAMCER PORCH (U)
- 2. (U) LOCATION: Defense Language Distitute Southwest, Biggs Field, Ft. Bliss, TX
- 3. (U) MATE APPROVED: 28 December 1971; per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Progrem (ACIP)
 Operations.
- 4.(U)(c) BACKGROUND:

ACIP coverage of the Defense Language Institute Southwest (DLI, SW) was requested by letter DLISC-S2/3, DLI, SW, dated 23 October 1967, subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Support and was instituted by this Command in 1968. Coverage was suspended on 17 February 1971 per ACSI Memorandum, dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Lieison Officer in his regular contact with the installation security intelligence office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commandant of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5. (2) THREAT ANALYSIS:

General: The Defense Language Institute Southwest Branch (DLISW) is a subordinate facility of Headquarters, Defense Language Institute (DLI), and was activated 1 August 1966, to provide Vietnamese Language instruction to Department of the Army personnel. The instructors are native born Vietnamese, employed by civilian contract schools, over whom the DLI exergises little or notcontrol. He classified material is provided DLISW instructors or students; therefore, there is no justification for the program exclusively to protect the security of the facility. Principal cover emphasis is placed upon the protection and/or the surveillance of the military student body which consists primarily of young impressionable servicemen.



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the majority of whom are faced with a Southeast Asia assignment. Hany of these servicemen have a preconceived opposition to the UE palicy in Southeast Asia, while others, apprehensive shout their pending assignment to Vietness, are susceptible to the influences of their fellow stokents or to subtle suggestions ande by their Vietnesses instructors. Information has been received from the Vietnesses Government indicating that a group of "laft-sdag" Vietnesses stokents were planning to use "standard in Southeast Asia. Although the school has an established student/instructor non-fraternization policy, the close, long-term context initiated during prolonged courses of instruction often results in the establishment of close friend-ships.

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- 6. (c) COMFIDENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: Two prospective Confidential Sources, with placement and access, have been spotted and are currently being assessed and developed. Sources utilized in the ACIP are DoD civilian and military amployees of the serviced facility.
- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8. —(C) USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED: None. Sources have not been reactivated.
- 9(U)(C) OPERATIONAL STATUS: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program
 CARCER FORCH should be continued because of the extreme sensitivity of the personnel assigned to the installation. Current
 activity centers around the reactivation of former confidential
 sources and the recruitment of new sources to assure coverage
 of sensitive areas designated by the responsible commanders.


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Period Ending: 31 March 1972
WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved —

- 1. (U) MICKHAME: LANDLESS TIME (U)
- 2. (U) LOCATION: US Army Electronics Command, Philadelphia Facility, Philadelphia, PA.
- 3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 19 January 1972 per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U).
- ACIP coverage of the Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command, was initiated 8 October 1965 per letter AMBEL-SE-P, HQS, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ, subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Support (U). On 17 February 1971, LANDLESS TIME was suspended per instructions contained in ACSI Memorandum dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. This operation was reactivated per authority contained in ACSI letter cited in paragraph three above. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Limison Officer in his normal contact with the installation security/intelligence office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator, during which the programs of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.
- 5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS:
 - a. General:





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b. Developed Information:

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During the existence of LAMNIESS TIME, one instance was reported involving an employee in which the employee had been in close personal contact with a foreign national. Investigation revealed the interest of hostile intelligence in this individual and subsequent contact by the foreign national was indicative of a preliminary assessment. Information of a suitability nature was also reported concerning several employees.

6. (C) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: None. The Project Maison Officer is checking to determine the location, status, and continued suitability of previous Confidential Sources for reactivation by the Project Control Officer. Sources utilized in LANDLESS TIME will be recruited only from DoD civilian and military personnel assigned the serviced installation.

7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None

8. (C) USEFUL INFORMATION: Because the operation is in its initial phase of reactivation, no useful information of counterintelligence interest to MI and the serviced command, Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command, was developed.

9 (C) OPERATIONAL STATUS: The operation should be continued because of the current sensitivity of the installation. Current activity centers around the reactivation of former confidential sources and the recruitment of new sources to assure coverage of sensitive areas designated by the Commander of the facility.





Period Ending: 31 March 1972

WARMING NOTICE: Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved

- 1. (U) TECRNAME: GORDOLA STAR (U)
- 2. (U) MACATION: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
- 3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 16 Pubruary 1972, per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP)
 Operations.

W(e) BACKEROUND:

ACIP coverage of Aberdeen Proving Ground was initiated by letter AMCIS-SI, US Army Materiel Command, dated 29 November 1965, subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) (U). On 17 February 1971, GONDOLA STAR was suspended per instructions ACSI-STF Memorandum, dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his regular contact with the installation security office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator during which the programs of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS:

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- 6. (C) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: Initial contact has been made with two sources utilized prior to GONDOLA STAR's suspension.

 Also, action is being taken to recruit additional sources.

 Activation of these sources must await their complete assessment.
- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8. (c) USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED: None. Sources have not been reactivated.
- 9. (c) OPERATIONAL STATUS: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program
 GCNDOLA STAR should be continued because of the extreme sensitivity of the installation and because of the potential threat to the National security posed by the sensitive mission performed by Abardeen Proving Ground. Current activity centers example the reactivation of former confidential sources and the secruitment of new sources to assure coverage of sensitive areas designated by the responsible commanders.

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ACIP QUARTERLY REPORT

Period Ending: 31 March 1972

WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Courses and Methods Involved

1. (W) MICHIAME: COMO SILK (U)

2. (U) BLOCATION: Picatinny Armenal, MJ

3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 16 Pebruary 1972 per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, imbject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U).

4. (C) BACKEROUND:

ACIP coverage of the US Army Munitions Command and Picatinny Armenal, NJ, was initiated 15 May 1968 per letter ANSMJ-SS-S, HQS US Army Munitions Command, subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Support (U). On 17 February 1971, GONG SILK was suspended per instructions contained in ACSI Memorandum dated 16 February 1971, subject Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. The operation was reactivated per authority contained in ACSI letter cited in paragraph three above. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his normal contact with the installation security office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS

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- b. Developed Information: Previously, GONG SILK provided extensive information concerning contact, both personal and through correspondence, between scientific personnel employed at Picatinny Arsenal and foreign scientists. Instances were also reported concerning foreign individuals seeking scientific papers published by the employees. Many instances were reported concerning character weaknesses and behavior problems of employees, six of which resulted in termination of employment.
- 6. (0) COMFIDENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: None. The Project Limison
 Officer is conducting discreet checks to determine the location,
 status and continued suitability of previous Confidential Sources
 for reactivation by the Project Control Officer. Sources utilized in GONG SILK will be recruited only from DoD civilian and
 military personnel assigned at the serviced installation.
- 7. (U) IMPORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None

- 8.74(0) UEKFUL IMPORMATION CETAINED: Because the operation is in its initial phase of reinstitution, no useful information of counter-intelligence interest was developed.
- 9. (C) CPERATICHAL STATUS: The operation should be continued because of the extreme sensitivity of the installation and the criticality of the mission it performs for the Department of the Army. Current activity centers around the reactivation of furner confidential sources and the recruitment of new sources to assure coverage of sensitive areas designated by the Commanding General, USAGROOM.



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ACIP QUARTERLY REPORT

Period Ending: 31 March 1972

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1. (U) NICKNAME: CENTRAL TAXI (U)

2. (U) LOCATION: Fort Monmouth, RJ

3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 16 February 1972, per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations.

4. (U) BACKGROUND: ACIP coverage of the US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ, was initiated 4 October 1967 per letter AMSKL-EI, HQS, US Army Electronics Command, subject: Request for Aggressive Counter-intelligence Support (U). On 17 February 1971, CENTRAL TAXI was suspended per instructions contained in ACSI Memorandum, dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. The operation was reinitiated per authority contained in letter cited in paragraph 3 above. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his normal contact with the installation security office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5. (e) THREAT ANALYSIS:

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- 6. (C) CONFIDENTIAL SCHECES UTILIZED: None. The Project Liaison Officer is conducting discreet checks to determine the location, status, and continued suitability of previous Confidential Sources for reactivation by the Project Control Officer. Sources utilized in CENTRAL TAXI are recruited only from smong the DoD civilian and military personnel assigned the serviced facility.
- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8.% (2) USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED: Because the operation is in its initial phase of reinstitution, no useful information of counterintelligence interest was developed.
- 9. V(C) OPERATIONAL STATUS: The operation should be continued because of the current sensitivity of the installation, and the criticality of the mission it performs for the Department of the Army. Current activity centers around the reactivation of former confidential sources and the recruitment of new sources to assure coverage of sensitive areas designated by the Commanding General, USAECOM.

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ACIP QUARTERLY REPORT

Period Ending: 31 March 1972

- WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved

1. (U) WICKNAME: CAMARY EFFORT (U)


2. (F) LOCATION: Fourt Ritchie, MD

3. (U) MATE APPROVED: 16 Pebrumny 1972, per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, Subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP)
Operations (U).

4. (c) BACKGROUND:

Aggressive Counterintelligence Program coverage of Fort Ritchie, MD, was initiated 11 August 1965, per letter SCCJ-B, HQS, US Army Joint Support Command, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program. On 17 February 1971, CANARY EFFORT was suspended per instructions contained in ACSI Memorandum dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. The operation was reinitiated per authority contained in letter cited in paragraph 3, above. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his regular contact with the installation security office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS:



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- 6. (C) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: Initial contact made with three Confidential Sources previously utilized prior to suspension of operation. One of the three has been reassigned on base and reassessment will be made to determine whether he is now within a legitimate target. Reactivation of the other two sources is taking place. Sources utilized in the ACIP are DoD civilian and military employees of the serviced facility.
- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8. (¢) USEFUL INFORMATION: None. Sources have not been fully reactivated.
- 9. (2) OPERATIONAL STATUS: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program
 CANARY EFFORT should be continued because of the extreme sensitivity of the installation and its mission within DoD as an
 Alternate National Command Post in time of emergency. Current
 activity centers around the reactivation of former confidential
 sources and the recruitment of new sources to assure coverage of
 sensitive targets or areas designated by the commander.



Period Ending: 31 March 1972

WARNING RETIGE: Sensitive Sources and farthods Involved

1. (U) WICKRAME: LENTENT CLOUD (U)

2. (U) LCCATION: Carlisle Barracks, PA

3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 16 February 1972 per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, ambject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP)
Operations (U).

4. (C) BACKGROUND:

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ACIP coverage of Carlisle Barracks and the US Army War College was initiated 13 August 1965 per letter AIBCB, HQS, Carlisle Barracks, subject: Counterintelligence Program. On 17 February 1971, LENIENT CLOUD was suspended per instructions contained in ACSI Memorandum dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. This operation was reactivated per authority contained in ACSI letter cited in paragraph three above. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his normal contact with the installation security/intelligence office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator, during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.


5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS:

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6. (C) COMPILENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: None. Four confidential sources formerly used in the operation have not been recontacted. Sources utilized in the ACIP will be limited to DeD civilian and military personnel assigned the serviced installation.

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- 7. (U) INFORMATION OBTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-DOD AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8. (U) USEFUL INFORMATION GBTAINED: Because the operation is in its initial phase of reinitiation, no useful information of counterintelligence significance was developed.
- 9. (C) OFERATIONAL STATUS: This operation should be continued because of the sensitivity of the installation and the exiticality of the mission it performs for the Department of the Army. Current activity includes the briefing of the Commanding General, USANE, who has assumed his position since the suspension of the operation. Following this briefing, recontact of former confidential sources will be attempted.

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BY CDH 05 ANSCOM FO11PO

BY CDH 05 ANSCOM FO11PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

CONFIDENCE

- WARNING NOTICE: Sensitive Courses and Methods Involved

- 1. (U) MICKHAME: CAMAL LOOP (U)
- 2. (U) LOCATION: Edgewood Arsenel, MD
- 3. (U) DATE APPROVED: 16 Pabruary 1972, per ACSI letter DAMI-DOI-S, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP)
 Operations.
- 4. (Ø) BACKGROUND:

ACIP coverage of Edgewood Arsenal was initiated 15 June 1965 by letter of request of the Commanding Officer, Edgewood Arsenal, thru the Commanding Generals, US Army Munitions Command and US Army Materiel Command. On 17 February 1971, CANAL LOOP was suspended per instructions contained in ACSI Memorandum dated 16 February 1971, subject: Suspension of Certain Army Counterintelligence Programs. This operation was reinitiated per authority contained in letter cited in paragraph three above. Information developed by the ACIP is provided the serviced command on a regular basis by the Project Liaison Officer in his regular contact with the installation security office. Formal quarterly briefings are given the Commander of the serviced installation or his designated ACIP Coordinator during which the progress of the program is discussed and recommendations made for future coverage.

5. (C) THREAT ANALYSIS:

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- 6. (c) COMPHENTIAL SOURCES UTILIZED: Initial contact made with five Confidential Sources previously utilized prior to suspension of operation. Astivation of these sources will take place following starther assessment. Sources recruited for utilization within the ASIP are limited to DoD civilians and military personnel assigned with serviced facility.
- 7. (U) IMPORMATION OPTAINED OFF-POST AND REPORTED ON NON-APPILIATED CIVILIANS: None
- 8. (c) USEFUL IMPORMATION OBTAINED: None. Sources have not been reactivated.



9. (c)

OPERATIONAL STATUS: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program CANAL LOOP should be continued because of the extreme sensitivity of the installation and because of the potential threat to the National security posed by the sensitive mission performed by Edgewood Arsenal. Current activity centers around the reactivation of former confidential sources and the recruitment of new sources to assure coverage of sensitive areas designated by the responsible commanders.

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ON 1661 S - d35
ON 2661 S - d35
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
BY CDR USAINSCOM 5200.1R
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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1 0 FEB 1972

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON

10 February 1972

ACSI -

For action — Please submit quarterly reports and recommendations thru me.


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PACIAL INTEREST RRAL SLIP FILE NUMBER DATE CASE NUMBER No SUSPENSE DATE(5) 10 February 1972 43496 SUMMARY (Sources, date, and subject or short title) OC of SA Quarterly Report to USofA re ACIP Operations 20 April 1972* OUSOIA COPO CofF CNGB OSA 20 April 1972* Cofspts CORC TSG CINFO CLL ACSFOR CofCh CUSAAA CMH-0C50P\$ XX ACSI TJAG CAR DOSPER 620 TAG TIG TPMG DESLOG CofEngrs CC-E COA NOTE AND (Forward) (Return) APPROPRIATE ACTION ADVANCE COPY provided DIRECT REPLY, COPY OF REPLY TO ACTION ASSIGNED TO INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE & REPLY PREPARE (Draft / Final) REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF REPORT ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE BY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AS REQUIRED 0 % 5 COORDINATE WITH COPY FURNISHED TO INFORMATION X DOMS, DSGS (CAR) *This RS will remain in effect indefinitely; new suspense will be announced each quarter. BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF: HARRY E. B. SULLIVAN LTC, GS Assistant Secretary of

the General Staff

DATE	AGENCY	ACTION TAKEN	SIGNATURE
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RECEIPT OF DOCU	MENT IDENTIFIED ABOVE IS AC	KNGWLEDGED:	DATE
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SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

On 4 December 1971 you forwarded to me a memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Policy Guidance, which informed me of the ACSI's decision to reactivate certain Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations. Attached to the memorandum was the operation plan for one such operation. I have reviewed that memorandum and the attached plan, and although I appreciate the conscientious steps which have been taken to assure adherence to current policies in this area, I remain concerned that this program may be placing us in a highly vulnerable position.

DoD Directive 5200.27 and the implementing Army policy letter dated 1 June 1971 impose two restrictions which are particularly relevant to ACIP operations. First, they require that there be "no covert or otherwise deceptive surveillance or penetration of civilian organizations without the prior approval of the Chairman, DIRC (now the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)). Second, they prohibit assigning DoD personnel "to attend public or private" meetings, demonstrations, or other similar activities for the purpose of acquiring information the collection of which is authorized vithout my prior approval, except in emergency situations. These prohibitions apply whether or not the formal "target" of the operation is affiliated with the Department of Defense. Although the ACSI letter approving the first reactivated ACIP operation incorporates these restrictions by reference (paragraph 3a), the operation plan and related documents obviously assume that confidential sources working in the operation may obtain and report information which they receive in the course of activities off military installations. While the plan prohibits extending the collection effort "directly" to non-BoD personnel (paragraph 4a(a)), and while the ACSI approval letter prohibits making non-DoD personnel 'targets' of off-post surveillance, I would assume that it is entirely possible that in the course of their off-most activities confidential sources wight obtain and report information

OSA,OGC - cont OSA,ASG USA - cont Mr. Greene Spenet

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on non-affiliated civilians. Although such activity wight not in all situations be forbidden by DoD Directive 5200.27, it is clearly on the borderline, and I therefore feel it is very important that these operations be closely supervised and tightly controlled.

In order to make an informed decision about whether further controls are necessary (including possible Under Secretary or DIRC review of each operation), I would appreciate your taking the following steps:

- 1. Beginning March 31, 1972, I would like to receive a quarterly report containing the following information on each ACIP operation in progress at any time during the reporting period: Date approved, code-name, location, number of confidential sources used during reporting period, number of instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians is obtained off-post and reported, and a brief narrative statement explaining whether useful information was obtained during the reporting period, whether the operation is to be continued, and if so, why. These reports may be submitted 30 days after the close of the calendar quarter which they cover.
- 2. With the second quarterly report, which will be due July 31, 1972, I would like to receive a full analysis of this program, including its value in terms of producing useful information and the adequacy of the controls which have been imposed. Recommendations for any further necessary controls should be included.

(sqd) Kenneth E. BeLieu

Xenneth E. DeLieu Under Socretary of the Army

OFFICE ECRETARY OF THE ARMY

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Information originated with one or more government agencies.

We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our

coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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As of $\frac{18 \text{ Sep } 85}{\text{(Date)}}$ all material included

in this file conforms with DA policies currently in effect.

18 Sep 85

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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OLIVER B. PATTON Brigadier General, GS Deputy ACofS for Intelligence





OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

2 November 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.

2/(1) The nine Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations reported by memorandum to you last quarter, all remain active. Two new operations CANARY STONE at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah and CENTAUR RACE at Fort Lewis, Washington were requested by the installation commanders, approved by ACSI, DA and implemented during the reporting period. These operations bring the total to 11 active ACIP's. At present, five ACIP proposals have been submitted by CONUS field commanders for consideration. The report of current operations for the quarter ending 30 September 1973 is attached.

3.(u) The primary values of ACIP operations are in their potential for early warning and detecting internal security weakness and security threats to the supported command. Inasmuch as these operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness, negative reports in themselves are frequently of value to a commander in planning for security requirements of a given installation or activity.

1 Incl as (CONFL General, United States Army

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Vice Chief of Staff

Classified by ____ DAMI-DO EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY____2 DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 1979



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE: WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: DAMI-DOI-S

29 OCT 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above (Inclosure 2).
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature of the memorandum at Inclosure 1 which transmits the report required by the cited reference.
- 3. Coordination: None required.

2 Incl

1. Memo for USofA w/attachment (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. Memo for VCSA, 8 Feb 72 (SECRET)


OLIVER B. PATTON
Brigadier General, GS
Acting ACofS for Intelligence

2 Nov 1973

APPROVED - VCSA w/comment: 'Why the title 'Aggressive CIP'? Drop the 'aggressive' unless there's some rationale for it that escapes me."

Assistant Secretary of the General Staff

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CTION REQUIRED	pproval of the quarterl	y ACTP repu	ort.				
				or recommend	led. Must be suff	iciently detaile	ed to identify
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	memorandum dated 8 Febr		СОБЕМ ТА ^Т	R R) the	Under Sec	retary o	of the
a. By Army reques	memorandum dated a rebr sted the Vice Chief of S	taff, US A	rmy, prov	ide quari	terly repo	rts on a	.11 ACIPs
b. Thi	s is the sixth such qua	rterly rep	ort.				
c. USA	AINTC input is at GREEN	TAB C.					
2. DISCUSS	SION: The memorandum at report for the quarter				orandum to	the VCS	A to
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3. RECOMME signed.	NDATION: That the memo	randum to	the VCSA	at <u>GREEN</u>	TAB A be	approved	and
signed.							
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R.M. STROM, LTC/77017

ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)

SPECIAL ACTIONS BR RECORDS COPY CONFIDENTIAL

CURRENT ACIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ACIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	NUMBER CONFI- DENTIAL SOURCES
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 Feb 72	5
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	CANARY EFFORT	16 Feb 72	3
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah	CANARY STONE	18 Jul 73	0
Fort Lewis, Washington	CENTAUR RACE	30 Jul 73	0
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 Feb 72	3
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	GONDOLA STAR	16 Feb 72	2
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	GONG SILK	16 Feb 72	3.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Electronics Command)	LANDLESS TÎME	19 Feb 72	3
Washington, D.C. (Language School)	LANYARD MOOD	22 Dec 71	0
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Army War College)	LENIENT CLOUD	16 Feb 72	4 .
Presidio of Monterey, California	LENTIL MONKEY	26 Oct 71	1
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HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

J S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

OCT 1 5 1973


ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S) WASH DC 20310

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. Letter, DAMI-DOI-S, 8 March 1972, subject as above.
 - b. Letter, ICDISO-OC, 11 October 1972, subject as above.
 - c. Letter, ICDO-OP, 12 July 1973, subject as above.
- 2. (U) In compliance with reference a, above, the ACIP quarterly report for the period 1 July 30 September 1973 is forwarded herewith.
- 3. (U) Operational and administrative control measures outlined in reference b, above, remained in effect during the reporting period. There were no reported instances of acquisition of information on non-DoD affiliated personnel.
- 4.(C)(C) During the reporting period emphasis was placed upon improving the viability of the program and stressing its importance at all levels throughout the Command. The scope of existing operations is currently being broadened to provide source coverage in depth of the designated target areas. The result should be an increase in significant items reported to the supported commanders.
- 5 (W)(C) ACIP briefings were given to appropriate staff members of the newly formed major commands, TRADOC and FORSCOM. Procedures were implemented to have the same briefing presented to selected commanders at the local level. This effort is expected to result in additional ACIP requests. In conjunction with these actions, the ACIP implementation process is being examined with a view towards decreasing the length of

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ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

time between the receipt of a request for an operation and the date it becomes productive. Two plans for new operations are being processed and will be forwarded for approval. These, plus the recently approved operations at Seneca Army Depot the Management Systems Support Agency, will add four ACIP gains during the next quarter.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ll Incl

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JESSE D. JOY, JR.

Colonel, GS

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

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BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/FO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R




- 1. CANAL LOOP: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - Location: Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The sensitivity of the activities serviced has not diminished and the supported command desires that the operation be continued.

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
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- 2. CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A civilian staff member at the installation has projected a trip to the USSR. This matter will be monitored on a continuing basis to determine if attempts to exploit have been or will be made by hostile intelligence.
- e. Operational Status: Continuation of the operation is desired by the supported commander. A new Project Liaison Officer has just reported and assumed his duties.

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- 3. CANARY STONE: (OACSI Approval 18 Jul 73)
 - a. Location: Dugway Proving Ground, Utah
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: No sources were recruited during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
- e. Operational Status: This operation was implemented with the briefing of the commander on 21 August 1973, and has not yet become fully operational.


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- 4. CENTAUR RACE: (OACSI Approval 30 Jul 73)
 - a. Location: Fort Lewis, WA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: No sources were recruited during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
- e. Operational Status: This operation was implemented with the briefing of the commander and staff on 23 August 1973, and has not yet become fully operational.

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
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
5. CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The Director of Security believes that the mission and function of this command place it high on hostile intelligence target priorities. One additional source was approved for recruitment during the reporting period.

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
- 6. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval 17 Feb 73)
 - a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Inasmuch as the sensitivity of the activities serviced remains the same, the commander desires that the operation continue. The Project Liaison Officer retired on 31 July 1973, and his replacement is not expected until 1 November 1973. This will unfortunately delay the planned expansion in source coverage.

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- 7. GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The sensitivity of the activities covered remains extreme, so that the operation should be continued. Some target areas were cancelled with the departure of the Munitions Command, so that coverage should be somewhat simplified.

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- 8. LANDLESS TIME: (OACSI Approval 19 Jan 72)
 - a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were contacted during the reporting period.
 - c. Information Obtained: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Of the three sources contacted, one retired and one transferred to another DoD facility, leaving the single source indicated in the previous report. The Project Liaison Officer will spot and assess prospective sources among the personnel moving to Fort Monmouth for utilization when this operation is incorporated into CENTRAL TAXI. At the request of the commander, coverage will continue until the facility is phased out.

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ON SEP - 5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.15



9. LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC

b. Confidential Source Utilization: To date, this operation has been using conventional sources.

c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None


d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.

e. Operational Status: Effective with the beginning of the new reporting period, the modus operandi is being changed to develop confidential sources in addition to the conventional sources used heretofore. Targets will be reconfirmed and redefined as necessary.

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
- 10. LENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Two security hazards and three instances of suitability information were reported. Foreign travel by one employee was not considered significant.
- e. Operational Status: An additional target is being added. During the period, the newly assigned Project Liaison Officer developed a total of 25 conventional sources who are being contacted on a regular basis.

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- 11. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval 26 Oct 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was recruited during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Seven additional students are being processed for use as confidential sources, and 20 conventional sources were recruited for broad coverage of target language departments. In addition, all of the 132 class monitors have been given SAEDA briefings and directed to report any incidents occurring in the classes.

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a. by m enuested t	he Vice Chief of Staff, US	S Army, provide a	uarterly	reports on	all ACIPs.
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b. This	is the fifth such quarter	rly report.			
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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: DAMI-DOI-S

3 1 JUL 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above (Inclosure 2).
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature on the memorandum at Inclosure 1 which transmits the report required by cited reference.
- 3. Coordination: None required.

2 Incl

1. Memo for USofA w/attachment (CONFIDE

2. Memo for VCSA, 8 Feb 72

Major General, GS

ACofS for Intelligence

OLIVER B. PATTON Brigadier General, GS Deputy ACofS for Intelligence

1 AUG 1973

APPROVED - VCSA.

Assistant Secretary of

the General Staff

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

1 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program Operations

- 1. Reference memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.
- 2. Of the 11 Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations reported to you by memorandum from this office, dated 4 May 1973, subject as above, nine remain in effect. Operation CANCER PORCH at the Defense Language Institute, Southeast Branch was terminated with the closing of the activity on 31 May 1973. Operation CANDID FROLIC at Fort Ord, California, was terminated on 12 June 1973 at the request of the installation commander. No new ACIP operations were initiated. The report of current operations for the quarter ending 30 June 1973 is attached.
- 3. The primary values of ACIP operations are in their potential for early warning and for detecting internal security weakness and security threads to the supported command. Inasmuch as these operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness, negative reports in themselves are frequently of value to a commander in planning for security requirements of a given installation or activity.


1 Incl as (CONFIDENTIAL)

General, United States Army

Vice Chief $^{\prime}$ of Staff

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ACTING VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above (Inclosure 2).
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature on the memorandum at Inclosure 1 which transmits the report required by cited reference.
- 3. Coordination: None required.

2 Incl

1. Memo for USoEA
W/attachment (COMPTERMENT)

2. Memo for VCSA, & Feb 72 (SECRET)

(agd, Cliver B. Tout .-

WILLIAM E. POTTS
Major General, GS
ACOES for Intelligence

CLIVER B. PATION Brigadier General, GS Deputy Adofâtor Invelligance

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 2031

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY


SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program Operations

- 1. Reference memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.
- 2. Of the 11 Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations reported to you by memorandum from this office dated 4 May 1973, subject as above, nine remain in effect. Operation CANCER PORCH at the Defense Language Institute, Southwest Branch was terminated with the closing of the activity on 31 May 1973. Operation CANDID FROLIC at Fort Ord, California, was terminated on 12 June 1973 at the request of the installation commander. No new ACIP operations were initiated. The report of current operations for the quarter ending 30 June 1973 is attached.
- 3. The primary values of ACIP operations are in their potential for early warning and detecting internal security weakness and security threats to the supported command. Inasmuch as these operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness, negative reports in themselves are frequencyly of value to a commander in planning for security requirements of a given installation or activity.

l Incl as (CONTIDENTIAL) FRED C. WEYAND General, United States Army Acting Vice Chief of Staff

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Off-post Information

Operational LENTIL MONKEY obtained information off-post by coincidence and not as part of the operation. A source who was accompanying his student group on a field trip was among those of the group shown pictures of three Czech females who were looking for pen-pals. The source reported the incident.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE OUDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1979

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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Information Obtained:

No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installations or a possible security hazard was developed during this reporting period.

Continuance of Operations:

Nine ACIP operations are being continued for the originally stated purposes.

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BY ODF USANISCOM 5200.1FR

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1FR



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

JUL 1 2 1973

ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S) WASH DC 20310

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. Letter, DAMI-DOI-S, 8 March 1972, subject as above.
 - b. Letter, ICDISO-OC, 11 October 1972, subject as above.
 - c. Letter, ICDO-OP, 11 April 1973, subject as above.
- 2. (U) In compliance with reference a, above, the ACIP quarterly report for the period 1 April 30 June 1973 is forwarded herewith.
- 3. (U) Operational and administrative control measures outlined in reference b, above, remained in effect during the reporting period. There was one instance of acquisition of information on non-DoD affiliated personnel, described in the inclosure covering LENTIL MONKEY (U).
- 4. (2) Supported commanders continue to indicate satisfaction with the program. They view the lack of contradictory information as reassurance that their employees are observing security regulations, and that no apparent hostile intelligence activities have been mounted against the installation. A certain amount of suitability information was developed during the reporting period at some of the installations, but was either minor or had not yet been confirmed. In such cases, the information is not passed to the supported commander.

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JUL 1 2 1973

ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

- 5. (U) Operations CANCER PORCH (U) and CANDID FROLIC (U) were terminated during the period covered by this report.
- 6. (C) Processing of the requests for ACIP support set forth in reference c, above, except for the Deseret Test Center, have not yet been completed. Additionally, an Operation Plan regarding ACIP support at Fort Lewis was forwarded on 7 July 1973. It is anticipated that future ACIP operations will result primarily from the recently established Sensitive Activity Vulnerability Estimate (SAVE) program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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EDWARD H. BORT

Aucra H. Fred

LTC, MI

Acting Deputy Chief of Staff,

Operations

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- 1. CANAL LOOP: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The sensitivity and criticality of activities covered warrant the continuation of the support provided.

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- 2. CANARY EFFORM (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Continuation of the operation is desired by the supported commander. Inasmuch as a new Project Control Officer is being assigned during the next quarter, recruitment of additional sources is being delayed until he assumes his duties.

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BY COTTA Para 1-503 DOD 5200.

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3. CANCER PORCH: (OACSI Approval - 28 Dec 71)

a. Location: Defense Language Institute Southwest Branch Fort Bliss, TX

b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was contacted during the reporting period.

c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.

d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.

e. Operational Status: The operation was terminated with the closing of the activity on 31 May 1973. The source has been transferred to the Defense Language Institute West Coast, where contact will be reestablished with him.

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4. CANDID FROLIC: (CACSI Approval - 21 Dec 71)

a. Location: Fort Ord, CA

b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were contacted during the reporting period.

c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.

d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.

e. Operational Status: As the result of discussion during a quarterly briefing on 16 May 73, on 18 May 73 the CG requested that the operation be terminated. No significant information had been produced to justify the risk of possible compromise or the further expenditure of manhours. Operational activity ceased at once, and the operation was officially terminated on 12 Jun 73, on which date security debriefings of the sources involved were concluded.

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5. CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ

b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period.


c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.

d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.

e. Operational Status: The Commander desires that the operation continue. The impending assignment of a new Project Control Officer will allow the expansion of the operation by recruitment of additional sources.

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- 6. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval 17 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: In view of the sensitivity/criticality of this installation, the supported commander desires that the operation continue.

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
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
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- 7. GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Despite the fact that modifications of the operation may be necessitated by forthcoming organizational changes, the Commander desires that the operation be continued.



Classified by DCSOPS USATNIC SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF 11 DULTIVE CREEK 11952 AUTOMATICALLY DESCRIPTED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC. 1997





- 8. LANDLESS TIME: (OACSI Approval 19 Jan 72)
 - a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four sources were utilized during the reporting period. This includes one source who was reluctant to be reactivated when the operation was revalidated, but finally agreed.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: By 30 Jun 74, this activity will be completely relocated to Fort Monmouth, and the operation will be terminated. One source transferred during the period, rather than make the move. Another is scheduled to move in Nov 73, and plans to do so. He will be transferred to the Monmouth operation at that time. Coverage will be difficult during the phaseout, but the commander has requested that the operation continue as long as possible.

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





9. LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: This operation uses conventional sources from the student body, primarily Army MI personnel.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The combination of alien instructors and students who are generally scheduled for sensitive assignments overseas makes this operation a necessity. With classrooms teaching 50 languages at various locations in the DC area, coverage is dependent on the availability of sources.



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INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC.






- 10. LENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The Commander continues to be appreciative of information provided and desires that the operation continue.

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INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC 1997





11. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval - 26 Oct 71)

a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch Presidio of Monterey, CA


- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period, but all were eventually terminated due to graduation.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: On 18 May 73, students of a Czech class visited a Czech restaurant in San Francisco on a field trip. While they were there, the owner showed the students pictures of three girls residing in Czechoslovakia who were looking for American pen-pals. Each of three students received the name and address of one of the girls. One of the students who received this data was a Confidential Source, and reported the incident. The other two students are now en route to Army Security Agency school at Fort Devens, MA, and will eventually be assigned in USAREUR.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: The above information assumes significance only if this proves to be an operational technique of Czech Intelligence. Consideration is being given to utilizing the source, now on TDY at Fort Huachuca, AZ, to probe this situation by establishing correspondence with the Czech girl. Under the circumstances, reporting this information is not considered a violation of the 1 June 71 letter.
- e. Operational Status: Just as in LANYARD MOOD, the combination of alien-born instructors and students destined for sensitive assignments overseas is considered to offer a challenge to hostile intelligence. Additional MI students have reported to the institute, and no problems are anticipated in recruiting new sources.

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BY OTH Para 1.503 DOD 5200.1R

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	ACTION SHEET	96	NTROL NUMBER		
SUBJECT			OFFICE SYMBOL	SUSPENSE	
			DAMI-DOI-S		
Quarterly ACIP Report			23 April 1973		
ACTION REQUIRED					

To forward memorandum requesting VCSA sign memorandum to USA.

(Describe briefly the requirement, background and action taken or recommended. Must be sufficiently detailed to identify MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. the action without recourse to other sources.)

1. BACKGROUND:

- a. By Memorandum dated 8 February 1972, the Under Secretary of the Army requested the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army provide quarterly reports on all ACIP's (BLUE TAB B).
- b. The fourth quarterly report for 1972 was submitted to the Under Secretary of the Army on 12 February 1973 (BLUE TAB C).
- c. Written input from USAINTC for the current quarterly report is attached at BLUE TAB D.

2. DISCUSSION:

- a. Word received from the SGS on 1 February 73 revealed the new VCSA desires to personally sign all memoranda to the Under Secretary of the Army. How long this new policy is to be effective is currently unknown. Based on DA memoranda 340-15 and 340-17, the ACSI has signed previous memoranda concerning this subject for the VCSA.
- b. The memorandum at BLUE TAB A forwards a memorandum to the VCSA requesting he sign and forward to the Under Secretary of the Army, the first quarterly ACIP report for 1973 Per agreement SGS and DAMI, this same procedure was used to forward the previous quarter ly report.
- 3. RECOMMENDATION: That the Memorandum to the VCSA at BLUE TAB A be approved and signed

(Continue on plain bond) IMPLICATIONS CINFO YES [PRIM PROGS BUDGET YES | NO 🗌 COORDINATIONS APPROVALS OFFICE NAME PHONE PC 93 DIV DIR FΧ CSI SPATCHED (DTG 2 6 APR 1973 SHOW ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SIDE OR CONTINUATION SHEET

ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)

W. WEBB, MAJ/77017



RECORDS COPY



MENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: DAMI -DOI -S

26 APR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above (TAB B).
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature on the memorandum at TAB A which transmits the report required by cited reference.

2 Incl

TAB A - Memo for USofA

(CONFIDENTIAL

TAB B - USofA memo,

8 Feb 72 (SECDI

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when

separated from classified

inclosures

WILLIAM E. POTTS

Major General, GS0

ACofS for Intelligence

THOMAS W. BOWEN Brigadier General, GS Director of Intelligence Support

4 MAY 1973

APPROVED - OCSA

PETER B. PETERSEN

LTC, GS

Assistant Secretary of the General Staff





MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program Operations

1. Reference your memorandum of 8 February 1972, subject as above.

2. The 11 Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) operations reported to you by my memorandum, dated 12 February 1973, subject as above, remain in effect. No additional ACIP operations have been approved. A quarterly report of current operations is attached.

1 Incl as (CONFIDENTIAL)

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. General, United States Army Vice Chief of Staff

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosures





CURRENT ACIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ACIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	NUMBER OF SOURCES
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 February 72	5
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	CANARY EFFORT	16 February 72	3
Fort Bliss, Texas (Language School)	CANCER PORCH	28 December 71	1
Fort Ord, California	CANDID FROLIC	21 December 71	` 2
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 February 72	3
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	GONDOLA STAR	16 February 72	2
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	GONG SILK	16 February 72	3
Philadelphia, Penn- sylvania (Electronics Command)	LANDLESS TIME	19 January 72	4
Washington, D.C. (Language School)	LANYARD MOOD	22 December 71	0
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Army War College)	LENIENT CLOUD	16 February 72	4
Presidio of Monterey, California	LENTIL MONKEY	26 O ctober 71	3
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TOTALS 11	11		30

Off-post Information

There were no instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians was collected off-post.

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ODR USAINSCOM F01/PO
BY ODR USAINSCOM 5200.1R
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1978

CONFIDENTIAL




Information Obtained:

- a. During the first quarter of 1973, none of the ACIP operations produced information which would indicate the existence of an active hostile threat to the supported installation nor were any reports received concerning potential security hazards to the supported installations. As emphasized in each quarterly report submitted to date, ACIP operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness. As such, the lack of reportable information from these operations is also of value to a commander in planning for his security requirements. The placement and access of current sources, and those under consideration, are such that the chances of detecting a developing security threat situation in a sensitive installation or unit are greater with these sources already operating.
- b. Significantly, supported commanders have voiced satisfaction with ACIP operational results to date and have reiterated their desire that these operations continue.

Continuance of Operations:

The eleven ACIP operations are being continued for the originally stated purposes.







U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

1 1 APR 1973

ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S) WASH DC 20310

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. Letter, DAMI-DOI-S, 8 Mar 72, subject as above.
 - b. Letter, ICDISO-OC, 11 Oct 72, subject as above.
 - c. Letter, ICDISO-OC, 15 Jan 73, subject as above.
- d. Letter, DAMI-DOI-P, 26 Feb 73, subject: Counterintelligence Support for Security of Nuclear Weapons, with 1st Indorsement, ICDO, 12 Mar 73.
- 2. (U) In compliance with reference a, above, the ACIP quarterly report for the period 1 January 31 March 1973 is forwarded herewith.
- 3. (U) Operational and administrative control measures outlined in reference b, above, remained in effect during the reporting period. There were no instances of acquisition of information on non-DoD affiliated personnel.
- $4\mathcal{U}(G)$ Utilization of the ACIP to enhance the security of chemical and nuclear weapons, as set forth in reference c, above, has been integrated into the overall counterintelligence support to the US Army Materiel Command (AMC) and HQ, US Army Air Defense Command. Action taken on this program will be reported as outlined in reference d, above. In the future, this quarterly report will pertain only to operations in progress and those in the planning stage.

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ICDO-OP

1 1 APR 1973

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations (U)

5.(11)(C) In the area of chemical and nuclear weapons, the Commander of Seneca Army Depot has formally requested an ACIP operation. The Commander, Savanna Army Depot, has requested an ACIP briefing. Additional assessment of the Sierra Army Depot will be necessary to determine the applicability of the ACIP. Requests for the program have been received from Harry Diamond Laboratories, US Army Mobility Equipment and Development Center, and Deseret Test Center, all subordinate to AMC. The Commander, US Army Management Systems Support Agency, an automatic data processing facility in the Pentagon supporting the Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, has also submitted a formal request for the program. The assessments necessary to justify the program in each case have been accomplished or are underway, and individual Operations Plans are expected in the near future.

6(12) In an effort to replace the expertise and continuity which have been lost through the reduction of civilian Excepted Service Position spaces in the MI Groups, an effort is underway to obtain Great Skills personnel for inclusion in the program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ll Incl

as

Colonel, GS

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1. CANAL LOOP: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The operation should be continued because of the criticality and sensitivity of the installation, as well as the reiterated desires of the Commander that this support be continued.



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




- 2. CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The Commander desires continuation of the operation in view of the sensitivity/criticality of the facility and the extensive volume of classified material and equipment maintained. The Liaison Officer has identified and assessed two additional sources for recruitment during the next reporting period.

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- 3. CANCER PORCH: ACSI Approval 28 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute Southwest Branch Fort Bliss, TX
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One such source was utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Closing date of the facility remains 30 June 1973, but operations will cease on 31 May 1973.

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ON SEP 5 1997

BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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


4. CANDID FROLIC: (OACSI Approval - 21 Dec 71)

a. Location: Fort Ord, CA

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were contacted during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The Cdr, Ft Ord, has voiced his satisfaction with the operation as part of the overall counterintelligence support rendered his Command. Four additional sources are currently under assessment for inclusion in the operation.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
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AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT 11.0 Y AP
INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC. 1979





5. CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command, Fort


Monmouth, NJ

b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were contacted on a regular basis during the reporting period.

- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: Continuation of the operation is dictated by its sensitivity and criticality; the desire of the Commanding General for this support is unchanged.

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- 6. GONDOLA STAP (OACSI Approval 17 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were contacted regularly during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The Commander desires that the operation be continued. The sensitivity of facilities at the installation justify this desire.

Classified by DCSOPS USATINTC SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11092 AUTOMATICALLY DOW: GRATED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC. 1979



- 7. GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Regular contact was maintained with three sources during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: This operation may be affected by forth-coming organizational changes, which will involve the move of a portion of the major command to another installation.

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
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
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BY CDR USAINS DOD 5200.1R

AUTH Para 1-803 DOD 5200.

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11052
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRALED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC. 1979





- 8. LANDLESS TIME: (OACSI Approval 19 Jan 72)
 - a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were contacted regularly.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The criticality of portions of this facility is considered to warrant continuation of the operation.

ON SEP - 5 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC. 10.77





9. LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: This operation utilizes conventional sources drawn from the student population.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: With students who will be assigned to sensitive positions, this facility is an ideal location for spotting and assessing by hostile intelligence.

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- 10. LENIENT CLOUD (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four sources were contacted on a regular basis during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The CG continues to reiterate his desire for support provided by the operation.


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- 11. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval 26 Oct 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was lost through graduation, reducing the number to three prior to the end of the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: As with other branches of the Defense Language Institute, this facility continues to offer a lucrative target to hostile intelligence. The manning of the Soviet Embassy in San Francisco presents an additional external security threat.

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	ACTION SHEET	NTROL NUMBER		
UBJECT		OFFICE SYMBOL SUSPENSE DAMI -DOI -S		
Quarterly ACIP Report		DATE 2 February 1973		
CTION REQUIRED				

To forward memorandum requesting VCSA sign memorandum to USA.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, background and action taken or recommended. Must be sufficiently detailed to identify the action without recourse to other sources.)

1. BACKGROUND:

- a. By Memorandum dated 8 February 1972, the Under Secretary of the Army requested the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army provide quarterly reports on all ACIP's (BLUE TAB B).
- b. The third quarterly report for 1972 was submitted to the Under Secretary of the Army on 20 October 1972 (BLUE TAB C).
- c. Written input from USAINTC for the current quarterly report is attached at BLUE TAB D.

2. DISCUSSION:

- a. Word received from the SGS on 1 February 73 revealed the new VCSA desires to personally sign all memoranda to the Under Secretary of the Army. How long this new policy is to be effective is currently unknown.
- b. Based on DA memoranda 340-15 and 340-17, the ACSI had signed a previous memorandum on this action for the VCSA (BLUE TAB E). This action was returned by SGS on 1 Feb 73 for compliance with new policy.
- c. The memorandum at BLUE TAB A forwards a memorandum to the VCSA requesting he sign and forward to the USA the fourth quarterly ACIP report for 1972.
- 3. RECOMMENDATION: That the memorandum to the VCSA at BLUE TAB A be approved and signed.

(Continue on plain bond) CINFO PRIM PROGS YES -NO [YES [NO | NO \square BUDGET IMPLICATIONS YES | COORDINATIONS APPROVALS OFFICE NAME PHONE INITIALS DATE BR DIV ΕX 8 FEB 1973 SHOW ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SIDE OR CONTINUATION SHEET

ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)

W. WEBB, MAJ/77017



SPECIAL ACTIONS BR RECORDS COPY







DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-DOI-S

8 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above (TAB B).

2. Recommend your approval and signature on the memorandum at TAB \boldsymbol{A} which transmits the report required by cited reference.

2 Incl

TAB A - Memo for USofA

(CONTIDENTIAL)

TAB B - USofA memo, 8 Feb 72 (CECKET) OLIVER B. PATTON

Brigadier General, GS

Acting ACofS for Intelligence

12 FEB 1973

APPROVED - VCSA

PETER B. PETERSEN

LTC, GS

Assistant Secretary of

the General Staff

nshw CITT 'at from classified



12 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program Operations

- 1. Reference your memorandum of 8 February 1972, subject as above.
- 2. The 11 Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) operations reported to you by OACSI memorandum, dated 20 October 1972, subject as above, remain in effect. No additional ACIP operations have been approved. A quarterly report of current operations is attached.

1 Incl as (CONFIDEN AL) MEXANDER M. HAIG, IT. General, United States Are Vice Chief of Staff

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


CURRENT ACIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ACIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	NUMBER CONFI- DENTIAL SOURCE
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 February 72	5
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	CANARY EFFORT	16 February 72	3
Fort Bliss, Texas (Language School)	CANCER PORCH	28 December 71	1
Fort Ord, California	CANDID FROLIC	21 December 71	2
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 February 72	3
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	GONDOLA STAR	16 February 72	2
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	GONG SILK	16 February 72	3
Philadelphia, Penn- sylvania (Electronics Command)	LANDLESS TIME	1 9 January 72	3
Washington, D.C. (Language School)	LANYARD MOOD	22 December 71	0
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Army War College)	LENIENT CLOUD	16 February 72	4
Presidio of Monterey, California	LENTIL MONKEY	26 October 71	4
	· Orași de la constitucione de la constitucion		
TOTALS 11	11		30

Off-post Information

There were no instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians was collected off-post.



Classified by DAMI-DO SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR



Information Obtained:

a. During the fourth quarter 1972, useful information was obtained from seven of the eleven Aggressive Counterintelligence Programs. The operations at Ft. Ritchie, Maryland, the Electronics Command, the Army War College, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey and Picatinny Arsenal, each identified one or more potential personnel or physical security problems which were reported to the respective serviced commanders. The program at Ft. Ord, California, continued to identify military personnel affiliated with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) and also military personnel associated with the proposed making of an anti-war film on the Ft. Ord reservation. This information was passed to representatives of the supported commander. A characterization of the VVAW is attached. The operation at the Presidio of California developed information on what appears to be a program of fradulent immigration from a Communist Country. Additionally, classroom statements by an Army student identified his father as a Soviet-born key employee of another US intelligence agency. In each case, the supported commander was informed and a summary of information report was forwarded to the appropriate federal agency.


b. The other four operations reported no information, during the fourth quarter, which would indicate the existence of a hostile intelligence threat or possible security hazard. Inasmuch as these operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness, negative reports in themselves are frequently of value to a commander in planning for the security requirements of a given installation or activity. The placement and access of current sources, and those under consideration, are such that the chances of detecting a developing security threat situation in a sensitive installation or unit are greater with these sources operating.

Continuance of Operations:

The eleven ACIP operations are being continued for the original stated purposes.



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VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR

(C) General: The Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Incorporated (VVAW) was founded in the spring of 1967 in New York City. The objectives of the VVAW include: the demand for an immediate cessation of fighting and withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam; and to support all military personnel refusing to serve in wars of aggression at home or abroad. The VVAW reportedly has chapters in all 50 states and Vietnam. The national office is located at 25 West 26 Street, New York, New York. VVAW policy is established by its National Steering Committee composed of 26 regional coordinators. The local chapters often act independently of the national office. (There have been indications that some local chapters of the VVAW have been taken over by youth groups of Marxist-Leninist organizations.) This is in keeping with the recent resignation of four of the five members of the Executive Committee of the National Steering Committee. During a November 1971 meeting of the Steering Committee, statements were made that conservative VVAW members would be replaced by more militant members who would take action rather than talk. Many of the VVAW officials and members are presently or have in the past been affiliated with organizations identified as being threats to Army morale and discipline, such as CPUSA, Socialist Workers Party, Progressive Labor Party, and People's Coalition for Peace and Justice. Total VVAW membership is reportedly approaching 10,000. Financial support appears to come from private donations.

deserters to go to Sweden rather than return to the US from Canada; and has provided deserters with funds and false draft registration cards. The organization has attempted to recruit active duty soldiers to the ranks of the VVAW and has urged inductees to "resist the Army and join the VVAW." VVAW local chapters have allied themselves with antimilitary dissident soldier organizations in an attempt to undermine morale and discipline of service personnel.

3. (U) Foregoing information falls under provisions of para 4a(1) and 4a(2), DA letter, AGDA-A(M)(1 Jun 71) CS, subject: Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense.

Classified by DAMI-DOA (Continued)
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1978

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,				ROL NUMBER	1 39 76
	ACTION SHEET				
SUBJECT				AMI-DOI-S	SUSPENSE
Quarterly ACIP Ro	eport	•	DATE 1	8 January	1973
ACTION REQUIRED					1072
	Secretary of the Arm	ny with the fourth o	quarteri	y report i	or 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. the action without recourse to		t, background and action taken o	or recommende 	a. Must be surner	ently detailed to identity
1. BACKGROUND:					
a. By memora the Vice Chief of (BLUE TAB B).	ndum dated 8 February f Staff, US Army, to	y 1972, the Under Se provide quarterly	ecretary reports	of the Aron all ACI	my requested P's
b. The third 20 October 1972	quarterly report was (BLUE TAB C).	s submitted to the	Under Se	cretary of	the Army on
c. Written in BLUE TAB D.	nput from USAINTC for	the current quart	erly rep	ort is att	ached at
	Memorandum at <u>BLUE TA</u> US Army, provides rec				
3. RECOMMENDATION	That the Memorano	dum at <u>BLUE TAB A</u> b	e approv	ed and sig	ned.
		(Continue on plain bond)			
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
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W. WEBB, MAJ/77017



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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: DAMI-DOI-S

26 379 183

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

1. Reference your memorandum of 8 February 1972, subject as above.

2. The 11 ACIP operations reported to you by OACSI memorandum, dated 20 October 1972, subject as above, remain in effect. No additional ACIP operations have been approved. A quarterly report of current operations is attached (TAB A).

1 Incl as (COND MITAL) WILLIAM E. POTTS
Major General, GS
ACofS for Intelligence

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

15 JAN 1973

ICDISO-OC

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP)
Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S)
WASH DC 20310

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. Letter, DAMI-DOI-S, 8 Mar 72, subject as above.
 - b. Letter, ICDISO-OC, 18 Apr 72, subject as above.
 - c. Letter, ICDISO-OC, 11 Oct 72, subject as above.
- 2. (U) In compliance with reference a, above, the ACIP quarterly report for the period 1 October 31 December 1972 is forwarded herewith.
- 3. (U) Operational and administrative control measures outlined in reference c, above, remained in effect during the reporting period. There were no instances of acquisition of information on non-DoD affiliated personnel.
- Based on the immediate concern for the security of chemical and nuclear weapons, this Command is preparing plans in conjunction with US Army Materiel Command and HQ, US Army Air Defense Command to provide counterintelligence support to these units and their sub-elements. In view of recent terrorist group actions, it is apparent that such groups will go to any extreme to achieve their ends. As some terrorist representatives have pointed out, they feel that such actions must have increasing world shock value in order to further their cause. The capture or explosive destruction of a nuclear weapon either in storage or in transit would be just such an act. Indications of intention may be developed through the ACIP. Planning for this kind of support in conjunction with other means available to USAINTC is being effected. It is expected that by the end of the next reporting quarter, more definitive information concerning initiation of ACIP in support of these two Commands will be established.

SEP -5 1997 BY COR USANISCO DOD 8200.1R AUTH Para 1-600 DOD 8200.1R Classified by DISO, U.S. AINTE SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DEC. 1979



ICDISO-OC

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP)
Operations (U)

5. (C) With a view towards the probable requirement of expanding ACIP operational capability by USAINTC field elements, this Command has initiated a training program designed to improve the professionalism of personnel in the operational techniques and reporting in such operations. This training program should qualify additional personnel to participate in current and potential future operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


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RAY W. CHAMBERS

MC, MI

Acting Assistant Adjutant General

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BY ODB USAMISCOM F01/PO
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




- 1. CANAL LOOP: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: During the reporting period, experienced personnel were assigned in both liaison and source handling capacity, and the operational capabilities can be expected to improve. The Commanding Officer of Edgewood Arsenal has again expressed his desire for continuation of ACIP operations within his installation.

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- 2. CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information reflecting on the character and suitability of certain employees in the target areas was obtained.
- e. Operational Status: During the period, both Case Officer and Liaison Officer were assigned to DIS. The transfer of the former diminished source contact appreciably. With the assignment of a case officer, information obtained during the period will be developed to its fullest extent. An experienced liaison officer is being assigned to this ACIP and will begin spotting and assessing potential sources to meet the desire of the Commanding Officer to achieve the greatest operational potential.

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- 3. CANCER PORCH: (SI Approval 28 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute Southwest Branch, Fort Bliss, TX
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One such source was recruited during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: As indicated in previous reports, this facility is expected to cease operations on 30 June 1973. The prime reason for developing this single confidential source is his expected transfer at that time to another branch of the Institute.

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4. CANDID FROLIC: (OACSI Approval - 21 Dec 71)

a. Location: Fort Ord, CA

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Regularly scheduled contacts were conducted with two such sources during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Identification of military personnel affiliated with the Vietnam Veterans Against the War; identification of military personnel associated with the proposed filming of an anti-war film on the Fort Ord reservation.
- e. Operational Status: As the major US Army training facility on the West Coast, the installation continues to be the target for dissident elements.

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- 5. CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were contacted on a regular basis during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affilated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained Information indicating a potential security problem area was developed and passed to the serviced command.
- e. Operational Status: Personnel turbulence during the period caused by transfers of operational personnel to DIS prevented the proper development of this ACIP. An experienced liaison officer was assigned during the period. This should result in the recruitment of additional sources needed to cover this complex target. The Commanding General has reiterated his desire to continue the operation.

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- 6. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval 17 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were contacted regularly during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The newly assigned liaison officer has begun the spotting and assessment process, which should result in expansion of coverage to the degree desired.




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- 7. GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Regular contact was maintained with three sources during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Two potential problem areas in the field of security were identified and reported to the serviced commander.
- e. Operational Status: The commanders of the two serviced facilities have expressed their desires that the ACIP be continued and expanded. Efforts to establish sources in each target area have been hampered to date by the lack of experienced MI personnel.



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- 8. LANDLESS TIME: (OACSI Approval 19 Jan 72)
 - a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was terminated due to lack of access; regular contact was maintained with the remaining three.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Identification of personnel with access to classified information who have character weaknesses or habits reflecting on suitability. This information has been brought to the attention of the supported commander.
- e. Operational Status: Individual personnel activities are being closely monitored to determine any adverse effects on the morale and discipline of the work force. The supported commander desires that this ACIP be expanded to cover more areas in depth.


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
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- 9. LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval 22 Dec 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Conventional, rather than confidential sources, have been utilized to date in this ACIP.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: No information to indicate the existence of a hostile threat to the installation or a possible security hazard was developed during the reporting period.
- e. Operational Status: The installation continues to offer a lucrative target to hostile intelligence, with students, ranging in rank from private to general, who undergo instructions for periods up to a year.







- 10. LENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval 16 Feb 72)
 - a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four sources were contacted on a regular basis during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Identification of four individuals possessing possible adverse suitability traits.
- e. Operational Status: Attempts to develop additional information on the four individuals mentioned above is continuing and upon completion, this information will be furnished to the supported commander.

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- 11. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval 26 Oct 71)
 - a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch,
 Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Contact was maintained with four sources during the reporting period. This represents an increase of one source.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information was developed on what allegedly is a program of fradulent immigration from a Communist country. Additionally, classroom statements by an Army student identified his father as a Soviet-born key employee of another intelligence agency. In each case, A Summary of Information was prepared for transmission to the appropriate agency.
- e. Operational Status: There is currently a source in each of four sensitive language departments. Sources have been alert for class-room discussion which would identify personnel who are in communication with relatives in countries considered hostile to the US. Additional sources are to be developed in the larger departments, which will allow more adequate monitoring for possible indicators of hostile intelligence influence.

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DOSSIER NO. <u>ZF0119</u> 464

As of 18 Sep 85 all material included (Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently in effect.

(Signature)

18 Sep 85

(Date Signed)

Delmar Smirh (Printed Name)

GS 5 (Grade)

Proviewed for Retention Criteria UP AR 381-10

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ICIP QUARTERLY REPORTS

INDEX

TAB A	21 Apr 72	Memo to USecArmy w/lst qtr rpt
TAB B	1 Aug 72	2nd qtr rpt, CY 72
TAB C	20 Oct 72	3rd qtr rpt, CY 72
TAB D	12 Feb 73	4th qtr rpt, CY 72
TAB E	23 Apr 73	1st qtr rpt, CY 73
TAB F	19 Jul 73	2nd qtr rpt, CY 73
TAB G	29 Oct 73	3rd qtr rpt, CY 73
TAB H	1 Feb 7կ	4th qtr rpt, CY 73
TAB I	19 Apr 74	1st qtr rpt, CY 74
TAB J	13 Aug 74	2nd qtr rpt, CY 74
TAB K	27 Sep 74	MFR, ICIP Brief for USecArmy
TAB L	29 Nov 74	3rd qtr rpt, CY 74
TAB M	L Feb 75	Memo for USofA (response) to include 4th qtr rpt, CY 74





OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REGRADED UNCLESSIVED ON SEP - 5 1997 BY CDH USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R 0 4 FEB 1975

DAMI - ZA

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

1. (U) This is in response to your Memorandum on 17 January 1975 to the Vice Chief of Staff in regard to subject and serves as the Quarterly ICIP Report for the 2d Quarter, FY 2975.

- 2. (2) On 2 October 1974, I directed a review of the entire ICIP program with a view towards the elimination of those no longer considered of sufficient merit to warrant retention. The criteria used in evaluating each ICIP operation was: (a) The sensitivity of the installation/activity is such that some type of special counterintelligence support is required or (b) There is a known threat of sufficient magnitude to the installation/activity to warrant a need for some type of special counterintelligence support and (c) The information desired cannot be obtained except through the use of confidential sources.
- 3. (2) Based on this review and considering your 17 January guidance, I directed the termination of 12 ICIP operations at the following head-quarters:
- a. Hq, US Army Communications Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona (CANAL ROPE).
 - b. Dugway Proving Ground, Utah (CANARY STONE).
 - c. US Army Air Defense Center, Fort Bliss, Texas (CANTINA ARCH).
 - d. Umatilla Army Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon (CANYON ROSTER).
- e. US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (CENTAUR SALE).


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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

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DAMI-ZA

0 4 FEB 1975

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

f. Hq, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey (CENTRAL TAXI).

- g. US Army Management Systems Support Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, DC (CENTURY SQUAD).
- h. US Army Electronics Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona (GONDOLA FLAG).
 - i. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland (GONDOLA STAR).
- j. Defense Language Institute East Coast, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC (LANYARD MOOD).
- k. Picatinny Arsenal, Armament Command, Dover, New Jersey (LEND TONE).
- 1. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (LENIENT CLOUD).
- 4. (U) The remaining seven ICIPs are worthy of retention as they meet your criteria. Reviews of these seven operations are attached at Incl 1. Reviews of the 12 to be terminated are at Incl 2.

2 Incls

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
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ICIP operations recommended for continuation (7)

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ACTION SHEET	CONTROL NUMBER		
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Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)	DATE		
	31 January 1	975	
To respond to tasking from the USofA pertaining to ICIP.			

1. BACKGROUND:

- a. At the direction of the USofA quarterly reporting of ICIP has been furnished to him through the VCSA since February 1972. In a memorandum to the VCSA (RED TAB B), the VSofA suggests that in more than half of the ongoing operations, no useful information was developed. He directed a detailed review of the benefits derived through the program over the last two years.
- b. On 29 January 1975, the ACSI directed the termination of 12 of the 19 ongoing operations. They will be terminated on a time phase basis with all 12 being terminated by 31 March 1975.
- 2. DISCUSSION: At RED TAB A is a memo through the VCSA to the USofA replying to the comments of USofA and providing the requested information pertaining to the program.
- 3. RECOMMENDATION: That the memo at RED TAB A be approved and signed.

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ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)

MAJ EBERSOLE/56074/th financial Chief (63

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ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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BY CDR USAMODOM F01/PO
AUTH_Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

MI IA-ZA

MEMORANDUM FOR: MG AARON, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR

INTELLIGENCE, DA

SUBJECT: Status of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

Operations

1. (U) References:

a. ACSI Memo, 7 Jan 75, subject: ICIP.

b. Under Secretary of the Army Memorandum, 17 Jan 75, subject: ICIP.

c. Letter, DAMI-DOI-S, 8 Mar 72, subject: Quarterly Reporting of ICIP Operations (U).

2. (U) In compliance with your oral instructions of 2 October 1974; your Memorandum of 7 January 1975; and guidance contained in the Memorandum of 17 January 1975 from the Under Secretary of the Army, we have completed a comprehensive review of the current active 19 ICIP operations.

3. Our review was basically governed by the following factors:
(1) The sensitivity of the installation/activity is such that some type of special counterintelligence support is required or (2) there is a known threat of sufficient magnitude to the installation/activity to warrant some type of special counterintelligence support and (3) the information desired cannot be obtained except through the use of Confidential Sources.

Of the 19 on-going operations are to be terminated. We believe that we can provide adequate support to the installations/activities concerned through a program of intensified liaison by the appropriate local USAINTA representative. The operations to be terminated are listed in an attached proposed Memorandum to the Under Secretary of the Army. These operations should be terminated on a time phased basis with all 12 to be terminated no later than 31 March 1975.



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EXEMPTION CATECLES A

DECLARGIEY ON 31 Dec 2005

SEURE



MIIA-ZA

SUBJECT: Status of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)
Operations

Phasing will permit adequate liaison to be established by RO and FO in

lieu of the operations and permit no degradation of necessary good will.

5. (U) The remaining seven operations to be retained are reviewed individually in our draft reply for Mr. Staudt.

1 Incl Proposed draft Memorandum WILLIAM S. WOLL Colonel, MI

Commanding

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON SEP COM FOUPO BY COR USAINSCOM FOUPO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R (A) CANARY EFFORT:

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources are currently being utilized.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Sensitive Character of the Mission that Necessitates an ICIP Operation: The mission of the elements within Fort Ritchie, which include the Telecommunications Directorate (TD), Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC), Site R, and Divisions organic to TD is critical sensitive. The Telecommunications Directorate provides the operation, maintenance, engineering, and installation of communication-electronic activities, facilities, systems, and networks comprising the AJCC serving the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) and other agencies as directed. This activity also provides direction and supervision to the operations division, the maintenance division and the communications services divisions which are included in the target list for the project. Because of the nature of the target areas and of the work force, a confidential source program is essential to provide adequate CI coverage to the project.
- e. Benefits and Information Obtained Over the Last Two Years: Although the operation was initiated in 1958, the program was terminated in 1971 and was not revalidated until February 1972. Sources within the target area report information concerning both US Army personnel and Department of the Army civilian personnel assigned to Fort Ritchie and AJCC. The following are examples of information obtained:
- (1) Suitability information concerning an Army NCO, specifically, indebtedness. The NCO was responsible for the issuance of passes, both temporary and permanent, to the AJCC. The surfacing of the indebtedness resulted in the reassignment of the individual to a less sensitive billet and further investigation was requested.
- (2) A report personality change manifested by alcohol abuse concerning an Army NCO assigned to sensitive duties at the TD, AJCC, resulted in the monitoring of the NCO's activities to determine if an investigation is warranted.
- (3) Suitability information, specifically, alleged drug abuse and irrational behavior, was provided on a DAC employed within the Office of the Comptroller. The report resulted in a request for a Suitability Investigation to be conducted by USAINTA.
- (4) Adverse suitablity information, specifically, financial problems and irrational behavior was developed pertaining to an Army NCO assigned sensitive duties within the Record Communication Branch, TD. This resulted in a request for a Suitablity Investigation from USAINTA.

SCHOOLINE

CANARY EFFORT:

- (5) Adverse suitability information, specifically, promiscuity with officers and enlisted personnel at Fort Ritchie, pertaining to a female DAC employee of the ADP Service Division resulted in the monitoring of her activities by local authorities.
- (6) Adverse suitability information, specifically, an abnormal interest in firearms, explosives and poisions, coupled with irrational behavior, was surfaced concerning an enlisted man assigned to the USACEEIA-CONUS, Automated Support Group. The result was the suspension of the individual's access to classified defense information pending a psychiatric evaluation of the individual.
- (7) During the period 1 January 1974 through 31 December 1974 a total of 94 Agent Reports were submitted concerning 44 individuals assigned to Fort Ritchie occupying either sensitive positions and/or having security clearances. The Agent Reports forwarded adverse suitability information. It is estimated that approximately 50% of the useful information obtained through this operation would not have been available on a timely basis without the use of confidential sources.
- f. Based on the above, and the fact that the type of activities conducted at Fort Ritchie are known to be of interest to hostile intelligence services, this operation has been selected for retention at this time.

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
(A)(C) CANINE PLATE:

- a. Location: Reca Army Depot, Romulus, MY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Sensitive Character of the Mission that Necessitates an ICIP Operation: The mission of the Seneca Army Depot (SAD) is the operation of a supply depot for the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, and disposal of missile and artillery weapons systems with a nuclear capability. Included in the items handled are ammunition, propellants, explosive components of guided missiles, special weapons materials, supplies, industrial production equipment (to include special tools), petroleum and chemical supplies, fire control test and measuring equipment, and other special weapons with a nuclear capability. SAD is also responsible for systems modification for AEC/DOD test firings. The Directorate for Special Weapons, which includes the Production Planning and Control Division. Supply Division. and Maintenance Division incluing the most sensitive and critical areas of Seneca Army Depot, and is the Priority I target for the operation. Because of the sensitivity and criticality of the activities at this installation, a confidential source program is essential to provide adequate CI coverage to the depot and its activities.
- e. Benefits and Information Obtained: This operation was administratively implemented in November 1973, but has not yet become operationally effective. The successful development of a viable source program has been hampered by personnel turbulence within the Army's Intelligence Agency, the remoteness of the target area, and the composition of the work force. The lack of significant information is viewed as a direct result of the absence of a firmly established confidential source program and reinforces the need to employ all possible means to deter and detect the efforts of hostile intelligence services to penetrate the activity or approach some of its key personnel. It is a known fact that hostile intelligence services have high priority collection objectives directed against activities such as those conducted at Seneca Army Depot. This is a matter of grave concern to the security of the Army, which is reinforced by the growing threat of nuclear theft and blackmail from terrorist groups.
- f. Based on the above, it is considered absolutely necessary to maintain a counterintelligence "early warning" device such as the ICIP as an adjunct to the normal internal security program; therefore, this operation has been selected for retention at this time.

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(U) CANVAS TAX:

a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SAD), Herlong, CA


b. Confidential Source Utilization: None


c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.

- d. Sensitive Character of the Mission that Necessitates an ICIP Operation: The mission of the Sierra Army Depot (SAD) is the operation of a supply depot for the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, and disposal of missile and artillery weapons with a nuclear capability. Included in the items handled are ammunition, propellants, explosive components of guided missiles, special weapons materials, supplies, industrial production equipment, petroleum and chemical supplies, fire control test and measuring equipment, and other special weapons with a nuclear capability. SAD is also responsible for maintaining a capability for systems modification in support of the joint AEC/DOD test firing programs. Priority I targets are Exclusion Area One, Exclusion Area Two, and the Maintenance Arta for Operated Meapons. Decause of the nature of the activities, the isolated location of the target areas and the composition of the work force, a confidential source program is essential to provide adequate CI coverage to the depot and its activities.
- e. Benefits and Information Obtained: This operation was administratively implemented in April 1974, but has not yet become operationally effective. In the nine months of its existence, the successful development of a viable source program has been hampered by personnel turbulence within the Army's Intelligence Agency. Although the operation has surfaced no significant information to date, this is considered directly attributable to the lack of a firmly established confidential source program and does not rule out the need to employ all available means designed to deter and detect the efforts of hostile intelligence services to penetrate the activity or approach some of its key personnel. It is a known fact that hostile intelligence services have high priority collection objectives pertaining to activities such as those conducted at Sierra Army Depot. When this matter of grave concern to the security of the Army is coupled with the growing threat of nuclear theft and blackmail from terrorist groups, it is considered absolutely necessary to maintain a counterintelligence "early warning" device such as the ICIP as an adjunct to the normal internal security program.
- f. Based on the above, this operation has been selected for-retention at this time.

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
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CENSUS TIME:

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Sensitive Character of the Mission that Necessitates an ICIP Operation: The mission of the elements of the Pentagon Telecommunication Center, which include the Operations Division, the Army Operations Center Division, Facilities Division, Supply Division, and Administrative Division is critical sensitive. The Operations Division provides electrical record communications cryptographic services for Department of the Army and communications support to the Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Command Center, Department of State. White House, other government agencies in the Washington area, embassies of allied nations and NATO. Additionally, the Fantagon Telecommunications Center operates the Forrestal Building Telecommunications Center, the Hoffman Building Telecommunications Center, and telephone and teletype service, including secure means, in the Army Operations Center. Because of the nature of the tanget areas and the work force, a confidential source program is essential to provide adequate CI coverage to the project.
- e. Benefits and Information Obtained: Although the operation was administratively activated in February 1974, it did not become operational until October 1974. The one source used in the operation is a recent recruitment and project control personnel have devoted their time to training and developing the source. This operation has produced no significant counterintelligence threat information to date because of the factors indicated. Based upon information available through other sources, it is known that the hostile intelligence services are extremely interested in computerized communications systems and on the type of communications and activities conducted by PRC. The lack of positive information acquired to date does not rule out the threat of hostile intelligence service efforts to penetrate the activity, and is viewed as an indication that confidential source program is essential to provide adequate CI coverage to the activity.
- f. Based on the above, this operation has been selected for retention at this time.



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(L) CENTAVO KID:

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Washington, DC.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Seven confidential sources are currently being utilized.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Sensitive Character of the Mission that Necessitates an ICIP Operation: The mission of the HDL includes critical sensitive research and development activities accomplished in support of the US Army. The most sensitive elements are the Branch Laboratory 240 which conducts research into the hardening of communications equipment against nuclear Weapons radiation; Branch Laboratory 290 which conducts tests of nuclear warhead and missile systems to determine their ability to withstand nuclear weapons radiation; Branch Laboratory 510 and 640 which conduct joint research to develop countermeasures against various foreign weapons systems; Branch Laboratory 750 which manages the development and production of all fuzes produced by HDL; Branch Laboratories 610 and 620 which develop fuzes for use with nuclear warheads and Branch Laboratory 1000 Which conducts development and testing or radiation hardened systems for Minutemen and Poseidon Missiles. Because of the sensitive research and development mission of HDL, and the dispersed location of the activities, a confidential source program is essential to provide adequate CI coverage to the activity.
- e. Benefits and Information Obtained over the Last Two Years:
 Although the operation was administratively initiated in March 1973, it
 did not become operational until October 1974. The sources within the
 target area provide coverage on five of the above listed six target
 areas. The following examples illustrate the type of information obtained:
- (1) The identification of a "loosetalk" problem at HDL's Woodbridge facility.
- (2) Adverse suitability information, specifically, extra marital affairs and other related marital problems, coupled with an assault incident was surfaced which contributed to an on-going security investigation concerning a DAC at HDL.
- (3) A security weakness was identified at the Woodbridge facility as various persons were entering the facility to hunt deer without any clearances or security checks of any kind.
- (4) It is estimated that approximately 60% of the useful information obtained through this operation during the past three months would not have been available on a timely basis without the use of confidential sources.






CENTAVO KID

f. Based on the above and the fact that the hostile intelligence services have a current high priority interest in the research and development activities of the type conducted at HDL, this operation has been selected for retention at this time.

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(c) LENS HOLDER:

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Sensitive Character of the Mission that Necessitates an ICIP Operation: The mission of the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) is to evaluate the Safeguard Missile System, missile vulnerability studies, and missile control systems, and perform pre-production tests and analyses of missile systems. Priority I targets of elements located at WSMR are the Missile Electronic Warfare Technical Area, National Range Operations Directorate, US Army Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate, and the US Army Safeguard Systems Evaluation Agency. These elements develop electronic countermeasure techniques to nullify vulnerabilities discovered in missile systems, conduct pre-production tests of rocket and guided missile systems, operate a nuclear effects facility, and operate National Range facilities for tests conducted at WSME.
- e. Benefits and Information Obtained: This operation was initiated administratively in August 1974. Not yet operational, this ICIP has no source assets and has profused no algorificant communicatelligence intermation to date. However, the nature of the activities and the work force. **

 at WSMR make it necessary that a confidential source program be developed to provide adequate CI coverage. The remoteness of the installation and the knowledge that the type of activities conducted there are current targets of hostile intelligence services make it necessary to provide the type of "early warning" protection offered by the ICIP.
- 2. Based on the above, this operation has been selected for retention at this time.

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(S) LENTIL MONKEY:

- a. (U) Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. (C) Confidential Source Utilization: Four confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. (U) Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- Gensitive Character of the Mission that Necessitates an ICIP Operation: The mission of DLI is to train DOD intelligence and communications security specialists in every major foreign language. Military attaches and employees of CIA, FBI, and other federal agencies are also trained at DLI, making it an extremely enticing target for hostile intelligence service operatives. The majority of the faculty of DLI have foreign backgrounds and many possibly have had contact with foreign intelligence agencies in their native countries. Many of the instructors who are subject to hostage factors, and may or may not have had previous contact with a hostile intelligence service, frequently travel to their native countries in Eastern Europe. Because of the unique nature of this activity and the sensitivity of the intelligence personnel who are students there, a confidential source program is essential to provide adequate CI coverage to the project.
- e. (8) Benefits and Information Obtained over the Last Two Years: Although initiated in 1968, the operation was dormant for most of 1971. Revalidated in October 1971, this operation and the sources employed have produced voluminous information and leads indicative of hostile intelligence modus operandi aimed at contact with students or faculty. The following are examples of information obtained:

(1) b1

- (2) Another indicator is the frequent attempt made by foreign-born instructors to induce "pen-pal" contact between DLI students and persons living in Soviet-bloc countries. This is a known spotting technique of hostile intelligence services.
- (3) Numerous reports have been surfaced of adverse suitability information involving drug abuse or immoral conduct on the part of students which have triggered investigations to determine their suitability for sensitive assignments.





LENTIL MONKEY

- (4) An incident in which two Soviet citizens visited DLI and moved about unescorted caused new visitor control regulations to be published and put into effect.
- (5) Students from DLI on field trips sponsored by the Arabic Language Department were exposed to anti-US propaganda at the Arabic Trade Mission in San Francisco.
- (6) Sources reported several instances on questionable activities and curricula in the Arabic Language Department which involved the use of politically contentious materials in classroom drills:
- (7) An ICIP source reported information which alerted another agency to a possible breach in the security of its intelligence operations and possibly helped avoid some embarrassment in relations with the Middle East.
- (8) It is estimated that approximately 70% of the useful information obtained in this operation would not have been available on a timely basis without the use of confidential sources.
- f. (U) Based on the above, and due to the unique mission of DLI, this operation has been selected for retention at this time.

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ICIP Operations Recommended for Termination (12)

CANAL ROPE

CANARY STONE

CANTINA ARCH

CANYON ROSTER

CENTAUR SALE

CENTRAL TAXI

CENTURY SQUAD

GONDOLA FLAG

GONDOLA STAR

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(1)

CANAL ROPE: (OACSI Approval - 17 Dec 73)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Communications Command (USACC), and 11th Signal Group, Fort Huachuca, AZ.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Initial assessment information on two prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: The two sources previously recruited in this operation were terminated during the last reporting period. Although two prospective sources have been spotted, they are still undergoing assessment and have not been recruited. One prospective source is in the llth Signal Group and the other is in the Headquarters, USACC. Information was reported on an NCO assigned to the Communications Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (CEEIA), USACC, alleging possible foreign business interests. USACC has initiated a limited investigation on the NCO to clarify the allegation. On 17 Dec 74 the PIO presented the Quarterly Briefing to CPT Richard Milligan, Assistant Director of Security, USACC, who indicated that the supported commands were satisfied with the progress of the ICIP.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this .* case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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


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CANARY STONE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Jul 73)

- a. Location: Dugway Proving Ground, (DPG), UT
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Assessment information obtained on two potential confidential sources.
- e. Operational Status: On 21 November 1974, COL Adalbert E. Toepel Jr., Commander, DPG, was presented the Quarterly Briefing by the PLO. MAJ Trevor E. Bissey, Commander, San Francisco Field Office, 525th MI Group, and Mr. Clinton E. Bair, Intelligence Officer, DPG, also attended the briefing. No immediate threat to DPG was surfaced during the reporting period. A possible item of long term interest was reported involving foreign correspondence and/or contacts by DFG scientific personnel. COL Toepel expressed satisfaction at the progress of CAMARY STONE and was appreciative of MI support rendered to DPG, particularly the conduct of security guard training preparatory to a AMC inspection in January 1975. Source spotting, recruitment, and assessment has been hambered by an impending reduction of civilian employees and a proposed reorganization of DPG directorates which will likely result in shifts of personnel. A reduction in force is scheduled for January 1975 and approximately 160 civilian employees, primarily research and scientific staff, will be discharged or reassigned to other duties.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated..


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CANTINA ARCH: (OACSI Approval - 12 Dec 74)


- a. Location: US Army Air Defense Center, Fort Bliss (USAADCENFB), Ft Bliss, TX
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Suitability information was reported on one DAC employee of the Directorate of Combat Developments who reportedly has a drinking problem. The unidentified individual reported previously as selling used clothing in Mexico and suspected of bribing Mexican border officials has been tentatively identified as an NCO assigned to the Air Defense School. A limited investigation is to be conducted on the NCO to determine the legality and extent of his activities.
- e. Operational Status: One of the four confidential sources used in the operation was terminated when he was reassigned from Fort Bliss. The PCO for the operation retired at the end of November 1974. Recruitment of additional sources has been hampered somewhat by personnel turbulence at the installation, but this situation is expected to stabilize in early 1975. On 16 December 1974, LTC Robert Davenport. Director of Security, USAADCEMPT. Ft Bliss, was given the Quarterly Briefing on CANTINA ARCH. LTC Davenport stated that he was pleased with the progress of the ICIP and stated that he was requesting limited investigations on Ft Bliss personnel on whom information had been recently surfaced.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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CANYON ROSTER: (OACSI Approval - 8 Mar 74)


- a. Location: Umatilla Army Depot Activity (UMDA), Hermiston, Oregon
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were utilized during this period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Some investigative data was obtained on prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source was terminated during the period and two confidential sources were recruited during the period. Firm liaison and operational rapport has been established with federal and local law enforcement agencies in the area. Five prospective sources are presently under initial assessment. Of the five, three are in the guard force of the Security Branch. On 23 December 1974, the PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to LTC Daniel W. Doty, Commander, Umatilla Depot Activity. The briefing consisted of a review of MI activities, performed in support of the installation's security program and the status of the ICIP. LTC Doty indicated that he was generally well satisfied with the program and the support rendered.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.



(c) (c) CENTAUR SALE: (OACSI Approval - 14 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center (USAMERDC). Fort Belvoir, VA
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Travel plans were learned for one USAMERDC civilian employee who will travel to the USSR in the Spring of 1975. A reported SAEDA attempt involving an officer of the Camouflage Division, USAMERDC in Oct 74 has led to an internal security measure in which the PIO will give informal SAEDA lectures to management personnel of USAMERDC in an effort to improve the security posture. The PIO will in the future accompany USAMERDC security inspection teams as they make weekly inspections of USAMERDC activities. This will not only increase the visibility of the PIO at USAMERDC, but will also enable the PIO to spot and assess additional personnel in the more sensitive areas of USAMERDC for possible use in the ICIP.
- e. Operational Status: The series of informal SAEDA lectures and the accompanyment of the security inspection teams described above have been coordinated with the supported command and the security officer to start in January 1975. On 10 December 1974, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to Mr. Leslie L. Askew, USAMERDC Security Officer. From the period 5 September through 5 November 1974, the PLO was on special duty with the OACSI, DA, and was unable to participate actively in the ICIP.
- f. Recommendation: Based upon results achieved to date we feel we can continue to provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based on the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.







(CACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command (ECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: On 23 October 1974, a bomb threat was received which caused evacuation of the new ECOM office building. During the evacuation some classified material was left unsecured and unattended. The ECOM Security Office is insuring that classified material is secured during future evacuations and that fire marshals and bomb squads remain on all floors during an evacuation. A source also reported that an unsecured fire exit door in the east wing of the new ECOM office building allowed free access to a fire tower and all floors above. The Security Officer was notified who in turn notified the Provost Marshal's Office (PMO) who will insure that the door is secured in the future. A discharged enlisted man used his expired building pass to enter the Hexagon Building, Ft Monmouth, in early Dec 74. The information was passed to the Security Office who coordinated with the PMO to correct such deficiencies during the out-processing of reassigned/separated personnel. A source reported an increase in use of narcotics among military personnel employed at ECOM. The information was provided to CID which assumed investigative responsibility. An ECOM civilian employee received a telephonic threat against his life during the week of 24 Oct 74. The PLO provided the information to the local CID which initiated an investigation.
- e. Operational Status: Thirteen conventional sources are used to provide coverage of the ECOM target areas in addition to the five confidential sources used. Efforts are being made to recruit two additional sources in the Directorate of Management Information Systems (DMIS), ECOM. On 9 January 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL John Sanderson, Security Officer, ECOM. MAJ Nicholas F. Quintarelli, Commander, Fort Monmouth Field Office, 902d MI Group, also attended the briefing. COL Sanderson indicated at the briefing that the command was extremely well pleased with the support being provided by this ICIP.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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CENTURY SQUAD: (OACSI Approval - 3 Oct 73)

- a. Location: US Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One confidential source was used during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: Only one confidential source has been recruited for this ICIP. The source has been assigned for much of the time to the 2300-0700 hour shift when there has been only a small number of other persons present. Thus the situation has not been conducive to a volume of reporting. The source will be terminated early in 1975 when he transfers to a new assignment. The PIO and PCO presently are making a re-evaluation of this ICIP which will lead to a recommendation for continuation or termination. On 18 December 1974, the PLO presented a Quarterly Progress Briefing to Mr. John R. Bjork, Security Manager, USAMSSA.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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




GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval - 17 Feb 72) (Revalidated 30 Oct 74)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Seven confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A source reported allegations that a civilian employee of Edgewood Arsenal was possibly engaged in an illicit affair with another Edgewood employee. The Commander was briefed.
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source was terminated on 9 Oct 74. During the reporting period, limited progress was made in increasing ICIP support to the serviced activities. The PIO's duties not directly related to the ICIP limited the acquisition of ICIP sources needed to increase the ICIP coverage to the desired level. However, two prospective sources are under assessment and their recruitment is planned for the next quarter. On 18 December 1974, the Quarterly Progress Briefing was given to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, Commander, APG, and Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG. On 19 December 1974, the Quarterly Progress Briefing was presented by the PIO to COL Kenneth L. Stahl, Commander, Edgewood Arsenal, APG, and MAJ Walter W. Stansberry, Chief of Security, Edgewood Arsenal.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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GONDOLA FLAG: (OACSI Approval - 22 Apr 74)

- a. Location: US Army Electronic Proving Ground (USAPEG), Fort Huachuca, AZ
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: At present, three prospective confidential sources are under initial assessment. Personnel turbulence has hampered significant progress in this ICIP. The PIO was transferred during the last reporting period. The PIO will be transferred on a PCS overseas during the next reporting period. On 20 December 1974, the Guarterly Briefing was presented to Mr. Henry O. Dupes, Director of Security, USAPEG, Ft Huachuca, AZ. The Director of Security expressed satisfaction with the progress of the ICIP.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R



(ACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast (DLIEC), Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Approximately half of the faculty of DLTEC which is being transferred to DLI West Coast have departed for that installation. Classes and all attendant activities have been greatly reduced in preparation of the phaseout of DLTEC in Jun 75.
- e. Operational Status: On 12 December 1974, the PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing on the ICIP to CPT Richard W. Pederson, Security Officer, DLIEC. The Security Officer stated that the supported command was pleased with the MI support provided by the ICIP and full cooperation would be provided for the PIO in the continued conduct of the ICIP.
- f. Recommendation: The Defense Language Institute, East Coast (DLIEC), will cease operations when its present cycle of students graduate this summer. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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


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LEND TONE: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal (PA), Armament Command, US Army Materiel Command, Dover, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A civilian employee identified earlier as being a possible security risk due to a reported episode of erratic and irrational behavior was removed from the employee rolls at Picatinny after an October 1974 report by a source that he behaved irrationally during a visit to the Installation's US Army Health Clinic.
- e. Operational Status: The PCO assigned to this ICIP is being released from active duty in January 1975. An officer of the 902d MI Group Headquarters is assuming the PCO duties on an interim basis pending assignment of a PCO. Source recruitment efforts in the future will be concentrated on attempting to recruit sources who are single and have more extensive social contact in the Picatinny Arsenal and thus are better attuned to the activities of the Arsenal personnel. On 30 December 1974, the Quarterly Progress Briefing was presented by the PLO to MAJ George Carpenter, Chief, Security Office, PA. MAJ Carpenter at the briefing expressed the desire of the command that the ICIP be continued at that location.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON SEP - 5 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200:1R



LENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: US Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were used during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A suitability investigation which was started in the previous period is still in progress and a subject interview plus a polygraph examination has been conducted on the original subject, an enlisted man assigned to the USAWC staff. The suitability investigation, which involved allegations of aberrant sexual activity, has expanded to include several leads implicating three officers assigned or recently assigned to USAWC. The Commandant, USAWC, has requested suitability investigations on all personnel implicated in the allegations. A female civilian applicant applying to be rehired at USAWC has become the subject of a loyalty/suitability investigation triggered by information from sources.
- e. Operational Status: COL Albert N. Stubblebine III, Commander, 902d MI Group, visited USAWC for an orientation and courtesy call on the Commandant. An ICIP briefing was presented on 6 Jan 75 to LTC Richard H. Gray, Beputy Secretary for Logistics, USAWC, upon his selection as ICIP Coordinator, succeeding COL David T. Teberg. No formal Quarterly Progress Briefing was given MG DeWitt C. Smith, Jr, Commandant, USAEC, at his specific request. The PLO briefed MG Smith six times during the quarter on specific progress made in the special suitability investigations in progress as described in d, above. Because of the frequency of these briefings, MG Smith stated that a formal quarterly briefing was unnecessary. MG Smith indicated continued satisfaction with the ICIP and the support being provided by it.
- f. Recommendation: The installation and activities are such in this case that we feel we can provide the support necessary without the use of confidential sources. Based upon the above, recommend the ICIP be terminated.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. 10310

17 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ADMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

I have received and reviewed the latest quarterly report of ICIP operations during 1974 as requested. In 1972 the Under Secretary authorized a trial run of this subject program. Judging from this report, the program has grown considerably and includes installations that I did not appreciate were considered sensitive. A cursory review of the data presented suggests that in more than half the cases, no useful information was obtained.

It would appear to me appropriate to review the results of this experiment to date in order to establish that the program is in fact of such a value that it should be continued in the future.

I would therefore appreciate a detailed report documenting all of the benefits, information, etc., that have been obtained through this program over the last two years. It would also be helpful to have a statement for each listed installation of the sensitive character of the mission that necessitates an ICIP operation. Finally, I would appreciate an indication of your subjective judgment as to how many of the issues that arose from these ICIP efforts would not have otherwise come to our attention.

Inclosure

Memo, 29 Nov 74,

Subj: ICIP Operations

Herman R. Staudt Under Secretary of the Army

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

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29 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

. 1. (U) Reference is made to memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.

2 (U)(c) During the third quarter of CY 1974, the ICIP at Edgewood Arsenal Maryland (CANAL LOOP) was combined with the Aberdeen Proving Ground ICIP (GONDOLA STAR). The nickname GONDOLA STAR was retained.

3.(U)G) With the subsidence of anti-military activity at Fort Lewis, Washington and in the absence of a specific on-post threat, the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division requested that the Fort Lewis ICIP (CENTAUR RACE) be terminated. This ICIP was inactivated on 22 Aug 74. During the same time frame, LENS HOLDER, a new ICIP developed at White Sands Missile Range was approved on 7 Aug 74. With the implementation of this ICIP, the total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the quarter was 19. Brief status reports are attached.

4(1)(6) After briefing you on 25 September 1974 on the status of this program, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence personally reviewed and revalidated each on-going operation. Each operation will be revalidated on an annual basis hereafter. Additionally, MC Aaron has initiated a systematic review of all source dossiers to insure that all sources possess sufficient maturity and stability to enable them to function efficiently and effectively in ICIP operations.

1 Incl as (CONFIDENTIAL) WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 2004

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
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of the Army	OUND: By memorandum, dated 8 Fe requested the Vice Chief of St all ICIP operations.					
forwarding Secretary o	the quarterly report for the questions of the Army. GREEN TAB A forward the Army.	arter ending	30 Septe	ember 1974	4 to the 1	Under
3. RECOMME signed by t	ENDATION: That the memorandum to	o the VCSA a	t GREEN	<u>TAB A</u> be a	approved	and
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO DAMI-DOI-C

2 9 NOV 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.
- 2. At the request of the Under Secretary of the Army, on 25 September 1974, I briefed him on status of this program. At that time, he expressed reservations about operational control within the program and its recent rapid growth. He wanted assurance that the program was carefully monitored.
- 3. On 4 October 1974, I personally reviewed and revalidated each operation and have arranged for a systematic review of all source dossiers.
- 4. Recommend your approval and signature of the attached memorandum which transmits the report required by the cited reference.

5. Coordination: None required.

l Incl as HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS ACofS for Intelligence

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
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JETHRO J. DAVIS
Colenci, GS
Assistant to the Director
of the Army Staff

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MAJ Ebersole/56074







DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

29 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.

2. During the third quarter of CY 1974, the ICIP at Edgewood Arsenal Maryland (CANAL LOOP) was combined with the Aberdeen Proving Ground ICIP (GONDOLA STAR). The nickname GONDOLA STAR was retained.

With the subsidence of anti-military activity at Fort Lewis, Washington and in the absence of a specific on-post threat, the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division requested that the Fort Lewis ICIP (CENTAUR RACE) be terminated. This ICIP was inactivated on 22 Aug 74. During the same time frame, LENS HOLDER, a new ICIP developed at White Sands Missile Range was approved on 7 Aug 74. With the implementation of this ICIP, the total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the quarter was 19. Brief status reports are attached.

4. After briefing you on 25 September 1974 on the status of this program, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence personally reviewed and revalidated each on-going operation. Each operation will be revalidated on an annual basis hereafter. Additionally, MG Aaron has initiated a systematic review of all source dossiers to insure that all sources possess sufficient maturity and stability to enable them to function efficiently and effectively in ICIP operations.

1 Incl 100 (CONFIDENTIAL)


WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
General, United States Army
Vice Chief of Staff

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BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-503 DOD 5200.1R

MAJ Ebersole/56074

CONFIDENTIAL





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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MIIA-SO

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SUBJECT:

Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program

(ICIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C) WASH DC 20310

Several significant changes occurred in individual Internal Seinterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations during the third quarter of CY 1974. Among these was the combination of the ICIP at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland (CANAL LOOP), with the Aberdeen Proving Ground ICIP (GONDOLA STAR) on 17 July 1974. The nickname GONDOLA STAR was retained for the resulting consolidated ICIP which will realize some savings in administrative requirements and permit a more effective utilization of available manpower.

The Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, and Headquarters, Fort Lewis, Washington, requested that the Fort Lewis ICIP be terminated due to the subsiding of the level of anti-military activities at that post and the absence of a specific on-post threat. With the concurrence of the Commanding General, FORSCOM, the ICIP was inactivated on 22 August 1974. The White Sands Missile Range ICIP, which had been requested in the previous quarter, was approved on 7 August 1974. Spotting and assessment for potential sources continues. With the implementation of the White Sands Missile Range ICIP, the total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the quarter is 19.


Since the 1 July 1974 organization of the US Army Intelligence Agency, the 902d MI Group and the 525th MI Group have both experienced a reduction in personnel authorizations at all levels to include some Resident Offices which were initially established for the purpose of supporting an approved ICIP project. The reductions are impacting on some areas, especially isolated installations where servicing by both the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and Project Case Officer (PCO) threatens to escalate TDY costs. In an effort to find a solution, the 525th MI Group has consolidated the functions of the PLO and the PCO by having the PLO perform duties for both. This measure has been put into

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

effect at Sierra Army Depot, Dugway Proving Ground, and Umatilla Army Depot. The 902d MI Group has experienced difficulty in maintaining PLOs full-time at Seneca Army Depot and Picatinny Arsenal. During the reporting period, PLOs at Carlisle Barracks, Fort Ritchie, and Fort Monmouth all spent a considerable amount of time on TDY and in support of other counterintelligence duties. Local Field Office Commanders are making efforts to assign their personnel to duties according to assigned priorities, but the current shortages are slowing somewhat on-going operations and hampering the development of the newly established ICIPs.

4 (1) Currently an in-depth review of each ICIP is being made with an objective of determining the effectiveness of each operation. The necessity of continuing or recommending termination of each ICIP and possible improvements which can be made are also goals of this revalidation program.

5. (U) Brief status reports for each of the active 19 ICIP operations are attached as inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


19 Incl as E. L. Stephens

Chief

Intelligence Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

MIIA-SO

· 1 1 DCT 1974

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C) WASH DC 20310

Several significant changes occurred in individual Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations during the third quarter of CY 1974. Among these was the combination of the ICIP at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland (CANAL LOOP), with the Aberdeen Proving Ground ICIP (GONDOLA STAR) on 17 July 1974. The nicknesse GONDOLA STAR was retained for the resulting consolidated ICIP which will realize some savings in administrative requirements and permit a more effective utilization of available manpower.

The Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division, and Headquarters, Fort Lewis, Washington, requested that the Fort Lewis ICIP be terminated due to the subsiding of the level of anti-military activities at that post and the absence of a specific on-post threat. With the concurrence of the Commanding General, FORSCOM, the ICIP was inactivated on 22 August 1974. The White Sands Missile Hange ICIP, which had been requested in the previous quarter, was approved on 7 August 1974. Spotting and assessment for potential sources continues. With the implementation of the White Sands Missile Range ICIP, the total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the quarter is 19.

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

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
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
5. (U) Brief status reports for each of the active 19 ICIP operations are attached as inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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
E. L. STEPHENS Chief Intelligence Division







1(U)e) CANAL ROPE: (OACSI Approval - 17 Dec 73)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Communications Command and 11th Signal Group, Fort Huachuca, AZ.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data and assessment information on newly recruited sources.
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source in the 11th Signal Group Crypto Facility who had been recruited in April 1974 was terminated when he lost his placement and access. He also is near the completion of his federal service. A second confidential source recruited in May 1974 in the Communications Electronics Engineering. Installation Agency (CEEIA), Hq, US Army Communications Command (USACC) was terminated when continued assessment and evaluation revealed previously unknown personal and professional problems. Spotting and assessing actions are now under way to recruit new confidential sources for the operation. The CANAL ROPE PIO presented a Quarterly Progress Report on the ICIP to Mr John Maiorana, Chief, Physical Security, USACC, Ft Huachuca, on 27 September 1974. The security official indicated to the PIO that USACC was satisfied with the ICIP.









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CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Three potential confidential sources are currently under assessment. Adverse suitability information alleging moral misconduct on the part of a civilian employee with a SECRET clearance was reported. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, Fort Ritchie, and the Provost Marshal have been notified and are monitoring the employee's activities. An enlisted man with a TOP SECRET clearance and assigned to the Automatic Message Processing Systems (AMPS) Branch, Telecommunications Directorate, Site "R", for temporary duty, displayed an abnormal interest in firearms, explosives, and poisons. He also displayed somewhat abnormal behavior traits. The individual's access has been suspended temporarily pending a psychiatric evaluation.
- e. Operational Status: Twenty-two official sources and 14 liaison sources are contacted on a frequent basis in addition to the three confidential sources. The PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to the supported command on 12 September 1974. The following were present at the briefing: COL Harold G. deMoya, Commander, Fort Ritchie; LTC Arlyn R. Madsen, Director, Telecommunications, Fort Ritchie; Mr. Joseph J. Carroll, Chief, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command-CONUS and HQ, Fort Ritchie; CPT Lawrence N. Brogan, Commander, Fort Ritchie Field Office, 902d MI Group; and CW2 Benjamin Struchen, HQ, 902d MI Group.

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BY CDR USAINSCOM 501/PO
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
. (U)
3. (C) CANARY STONE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Jul 73)

- a. Location: Dugway Proving Ground, (DPG), UT
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Assessment information and investigative data used for potential confidential sources. Minor suitability information on the drinking habits of three DPG employees was reported. The Installation Security Officer has been appraised of the information and will continue to monitor the behavior of the employees in coming weeks.
- e. Operational Status: Two confidential sources were recruited during the reporting period and are being provided training and orientation. On 9 September 1974, a new PLO/PCO was assigned to the ICIP and the Dugway Proving Ground Resident Office. The new PLO/PCO has assumed control of both the newly recruited confidential sources used in the operation and has been engaged in thorough orientation of his new duties. On 29 August 1974, LTC Andrew J. Armstrong, Acting Commander, DPG, was briefed by the former PLO in the presence of MAJ Trevor E. Bissey, Commander, San Francisco Field Office, 525th MI Group, and Mr. Clinton E. Bair, Intelligence Officer, Security Div, DPG. LTC Armstrong provided the initial ICIP briefing to the new DPG Commander, COL Adalbert F. Toepel, Jr., on 9 September 1974. The ICIP PLO and LTC Henry F. Kale, Director of Security, DPG, will provide a more detailed briefing to the new Commander at a later date.

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CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Sep 73)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prespective sources.
- e. Operational Status: Coverage of the Directorate for Special Weapons (DSW) presently is maintained by use of two conventional sources. Two additional prospective sources, both of whom are assigned to the military police guard force, are presently under assessment. Prolonged absence of the PLO during this period due to leave and TDY travel to other locations hampered effective development and recruitment of new sources. The PLO has identified a total of four individuals for possible use as conventional sources in support of the operation. It is the goal of the Fort Monmouth Field Office Commander to recruit an additional three or four sources by the end of the calendar year. COL Light, Seneca Army Depot Commander, has instructed the PLO to use extreme care in the recruitment of sources and expressed his desire that the ICIP be developed very slowly. No Quarterly Progress Briefing was given during the period since there were no significant items of information reported. The PLC was on extended TDY for most of the month of September.

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
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CANYON ROSTER: (OACSI A

(OACSI Approval - 8 Mar 74)

- a. Location: Umatilla Army Depot Activity (UMDA), Hermiston, Oregon
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One confidential source was utilized during this period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information received on the possible theft and a sale of weapons from UMDA has resulted in all weapons being placed in an area under twenty-four hour guard. A construction project has been started to build a centralized weapons storage area. As a result of a request for aerial photographs of UMDA being received by the depot, procedures have been established whereby all questionable requests for information will be routed through the PLO of the ICIP.
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source was recruited during the reporting period. Seven other potential sources, four of whom are guards on various shifts at UMDA, are also under assessment and preliminary investigation. On 17 September 1974, the PLO briefed the Commander, UMDA, LTC Daniel W. Doty on the progress of the ICIP during the quarter. The briefing consisted of a review of MI activities directed toward improving the security of UMDA. LTC Doty indicated he was generally well satisfied with the program and the support rendered. It became evident during the quarter that UMDA's mission will be one of a long-term storage of conventional and toxic munitions. Although the work force is still unstable, target areas within the UMDA organizational structure have been identified and potential sources within each area are now under assessment. Liaison contacts with other Federal agencies and civilian law enforcement agencies are being developed as part of an early warning net around UMDA.


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


6. **(A)**

CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Approval - 8 Mar 74)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), Herlong, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prospective confidential sources.
- e. Operational Status: Overall progress in this ICIP has been extremely slow due to the non-availability of a PLO. The PLO assigned in June 1974 which was reported in the previous Quarterly Report was not continued on station. A decision was made to combine the PLO and Project Case Officer (PCO) functions in this ICIP. Continued development of the operation can be expected as soon as a PLO/PCO is on station. On 15 August 1974, the Quarterly Briefing was presented to the supported command. Those in attendance were: COL Robert Hawlk, CDR, SIAD; LTC Bernard Render, Dep CDR, SIAD; MAJ John Jolley, PM/Security Officer; SIAD; ILIT Wayne Heringer, Intelligence Officer, SIAD; and Mr. Anthony Tornabene, Asst Intelligence Officer, SIAD. LTC Clifford Fry, USAINTA Liaison Officer to HQ, Army Materiel Command, also attended the briefing. COL Hawlk, SIAD Commander, expressed his support for the concept of the operation and added that support would be provided the SIAD Resident Office When it was established.






7. (E)

CANTINA ARCH: (OACSI Approval - 12 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss (USAADCENFT), TX
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information was reported on a person assigned to Fort Bliss with a security clearance who resides in Mexico and was allegedly dealing in gold and silver. The report was provided to the Directorate of Security (DSEC) and to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) for further investigation. As a result of this report, the supported command now requires that all personnel holding a security clearance and residing in Mexico report this fact, along with their address. The DSEC now maintains a roster of all such personnel.
- e. Operational Status: The prospective confidential source in the Emergency Operations Center who was under assessment during the last reporting period was recruited on 4 September 1974. The US Army Communications Command Agency Fort Bliss Telecommunications Center presently is being covered through the liaison efforts of the Project Liaison Officer (PLO), but efforts are being made to recruit a confidential source there in the future. On 20 September 1974, the ICIP PLO presented a Quarterly Status Report on CANTINA ARCH to CPT James E. Stevens, Acting DSEC, USAADCENFT, Ft Bliss. Speaking for the Commander, the Acting DSEC indicated that the operation seems to be progressing in a satisfactory manner. He had no other comments, recommendations or expressed problem areas. A new DSEC will be appointed in the near future and will be briefed on the operation after he assumes his duties.

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



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CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Approval - 5 Feb 74)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative leads for possible confidential sources.
- e. Operational Status: As part of his training, the one confidential source used in this ICIP was given test EEI and tasked to provide names of other potential sources. Three other potential sources, all in the Operations Division, PTC, are currently under assessment. If these sources are successfully recruited, the depth of coverage of the target area will be improved considerably. The PIO provided the Quarterly Progress Briefing on 26 August 1974 to COL Joseph T. Adinaro, Commander, PTC, and Mr. D. E. Thompson, Deputy Commander, PTC. Both the Commander and the Deputy Commander, PTC, indicated satisfaction with the support rendered by the ICIP and the progress of its development to date.








9. (c) CENTAUR SALE: (OACSI Approval - 14 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center (MERDC), Fort Belvoir, VA
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: This ICIP coverage to date has been made by conventional sources who have access to the target areas and liaison contacts. Efforts are being made by the Pentagon CI Force/National Capital Region Field Office to revitalize this ICIP. To provide a wider target coverage of MERDC, three potential confidential sources are presently under assessment. The PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to Mr. Leslie L. Askew, Security Manager, MERDC, on 28 August 1974. The Commander and the MERDC staff continue to provide support for the ICIP and render all possible assistance for its continued development.

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
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
CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Approval - 18 Oct 73)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: The Pentagon Counterintelligence Force/National Capital Region Field Office (PCF/NCR FO), 902d MI Group, which is charged with the conduct of this ICIP is engaged in an intensive review and revitalization program for the operation. At present, two individuals who are employed in the Harry Diamond Laboratories, one in the Engineering/Reserve Support Division, and one in the Relocation/Planning Group are under assessment as potential confidential sources. The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing on 23 August 1974 to COL D. W. Einsel, Jr., Commander, Harry Diamond Laboratories, and Mr. Joseph Schnieder, Security Manager. Both the Commander and the Security Manager continue to support the ICIP strongly and provide cooperation necessary for its development.

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


11. CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command (ECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A source reported that a civilian employee at Fort Monmouth was stealing US Government property. The information was passed to the Fort Monmouth CID for further investigation. Another source reported that an employee in the ECOM Directorate of Research, Development, and Engineering was planning non-official travel to Finland and the Soviet Union. Further details are being sought on the lead. A civilian physicist in the Electronics Technology and Devices Laboratory at ECOM received unsolicited correspondence from an organization calling itself the Arab Projects and Development, Beirut, Lebanon. The employee promptly notified the proper security authorities and requested permission to respond to the letter. He was granted permission by the US Army Materiel Command, answered the initial letter and received a reply in September 1974. Investigation to date has revealed little information concerning Arab Projects and Development but the assets in the ICIP will continue to monitor future activity.
- e. Operational Status: In addition to the five confidential sources being contacted regularly in this ICIP, thirteen conventional sources provide additional coverage of ECOM target areas. Among four employees presently being assessed as possible sources, one has been dropped from further consideration due to refusal to cooperate in the program. There are three remaining under active consideration. The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing on 30 September 1974 to COL John Sanderson, Security Officer, ECOM, and ICIP Project Coordinator for ECOM. COL Sanderson indicated command satisfaction with the type of information and support rendered by this ICIP.

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CENTURY SQUAD: (OACSI Approval - 3 Oct 73)

- a. Location: US Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One confidential source was utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: Only one confidential source has been recruited to date in this operation. The PCO has been devoting most of the meeting periods to further training and testing of this source. In addition to training, the source is being tasked to provide names and leads for additional possible sources. Two other employees of the Operations Division, USAMSSA, are being evaluated as potential sources. The Quarterly Briefing of the supported command was presented by the PLO on 18 September 1974 to Mr. John R. Bjork, Security Manager, USAMSSA. The Director and his security staff continue to support the operation fully and have offered every assistance to aid in its development.

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13(U) GONDOLA FLAG: (OACSI Approval - 22 Apr 74)

- a. Location: US Army Electronic Proving Ground (USAPEG), Fort Huachuca, AZ
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Additional investigative data on a prospective confidential source.
- e. Operational Status: The prospective source, located in the Electromagnetic Branch, USAEPG, is in the final stages of assessment and recruitment is expected during the next reporting period. Efforts to spot and recruit sources in this comparatively new ICIP were somewhat hampered by the transfer of the PIO during the period. On 27 September 1974, the PIO gave the Quarterly Progress Report to Mr. Henry O. Dupes, Director of Security, USAEPG, Ft Huachuca, AZ, who stated that the Commander, USAEPG, was satisfied with the progress of the ICIP to date.

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14 (c) GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval - 17 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A report of an employee who travelled to Poland with his two sons triggered a request for an investigation by the supported command of the employee's foreign travel and extent of his foreign connections when it was learned that he plans to send his eldest son to Poland on some type of foreign exchange program. Another employee planned travel to Czechoslovakia in Aug 74, but postponed his trip to 1975 when he was hospitalized. The supported command does not desire an investigation immediately, but has requested continued monitoring by the ICIP. A man and wife physicist team have had their access to classified information suspended while an investigation is conducted concerning their alleged loose moral conduct andabuse of alcohol. A confidential source reported that a cipher lock installed on a door to a Data Processing Office of the US Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), APG, had been altered so the door could be opened without using the combination. Investigation revealed that the lock had been installed and made operational to check for possible defects and subsequently disconnected. The lock was disconnected pending installation of a telephone at the door for use by persons not having the combination in order to call for escort. The telephone has now been installed and the cipher lock has been re-connected.
- e. Operational Status: During the reporting period, limited progress was made in increasing ICIP support to the serviced activities since duties not directly related to the ICIP required the greatest portion of the PIO's time. One confidential source was terminated due to loss of placement and access. One confidential source with placement in Edgewood Arsenal was recruited. Three other potential sources are still under assessment. On 25 September 1974, COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, newly assigned Commander, APG, was given both the initial ICIP Briefing and the Quarterly Progress Briefing. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer (IIO), APG, was present for both briefings. The PIO gave a Quarterly Progress Briefing on 26 September 1974 to COL Kenneth L. Stahl, Commander, Edgewood Arsenal. APG, and MAJ Walter W. Stansberry, Chief of Security, Edgewood Arsenal.

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15 (U)e) GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal (PA), Armament Command, US Army Materiel Command, Dover, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were used during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A source reported that a PA employee frequently used a substance which appeared to be a narcotic during duty hours, then left his work area to sleep in parked cars. The information was passed to the PA security officials with a recommendation that a limited investigation be conducted. Another PA employee of the Ammunition Development and Engineering Directorate (ADED) was reported to be under the care of a psychiatrist. Investigation revealed that the PA Civilian Personnel Office and the employee's supervisors were aware of the problem. Although the employee continues to have access to classified defense information, his workload has been significantly reduced and all of his activities at ADED are closely supervised. A confidential source reported that combinations on adjacent security containers in the Nuclear Development and Engineering Directorate were set in numerical sequence, a practice in contravention of security regulations. Security officials were briefed on the weakness and have taken corrective action.
- e. Operational Status: A new PIO has assumed duties who has devoted much of his efforts acquiring area knowledge, establishing source rapport and acquiring on-the-job experience. Due to a personnel shortage, the PIO no longer is able to spend his full time with the supported command, but the commander of the Fort Hamilton Resident Office performs the PIO duty on a TDY basis. This will serve to make spotting and assessing of future sources difficult. On 20 September 1974, the PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to MAJ George Carpenter, Chief, Security Office, PA. MAJ Carpenter indicated during the briefing that the command was satisfied with the service provided by the ICIP.

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16 (U)(c) LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute, East Coast (DLIEC), Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on a potential confidential source.
- e. Operational Status: As reported previously, DLTEC is being phased out during Fiscal Year 1975 in preparation for its move to DLTWC, Presidio of Monterey, CA. For that reason, a concerted effort is not being made to recruit large numbers of sources, although at present one potential source is being assessed. The move to the Presidio of Monterey will be completed by 1 Jul 75. DLTEC security records have been shipped to DLTWC. The PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing in the ICIP to CPT Richard W. Pederson, Security Officer, DLTEC, on 16 September 1974. The Commandant and the Security Manager continue to provide cooperation and no problems exist at this time.

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


17. (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: US Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Numerous reports were made on USAWC personnel during the period, primarily on suitability, but ranging from drug abuse to aberrant sexual activity. Five military policemen were apprehended for narcotics abuse; their security clearances were suspended and they were removed from sensitive duties. Of the total of 13 suitability cases reported during the period, security clearances were suspended for 6; investigations have been requested for 4; 1 individual was dismissed from USAWC; 1 has been reassigned, and the activities of the one remaining are being monitored. With the addition of the US Army Military History Research Collection to USAWC, both the ICIP PLO and the Ft Ritchie Field Office personnel have provided security support and assistance in the form of a Counter-intelligence Survey and identification of security weaknesses and deficiencies.
- e. Operational Status: The PLO served as Acting USAWC Security Manager during a three-week absence of the incumbent and has now established at least one after duty hours CI inspection per week with the approval of COL D. T. Teberg, ICIP Coordinator. On 5 August 1974, MG DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., Commandant, USAWC, was provided his initial ICIP briefing. Following that briefing, MG Smith requested that he be briefed on significant developments of the operation at least monthly rather than quarterly. MG Smith was given a second briefing on 30 Aug 74. The PLO presented an initial ICIP briefing to COL William M. Whitesel, Deputy Commanding Officer, Carlisle Barracks, on 3 September 1974

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
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LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Approval - 7 Aug 74)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Initial spotting and assessment actions are taking place.
- e. Operational Status: During the processing of applicants for MI, the PLO has identified two potential sources for this ICIP, which is the most recently implemented operation. The ICIP PLO briefed MG Robert J. Proudfoot, Commanding General, WSMR, on the implementation of the ICIP on 16 September 1974. MG Proudfoot verbally approved the operation which had been requested by his predecessor, MG Sweeney. MG Proudfoot stated that he desired a progress briefing on the ICIP in two or three months. LTC Carl I. Davis, Chief of Security, WSMR; and Mr. William F. Arket, Chief, Intelligence Div, WSMR, also attended the briefing.

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19. (V)

LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval - 26 Oct 71)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast (DLIWC), Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Nine confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: The Czech "Pen-Pal" incident and the visit of a Polish national with his brother, a DIJWC instructor, reported in the last period, are still under investigation. Information concerning a new "pen-pal" relationship was reported, this one involved a US Air Force student. The airman exchanged several letters with a Polish citizen and sent him money for the purchase of Polish magazines. The Polish citizen commented in his letters that he believes the letters are being checked by Polish officials, since one was received in an opened condition. Information on this incident has been passed to the Air Force. Information surfaced that an instructor of the Polish Language Department has a radio transmitter at his residence is presently being investigated. Another report that unauthorized radio transmissions were being heard in the Fort Ord area is being evaluated by the National Security Agency (NSA). Two Soviet citizens, allegedly language instructors for the Soviet Government, visited DLIWC on a State Department sponsored trip. The State Department did not provide an escort and the visitors were able to visit the Russian Language Department unescorted. The DLIWC Security Officer has taken steps to prevent a recurrence of this type of incident and especially to insure that all visitors are properly escorted. Suitability information concerning student personnel continued to be reported and was passed to the appropriate authorities. Information received from another government investigative agency and amplified by the ICIP sources indicates that the Arabic Trade Mission located in San Francisco is gathering data on DLIWC Arabic students. During a class visit to the Arabic Trade Mission, DLTWC Arabic students were required to sign a guest register, listing their names and addresses. The reason for the register was allegedly so that additional printed information could be sent to the students. The students were also given anti-Israel propaganda.
- e. Operational Status: Five confidential sources were terminated during the period due to graduation. Reduction of case officer personnel on the project to one full-time and one part-time case officer may make it necessary to limit the number of confidential sources handled to five.

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At present, four confidential sources are active; two potential sources, including one instructor, are under assessment. In the future, confidential sources will be recruited on a staggered basis, with no more than two sources recruited in any one quarter. This will prevent the loss of several sources at one time due to graduation. The PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Report on 19 Sep 74 to LTC Max Newman, Secretary, DLIWC; MAJ Richard Erickson, Security Officer, DLIWC; and CPT Edward N. Janecki, Commander, Fort Ord Field Office, 525th MI Group. LTC Newman expressed appreciation for information furnished through the project and requested that briefing be planned for mid-October 1974 for the new incoming Director, DLIWC, COL Koenig.

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DAMI-DOI-C

27 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ICIP Briefing for Under Secretary of the Army (U)

1. (6) On 25 September 1974 MG Aaron briefed Mr. Herman Staudt, on the ICIP. Mr. Staudt expressed reservations about operational control within the program and concern about the sudden rapid growth. He wanted assurances that the program was carefully monitored precluding the possibility for embarrassment.

2/U) General Aaron assigned the following tasks to USAINTA through Mr. Leslie Hime, the USAINTA representative at the meeting.

- a. Prepare all the operations plans for review; General Agron will personally re-validate each plan.
- b. Prepare source dossiers for review. General Aaron wants to be able to personally be assured that all sources are of such maturity and stability that they would not cause any embarrassment to the Army.
- 3. (6) General Aaron will personally validate and approve all future operations plans and will assume command and control of the program. Only essential plans will be approved and permitted to continue. General Aaron did not consider the operation at the War College to be essential.
- 4. (U) Operations plans and dossiers will be reviewed on 4 October 1974.

RICHARD EBERSOLE Major, CS


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: DAMI-DOI-C

2 1 AUG 1074

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature of the attached memorandum which transmits the report required by the cited reference.
- 3. Coordination: None required.

l Incl

HAROLD R. AARON
Major General, GS
ACofS for Intelligence

21 AUG 1974

APPROVED - VOSA


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
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Assistant to the Director of the Army Sualf

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DAMI-DOI-C

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations


- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 Pebruary 1972, subject as above.
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature of the attached memorandum which transmits the report required by the cited reference.
- 3. Coordination: None required.

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HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS ACOES for Intelligence

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MAJ Pignato/77017



MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.

Progress in the second quarter of CY 1974 in the ICIP was characterized by a sizeable increase in the number of Confidential Sources utilized in the various ICIPs. Thirty-six Confidential Sources have been recruited, an increase from 27 in the preceding quarter. One request for an ICIP was received during the period which requested ICIP coverage at the White Sands Missile Range, White Sands, New Mexico. Brief status reports are attached.

As Army reorganization results in some shifts of facilities to other locations, the consolidation of ICIP operations continues in the interest of more efficient management and administration. The ICIP LANDLESS TIME (U), which formerly supported the Philadelphia Facility of the US Army Electronics Command, has been consolidated with the ICIP CENTRAL TAXI (U), which supports Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. A similar revised plan is being written in which the ICIP CANAL LOOP (U) at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, will be combined with the Aberdeen Proving Ground ICIP GONDCLA STAR (U). Including these consolidations, there were 19 ICIP operations active at the close of the period. The White Sands Missile Range ICIP, for which implementation is expected early in the next quarter, will bring this total to 20.

As I mentioned to you in my memorandum of 30 April 74, the primary value of ICIP operations is in their potential for early warning and detecting internal security weakness and security threats to the supported command. Inasmuch as these operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness, negative reports in themselves are frequently of value to a commander in planning for security requirements of a given installation or activity.

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FRED C. WEYAND General, United States Army Vice Chief of Staff

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY **HEADQUARTERS** U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

MIIA-OP-O

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C) WASH DC 20310

1.(U)(C) Progress in the second quarter of CY 1974 in the ICIP was characterized by a sizeable increase in the number of Confidential Sources utilized in the various ICIPs. Thirty-six Confidential Sources have been recruited, an increase from 27 in the preceding quarter. One request for an ICJP was received during the period which requested ICIP coverage at the White Sands Missile Range, White Sands, New Mexico.

2.[4](c) As Army reorganization results in some shifts of facilities to other locations, the consolidation of ICIP operations continues in the interest of more efficient management and administration. The ICIP LANDLESS TIME (U), which formerly supported the Philadelphia Facility of the US Army Electronics Command, has been consolidated with the ICIP CENTRAL TAXI (U), which supports Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. A similar revised plan is being written in which the ICIP CANAL LOOP (U) at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, will be combined with the Aberdeen Proving Ground ICIP GONDOLA STAR (U). Including these consolidations, there were 19 ICIP operations active at the close of the period. The White Sands Missile Range ICIP, for which implementation is expected early in the next quarter, will bring this total to 20.

3/U(c) Significant progress in the operations at Sierra and Umatilla Army Depots is expected during the coming quarter. The Project Liaison Officer arrived at Sierra Army Depot on 19 June 1974. Two prospective sources, spotted during TDY trips to the installation by personnel from the San Francisco Field Office, are presently under assessment. A similar situation exists at the Umatilla Army Depot at Hermiston, Oregon. The Project Liaison Officer became operational at that facility on 30 June 1974, at the close of the quarter. TDY trips pending the assignment and arrival of the PLO have resulted in having 19 civilian

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MIIA-OP-0

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

employees of the Umatilla Depot under assessment as potential sources by the close of the reporting period.

(U) Brief status reports for each of the active 19 ICIP operations are attached as inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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EDWARD H. BORT

Colonel, MI

Chief, Operations Division

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1 (U(c) CANAL ROPE: (OACSI Approval - 17 Dec 73)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Communications Command and 11th Signal Group, Fort Huachuca, AZ.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source was recruited in the 11th Signal Group Crypto Facility on 17 April 1974, and a second confidential source was recruited in the Communications Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (CEEIA), Headquarters, US Army Communications Command (USACC), on 20 May 1-74. Two additional sources in USACC are under assessment for possible recruitment in the next quarter. One CIRL surfaced by the ICIP is under assessment for possible exploitation as an OFCO. The CANAL ROPE PLO briefed Mr. R. H. Milligan, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Security, USACC, on 28 May 74, on the status of the ICIP. Mr. Milligan stated that USACC was pleased with the support being provided by this ICIP.

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2 (U)(G) CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information developed on 15 US Army personnel involved in drug abuse-related incidents was passed to the ICIP Coordinator. Adverse suitability information developed on a soldier assigned to the Operations Company, Fort Ritchie. The soldier, whose clearance was suspended, was transferred to Kimbrough Army Hospital, Fort Meade, for psychiatric evaluation on 28 May 1974. Alleged moral misconduct on the part of a WAC was reported to the ICIP Coordinator. The supported command is monitoring the activities of the WAC to determine if an investigation is warranted. Information obtained on alleged threats against the lives of three Military Police investigators was provided the Fort Ritchie Commander and the ICIP Coordinator. The US Army Criminal Investigation Department Command (USACIDC) is conducting an investigation.
- e. Operational Status: In addition to the confidential sources used, three potential new sources are under assessment. Twenty-one conventional sources and thirteen liaison sources are contacted on a regular basis. The Quarterly Progress Briefing, scheduled for 15 June 1974, was postponed until July 1974 because the Fort Ritchie Commander was not available.

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


3. CANARY STONE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Jul 73)

- a. Location: Dugway Proving Ground, UT.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: Efforts continue to recruit confidential sources; at present eleven individuals are being assessed. An initial recruitment approach was made to one prospect during the period, but due to personal circumstances of the individual, recruitment could not be accomplished. Two of the CIRLs have been processed to the point where recruitment can be attempted in the next quarter. On 3 Jun 74, the PLO briefed COL Robert A. Shade, Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, on the status of the operation. The briefing was also attended by COL Eric H. Vieler, Commander, 115th MI Group, LTC Henry F. Kale, Security Officer, Dugway Proving Ground, and the SAIC, Fort Douglas Resident Office, 115th MI Group. COL Shade expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the ICIP. COL Shade retires on 1 Jul 74. LTC Andrew J. Armonstrong, who will serve as Acting Commander pending assignment of a new commander, will be briefed by LTC Kale and the CAVARY STONE PLO on the ICIP early in the next quarter.

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4. (CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Sep 73)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, NY.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: Two conventional sources were recruited during the period and were given security training and general EEI. Two additional individuals are being assessed as potential sources; both have access to the Directorate for Special Weapons. The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Allen H. Light, Jr., Commander, Seneca Army Depot, on 21 Jun 74. The Commander expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the ICIP and reiterated his previous desires that the ICIP be conducted in such a way to not cause any embarrassment to the Army, specifically, he has cautioned the PLO to exercise care in the recruitment of any sources used in the operation. He expressed his confidence in the conduct of the ICIP thus far.

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5. CANTINA ARCH: (OACSI Approval - 12 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss (USAADCENFB), TX.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c: Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: Three confidential sources were successfully recruited during the period. Two of the sources are in the Office of the Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Developments and the third is in the Ballistic Missile Defense Department, both of which are on the prime targets list of the ICIP. An approach plan is being devised for a prospective source in the Emergency Operations Center. Two other individuals currently under assessment work in the Ballistic Missile Defense Department and the Telecommunications Center. The ICIP PLO briefed COL George M. Hamscher, Director of Security, USAADCENFB, on the status of CANTINA ARCH on 14 Jun 74. COL Hamscher has indicated a keen interest in the progress of the ICIP and is satisfied with the successful recruitment of sources during this period.

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6. (C) CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Approval - 8 Mar 74)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), Herlong, CA.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prospective confidential sources.
- e. Operational Status: The project has been delayed in its initial stages due to non-availability of a Project Liaison Officer. Pending arrival of the PLO, San Francisco Field Office personnel established liaison with the Commander of SIAD and his staff and also initiated spotting and assessment actions for potential confidential sources. At present, two individuals are under assessment and preliminary investigations are being conducted on them. The PLO arrived on station on 19 Jun 74 and considerable operational progress is expected during the next quarter.

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CANYON ROSTER: (OACSI Approval - 8 Mar 74)

- Location: Umatilla Army Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon.
- Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential conventional and confidential sources.
- e. Operational Status: Despite the absence of an established Resident Office at Umatilla or a PLO at the supported activity for the reporting period, considerable progress was made in establishing liaison contacts and spotting and assessing potential confidential sources. This has been accomplished by personnel from the Fort Lewis Field Office performing TDY trips to the Umatilla Army Depot. At present nineteen civilian employees of the Depot are under assessment. One CIRL has been approved for recruitment and a Lead Development Report has been submitted on a second one. The Commander, Fort Lewis Field Office, contacted LTC Harold Echols, Commander, Umatilla Army Depot, on 11 Jun 74, to arrange for the first Quarterly Progress Briefing. The Commander stated he desired a briefing later after the new PLO had sufficient time to become established. The PLO became operational on 50 Jun 74.

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8. CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Approval - 5 Feb 74)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source, assigned to the Operations Division, Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), was recruited during the reporting period. This source is being trained by the PCO and appears to have excellent potential for covering the target. Two other individuals, assigned as Communications Relay Operators, are being assessed as potential confidential sources. Recruitment of either one or both of these sources will improve the coverage of the target area. The PTC Director is appreciative of the progress being made in the ICIP and his staff of security officials are completely cooperative.

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9. CENTAUR RACE: (OACSI Approval - 30 Jul 73)

- a. Location: Ninth Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, WA.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A confidential source reported that a soldier assigned to the 9th AG Company, Fort Lewis, Washington, exhibited signs of affluence beyond the normal financial capacity of a soldier in his grade. A limited investigation is being conducted. No significant counterintelligence information was developed during the period, and all indications are that anti-military/dissident activity has subsided to a low level.
- e. Operational Status: Spotting and assessment of potential sources continues to be emphasized in an effort to improve the ICIP coverage. Three confidential sources were recruited during this period. In addition to these, twenty conventional sources are used, as well as six official liaison sources. Nine individuals currently are under assessment for use as conventional or confidential sources. The Fort Lewis Field Office Commander presented a quarterly progress briefing on 21 Jun 74 to BG McFadden, Asst Division Commander, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis. COL Kenneth Koch, Chief of Staff, and LTC Roy Davis, AC of S, G2, 9th Inf Div, were also in attendance. The 9th Infantry Division Asst Commander and the AC of S, G2, are preparing to recommend to the Division Commander that CENTAUR RACE be terminated because of a lack of specific, identifiable targets.

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CENTAUR SALE: (OACSI Approval - 14 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center. Fort Belvoir, VA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: Two conventional sources presently are being used in CENTAUR SALE who have access to all target areas. Three other individuals are in various stages of assessment as potential sources; two of the prospects are in the Countermine/Counterintrusion Department, the third is in the System Engineering & Computer Support Office, Computer Division. The PLO provided the Quarterly Progress Briefing on the ICIP to Mr. Leslie L. Askew, Security Officer, US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center (MERDC), on 6 Jun 74. During the briefing, Special Agent Shawn M. Sandlin was introduced to Mr. Askew as the New PLO for the operation effective 1 Jul 74.

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11. CENTAVO KID: (OACSJ Approval - 18 Oct 73)

a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, Washington, D.C.

b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.


c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.

d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.

e. Operational Status: A new PLO was appointed effective 14 Jun 74 due to the PCS of the present PLO. A series of thefts have occurred at the Adelphi, Maryland, Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL) facility. The PLO provided some assistance to the Security Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during its investigation. The results of the FBI investigation of the prime suspect were negative and no further action has been taken. Two individuals who are employed in the facilities are under assessment as potential confidential sources. The quarterly ICIP Progress Briefing was presented on 7 Jun 74 to the ICIP Coordinator and Security Officer, Mr. Alfred F. Schneder, and Mr. James H. Yeick, Asst Security Officer, HDL. The briefing was presented by the former PLO who introduced the new PLO to the IDL security staff at the time.

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12. CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command (ECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One additional source was recruited, bringing the total utilized to five.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) An ECOM civilian employee regularly engages in foreign travel. This information was brought to the attention of the ICIP Coordinator purely as a matter of interest since the employee is not in violation of existing regulations and none of the travel has been made to a Soviet bloc country.
- (2) Another ECOM employee was arrested on 3 May 74 on a federal misdemeanor for her part in alleged forgery of US Government checks by the US Secret Service in Newark, New Jersey. The federal authorities released the employee because of her cooperation and set bail at \$1,000. The information was passed to the ICIP Coordinator who informed the Provost Marshal's O-fice and the CID. Removal of the individual's security clearance is pending.
- e. Operational Status: A revised Operations Plan was submitted during the period which consolidated ICIP LANDLESS TIME with CENTRAL TAXI. The consolidation resulted from the closing of the ECOM Philadelphia Facility and its subsequent transfer to ECOM, Fort Monmouth, NJ. A new PLO assumed duties in May 74. In addition to the five confidential sources used in the ICIP, ten conventional sources are being used, and one prospective sources is under assessment. Target coverage by conventional sources has been expanded to cover the Avionics Laboratory, Comptroller Office, and the Directorate of Procurement and Production. The Fort Monmouth Field Office Commander presented the Quarterly Progress Report Briefing to LTC Richard O. Aamot, Chief, Security Officer, ECOM, on 4 June 1974. LTC Aamot stated that he is most pleased with the continuing progress and effectiveness of CENTRAL TAXI and the security support being provided to ECOM by the ICIP. All priority targets are covered by conventional sources or by confidential sources.

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
CENTURY SQUAD: (OACSI Approval - 3 Oct 73)

- a. Location: US Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One confidential source was utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: The confidential source has been provided with training instruction during this period. Source works during non-duty hours and surfaced no information of a counterintelligence interest during the reporting period. Two additional individuals currently under assessment as prospective sources, are expected to be recruited during the next period. Both are in the Operations Division, USAMSSA; one is a Computer Operator, the other is a Computer Technician. Recruitment of either of these prospects will provide coverage of the primary target during regular duty hours.

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


14. GONDOLA FLAG: (OACSI Approval - 22 Apr 74)

- a. Location: US Army Electronic Proving Ground (USAEPG), Fort Huachuca, AZ.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Limited investigative data on a potential source.
- e. Operational Status: Initial implementation efforts in this ICIP to date have been expended in establishing liaison contacts at USAEPG and conducting spotting and assessments of individuals who have placement and access in one of the prime target areas. One employee in the Electromagnetic Branch, USAEPG, is currently under assessment. Acquisition of several conventional sources is expected in the next quarter. The Commander, USAEPG, COL E. D. Downing, was provided the implementation briefing on GONDOLA FLAG on 7 May 74.

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GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval - 17 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) A confidential source reported the possibility that classified information may have been compromised by having been published in an unclassified publication. A follow-up report established that the information was not classified.
- (2) A conventional source reported that a civilian employee of the Behavioral Research Directorate, Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL), Aberdeen Proving Ground, had some foreign professional contacts made in the line of duty. No unusual activity was reported; however, the situation is being monitored for unusual activity or interests.
- (3) A confidential source surfaced the possibility that APG contractors were receiving unauthorized information pertaining to contracts being processed by the APG Procurement Directorate. Subsequent checks with APG authorities disclosed that the information being disclosed was not only authorized, but it was in fact required to be disseminated by regulation.
- e. Operational Status: Three conventional sources are presently under assessment as potential new sources to expand and improve the target coverage in this ICIP. the PLO has established several worthwhile contacts in the Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) and make the presence of MI better known in this key target facility. No basic change in priority for ICIP coverage occurred in this current quarter, but coverage of the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Agency (AMSAA) will receive greater emphasis in the next quarter. On 20 Jun 74, COL Walter R. Harris, Commander, APG, and Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer (IIO), APG, were given the Quarterly Progress Briefing on GONDOLA STAR. Both the APG Commander and the APG IIO expressed strong and continuing interest in the ICIP and pledged their full support and cooperation.

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AUTH Para 1-603 DGD 5200.1R

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16. GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Picatinny Arsenal (PA), Dover, NJ.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A confidential source reported suitability information concerning two PA employees who were allegedly emotionally unstable and had bad tempers. Security officials at PA took appropriate action following the incidents. Another source reported that two employees at PA were engaged in selling stolen merchandise. Initial information, in the form of hearsay, was too fragmentary; attempts are being made to obtain further details. As part of the effort to respond to EEI on Extremist Threat Against the US Army, PA Security Office records were examined to identify PA employees born in Arabian countries. Biographical data on four such employees was submitted in Agent Reports which were placed in appropriate dossiers of the individuals. The files search revealed nothing indicating connections with any known extremist activity.
- e. Operational Status: In addition to the three confidential sources, 11 conventional sources are being met on a regular basis. Spotting and assessing activities, held in abeyance during April and May until PA employees had received Reduction in Force (RIF) notices, has now been resumed. In the course of the RIF 418 positions were deleted, and 1,700 employees were affected. The PA Security Office has been changing its manual document security procedures to the Controlled Accountable Document Inventory System (CADIS), a computerized system of accountability. The 109th MI Group Security Assistance Program representative and the PLO provided considerable assistance to PA in its preparation for CADIS. On 3 Jun 74, the Quarterly Progress Briefing was presented by the PLO to MAJ George A. Carpenter, Chief, Security Office, PA, and Mr. John R. Greffe, Asst Chief of the PA Security Office.

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17. LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute, East Coast Branch (DLIEC), Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, D.C.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None. Coverage is provided by conventional sources.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Local Agency Checks and additional biographic information was submitted on eight instructors of Arabic origin. The information is submitted in response to requirements of a USAINTC program concerning extremist threats against the Army.
- e. Operational Status: DLIEC will begin movement to the Presidio of Monterey, CA, in July 1974. Permanent instructors are being offered an opportunity to relocate if they so desire; however, there has been no movement schedule established. Classes in session will continue at DLIEC until they graduate, attenuating the move over the next year. The move will be completed by 1 Jul 75. Information pertaining to instructors of DLIEC will be transferred to the PLO of the ICIP at DLIWC as the instructors transfer to the new location. On 3 Jun 74, the PLO briefed LTC Matthew T. Hendrickson, Commandant, DLIEC, providing the Quarterly Progress Briefing. No problems exist at this time and the Commandant expressed his satisfaction with the ICIP.

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18.

LENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: US Army War College (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, PA.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: The investigation concerning the financial activities of the captain reported during the last quarter has been completed except for a subject interview. The officer was assigned to less sensitive duties on 6 May 74 and will be transferred to Indiantown Gap Military Reservation in Jul 74. A limited investigation was conducted on a soldier assigned to Carlisle Barracks for reported use of narcotics.
- e. Operational Status: In addition to the three confidential sources used in the operation, 35 conventional sources are contacted on a recurring basis. Target research provided to the Security Manager, USAWC, was sufficient justification for assignment of two full-time Military Police sentinels in Root Hall, an aid toward accomplishing a completely restricted access to the USAWC. Research is continuing on the best ways of restricting movement within Root Hall, to include surveys of electronic and mechanical equipment. Use of such equipment and reconfiguration of Root Hall is planned for Fiscal Year 1975. The PLO assisted in the preparation of security directives relative to the USAWC Military Research Program (MRP) in which student officers travel to foreign countries to obtain information for their thesis. The PLO also coordinated with elements of the 902d MI Group concerning MRP travellers in respect to Army Regulation 381-15. The PLO gave a Quarterly Progress Briefing to MG Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Commandant, USAWC, on 7 Jun 74. MG Davis indicated that he was very enthusiastic with the support received from LENIENT CLOUD and also that he expected the in-coming USAWC Commandant. MG DeWitt Clinton Smith, would be as receptive toward continuation of the ICIP.

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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FO 1/PO
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19. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval 26 Oct 71)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast (DLIWC), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Nine sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A confidential source reported a May 74 incident involving an approach made to Czech language students on a picnic to engage in a pen-pal relationship with residents of Czechoslovokia. Details of this latest incident and previous incidents are being further investigated by the 902d MI Group and coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An instructor in the Polish Language Department was visited by his brother, a Polish national, who also attended a picnic with students and instructors of the Polish Language Department. Further inquiries are underway with other Federal Agencies concerning the visitor. Verbal information given to the DLIWC Security Office concerning the homosexual activities of a student was used as a partial basis for separation action. Sources provided valuable background and biographic data on DLIWC instructors born in foreign countries which now have Communist Governments. This information is used to update target data files on instructors who might be potential targets of hostile intelligence.
- e. Operational Status: Eleven conventional sources are currently used in the ICIP. During the quarter, five confidential sources were recruited while four were terminated because of their graduation. Source lead and Development Reports have been prepared on two prospective sources and an additional seven new leads are undergoing initial investigation. The new recruitment efforts are being directed at Priority II Language Departments since present sources are located in Priority I language areas. The ICIP PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing on 14 Jun 74 to COL John F. Hook, Commandant, DLIWC, MAJ Richard Erickson, Security Officer, DLIWC, and Mr. James R. Green, Asst Security Officer, DLIWC. COL Hook expressed his appreciation for the briefing and stated that he believed the Operation was achieving its objectives and had improved the security posture of DLIWC.

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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ACTIC SHEET

SUBJECT

Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations

DAMI-DOI-S

DATE

19 April 1974

ACTION REQUIRED

To obtain approval of the quarterly ICIP report.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, background and action taken or recommended. Must be sufficiently detailed to identify the action without recourse to other sources.)

1. BACKGROUND:

- a. By memorandum, dated 8 February 1972 (<u>ORANGE TAB B</u>), the Under Secretary of the Army requested the Vice Chief of Staff (VCSA), US Army, provide quarterly reports on all (ICIP) operations.
 - b. This is the eighth such quarterly report.
- c. The quarterly report of current operations for the quarter ending 31 March 1974 is at (ORANGE TAB C).

2. DISCUSSION:

- a. Inclosure 1 to ORANGE TAB A is a memorandum for the VCSA's signature forwarding the quarterly report to the Under Secretary of the Army.
 - b. QRANGE TAB A forwards to the VCSA the memorandum and ICIP Quarterly Report.
- 3. RECOMMENDATION: That the memorandum to the VCSA at $ORANGE\ TAB\ A$ be approved and signed by the ACSI.

(Continue on plain bond)

IMPLICATIONS	CINFO	YES	NO 🗌	PRIM PROGS	YES _	NO 🗌	BUDGET	AE2 NO
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SHOW ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SADE OR CONTINUATION SHEET

ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)

LTC STROM/77017

ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

SPECIAL ACTIONS BR RECORDS COPY à

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO DAMI-DOI-S

26 APR 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above (Inclosure 2).
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature of the memorandum at Inclosure 1 which transmits the report required by the cited reference.
- Coordination: None required.

2 Incl

HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS AGofS for Intelligence

80 APR 1974

APPROVED . VCSA

MICHAEL F. SPIGELMIRE Major, GS Assistant Secretary of the General Staff

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosures.

SECRET_

LTC STROM/77017/jl



JEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

30 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

1. Reference is made to memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dared 8 February 1972, subject as above.

Operations reported by memorandum to you last quarter remain active. Three new operations submitted during the quarter covered by this report have been reviewed at DA and approved for implementation. The list of current operations and narrative summary for the quarter ending 31 March 1974 are attached. Adjustments to ICIP operations will be made in the next quarterly report to conform with Army reorganization.

3. The primary value of ICIP operations is in their potential for early warning and detecting internal security weakness and security threats to the supported command. Inasmuch as these operations are a form of intensified security watchfulness, negative reports in themselves are frequently of value to a commander in planning for security requirements of a given installation or activity.

2 Incl

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BY COR USAINS DOD 5200.1R

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.18

General, United States Army Vice Chief of Staff

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 1980

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CURRENT ICIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ICIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	CONVENTIONAL SOURCES	CONFIDENT LA SOURCE S
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 Feb 72	0	5
Fort Huachuce, Arizona	CANAL ROPE	17 Dec 73	0	0
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	Canary effort	16 Feb 72	18	
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah	Canary Stone	18 Jul 73	C	0
Seneca Army Depot, New York	CANINE PLATE	18 Sep 73	0	0
Fort Bliss, Texas	CANTINA ARCH	12 Dec 73	0	0
Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, CA	CANVAS TAX	8 Mar 74	0	0
Umatilla Army Depot, Hermiston, OR	CANYON ROSTER	8 Mar 74	0	0
Telecom Center, Pentagon	CENSUS TIME	5 Feb 74	o	0
Fort Lewis, Washington	CENTAUR RACE	30 Jul 73	26	0
Fort Belvoir, Virginia	CENTAUR SALE	14 Dec 73	0	O
Harry Diamond Lab, Washington, DC	Centavo kid	18 Oct 73	0	0
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 Feb 72	9	4

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CURRENT ICIP OPERATIONS (cont)

LOCATION	icip Nickname	DATE APPROVEI	CONVENTIONAL SOURCES	CONFIDENTIA SOURCES
Mgmt Sys Spt Agency, Pentagon	CENTURY SQUAD	3 Oct 73	O	1
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	CONDOLA STAR	16 Peb 72	0	2
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	GONG SILK	16 Feb 72	11	2
Electronics Command, Philadelphia, PA	LANDLESS TIME	19 Jan 72	0	1
Defense Language Institute Washington, DC	LANYARD MOOD	22 Dec 71	1	0
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA	LENIENT CLOUD	16 Feb 72	2	4
Defense Language Institute Presidio of Monterey, Ca	LENTIL MONKEY	26 Oct 71	11	4
TOTALS 20	20		78	26

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ON SEP - 5 1997
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BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

CONTIDENTIAL

^{*} Conventional sources are those on-post sources which are met overtly and from which information of a counterintelligence nature is elicited.

ICIP Narrative Summary

There were no instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians was collected off post.

Progress in the development of information of counterintelligence value is slow. All significant reporting during the quarter has come about through the use of confidential sources with critical placement and access; however, to date, only 10 of the 20 ICIPs have confidential sources of information. Guidance has been provided the Intelligence field units to upgrade their efforts in the recruitment of confidential sources. The USAINTC has placed increased efforts on the use of conventional source contact by the Army counterintelligence units servicing installations not employing formal ICIPs. This effort may provide indications that such ICIP operations are warranted on the posts or installations. Emphasis on acquiring such conventional installation sources has been placed at Forts Rucker, Sheridan, Sill, Polk, Sam Houston, and McClellan.

Information of counterintelligence value developed during the 1st quarter of CY 74 came from six of the 20 counterintelligence programs in operation. The significant information was concerned primarily with adverse suitability and weaknesses in security practices. Typical of the information developed is that uncovered in the following two operations. Operation CANARY EFFORT developed information of adverse suitability on an Army captain, who eventually offered to resign from the Army and similar information on a Military Police investigator who subsequently was reassigned less sensitive duties. Adverse suitability information considered of lesser significance was reported on 17 other individuals assigned to the Communications Command, Ft. Ritichie, Md. Thirteen of these US Army personnel were involved in drug related activity. Operation CENTRAL TAXI revealed information concerning a highly placed employee in contact with foreign export companies, some of which are located within the Soviet Bloc. Poor security practices in several other instances at the Electronics Command have been brought to the attention of the Chief of Security, Ft. Mormouth.


Progress has been made in simplifying the procedural steps which must be followed to implement an ICIP operation. The establishment of an umbrella or basic OPLAN which precludes the preparation of lengthy separate plans at the unit level was approved by OACSI. This action was considered appropriate as all ICIP plans have sufficient common elements to permit utilization of a single basic plan. Operations plans will, in the future, be "fleshed out" by appropriate detailed annexes. This procedural change will significantly reduce the time from requestor to the time when the approved plan can be implemented.

The Army reorganization has caused two ICIPs to be combined with existing ICIPs. At the end of the reporting period, there was a total of 20 operations including one pending approval. It is planned that two additional

1 24 11

ICIP plans will be submitted for approval during the second quarter 1974.

Supported commanders continue to express their support for the program and their satisfaction with the results. The ICIP operations will be continued for their original stated purposes.



CURRENT ICIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ICIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	*CONVENTIONAL SOURCES	CONFIDENTI SOURCES
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 Feb 72	0	5
Fort Huachuca, Arizona	CANAL ROPE	17 Dec 73	0	0
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	CANARY EFFORT	16 Feb 72	18	3
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah	CANARY STONE	18 Jul 73	0	0
Seneca Army Depot, New York	CANINE PLATE	18 Sep 73	0	0
Fort Bliss, Texas	CANTINA ARCH	12 Dec 73	0 .	0
Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, CA	CANVAS TAX	8 Mar 74	0	0
Umatilla Army Depot, Hermiston, OR	CANYON ROSTER	8 Mar 74	0	0
Telecom Center, Pentagon	CENSUS TIME	5 Feb 74	. 0	0
Fort Lewis, Washington	CENTAUR RACE	30 Jul 73	26	0
Fort Belvoir, Virginia	CENTAUR SALE	14 Dec 73	0	0
Harry Diamond Lab, Washington, DC	CENTAVO KID	18 Oct 73	o	0
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 Feb 72	9	. 4

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11892

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2

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CURRENT ICIP OPERATIONS (cont)

LOCATION	icip Nickname	DATE APPROVED	CONVENTIONAL SOURCES	CONFIDENTIA SOURCES
Mgmt Sys Spt Agency, Pentagon	CENTURY SQUAD	3 Oct 73	0	1
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	GONDOLA STAR	16 Feb 72	0	2
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	GONG SILK	16 Feb 72	11	2
Electronics Command, Philadelphia, PA	LANDLESS TIME	19 Jan 72	0	1
Defense Language Institute Washington, DC	LANYARD MOOD	22 Dec 71	1	0
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA	LENIENT CLOUD	16 Feb 72	2	4
Defense Language Institute Presidio of Monterey, C		26 Oct 71	11	4
TOTALS 20	20		78	26

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^{*} Conventional sources are those on-post sources which are met overtly and from which information of a counterintelligence nature is elicited.

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
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Progress has been made in simplifying the procedural steps which must be followed to implement an ICIP operation. The establishment of an umbrella or basic OPLAN which precludes the preparation of lengthy separate plans at the unit level was approved by OACSI. This action was considered appropriate as all ICIP plans have sufficient common elements to permit utilization of a single basic plan. Operations plans will, in the future, be "fleshed out" by appropriate detailed annexes. This procedural change will significantly reduce the time from requestor to the time when the approved plan can be implemented.

The Army reorganization has caused two ICIPs to be combined with existing ICIPs. At the end of the reporting period, there was a total of 20 operations including one pending approval. It is planned that two additional

ICIP plans will be submitted for approval during the second quarter 1974.

Supported commanders continue to express their support for the program and their satisfaction with the results. The ICIP operations will be continued for their original stated purposes.





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS ARMY INTELLIGENCE, COMMAND

FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

10 APP 1014

ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence


Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-S) WASH DC 20310

Progress in the ICIP continued during the first quarter of CY 1974. The accession rate dropped from six requests in the previous quarter to three for the reported quarter. However, additional requests are anticipated during the next reporting period. In addition, Installation Source Programs are being established at appropriate locations and may result in changes to ICIP operations if significant information is developed. These operations have been established at Forts Rucker, Sheridan, Polk, Sill, Sam Houston and McClellan.

(2) Much of the credit for the significant information developed can be attributed to the increased use of Conventional Sources to supplement the coverage provided by Confidential Sources. A large percentage of the sources mentioned as being under assessment in the inclosures will be initially recruited as Conventional Sources controlled by the Project Liaison Officers. When their training has progressed to the point where their reliability is established and their production becomes substantial, they can be transferred to confidential status under the control of Project Case Officers. This approach is expected to increase the quantity and quality of production in established operations. A monthly operational status report system was initiated during the quarter which will provide a continuing overview to insure that each operation is productive in relation to the manhours and funds expended and is not being continued merely for the sake of having an operation on the books.

Difficulties are being experienced in the implementation of the approved operations at Sierra and Umatilla Army Depots. Their isolated locations require that a Project Liaison Officer be stationed at each. Two volunteer CWOs were found among the assets of the 115th MI Group, but OPO disapproved their contemplated assignment because both were nearing 20 years service and were not to be retained on duty. Emergency requisitions are at MI Branch, and a candidate for Sierra has been nominated



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ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

to arrive o/a 15 June 1974. The status of the Umatilla fill is not known. In the meantime, the MI presence is manifested by regular TDY visits to each installation. Individual inclosures were therefore not prepared on these installations.

The inclosures on CANAL LOOP and LANDLESS TIME are submitted for the last time. These operations are being absorbed into GONDOLA STAR and CENTRAL TAXI as a result to Army reorganization. In the case of CANAL LOOP, administration and management will be simplified. At the end of the reporting period, there was a net gain of two for a total of 19 operations, including the Electronic Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, which is pending approval. There are two known gains during the second quarter of CY 74, not including any operations which will be generated as a result of the proposed letter by the CG, US Army Communications Command - CONUS, which is addressed in the CANARY EFFORT inclosure.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

18 Incl

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
JESSE D. JOY, JR.

Colonel, GS

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

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1. (M)

CANAL LOOP: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Sources provided additional leads on b6 USAR officer, which will be utilized in the limited investigation now underway.
- e. Operational Status: Three additional sources are under assessment, and emphasis was placed on increasing contact with official sources during the reporting period. A study of targets covered under this operation was made by the Installation Intelligence Officer, Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Chief of Security, Edgewood, and the Project Liaison Officer. It was agreed that all current targets have the highest priority under the ICIP. A reviewed OPLAN is being prepared to consolidate the operations at Edgewood and Aberdeen. This will relieve the administrative burden of reporting on two separate operations, and is logical since the two posts are considered as a single entity.

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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CANAL ROPE: (OACSI Approval - 17 Dec 73)

a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Communications Command and lith Signal Group, Ft Huachuca, AZ


- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: The recruitment of two sources in the llth Signal Gp Crypto Facility, the primary concern of the ACofS, Intelligence and Security, will be accomplished upon the receipt of NAC results. A source is under assessment in the Communications-Electronics Engineering Installation Agency. COL Vega, the ACofS, IS, is pleased with the support rendered to date.

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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3. **(U)**.

CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Adverse suitability information was developed on a Military Police investigator and resulted in his relief from investigative duties and assignment to less sensitive duties. A request for an investigation was forwarded to USAINTC. Similar information was developed on a US Army Captain being considered for sensitive duties in the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC). Prior to the submission of a request for investigation to USAINTC, the officer became involved with law enforcement agencies and, after counseling, offered to resign from the Army. Information on drug abuse related incidents involving 13 US Army personnel was developed, and passed to the ICIP Coordinator. This is a decrease in the number of incidents from the previous quarter, and the Post Commander and ICIP Coordinator credit the ICIP operation and increased liaison between the Project Liaison Officer and the Provost Marshal with contributing to the decrease. The CG and C/S of US Army Communications Command-CONUS were also given an ICIP briefing during the period. BG Redman advised that he had been made aware of the achievements of the ICIP at Fort Ritchie and was planning to request coverage of sensitive installations within his command. Additional details are contained in the attached Quarterly Progress Report (ANNEX A).
- e. Operational Status: In addition to the Confidential Sources, contact was maintained with 18 casual and nine liaison sources during the period. The favorable attitude of the Commander and the ICIP Coordinator are reflected in attachment.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Fort Ritchie Field Office 109th Military Intelligence Group Fort Ritchie, Haryland 21719

ICGP-B-FR

29 Harch 1974

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2

Period January 1974 thru March 1974

"WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED"

SUBJECT: Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

CIRCUMSTANCES:

a. On 25 February 1974, the US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Briefing was presented to BG Albert Redman, Jr., Commander, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Mr. Kenneth L. Alexander, DAC, GS-14, Chief of Staff, US Army Communications Command - CONUS, Fort Pitchie. The aforementioned briefing, presented by the Project Liaison Officer (PLO), Operation CANARY EFFORT, was enthusiastically received by BG Redman and Mr. Alexander. Both BG Redman and Mr. Alexander were knowledgeable that an ICIP was in effect at Fort Ritchie and indicated that the ICIP had received many laudable comments. BS Redman indicated a desire to have the ICIP program expanded to include sensitive installations within his command. The following personnel were in attendance at the aforementioned briefina:

BG Albert Redman, Jr., Commander, US Army Communications Command - CONUS, Fort Ritchie.

Mr. Kenneth L, Alexander, DAC, GS-14, Chief of Staff, US Army Communications Command - COMUS, Fort Ritchie.

Mr. Joseph J. Carroll, DAC, GS-14, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Headquarters, Fort Ritchie.

MAJ Robert L. Brooks, MI, Commander, Fort Ritchie Field Office, 109th Military Intelligence Group, Fort Ritchie.

b. A formal briefing, per se, was not presented during the reporting period of 15 October 1973 to 15 December 1973. The Quarterly Progress Briefing presented on 29 March 1974, included the aforementioned period as well as the period of January 1974 thru March 1974. The Quarterly Progress Briefing was presented on 29 March 1974 at the request of COL James A. Manning, Commander, Fort Ritchie, as COL Manning felt the briefing should be presented at the end of the reporting period

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29 March 1974

as opposed to 15 March 1974, as stipulated by existing USAINTC regulations. Although the formal briefing was presented on 29 March 1974, continual/constant liaison was maintained with appropriate individuals briefed on the ICIP prior to the formal briefing. The following briefed personnel were present on 29 March 1974, at which time the Quarterly Progress Briefing was presented:

Ritch i	COL James A. Manning, b6	Armor, Commander, Fort
	COL Harold G. de Moya, b6	Infantry, Deputy Commander,
Teleco	LTC Arlyn R. Madsen, b6	Signal Corps, Director,

Mr. Joseph J. Carroll, DAC, GS-14, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Headquarters, Fort Ritchie. Mr. Carroll is the ICIP Coordinator, Operation CANARY EFFORT.

2. RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. During reporting period, Spotting and Assessment for Confidential Sources with placement and access continued.
- b. Daily liaison was maintained with the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command CONUS and Headquarters, Fort Ritchie and/or a briefed member of the aforementioned office.
- c. Periodic, if not daily, liaison was maintained with 16 individuals assigned key positions within the Fort Ritchie military community. Aforementioned individuals, considered Casual/Official Sources, include the Director, Telecommunications Directorate, the Provost Marshal, Military Police Investigations, Company Commanders, and other appropriate personnel.
- d. Periodic/continual liaison was maintained with appropriate federal, state and local agencies.
- e. During reporting period a total of 31 Agent Reports were submitted concerning 19 individuals assigned to Fort Ritchie occupying either sensitive positions and/or having security clearances. The aforementioned Agent Reports forwarded adverse suitability information.

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
- f. On 4 January 1974, a draft letter was prepared for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Headquarters, Fort Pitchie, to be used by the aforementioned individual/office in requesting expansion of the ICIP within the US Army Communications Command -CONUS. The aforementioned letter (draft) was well received and appropriate staffing was initiated. On 26 March 1974, COL Antonio Vega, GS, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, discussed proposed ICIP expansion with Mr. Carroll and indicated strong interest in the proposal. COL Vega reportedly informed Mr. Carroll that the letter from Fort Bitchie would be enthusiastically received at Fort Huachuca and that COL Vega would recommend that the request for ICIP expansion be approved and forwarded, in the form of a formal request, to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Mr. Carroll indicated to undersigned PLO that the aforementioned letter would leave Fort Ritchie by 8 April 1974.
- g. Upon termination of the Quarterly Progress Briefing, 29 March 1974, COL Manning and Mr. Carroll expressed their appreciation and enthusiasm for the ICIP at Fort Ritchie. Comments for accomplishments rendered during the reporting period were laudatory, to say the least. COL Manning indicated his desire to continue the ICIP at Fort Ritchie as he believed it's contribution toward enhancing the security posture of Fort Ritchie and the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) was invaluable. Both COL Manning and Mr. Carroll desired that the existing ICIP at Fort Ritchie continue "uninterrupted" despite any reorganizational changes anticipated by USAINTC. Mr. Carroll stated that he did not desire to see any personnel changes in as far as the PLO was concerned as he was "immensily satisfied" with the present PLO both professionally and personally. Mr. Carroll added, that for the first time since his assignment to Fort Ritchie in 1971, he was totally satisfied with the ICIP in it's entirety.
- h. COL Manning and Mr. Carroll further expressed their appreciation of SAEDA briefings presented to a total of 583 personnel, both military and civilian, on 28 March 1974, by the PLO.

. SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

a. As previously stated, a total of 31 Agent Reports (DA Form 341) were submitted concerning 19 individuals, US Army personnel, assigned to the US Army Communications Command + CONUS and Fort Ritchie. Aforementioned Agent Reports, submitted by the PLO, forwarded adverse suitability information. Of the aforementioned 31 Agent Reports, a total of 15 Agent Reports were submitted concerning 13 US Army personnel involved in drug abuse related incidents. A total of 17 Agent Reports concerning five US Army personnel were submitted in regard to adverse suitability information.

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
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- b. On 4 February 1974, PLO was notified of an alleged threat on the life of the Commander, 572d Military Police Company (Security), Fort Ritchie. The threat, in form of an alleged \$10,000 "contract", was allegedly sponsored by either De Mau Mau or the Black Liberation Army. Contact was effected with appropriate military and civilian agencies and reported information was forwarded in form of a Spot Report as well as a follow-up Agent Report. Both COL Manning and Mr. Carroll expressed appreciation for the timely and effective manner in which the aforementioned incident was handled by the PLO.
- c. In yet another case, adverse suitability information was surfaced concerning a former Military Police Investigator assigned to Fort Ritchie. The aforementioned individual was relieved of MPI duties and assigned less sensitive duties. Adverse suitability information was gleaned from official records and Official Sources and brought to the attention of Mr. Carroll. Mr. Carroll, in turn, requested an investigation of the individual from USAINTC.
- d. In still another instance, adverse suitability information was surfaced concerning a US Army Captain who was being considered for a sensitive position both at Fort Ritchie and the AJCC. Adverse suitability information was gleaned from official records and Official Sources and brought to the attention of both COL Manning and Mr. Carroll. Prior to an investigation being requested by Mr. Carroll, the individual concerned again became involved with law enforcement agencies and, after counselling by COL Manning, offered to resign from the US Army. The aforementioned incident was particularly delicate as the individual concerned was a graduate of the US Military Academy and possessed a distinguished combat record in the Republic of Vietnam. COL Manning and Mr. Carroll both expressed complete satisfaction in the manner in which the PLO brought the adverse suitability information to their attention and concurred with PLO in recommendations offered.
- e. While drug abuse, per se, is not within the investigative purview of USAINTC, the issue does involve suitability of the individuals concerned to hold security clearances and occupy sensitive positions. Upon reciept of adverse information, immediate action was taken to notify the ICIP Coordinator, Operation CANARY EFFORT, Mr. Joseph J. Carroll; the Commander, Fort Ritchie; and the Director, Telecommunications Directorate, if applicable. In addition to the aforementioned, action was taken to disseminate information, criminal in nature, to the appropriate military and civilian authorities. COL Manning and Mr. Carroll both expressed satisfaction in the decrease of drug abuse related incidents during reporting period and voiced belief that the marked decrease was largely due to the enhanced liaison between the PLO and the Office of the Provost Marshal.

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- f. Information concerning both military and civilian personnel assigned to US Army Communications Command CO'NUS and Fort Ritchie, and on whom Agent Reports have been submitted, by both the PLO and Project Case Officer (PCO), are duly reflected in Monthly Status Reports (MSR) for the months of February and "arch 1974. Paragraphs 2.e. and 3.a. of this report contain statistics concerning Agents Reports submitted only by the PLO.
- g. Covert Sources within the CANARY EFFORT target area continue to report adverse suitability information concerning both US Army and Pepartment of the Army personnel assigned to Fort Ritchie and the AJCC(i)

4. (E) COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. It is strongly recommended that, in the event personnel changes are anticipated in the forthcoming reorganization, appropriate and responsible USAINTC personnel effect contact with COL Manning and/or Mr. Carroll prior to initiating such changes. If noching else, the aforementioned recommended action should be accomplished as a "matter of courtesy".
- b. PLO and PCO continue to enjoy an excellent professional and personal working relationship. PLO and PCO indeed work and function as a team. PLO continues to enjoy an excellent professional and personal working relationship with his counterparts, liaison contacts, and Casual/Official Sources.
- c. It is envisioned that, once the Fort Ritchie Field Office increases it's personnel strength, and once the administrative requirements levied on the PLO either diminish or stabilize, the PLO will become increasingly effective/productive and be permitted to support the supported commander in the manner intented by the ICIP, i. e. in the "true spirit" of the program. The ultimate goal of the ICIP and, hence, the PLO, is to afford the Commander, Fort Ritchie, with coverage desired, i. e., enhancement of the security posture of Fort Ritchie and the AJCC by means not locally available the Commander.

GARY L. PEISEN CN4, USA

Project Liaison Officer

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4. (Ø) CANARY STONE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Jul 73)

- a. Location: Dugway Proving Ground, UT
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: Descret Test Center, the original organization, has been disestablished and the functions assumed by Dugway, necessitating a realignment of targets. The Project Liaison Officer has established excellent liaison with the Commander and Security Officer. As of the end of the reporting period, 12 potential sources with proper placement were under assessment. Production is expected during the next quarter.

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(OACSI Approval - 18 Sep 73)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Limited investigative data on prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: This operation has been developing slowly at the specific desires of the commander. He has directed that no onpost record or file checks be conducted on potential sources for fear that they or the operation will be compromised. However, he has suggested that any prospective source approached who is in doubt of the Project Liaison Officer's bona fides be instructed to telephone him privately. Four potential sources have been identified and subjected to police and FBI checks, and will be recruited when favorable assessment is concluded.

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6. US CANTINA ARCH: (OACSI Approval - 12 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Air Defense Center and Ft Bliss, TX
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: Complete cooperation is being received from the DSEC, who is the ICIP Coordinator. Two sources are ready for recruitment and five are under assessment. Two were assessed and rejected because of suitability information developed. Production can be expected during the second quarter of CY 74. The DSEC is being kep abreast of developments and is satisfied with the progress to date.

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7. CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Approval - 5 Feb 74)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on prospective sources.
- e. Operational Status: This operation has not been completely implemented due to the lack of recruited sources. Two are currently under assessment and, if acceptable or amenable to recruitment, should begin to provide information during the coming quarter. The Director and his security officials continue to be completely cooperative and appreciative of the development of the operation.

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
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8. CENTAUR RACE: (OACSI Approval - 30 Jul 73)

A. Location: Ninth Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, WA

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A conventional source reported activity by the wife of SP4 b6 courtmartialed on 17 Jan 74 for illegal distribution of literature on post. (Agent Report attached at ANNEX A.) There were two instances of distribution of such literature on the post during the period reported on. The FBI continues to provide information on military personnel who engage in anti-military activity off-post.
- e. Operational Status: b6 transferred to Leavenworth and then released from confinement and the service during the period, is allegedly returning to or already in Tacoma, WA. He is expected to continue his anti-military activities, but the FBI is in a position to provide continuing coverage. Both b6 and b6 are expected to assist b6 in his activities. Security officials at Fort Lewis indicate that this minor activity has no apparent affect on troop morale or efficiency. This is confirmed by contacts with 26 conventional sources during the period. Eighteen additional individuals are under assessment for use as either confidential or conventional sources. The civilian deputy to the G2 advised the CI Div, DCSI, FORSCOM, that he was pleased with what was being provided.

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
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AGEN1 For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent og	REPORT concy is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.					
1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED					
ANTI-MILITARY/DISSIDENT ACTIVITIES	31 January 1974					
Company A, 3/39th Inf, 9th Inf Div	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER					
Fort Lewis, Washington						
4. REPORT OF FRIDINGS						
(0.000 000000) 0 77 7 200 -						
(CASUAL SOURCE) On 31 January 1974, F	PFC b6					
Company A, 3/39th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, was interviewed by the undersigned, at the Fort Lewis Field Office, 115th						
Military Intelligence Group, Fort Lewis, re	rort bewis rigid Office, II)th					
substantially as follows:	garding bobonol, and stated					
Two of b6's friends, PVT	b6 and PFC b6					
b6 , both members of the 3/39th Infantry	, collected approximately \$175.00					
from Source's platoon on 31 January 1974.	The money was collected for					
b6 s wife. A substantial number of perso	ons in Company A, 3/39th Infantry					
are highly disgruntled with the US Army for	the stiff sentence b6 received					
as a result of his recent court-martial at	Fort Lewis.					
AGENT'S NOTES: b6 a forme	er member of Company A, 3/39th					
Infantry, Fort Lewis, was given a Special C	lount-Martial on 16 January 3071					
for the unauthorized distribution of litera	ture at Fort Lewis Washington.					
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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT	8. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT					
ROBERT T. JEWELKS, 115th ME Cp (LE)	Lett Vick					



9. (U)c) CENTAUR SALE: (OACSI Approval - 14 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Ft Belvoir, VA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable
- d. Useful Information Obtained: SSG b6 , mentioned in the previous report, went AWOL and was dropped from the rolls as a deserter. He was not reported as a Knowledgeable AWOL. A contractor employee was caught taking unauthorized photographs on post. Examination of the developed photos indicated nothing of security interest, and MERDC authorities plan no further action.
- e. Operational Status: The relationship with MERDC security officials continues to be excellent. The Project Liaison Officer (PLO) has been hampered by having to function in the same capacity at Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL). However, he has identified 10 prospective sources and appropriate checks are being conducted. A separate PLO will be assigned to HDL and will allow the CENTAUR SALE PLO to function full-time.


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CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Approval - 18 Oct 73)

a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, Washington, DC

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Agent Reports on an Israeli-born employee which satisfy requirements in a USAINTC program concerning extremist threats against the Army.
- e. Operational Status: This operation has been somewhat hampered by the reluctance of the Security Officer to cooperate with the Project Liaison Officer (PLO). The PLO has been also required to function in that capacity for CENTAUR SALE. A separate PLO for CENTAVO KID has been assigned and documented with a security badge. By working with the more receptive Assistant Security Officer, who is expected to take over from his chief when the latter retires this year, it is hoped that progress will be made. The staff in the Personnel Office cooperate fully, so that identification and selection of potential sources should begin shortly.

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11.

CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command, Ft Monmouth, NJ
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One additional source was recruited, bringing the total utilized to four.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) A civilian employee continues to drink to excess; the matter will be discussed with his supervisor by the ICIP Coordinator.
- (2) Another employee is in contact with foreign export companies, but the fact that some are in the Soviet Bloc has heretofore been unknown to ECOM officials. The coordinator has asked that sources be tasked to provide additional details.
- (3) A civilian guard detailed to control access to a sensitive area has been absent from his post, allowing personnel to come and go with identification not checked. He has been transferred to other duties.
- (4) A GS 15 scientist discussed SECRET information in a GSA cafeteria while on TDY. He will be counseled on proper security procedures, since he will soon host a visiting Japanese student and may inadvertently release unauthorized information. (See ANNEX A)
- e. Operational Status: In addition to the confidential sources listed above, nine conventional sources were used during the period, two of whom contributed information on the guard and the talkative scientist. ECOM staff members continue to express appreciation for the information surfaced by the operation. LTC Richard O. Aamot, Chief, Security Office, and ICIP Coordinator, has announced his intention of expressing in writing his appreciation to personnel involved in the ICIP for their contributions to the security of ECOM. Additional details are contained in attached Quarterly Progress Report.

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
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PARTMENT OF THE ARM'S FORT MONMOUTH FIELD OFFICE 109TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP

109TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
P. O. BOX 176, EATONTOWN, NEW JERSEY 07724

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 16

Period: 10 December 1973 to 1 March 1974

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

- 7 MAR 1974

SUBJECT: CENTRAL TAXI (U)

1. (U) CIRCUMSTANCES:

On 4 March 1974, Quarterly Progress Report Number 16 was presented orally to LTC Richard O. Aamot, Chief, Security Office, US Army Electronics Command (ECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in LTC Aamot's office; no others were present.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. The prospective confidential source mentioned in Quarterly Progress Report Number 15 (IC-B-075) was recruited by the PCO on 10 January 1974. (See CR-001-109-MON, Subject: IC-B-075, dated 16 January 1974).
- b. The name of the program has been changed from the Counterintelligence Screening Program (CISP) to the Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP).
- c. Emphasis continues on spotting, assessing and recruiting conventional sources. During the reporting period, the PLO recruited six additional conventional sources. A total of nine conventional sources have been recruited since November 1973, when the new conventional source program was implemented. The PLO is in the process of spotting and assessing four new conventional sources.
- d. The PLO has been alerted by DA that he will be transferred to USAREUR. Hopefully, a new PLO will be on station prior to the undersigned's departure.

3. SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

- a. On 9 January 1974, it was reported that Sherman Ray SHIELDS (see Quarterly Progress Report Number 15) continued to consume alcoholic beverages to excess. (CR-011-109-MON, Subject: IC-B-072, dated 15 January 1974).
- b. On 9 January 1974, it was reported that b6 DAC, GS12, b6 Electronics Devices Branch, Components Section, Production
 Engineering Division, Directorate of Research, Development and Engineering,
 ECOM, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, was involved in foreign business transactions,
 to include transactions emanating from Soviet Bloc countries. (CR-Oll-109MON, Subject: IC-B-072, dated 15 January 1974). Subsequent investigation re-

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
yealed that b6 had indicated on HIS latest Statement of Personal History that HE was involved in foreign business transactions, but failed to note HIS dealings with Soviet Bloc countries. Noteworthy is the fact that HIS mother, father and spouse were all born in Poland. c. On 1 March 1974, information was received that John Randolph DICKER-SON, Sr., DAC, GS-4, b6 a US Government Security Guard employed by ECOM was not carrying out HIS duties in a proper manner. DICKERSON had been observed for over a two-year period at HIS normal post at the entrance/exits to the Hexagon cafeteria. During this period, DICKERSON, who was supposed to be checking personnel for proper identification and clearance, was seen sleeping, wiping tables, working in the kitchen and operating the cafeteria cash register. (Agent Reports prepared by Jerome A. Britton, 109th MI Group, regarding DICKERSON, dated 1 March 1974.) d. On 1 March 1974, information was received that Chief, Laser Technical Area, Combat Surveillance & DAC, GS-15, b6 Target Acquisition Laboratory (CSTA), ECOM, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, had taken a TDY trip to the Washington, D.C. area during the past 30 days. While in the Washington area, b6 accompanied by several others, went to an AMC cafeteria and began discussing sensitive SECRET information. It is unknown if uncleared personnel were able to listen to b6 s conversation. (Agent Reports prepared by Special Agent Jerome A. Britton, 109th MI Group, regarding b6 | dated 1 March 1974). e. Information regarding | b6 (see Quarterly Progress Report Number 15) was passed to the Fort Monmouth Resident Agency, USACIDC, for possible exploitation.

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4. (3)
COMMENTS, REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:


- a. Reference paragraphs 2a and 2c above: LTC Aamot expressed deep satisfaction with CENTRAL TAXI's progress, and urged that personnel involved in the program continue their aggressiveness.
- b. Reference paragraph 3a above: LTC Aamot will talk to SHIELDS' supervisor.
- c. Reference paragraph 3b above: LTC Aamot requested additional information regarding b6 as it is developed. Aamot already has briefed the ECOM Chief of Staff on b6 and would be most appreciative if we can surface additional details.
- d. Reference paragraph 3c above: LTC Aamot advised the PLO that DICKERSON will be relieved from HIS post and transferred to another position with decreased responsibilities.

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e. Reference paragraph 3d above: LTC Aamot contacted the Director of the CSTA laboratory and informed him that b6 had been overheard discussing SE-CRET information in an unauthorized area. Aamot will confront b6 with the same information, without being specific so as not to compromise our source. The Agent Report on b6 bould be of more importance than superficially indicated because b6 is sponsoring a Japanese exchange scientist who only is cleared for access to CONFIDENTIAL material, and b6 is capable of inadvertently passing SECRET data to the Japanese scientist. The verbal counseling by Aamot should negate such an eventuality and result in increased security awareness on b6 spart.
f. Reference paragraphs 2c and 3c and 3d above: The Agent Reports on b6 and DICKERSON were especially significant because they represent the first reporting by conventional sources since implementation of the conventional source program in November 1973. This data was obtained on just the second contact with the sources and indicates a very promising future for the overall program.
g. CENTRAL TAXI target coverage is presently as follows:
(1) Research, Development and Engineering Directorate: Confidential Sources IC-B-072 and IC-B-073.
(2) Directorate of Product Assurance: Confidential Source IC-B-074.
(3) Maintenance Directorate: Conventional Sources b7(d) and b7(d)
(4) Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Laboratory: Confidential Source IC-B-075 and Conventional Source b7(d)
(5) Electronics Technology and Devices Laboratory: Conventional Source
(6) Electronic Warfare Laboratory: Conventional Sources b7(d) b7(d) and b7(d)
(7) Research and Development Technical Support Activity: Conventional Source [b7(d)].
(8) Directorate of Management Information Systems: Confidential Source IC-B-058, upon his transfer from ECOM/Philadelphia to Fort Monmouth.
(9) Communications/Automatic Data Processing Laboratory: Conventional Source b7(d)
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h. Future plans relative to new target areas are to recruit sources in the following ECOM activities which are presently void of source coverage: Avionics Laboratory; Directorate of Procurement and Production; Directorate of Materiel Management, upon its relocation from Philadelphia to Fort Monmouth; Comptroller; and Directorate of Plans, Training and Force Development.


i. A total of 11 CENTRAL TAXI Agent Reports, consisting of 19 leads were prepared by the PCO and PLO during the reporting period.

JERONE A. BRITTON

CW3, USA

PLO, CENTRAL TAXI

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12. (OACSI Approval - 3 Oct 73)

a. Location: US Army Management Systems Support Agency, The Pentagon

b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was recruited during the period.

c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None

d. Useful Information Obtained: None


e. Operational Status: The source is still in the training phase, but can be expected to begin satisfying EEI during the next reporting period. Twenty-one prospective sources have been subjected to file reviews, IACs, NACs and assessment, and can be activated as required. The Director and the Security Manager continue to provide the cooperation necessary in the development of this operation. During the quarterly briefing, the Director stated that sensitive information discussed in his office was becoming common knowledge within the agency and felt that this information was either released by someone without authorization or that his office was technically monitored. He requested that a technical inspection of his office be provided, and was assured that an inspection would be conducted in the near future. A complete inspection was completed on 5 Apr 74 with negative results.

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13. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval - 17 Feb 72)

a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigative data on potential sources.
- e. Operational Status: A review of installation targets indicates that the highest priority should be given the Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL). One of the above sources is assigned to BRL, and three conventional sources are now under assessment to expand the coverage. Two additional conventional sources are under assessment in other target activities. The Project Liaison Officer has been assisting in preparation of the Sensitive Activity Vulnerability Estimate (SAVE) at Aberdeen since February. This has given him an opportunity to make additional useful contacts and identify areas such as BRL which need additional source coverage.

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GONG SILK: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

Location: Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, NJ

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was terminated during the period, leaving a total of two.
- c. Information Optained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: As a result of information provided by a source, the Commander and Security Officer were made aware of excessive absenteeism by a GS 11 Engineer. The employee's absence and irrational behavior were known to the Civilian Personnel Office but not staffed. As a result, procedures have been changed so that such information will be reported to the Security Officer. Another engineer, a GS 12, allegedly takes bets from fellow employees in excess of \$100 and "lays them off" with umidentified individuals off-post. Another engineer, a GS 11, is offering photographic equipment for sale to fellow employees at about 60% of cost, most of it admittedly "hot." This information, which could conceivably be exploited by HOIS came to the source as a target of opportunity. The ICIP Coordinator has requested further information be developed before requests for investigation are submitted to USAINTC.
- e. Operational Status: Eleven of the 12 potential conventional sources mentioned in the previous quarterly report have been contacted, and 10 were amenable to recruitment. The 11th was agreeable, but did not consider that he had the proper placement. He identified the building in his directorate which was the location of the most sensitive activities, and recommended two individuals as possible sources. He has been briefed on the necessity of remaining silent about the operation. The Project Liaison Officer has been requested to assist in future SAEDA lectures, and expects to acquire additional potential sources from among the "walk-ins" who normally surface after such lectures. The Commander has taken an interest in the operation and requested the expanded coverage which will be provided by the use of conventional sources. Termination of the source was necessitated because of a RIF which reduced him from a GS 11 to a GS 7, affecting his production as a source. He was also transferred to a less sensitive area, ending his placement.

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15. Un LANDLESS TIME: (OACSI Approval - 19 Jan 72)

a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command

b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was contacted during the reporting period.

c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None

d. Useful Information Obtained: None.

e. Operational Status: The source was met in New Jersey and stated that he was to be officially transferred to Ft Monmouth on 11 Mar. From a practical standpoint, this signifies the demise of LANDIESS TIME. A revised CENTRAL TAXI OPLAN will include the functions transferred from Philadelphia to Ft Monmouth, and will identify the Management Information Services Branch, to which this source is assigned, as a target area. This source will be carried during the next reporting period under CENTRAL TAXI.

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16. LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute, East Coast Branch Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None; coverage is provided by conventional sources.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Agent Reports on eight Arabian instructors which satisfies requirements of a USAINTC program concerning extremist threats against the Army.
- e. Operational Status: During the reporting period, word was received that the headquarters and school would begin a move to the Presidio of Monterey, CA, after 1 July. However, all classes which are in session on that date will continue here until graduation. It will therefore be necessary to continue this operation until the move by attrition is completed, while LENTIL MONKEY will increase coverage accordingly.

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17. ENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four sources used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: The limited investigation on the captain displaying unexplained affluence is not yet complete. A Hungarian-born NCO was identified as not having completely accounted for foreign visits and relatives. The requested investigation has been completed and is being returned to AWC. The questionable areas appear to have been satisfactorily resolved.
- e. Operational Status: The CG, AWC continues to express his complete satisfaction with the operation. Conventional Sources continue to provide information to supplement that provided by the Confidential Sources. The new Deputy CG was briefed during the period and expressed reservations concerning the operation. It can only be hoped that the Commandant's enthusiasm for the operation will serve to overcome this attitude.

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LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval - 26 Oct 71)

/a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch
Presidio of Monterey, CA

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four sources were utilized during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Another incident involving penpals in Czechoslovakia was surfaced, although it took place during the summer of 1973. It involved unidentified ethnic Czechs at the SOKOL Hall in San Mateo, CA and two unidentified WAC members of the Army Security Agency who graduated in Sep 73. ODCSI, USAREUR has been requested to pass this information to ASA security authorities in USAREUR and provide the identity of the perpetrators and the names of the Czech pen-pals. Five individuals involved in the illegal use of drugs were identified and appropriate notifications made. One of these was alleged to have admitted using heroin.
- e. Operational Status: The Commandant, Defense Language Institute, was present for the quarterly briefing and was extremely receptive to the program. He expects to move his staff to the West Coast by Sep 74. There are 11 conventional sources employed, and eight additional students have been identified as probable confidential sources. Both the Commandant and Security Officer have expressed appreciation for the enhancement of the installation's security posture as a result of the ICIP and attendant CI support.

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ACTION SHEET		, in	ROL NUMBER				
BUBJECT		OFFIC	E SYMBOL	SUSPENSE			
		DAI	11-D01-S				
Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations		DATE	DATE				
			28 January 1974				
ACTION REQUIRED	CTD						
To obtain approval of the quarterly I	CIP report.						
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, the action without recourse to other sources.)	background and action taken	or recommende	d. Must be suffici	ently detailed to identify			
1. BACKGROUND:							
a. By memorandum dated 8 Februar Army requested the Vice Chief of Staf on all (ICIP) operations.	y 1972 (YELLO <u>W T</u> f (VCSA), US Arm	AB B) the y, provid	Under Sec e quarterl	retary of the y reports			
b. This is the seventh such quarterly report.							
c. USAINTC input is at YELLOW TA	AB_C.						
2. DISCUSSION:							
a. At the direction of the VCSA, telligence Program (ICIP) replaced th (ACIP).	, 2 November 1973 ie term Aggressiv	, the ter e Counter	m Internal intelligen	Counterin- ce Program,			
b. <u>YELLOW TAR A forwards</u> to the 1973 for the Under Secretary of the A	VCSA the ICIP Qu	arterly R	eport endi	ng 31 December			
3. RECOMMENDATION: That the memorar signed.	idum to the VCSA	at <u>YELLOW</u>	TAB A be	approved and			
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-DOI-S

0 1 FEB 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations

- 1. Reference Under Secretary of the Army memorandum, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above (Inclosure 2).
- 2. Recommend your approval and signature of the memorandum at Inclosure I which transmits the report required by the cited reference.
- 3. Coordination: None required.

 Memo for USofA w/attachment (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Memo for VCSA, 8 Feb 72 --(SECRET)

HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS

AGofS for Intelligence

15 Feb 74

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APPROVED - VCSA. (Memo to USofA hand carried).

Assistant Secretary of the General Staff

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MEMORANGIM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIF) Operations (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army, dated 8 February 1972, subject as above.

2. The eleven Internal Counterintelligence Progret (ICL) operations reported by memorandum to you last quarter remain active. Lix new operations submitted during the last quarter have been reviewed at DA and approved for implementation. The report of current operations for the quarter ending 31 December 1973 is attached.

3. The primary value of ICIP operations is in their potential for early warning and detecting internal accordity weakness and security threats to the supported command. Insecuely as these operations are a form of intensified security vatchfulness, negative reports in these solves are frequently of value to a commender in planning for security requirements of a given installation or activity.

1 Incl as (COFEANTIL) FR.1 C. TIME General, United State. Lang Vice Chief of Staff

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CONTIDENTIAL

CURRENT ICIP OPERATIONS

LOCATION	ICIP NICKNAME	DATE AFPROVED	NUMBER CONFI- DENTIAL SOURCE
Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland	CANAL LOOP	16 Peb 72	5
Fort Huschuce, Arigona	CANAL ROPE	17 Dec 73	o
Fort Ritchie, Maryland	CANARY EFFORT	16 Feb 72	3
Dugway Proving Ground, Utah	CANARY STONE	18 Jul 73	C
Seneca Army Depot, New York	CANINE PLATE	18 Sep 73	c
Fort Bliss, Texas	CANTINA ARCH	12 Dec 73	o
Fort Lewis, Washington	CENTAUR RACE	30 Jul 73	o
Fort Belveir, Virginia	CENTAUR SALE	14 Dec 73	o
Harry Diamond Lab, Washington, DC	CENTAVO KID	18 Oct 73	0
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey	CENTRAL TAXI	16 Feb 72	3
USAMSSA, Pentagon	CENTURY SQUAD	3 Oet 73	0
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland	GONDOLA STAR	16 Feb 72	2
Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey	CONG SILK	16 Feb 72	3
Electronics Command, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	LANDLESS TIME	19 Jan 72	1 .

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CURRENT ICIP OPERATIONS (cont)


LOCATION	ICIP NICKNAME	DATE APPROVED	NUMBER CONFI- DENTIAL SOURCES
Defense Language Institute Washington, DC	LANYARD MOOD	22 Dec 71	0
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania	LENIENT CLOUD	16 Feb 72	4
Defense Language Institute Presidio of Monterey, California	LENTIL MONKEY	26 Oct 71	4
TOTALS 17	17	•	25


Off-post Information: There were no instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians was collected off post.

Information Obtained:

- a. During the second quarter FY 74 the ICIP operations have received increased emphasis from the Intelligence Command and the supported commanders. The 17 operations, six of which are newly implemented, have been received with enthusiasm from the supported commands. None of the operations during this quarter indicated the existence of a hostile threat.
- b. Approximately 30 reports emanating from the ongoing operations and passed to the supported commanders concern personnel suitability and incidents.

Continuance of Operations: The 17 ICIP operations are being continued for their original stated purpose.









DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 0
U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

C 9 JAN 1974

ICDO-OP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence

Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

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
There has been positive improvement in the Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) during the second quarter FY 1974. The
positive improvement has resulted from Command emphasis placed on making
the individual operations viable and productive. The briefings conducted by the Intelligence Command and the Group Commanders' visits
have contributed immeasurably to understanding, acceptance and cooperation in the ICIP by the supported Commanders and their staffs. With
this impetus and assignment of aggressive Project Liaison and Contact
Officers, the operations are beginning to produce the counterintelligence
information that meet and satisfy the objectives of this program.
Criminal and security information gleaned as an adjunct of the program
activity have been furnished the appropriate Army authorities for their
action.

2. During the reporting period, there have been six additional ICIP operations approved of which three were implemented and the other three are scheduled for implementation during January 1974. This brings the total number of operations to 17 for the program.

In addition to Quarterly Status report, Progress Reports are inclosed for in depth information concerning the individual operations. These reports not only reflect the progress accomplished during the reporting period, but the positive attitude that now prevails at all levels.

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

This aggressive attitude is expected to result in increased productivity with each quarter. Equally important, the ICIP is expected to continue to project a favorable image of counterintelligence through professional accomplishments and service to the supported commands.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

32 Incl 1-17. Quarterly Status Rpts 18-32. Quarterly Progress Rpts

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

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1. CANAL LOOP: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Two Agent Reports dated 13 Dec 73, subject: 66 submitted.
- e. Operational Status: The assignment of a replacement Project Liaison Officer will enhance the planned recruitment of additional sources both here and at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

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2. CANAL ROPE: (OACSI Approval - 17 Dec 73)

- a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Communications Command and 11th Signal Group, Ft Huachuca, AZ
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: Not applicable.
- e. Operational Status: Implementation by the field element directed on 21 December 1973 is expected to be actioned in January 1974.

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


3. CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three Confidential Sources were utilized during the reporting period. Additionally, one Conventional Source has been coded and was utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Twenty-two Agent Reports were submitted pertaining to incidents and adverse suitability information regarding US Army personnel assigned to the US Army Communications Command CONUS and Fort Ritchie. Several individuals were identified as being involved in drug abuse or drug abuse incidents. Appropriate Fort Ritchie staff personnel and CID were notified. Activities of these individuals will be monitored for development of specific suitability information, since the majority have access to the Alternate Joint Communications Center. A senior NCO assigned to communications was identified as being in debt.
- e. Operational Status: An experienced Project Liaison Officer was assigned the operation on 15 October 1973 and is now well established. The Fort Ritchie commander expressed his gratitude at the accomplishments rendered during the reporting period. The Commanding General, US Army Communications Command CONUS has expressed his desire that the operation continue in effect to enhance the security of his command.

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4.

CANARY STONE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Jul 73)

- à. Location: Deseret Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground, UT
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: Not applicable
- e. Operational Status: With the arrival of the Project Liaison Officer on station on 1 December 1973, and the finalization of the Intraservice Support Agreement, this operation can be expected to become operational during the coming quarter.


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


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CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Sep 73)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: Not applicable.
- e. Operational Status: The Commander was briefed on the implementation of the operation on 17 November 1973. Sources are expected to be recruited and reporting during the third quarter of FY 7^{l_4} .

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6. CANTINA ARCH: (OACSI Approval - 12 Dec 73)


- a. Location: US Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss, TX
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: Not applicable.
- e. Operational Status: Implementation by the field element directed on 21 December is expected to be accomplished in January 1974.

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7. (C) CENTAUR RACE: (OACSI Approval - 30 Jul 73)

- a. Location: Ninth Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, WA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: This operation currently has no Confidential Sources.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Conventional Sources have reported damage to signal equipment and to a helicopter. Both incidents are still under investigation to determine whether the damage was intentional or accidental. Information was also obtained on the distribution of antimilitary/dissident literature at Fort Lewis.
- e. Operational Status: The impending courtmartial of SP4 b6
 b6 for illegal distribution of literature on-post has increased the tempo of anti-military activity at Fort Lewis. Lead Development data on prospective Confidential Sources is expected by mid-January 1974. In the meantime, coverage is provided by 11 Conventional Sources, with another 12 under assessment.

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8. (c) CENTAUR SALE: (OACSI Approval - 14 Dec 73)

- a. Location: US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, VA
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: Not applicable.

d. Use	ful Information Ob	otained: Du	ring this per	iod three	e Agent _
Reports were	e produced. These	e reports are	as follows:	b6	
b6 , DPOB:	b6		SSG be	3	report
submitted 2	6 October 1973, co	oncerned sui	tability due	to indeb	tedness;
b6	, DPOB:	b6	-		, CIV
b6	report submitted		1973, concer	ned suita	bility due
to alcohol	drinking problems;	b6	DPOB:	b6	
b6	SSAN b6		ort submitted		
	threatening telep				
developed by	y the Project Liai	ison Officer	pending form	al appron	ral of the
Operations :	Plan.				

e. Operational Status: Formal implementation by the field element directed on 21 December 1973 is expected to be accomplished in January 1974.

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9. (G) CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Approval - 18 Oct 73)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.

d. Useful Information Obtained:	One Agent Report was produced on
suitability information developed on	b6 DPOB: b6
b6	CIV b6

e. Operational Status: The Commander was advised on 12 November 1973 that the operation was being implemented. However, source recruitment is not expected until the next reporting period.

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
CENTRAL TAXI: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

a. Location: Headquarters, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three such sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A US Army truck has been observed delivering unidentified articles each week to a civilian residence in a hearby town; a civilian employee has a drinking problem to the extent that he has come to work inebriated. A civilian employee is allegedly involved in narcotics traffic.
- e. Operational Status: Above items of information were passed to the appropriate officials at Fort Monmouth. The operation has been revitalized. The confidential sources have been reactivated by the newly assigned Project Control Officer, and the Project Liaison Officer has recruited three conventional sources; two in the Electronics Warfare Laboratory, ECOM's most sensitive activity and one in the Maintenance Directorate where the majority of the ECOM security violations originate.

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


11. CENTURY SQUAD: (OACSI Approval - 3 Oct 73)


- a. Location: US Army Management Systems Support Agency, The Pentagon
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Not applicable.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - . d. Useful Information Obtained: Not applicable.
- e. Operational Status: The Security Officer and his assistant were advised on 5 November 1973 that the operation had been approved for implementation. Ten individuals have been identified as potential Confidential Sources, and requests for Local and National Agency Checks have been initiated. Recruitment of these individuals will depend on the investigative results. The files of 17 civilian employees have also been reviewed and records checks have been requested.

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GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Approval - 17 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: The recently assigned Project Liaison Officer, who also handles the operation at Edgewood Arsenal, has served two previous tours at Aberdeen, and his contacts needed to spot and assess the additional Confidential Sources required for this operation have been re-established. Edgewood is a sub-post of Aberdeen, and it appears advisable to revise the GONDOIA STAR OPIAN to include CANAL LOOP. A single Project Control Officer handles the sources at both posts, and the Aberdeen Installation Intelligence Officer, who is the ICIP Coordinator, functions also for Edgewood.

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14. (C) LANDLESS TIME: (OACSI Approval - 19 Jan 72)

- a. Location: Philadelphia Facility, US Army Electronics Command
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was contacted during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: The single source available in this operation moved to a newly-purchased house near Fort Monmouth shortly before Christmas and he is commuting to Philadelphia. At the present time, source is employed in the Management Information Services Directorate, which is not included in the designated target areas of the Fort Monmouth operation. Retention of source depends upon his projected transfer in March 1974 to duties at Fort Monmouth.

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15. (C) LANYARD MOOD: (OACSI Approval - 22 Dec 71)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute East Coast Branch Anacostia Naval Annex, Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None; coverage is provided by conventional sources.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: This facility has changed from the previous utilization of contract schools scattered throughout the Washington area to a more traditional self-contained facility with seven language departments and its own instructors. A revised operation plan reflecting this structure and placing emphasis on the utilization of confidential as well as conventional sources has been prepared and will be forwarded under separate cover.

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LENIENT CLOUD: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Four such sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information was developed indicating a captain has exhibited unexplained affluence, which served as basis for initiating an investigation.
- e. Operational Status: The Project Liaison Officer has developed 31 conventional sources, whose information has identified a number of security weaknesses. The Commandant has been made aware of this situation and has established additional security safeguards. The Military History Research Collection, a tenant agency, has been added to the list of target activities.

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
(OACSI Approval - 26 Oct 71)

a. Location: Defense Language Institute West Coast Branch Presidio of Monterey, CA

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was used as of the beginning of the reporting period. Three additional sources were added during the period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-post and/or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: A Czech class made a field trip to the same San Francisco restaurant mentioned in status report for the second quarter of CY 73. There was no repetition of the May 73 incident. Communist literature was found in the post gymnasium. Improper procedures were used in a briefing with a SECRET classification. This information was passed to appropriate staff personnel.
- e. Operational Status: The lead Bank of prospective sources stands at 68 MI students. Twelve have been selected as prospective conventional sources and eight for confidential sources. The continued SAEDA briefings of class monitors has increased the security awareness of the students, and incidents which went unreported in the past are now being brought to the attention of the proper authorities.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 109TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP FORT MEADE, MARYLAND, 20755

ICGP-B-SP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR) and Quarterly Status Reports

(QSR) (U)

Commander

United States Army Intelligence Command

ATTN: LCDC-OP

Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

The state of the s

1. (U) Forwarded herewith are ten Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR) and ten Quarterly Status Reports (QSR) for the period 15 September 1973 to 15 December 1973 for the following Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Projects:

- a. CANAL LOOP (U)
- b. GONDOLA STAR (U)
- c. CANINE PLATE (U)
- d. CENTAVO KID (U)
- e. CENTRAL TAXI (U)
- f. GONG SILK (U)
- g. LANYARD MOOD (U)
- h. CENTAUR SALE (U)
- 1. CANARY EFFORT (U)

1. LENIENT CLOUD (U)

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2 Project accomplishments are contained in individual QPRs; however, specific attention is invited to the following projects:

a. CANAL LOOP (U) and GONDOLA STAR (U): The new Project Liaison

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ICGP-B-SP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR) and Quarterly Status Reports (QSR)


Officer (PLO) is on station and the new Project Control Officer (PCO) has reactivated seven dormant sources. This Group will recommend combining these two operations in view of organizational changes in the mission and functions of Edgewood Arsenal and Aberdeen Proving Ground.

- b. CANINE PLATE (U): During the reporting period, formal approval of the Operation Plan (OPlan) was received from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (OACSI), Department of the Army, and the Commander, Seneca Army Depot was briefed. A PLO is assigned and the program is being implemented based on ground work previously initiated.
- c. CENTAVO KID (U): During the reporting period OACSI approval of the OPlan was received and the Commander, Harry Diamond Laboratory was briefed regarding the project. A PLO has been assigned and the program has been implemented. Sources are under consideration.
- d. CENTRAL TAXI (U) and LANDLESS TIME (U): The CENTRAL TAXI (U) OPlan is under revision and should be combined with LANDLESS TIME (U). This action is recommended in view of the deactivation next year of the Electronics Command, Philadelphia (ECOM/P) and transfer of its functions to Fort Monmouth (ECOM/M). As a result of the on-going drawdown, transfer of functions and necessary termination of all but the one Confidential Source who is moving to Fort Monmouth, no OPR or OSR will be submitted for Operation LANDLESS TIME (U).
- e. GONG SILK (U): The newly assigned GREAT SKILL (U) PCO has reactivated the three dormant Confidential Sources and broadened his base.
- f. LANYARD MOOD (U): ICIP Support to the Defense Language Institute, East Coast (DLIEC) has a new PLO designated, and the revised OPlan submitted to your headquarters for approval.
- g. CENTAUR SALE (U): OACSI approval of the OPlan was received on 14 December 1973. The Commander, Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center (MERDC) elected to be briefed in January 1974. A PLO has been designated and is presently active in the overt aspects of the program.
- h. CANARY EFFORT (U): The project in support of USACOM-CONUS and Fort Ritchie is the best example of what the ICIP can accomplish when aggressively pursued by all personnel involved. Specific attention is invited to the CANARY EFFORT (U) QPR and QSR. I have directed that CANARY EFFORT (U) serve as the pilot operation for all ICIP operations conducted by the 109th MI Group. A new PLO has been recently assigned.

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


ICGP-B-SP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Progress Reports (QPR) and Quarterly Status Reports (QSR)

- i. LENIENT CLOUD (U): The Military Mistory Research Collection (MHRC), at the request of the Commandant, US Army War College (USAMC) has been added to the LEVIENT CLOUD (U) Target List. Information developed by the PLO has led to the initiation of background investigations concerning two individuals assigned to USAWC. Two Conventional Sources have been coded during the reporting period.
- 3. The following items constitute group-wide accomplishments which have significantly improved all aspects of the ICIP:
- a. Operational control of the ICIP has been returned to Field Office control and energized there. A Special Operations Letter of Instruction (LOI) has been published which will constitute 109th MI Group policy and procedures regarding the ICIP. I have placed great Command Interest throughout the quarter on the program and stressed the importance of the ICIP during the recent 109th MI Group Commanders' Conference. I will continue to emphasize this program during my periodic visits to all subordinate elements. Additionally, I have personally briefed a number of commanders of supported activities and their security managers concerning ICIP. This quarter we have placed first priority on the ICIP program and results have been satisfactory. More will be accomplished.
- b. Action has been taken to fully coordinate the provisions of existing ICIP OPlans with the provisions of USAINTC and 109th MI Group OPlans 109-73, 110-73, and 111-73. Simultaneously, all ICIP OPlans will be revised and updated on a programmed basis. The object is to better our product and expand our base.
- c. My staff has worked closely with your Special Operations personnel in the formulation of an ICIP Monthly Operational Status Report which is designed to update and replace the QSR and QPR.
- d. GREAT SKILL (U) Personnel have been assigned and are operationally active as PCOs. All dormant Confidential Sources have been reactivated and are being retrained and redirected in line with increased standards of professionalism. More sources are being considered.
- e. A Conventional Source Program is being developed to augment and support existing Confidential Sources.
- f. Guidance has been formulated and disseminated directing subordinate commanders to evaluate supported installations and activities for potential ICIP implementation.

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ICGP-B-SP

SUBJECT: Quarterly Progress Reports (OPR) and Quarterly Status Reports

(QSR)

4. (c) The preceding actions have resulted in the highest level of productivity since the TCTP was reactivated in late 1971. I am confident that continued emphasis upon ICTP by all personnel will result in significant, demonstrable enhancement of the security posture of supported activities and installations.

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CHARLES E. THOMANN

Colonel, MI Commanding

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CARLISLE BARRACKS LIAISON OFFICE 109th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER

Period 12 October 1973 to 18 December 1973

OPERATION LENIENT CLOUD (U) SUBJECT:

(U) CIRCUMSTANCES: At 0900, 18 December 1973, Major Franklin M. Davis, Jr., Commandant, US Army War College, (USAWC), Carlisle Barracks, PA, 17013, received the quarterly briefing concerning significant items of interest within the target areas defined by Installation Counterintelligence Program (ICIP), LENIENT CLOUD, from Special Agent John A. Nolan III, Project Liaison Officer, (PLO). No other persons were present during the briefing.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. Operational and administrative control of ICIP LENIENT CLOUD was placed in Field Office Commander, (FOC), Fort Ritchie Field Office (FRFO), 109th MI Group.
- (1) Such operational control caused PLO to be responsible for the conduct of SAEDA Briefings. Two SAEDA briefings were presented to a total of 560 military and civilian personnel on the installation on 1 November 1973. Presentation of such briefings allowed greater exposure of PLO to military and civilian personnel as a representative of USAINTC; allowed PLO to include himself among those persons continuously present on the installation capable of resolution of security related problems; and greatly enhanced PLO's accessibility to records and personnel on the installation and vise versa.
- (2) On 24 October 1973, MAJ Robert L. Brooks, FOC, FRFO, visited Carlisle Barracks for an orientation, which included meetings with the Directors, and tours, of Strategic Studies Institute, Operations Group, Military History Research Collection (MHRC), USAWC Library, USAWC itself and USACC-C facility. Carlisle Barracks.
- (3) On 11 December 1973, COL Charles E. Thomann, Commanding Officer, 109th MI Group, accompanied by MAJ Brooks, visited Carlisle Barracks for an orientation and in addition to an office call on General Davis, received a tour through those facilities in paragraph 2a(2) above, with the exception of MHRC.
- (4) As a result of the visit by COL Thomann and MAJ Brooks, a comprehensive paper is presently being prepared with a view toward reducing the administrative CLASSIFIED BY COR 109TH MI GROUP EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

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time, especially in regard to security clearance procedures, involved in hiring of civilian professors and consultants at Strategic Studies Institute, possibly through USAINTC assets.

- (5) An additional result of the visits by COL Thomann and MAJ Brooks was an appreciation of the physical plant, the functions and the key personnel of target areas defined within ICIP LENIENT CLOUD.
- b. In response to General Davis' request of 23 October 1973, approval was sought for the addition of MHRC to the target list of those organizations and facilities covered by Project LENIENT CLOUD.
- (1) On 14 November 1973, approval was granted by letter from Commanding Officer, USAINTC, to add MHRC to the target list.
- (2) Since 1 April 1973, target operational research for operational data relative to MHRC has been conducted and has thus far resulted in the submission of two Agent Reports detailing security procedures in effect at MHRC and two Agent Reports concerning persons assigned to MHRC.
- (3) Spotting and assessment of potential assets has not thus far resulted in the submission of any formal, comprehensive Lead and Development Reports; however, daily to weekly contact has been established with three individuals presently identified as casual sources, within MHRC.
- (4) As a result of contact with casual sources within MHRC, a formal written request for counterintelligence technical services was submitted to HQ, 902nd MI Group and subsequently completed by elements of the AJCC Field Office, 902nd MI Group, Fort Ritchie, MD. The services resulted in an appreciation on the part of MHRC administrative personnel of the benefits which accrue to the facility by such technical services. By virtue of the established reluctance on the part of COL George S. Pappas as regards the need for counterintelligence services, the basis for request of the services primarily concerned the safeguarding of valuable manuscripts, weapons, uniforms and other exhibits maintained in MHRC. At this point in time, such emphasis establishes, in the mind of the Director, a compatability between academic and historical prespectives and counterintelligence services.
- c. During the reporting period, in-depth spotting and assessment potential assets for utilization, has resulted in submission of seven Lead and Development Reports.
- d. To date, a total of twenty-nine casual sources, with whom daily to weekly contact had been maintained, have been utilized. As a result of utilization, two casual sources have coded as Source 9002 and Source 9003.
- e. Establishment of the PLO as a quasi-officially assigned assistant to the USAWC Security Manager, and who has a capability of providing a liaison conduit to USAINTC as an adjunct to such duties, has resulted in:

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
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
- (1) Casual and conventional sources providing information which they would normally not have occasion to report officially due to periodically vagarious requirements of military administrative procedures.
- (2) Causing the PLO to be queried relative to organizations with which members of the USAWC Staff and Faculty deal. Such queries have resulted in very rapid resolution of requests for characterization, in two cases, through CPT B. A. Oullette, Special Investigations Branch, 109th MI Group, and establishment of the PLO, in the view of the Staff and Faculty members, as a viable contact for intelligence related matters.
- (3) Causing requests for all classified and unclassified military information to be routinely channelled through the USAWC Security Office, as opposed to the previous "hit or miss" manner in which each department of USAWC validated the requestor's authenticity. Further results include an established procedure whereby the List of Collectors of Unclassified Military Information (LHCUMI) is reviewed and has caused the submission of three letters to the appropriate agency at ACSI, when organizations/individuals have appeared in the LHCUMI document.

SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

- a. As a result of contact with a casual source in the administrative section of MHRC, a request for a background investigation of SGT b6

 b6 MHRC has been submitted, through USAINTC channels, and is being conducted by PLO. Estimated date of completion of the initial portion of the investigation is 5 January 1974, dependent upon availability of sources who may be able to resolve derogatory information which has arisen.
- b. As a result of inquiries by PLO, contact with conventional and casual sources on the installation, and in concert with information developed through confidential sources, a request for another investigation into the financial and moral background of CPT b6 assigned to Department of Command and Management, USAWC, has been initiated to be resolved by USAINTC elements. To date one Agent Report has been submitted to SIB, 109th MI Group, for forwarding to USAINTC, as background, prior to the submission of the request for investigation through the Deputy for Plans, Training and Security, Carlisle Barracks.
- c. As a result of information supplied by casual sources, PLO is currently attempting to ascertain the true identity and purpose of a Mr. fnu b6 , who has been "gate-crashing" parties and other social affairs at Carlisle Barracks, at which times he wears either a social or military nametag. Local agency checks on Carlisle Barracks reveal that no individual by the name of b6 is assigned or employed at the installation.
- d. An individual, subsequently coded, volunteered information in interview and sworn statement, relative to narcotics availability and use on Carlisle Barracks, as background information relative to the operation of





the installation, and which contained allegations relative to an individual assigned to Carlisle Barracks in possession of a TOP SECRET security clearance. To date, nine Agent Reports, Subject: Availability and use of Narcotics on Carlisle Barracks, PA 1973 and a Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Information and Circumstances Relative to Drugs on Carlisle Barracks, have been submitted.

COMMENTS, REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 'a. General Davis commented that he appreciated the presence of a full time PLO, whose integration into both the official and social functioning of the installation has been such as to provide much more effective coverage than had previously been experienced. General Davis queried PLO relative to the PLO serving as the Security Manager, USAWC during the impending leave of the Security Manager during the latter two weeks in January 1974, and was assured that the PLO would so serve, without any substantial reduction in coverage. Further, the assumption of the Security Manager's duties for two weeks could only serve to cement the acceptability of the PLO as the assistant to the Security Manager.
- b. General Davis was receptive to the PLO's suggestion that a consideration be given for a formal request for a penetration test of the USANC, subsequent to the full implementation of additional security safeguards presently being substituted for systems previously determined to be inadequate. Formal request will probably be forthcoming in late January, 1974, when construction is completed.
- c. General Davis was also receptive to a recommendation that consideration be given for up-grading the security posture of Root Hall, which houses USAWC, in respect to limiting access to the building and effectively reducing the threat posed by a star-behind.

JOHN A. NOLAN III PLO, LENIENT CLOUD



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
FORT ORD FIELD OFFICE
115TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA 93941

ICGP-F-OR

11 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4

For the Period 1 October to 31 December 1973

WARRING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND AETHODS INVOLVED

SUBJECT: Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U)

1. (U) CIRCUMSTANCES:

a. At 1030 hours on 4 December 1973, a briefing on the progress of LENTIL MONKEY was conducted at the Fort Ord Field Office, 115th Military Intelligence Group, Fort Ord, California. Attending were:

Colonel Eric H. Vieler, Commander, 115th Military Intelligence Group Major James H. Donnelly, Commander, Fort Ord Field Office CW2 James E. McKinley, Project Liaison Officer, LENTIL MONKEY

b. Between 1430 and 1500 hours, 4 December, a similar briefing was held in the office of the Commandant, Defense Language Institute, West Coast (DLIWC), Presidio of Monterey, California. Persons present were:

Colonel John F. Hook, Commandant, DLIWC Colonel Eric H. Vieler Major Richard Erickson, Security Officer, DLIWC Major James H. Donnelly CW2 James E. McKinley

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

a. The On-Post Liaison Operation: A total of 80 students, who were Class and Section Monitors, received individual SAEDA briefings in this operation. Included in this total were four monitors who received second briefings, and five who received third briefings. Intelligence-trained students were also contacted and reminded of their professional responsibility to report anything of intelligence interest.

b. The Conventional Source Operation:

(1) At the start of the quarter this operation had 20 prospective sources. Eight more were selected during this period, giving the operation

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SUBJECT: Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U)

a total of 28 prospective sources. Information produced by this operation exceeded that of any previous quarter since the project was reactivated in November 1971.

- (2) Colonel Hook and Major Erickson were not briefed on the following:
- (a) During the reporting period the Lead Bank was expanded from 42 to 68 MI students. Twelve new Leads were selected as prospective Conventional Sources; however, four were later dropped because of academic difficulties with the language being studied.
- (b) On 24 October 1973, this operation acquired a prospective source who is a DA civilian employee of the Systems Development Agency, Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey. This individual was formerly Confidential Source IC-D-310 of the 112th Military Intelligence Group.
- c. The Confidential Source Operation: When the quarter began, this operation had eight prospective sources. One was recruited on 11 October 1973, four are still under assessment, and three have been dropped as unsuitable. Seven additional leads are presently being screened for possible development as sources. Colonel Hook and Major Erickson were not briefed on the following:
- (1) Lead and Development Reports have been forwarded for four prospective sources. Recruitment of one of these sources is awaiting Headquarters, USAINTC approval of the approach plan.
- (2) The seven new Leads were selected to cover the Chinese (1), Czech (1), Hungarian (1), Polish (1), Russian (2), and Japanese (1). languages.

significant counterintelligence information developed:

- a. Information was developed concerning the visit of a DLIWC Czech class to the Europa Restaurant, 2769 Lombard Street, San Francisco, CA, on 2 and 9 November 1973. A Confidential Source reported in May 1973 that the owner of this restaurant had encouraged Czech language students to establish "pen-pal" correspondence with three young females in Czechoslovakia. The class visited the restaurant as scheduled, but no further attempts to recruit "pen-pals" were noted.
- b. A student reported that members of his Russian language class proposed a class visit of the Russian Consulate in San Francisco. Since the trip was not being planned for the immediate future, nothing further developed concerning this proposal.

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- c. Confidential Source IC-F-081 reported on Czechoslovakian publications available to his class which contained Communist propaganda.
- d. A student provided a copy of a booklet published by the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, which he had received in the mail. Numerous copies of this same booklet have been received by military personnel at Fort Ord.
- 4. (U) COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The briefing ended with no questions by the attending parties. Colonel Hook expressed his appreciation for the effort expended in the conduct of the Internal Counterintelligence Program, and was very pleased with the progress that had been made.

JAMES H. DONNELLY Major, MI Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Fort Ritchie Field Office

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ICGP-B-FR

15 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER

Period 15 October 1973 to 15 December 1973

THEORY SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.

SUBJECT: Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

CIRCUMSTANCES:

a. Although a formal briefing per se has not been presented during reporting period, continual liaison has been effected and maintained with individuals briefed on the Counterintelligence Screening Program (CISP), Operation CANARY EFFORT, at Fort Ritchie. Continual/constant liaison has been effected and maintained with the following briefed individuals:

COL James A. Manning, b6 Armor, Commander, Fort Ritchie. COL Daniel T. Larkin, b6 MPC, Deputy Commander, Fort Ritchie and Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Fort Ritchie.

SC, Director, Telecommunications, LTC Arlyn R. Madsen, Fort Ritchie.

CWL Earl K. Osborne, b6 USA, COMSEC Officer, US Army Communications Command . CONUS and Fort Ritchie.

Mr. Joseph J. Carroll, DAC, GS-13, b6 Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Fort Ritchie. Carroll is presently the CANARY EFFORT CISP Coordinator, Fort Ritchie.

Mr. Charles H. Koontz, DAC, GS-12, b6 Chief, Security Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Fort Ritchie.

Mr. William A. Kent, DAC, GS-11, b6 Chief, Intelligence Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Fort Ritchie.

b. On 19 November 1973, COL Charles E. Thomann, Commander, 109th Military Intelligence Group and LTC Leland J. Holland, Deputy Commander, 109th Military Intelligence Group, visited Fort Ritchie and effected personal contact with BG Albert Redman, Jr., b6 Commander, US Army Communications Command - CONUS, Fort Ritchie. BG Redman acknowledged that he was aware of the existence of a CISP at Fort Ritchie. BG Redman

· · · Cdr, 109th II Group

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SUBJECT: Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

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further indicated a general knowledge of the aforementioned program as sponsored/directed by the US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC). Undersigned Project Liaison Officer (PLO) was tasked with presenting an approximate ten minute informal briefing of the CISP in general.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. CWh Gary L. Peisen was assigned as the PLO for Fort Ritchie on 10 October 1973 and became operational on 15 October 1973. Introduction to essential personnel was effected without difficulty and no apparant operational difficulties are foreseen. Four key personnel at Fort Ritchie were briefed on the CISP and executed required Security Oaths. Formerly briefed individuals with no placement and access due to assignment changes were debriefed and executed required Debriefing Statements. Overt liaison contacts were initiated and maintained with both military and appropriate civilian agencies and individuals during the reporting period. COL Manning, Commander, Fort Ritchie, expressed a keen interest in the CISP at Fort Ritchie and projected a sense of gratitude for accomplishments rendered during the reporting period. COL Manning further stated that he had every intention of continuing the CISP at Fort Ritchie as he believed it's contribution to enhancing the security posture of Fort Ritchie and the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC), Site "R", was invaluable.
- b. During reporting period a total of 22 Agent Reports (DA Form 341) were submitted by PLO pertaining to incidents and adverse suitability information concerning US Army personnel assigned to the US Army Communications Command CONUS and Fort Ritchie. The majority of the aforementioned Agent Reports cited US Army personnel having access to the AJCC, Site "R", Fort Ritchie.
- c. During reporting period Conventional Sources were vetted and provided reportable information concerning adverse suitability information regarding US Army personnel assigned to sensitive duties at Fort Ritchie. One Conventional Source was assigned a Key Sheet Identification Code and provided reportable information.
- d. Spotting and Assessment for Confidential Sources with placement and access continues.

SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

a. As previously stated, a total of 22 Agent Reports (DA Form 341) were submitted by PLO pertaining to incidents and adverse suitability information concerning US Army personnel assigned to the US Army Communications Command - CONUS and Fort Ritchie. The majority of the aforementioned reports concerned US Army personnel, assigned to sensitive positions at Fort Ritchie, allegedly involved in drug abuse or drug abuse incidents. While drug abuse per se is not within the investigative purview of USALNIC

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SUBJECT: Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

15 December 1973

the issue does involve suitabliity of the individuals concerned to hold security clearances and occupy sensitive positions. Upon receipt of the aforementioned adverse information, immediate action was taken to notify the CANARY EFFORT CISP Coordinator, the Commander, Fort Ritchie, and the Director, Telecommunications, if applicable. In addition to the aforementioned, action was initiated to disseminate information criminal in nature to the appropriate military and civilian authorities. In one case, liaison with a Conventional Source, disclosed that a member of the US Army assigned to Fort Ritchie, was experiencing adverse financial difficulties. Aforementioned information was brought to the attention of the CANARY EFFORT CISP Coordinator and resulted in serviced command having requested a Suitability Investigation from USAINTC concerning the individual involved.

- b. SSG b6 Operations Company,
 US Army Communications Command CONUS and Fort Ritchie, with duty
 as a Teletype Repairman, Telecommunications Directorate, was reported
 as having questionable financial habits, i. e., indebtedness. Information
 contained in submitted Agent Report was reported to CANARY EFFORT CISP
 Coordinator, the Commander, Fort Ritchie, and the Director, Telecommunications. The Project Control Officer (PCO) and PLO will continue
 to monitor the aforementioned situation closely and report significant
 findings via appropriate Agent Report and to CANARY EFFORT CISP Coordinator.
- c. Covert Sources within CANARY EFFORT target area continue to report information concerning drug and alcohol abuse by members of the US Army at Fort Ritchie and the AJCC. Covert Sources have also reported adverse suitability information, i. e., financial and moral indiscretion, involving both US Army and Department of the Army personnel at Fort Ritchie and the AJCC. Monitoring will continue.

COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is anvisioned that a formal Quarterly Briefing will be presented to BG Redman, COL Manning, LTC Madsen, Mr. Carroll, and Mr. Kent in early January 1974. The aforementioned is deemed appropriate as this PLO did not become operational until 15 October 1973 and there is no record of a formal Quarterly Briefing having been presented concerning Operation CANARY EFFORT since 8 January 1973. The aforementioned proposed briefing will be held in abeyance until such time it is deemed appropriate, with USAINTC approval, to present BG Redman with the approved USAINTC CISP briefing, if applicable. The reader should also consider current instructions issued by Headquarters, 109th Military Intelligence Group, to the effect that ACIP coverage be expanded to include US Army Communications Command - CONUS elements not thus far included in the current operations plan coverning CANARY EFFORT.

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15 December 1973

b. PIO and PCO enjoy an excellent working relationship as does PIO with his counterparts, liaison contacts, and Conventional Sources. It is invisioned that the CISP, Operation CANARY EFFORT, at Fort Ritchie will become increasingly productive and will ultimately afford the Commander, Fort Ritchie, with coverage desired, i. e., afford the security posture of Fort Ritchie and the AJCC by means not locally available the Commander

GARY L. PEISEN

CWL, USA

Project Liaison Officer

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FORT MONMOUTH FIELD OFFICE 109TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP P. O. BOX 176, EATONTOWN, NEW JERSEY 07724

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 15

Period: 1 September 1973 to 10 December 1973

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SUBJECT: CENTRAL TAXI (U)

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1.(U) CIRCUMSTANCES:

On 10 December 1973, Quarterly Progress Report Number 15 was presented orally to LTC Richard O. Aamot, Chief, Security Office, US Army Electronics Command (ECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, in LTC Aamot's office; no others were present.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. The Lead and Development Report mentioned in Quarterly Progress Report Numbers 13 and 14 (IC-B-075 (T)) was approved by the US Army Intelligence Command. Recruitment of this prospective confidential source has been delayed, however, due to his heavy travel schedule. The Project Liaison Officer recently arranged a meeting between the PLO, the Project Control Officer and this prospective source, which will take place on 12 December 1973. His recruitment will be effected at this time.
- b. The new FCO is now on station and has re-contacted all CEMTRAL TAXI confidential sources at least two times. The sources promised their continued cooperation with the new PCO.
- c. The name of the program has been changed from Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) to Counterintelligence Screening Program (CISP).
- d. Emphasis continues on spotting, assessing and recruiting conventional sources. A vigorous spotting and assessing effort was implemented by the PLO during the reporting period. The names of nine prospective conventional sources wend forwarded by the Fort Monmouth Field Office on 23 October 1973 to the 109th MI Group Headquarters requesting contact approval. Approval was granted, and to date, the PLO has contacted and recruited three of these sources.
- e. Due to the move of ECOM/Philadelphia to Fort Monmouth, the mission of the ECOM/Philadelphia CISP will be incorporated into CENTRAL TAXI.

SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED: FILE CLERK a. On 2 November 1973, information was received that Quarterly Progress Report Numbers 11, 12 and 13) was separated from Government DEALS IN GUNS -

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Service and is no longer an employee at ECOM, Fort Monmouth. (CR-09-109-MON, re IC-B-072, dated 6 November 1973).

- ELOCT TECH b. On 2 November 1973, information was received that Quarterly Progress Report Numbers 11 and 12) allegedly continues to be involved in narcotics traffic. (CR-C9-109-MON, re IC-B-072, dated 6 November 1973).
- c. On 2 November 1973, information was received that a US Army truck had been seen delivering unidentified articles on a weekly basis to a residence on Victor Avenue, West Long Branch, NJ, for approximately five months. This information was passed to CID, Fort Monmouth, for possible exploitation. (CR-09-109-MOH, re IC-B-072, dated 6 November 1973).
- d. On 5 December 1973, information was received that Ray Shields, later determined to be Sherman Ray Shields, DAC, b6 GS-11, Electronics Technician, Electronics Devices Branch, Froduction Engineering Division, Directorate of Research, Development and Engineering, ECOM, Fort Monmouth, was a heavy drinker of alcoholic beverages. An example of Shields' drinking problem was cited. On one occasion Shields came to work inebriated, and after being confronted by his supervisor, proceeded to urinate all over himself. (CR-10-109-MON, re IC-B-072, dated 7 December 1973; and Agent Reports by Special Agents Jerome A. Britton and Charles Grantham re Sherman Ray SHIELDS).

COMMENTS. REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 'a. Reference paragraphs 2a, 2b and 2d above: LTC Aamot expressed deep satisfaction with the progress of CENTRAL TAXI. He also stated that he intended on officially commending everyone connected with the CEMTRAL TAXI CISP prior to his retirement in mid-1974.
- b. Reference paragraph 2d above: Of the three conventional sources recruited, two are employees of the Electronic Warfare Laboratory, ECOM's most sensitive activity and previously void of source coverage; the third conventional source is employed with the Maintenance Directorate, originator of the majority of ECOM's security violations, also previously without source coverage.
- c. Reference paragraph 3b above: LTC Aamot was advised that MAJ Quintarelli, Fort Mormouth Field Office Commander, and the PIO will pass the information concerning b6 alleged continued connection with narcotics to an appropriate agency.
- d. Reference paragraph 3d above: LTC Aamot stated that he would handle the matter with utmost discretion.

JEROME A. BRITTON

CN3, USA PLO, CENTRAL TAXI



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FORT MEADE FIELD OFFICE, 109TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

ICGP-B-FM

19 December 1973

SUBJECT: Operation GONDOLA STAR (U)

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCE AND METHODS INVOLVED

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER
Period 15 September 1973 to 15 December 1973

1. (U) CIRCUMSTANCES: On 29 November 1973, LTC Leroy Walton, Chief of Security, Aberdeen Proving Ground, (APG), MD was given the initial ICIP briefing and a progress report by the undersigned. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG and CPT Charles H. Lightner, Deputy Commander, Fort Meade Field Office, 109th MI Group, Fort Neade, MD were present. On 5 December 1973, COL Walter R. Harris, Commanding Officer, APG was given a progress report; Mr. Mencke was also present at this meeting.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. This operation was inactive from the early spring of 1973 to October 1973. The Project Control Officer was reassigned during the spring of 1973 and the position was vacant until October 1973. The Project Liaison Officer retired in July 1973 and this position was vacant until November 1973. Both the new PCO and PLO are now in place and actively pursuing this operation.
- b. Operation GONDOLA STAR (U) has two active covert Sources. The PCO has recontacted each Source and started a period of building rapport between the Source, PCO and Military Intelligence. During this period, the PCO is also concentrating on verifying placement and access, operational training and assigning current EEI. Initially, both Sources appear to be responding well to the PCO.
- 3. (U) SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED: No significant counterintelligence information was developed during the reported period.
- 4. COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
- a. Subject OPIAN is currently under revision. Strong consideration is currently being given to the consolidation of operations GONDOLA STAR (U) and CANAL LOOP (U) since Aberdeen Proving Ground and Edgewood Arsenal consolidated into one installation on 1 July 1971. A status report will be

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submitted to Headquarters, 109th MI Group by 6 January 1974.

- b. This PLO has initially placed emphasis on re-establishing liaison and acquiring updated information in support of this operation. Liaison has been established with both the headquarters and security offices of Aberdeen Proving Ground and Edgewood area, Aberdeen Proving Ground. Liaison is also in effect with both Military Police offices, the local FBI office, state police and the Harford County Sheriff's Office. Effort will be given to the development of additional Confidential and Conventional Sources during the next quarters. This PLO has served two pervious tours of duty at Aberdeen Proving Ground and is a native of Harford County; consequently, much personal liaison was already established when this PLO was assigned.
- c. COL Harris, LTC Walton and Mr. Mencke have expressed strong interest in the support available through ICIP and have offered their full cooperation.

RICHARD L. GREIDER

Project Liaison Officer

Briefer

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P. O. BOX 176, EATONTOWN, NEW JERSEY 0772AEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON SEP -8 199/ CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 14 AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Period: 1 September 1973 to 30 November 1973

SUBJECT: Operation GONG SILK (U)

On 6 December 1973, Quarterly Progress Report Number 14 was presented orally to COL Jonathan L. Holman, Commander, Picatinny Arsenal (PA), Dover, New Jersey, and to Er. John R. Greffe, DAC, Chief, Security Office, PA. Greffe is the CISP Coordinator for PA. The briefing was included in a liaison visit made by COL Charles E. Thomann, Commander, 109th Military Intelligence Group. Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. The primary purpose of this liaison visit was for COL Thomann to explain to COL Holman the methodology and purpose of the CISP, and to discuss conventional source limitations imposed by COL Holman during Quarterly Progress Report Briefing #3 on 6 September 1973. Other 102th MI Group representatives in attendance were LTC Glenn P. Vornsand, Commander, Horthern Area Control Office; MAJ Nicholas F. Quintarelli, Commander, Fort Monmowih Field Office: MAJ Hugh Fitzpatrick, Assistant Group Operations Officer; and WO1 Dugene H. McNally, Project Liaison Officer, PA.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

a. When briefed on the CISP on 6 September 1973 (reference Quarterly Progress Report #13), COL Holman expressed apprehension over the establishment of a conventional source program on his installation. As a result, he imposed the requirement that the names of all potential sources be coordinated in advance with his Security Officer, Mr. Greffe. Greffe had later stated that initially he would want to coordinate the selection of all conventional sources directly with COL Holman. Because there was a question as to the advisability of taking such action. PLO was instructed to begin spotting and assessing potential conventional sources; to complete the necessary investigative checks on those individuals selected; but to hold contact in abeyance until the limitations imposed by COL Holman could be resolved. During the reporting period, PLO selected and completed the investigative checks on 12 civilian employees within the target area at PA. Since initiation of the checks, one of the individuals has retired from government employment, and his file has been eliminated. PLO has formulated a conventional source contact approach plan, and has coordinated it with the Commander, Fort Monmouth Field Office.

b. The new Project Control Officer is now on station and has recontacted all GONG SILK confidential sources. The sources pledged their continued support to the new PCO.

SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

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a. On 4 September 1973, an employee of the Aeroballistics Branch, Engineering Science Division, Feltman Research Laboratory, PA, visited the Security Office and stated that he believed that another employee possibly was tampering with equipment in the wind tunnel. FLO interviewed this unsolicited source on 5 September 1973 and on 20 September 1973 when he returned to relate further information. Additionally, a co-worker visited PLO on 21 September 1973. at the apparant encouragement of the individual who made the initial visit. These visits were recorded in Agent Reports, Subject: Possible Tampering of Equipment in Wind Tunnel, Engineering Science Division, Aeroballistics Branch, Experiment Evaluation Section, Feltman Research Laboratory, Picatinny Arsenal, Dover New Jersey 07801, signed by PLO and dated: 4 September 1973, phase designation (OFFICIAL SOURCE); 6 September 1973, phase designation (MISCELLANEOUS); 20 September 1973, phase designation (MISCELLANEOUS); and 24 September 1973. phase designation (MISCELLAMECUS). Related reports were Agent Report, Subject: DFOB: b6 . CIV. b6 dated 4 September 1973. phase designation (201 FILE CHECK), signed by Thomas P. Ciccarelli, 109th MI Group; and Agent Report, Subject: SWETZ, Andrew J., CIV,

Ciccarelli, 109th MI Group; and Agent Report, Subject: SWETZ, Andrew J., CIV,

b6 DPOB: 2 July 1920, Franklin, New Jersey, dated 10 September 1973,

phase designation (201 FILE CHECK), signed by PLO. Information contained in all
reports was provided to the Security Office, PA.

b. On 5 November 1973, a telephone call was received by the Office of the Army Materiel Command, Project Manager for Selected Ammunition, PA, from an individual who desired information regarding names and addresses of US Ammunition contractors. After telling the caller that he would check into the request and return the call, the employee receiving the call obtained the name and address of the caller and reported the matter to the Security Office, PA. Initial inquiries were made by the PLO and the 109th MI Group SECAP representative and the results of the inquiry were relayed to the Security Office, PA. The inquiry is reported in Agent Report, Subject: Request for List of Munitions Contractors in the United States, dated 6 November 1973, phase designation (MISCELLANEOUS), signed by PLO.

COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. COL Holman obviously recalled the details of the last briefing, and indicated that he had given thought to a conventional source program at PA. His attitude was that although he was unaware of any threat, and did not feel that there was a threat, it would do no harm to have this preventive detection program implemented; therefore, he readily recommended that the conventional source program begin. COL Thomann gave an in-depth explanation of how the 109th Military Intelligence Group could be of assistance in the CISP and other fields, and COL Holman was impressed with the discussion and felt certain that those in Military Intelligence were the experts in the field. COL holman was assured that before an individual would be selected as a potential conventional source, an extensive background check would be completed and that mature judgment would be employed throughout the operation. It was mutually agreed that the names of prospective conventional sources would be verbally cleared through Mr. Greffe, but that no list would be provided or maintained by the Security Office. CCL Holman requested that if a "flap" appeared imminent during a contact, that he be immediately notified by PLO so that he could CCL Holman was assured that this would contact the individual and placate him. be the procedure.

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b. Both COL Holman and Mr. Greffe appeared highly pleased with the command visit, and to have a proper awareness of the CISP. PLO has been given permission to initiate contact with the prospective conventional sources by HQ, 109th MI Group. Contacts will be effected on a deliberate "one-by-one" basis commencing mid December 1973. Because of this command visit, PLO feels that the obstacles have been removed and the operation can progress smoothly.

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
O' EUGENE H. McNally

WO1, USA

Project Liaison Officer

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FORT MEADE FIELD OFFICE, 109TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP

FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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19 December 1973

ON:

SUBJECT: Operation CANAL LOOP (BY CDR USA!NSCOM F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER Period 15 September 1973 to 15 December 1973

1. (U) CIRCUMSTANCES: On 29 November 1973 LTC Leroy Walton, Chief of Security, Aberdeen Proving Ground, (APG), MD was given the initial ICIP briefing and a progress report by the undersigned. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG and CPT Charles Lightner, Deputy Commander, Fort Meade Field Office, 109th MI Group, Fort Meade, MD were present at the briefing. On 5 December 1973 COL Walter R. Harris, Commanding Officer, APG was given a progress report; Mr. Mencke was also present at this meeting.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. This operation was inactive from the early spring of 1973 to October 1973. The Project Control Officer was reassigned during the spring of 1973 and the position was vacant until October 1973. The Project Liaison Officer retired in July 1973 and this position was vacant until November 1973. Both the new PCO and PLO are now in place and actively pursuing this operation.
- b. Operation CANAL LOOP (U) has five active covert Sources. The PCO has recontacted each source and started a period of building rapport between Source, PCO, and Military Intelligence. During this period, the PCO is concentrating on verifying placement and access, operational training, and assigning current EEI. All Sources initially appear to be responding well to the PCO.
- (U) SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED: No significant_counterintelligence information was developed during the reported period.

COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATION:

a. Subject OPLAN is currently under revision. Strong consideration is currently being given to the consolidation of Operations GONDOLA STAR(U) and CANAL LOOP (U) since Aberdeen Proving Ground and Edgewood Arsenal consolidated into one installation on 1 July 1971. A status report will

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be submitted to Headquarters, 109th MI Group by 6 January 1974.

- b. This PLO has initially placed emphasis on re-establishing liaison and acquiring updated information in support of this operation. Liaison has been established with both the headquarters and security offices of Aberdeen Proving Ground and Edgewood area, Aberdeen Proving Ground. Liaison is also in effect with both Military Police offices, local FBI office, state police and the Harford County Sheriff's Office. Effort will be given to the development of additional Confidential and Conventional Source during the next quarters. This PLO has served two previous tours of duty at Aberdeen Proving Ground and is a native of Harford County; consequently, much personal liasion was already established when this PLO was assigned.
- c. COL Harris, LTC Walton and Mr. Mencke have expressed strong interest in the support available through ICIP and have offered their full cooperation.
- d. COL Kenneth L. Stahl was assigned as the Commanding Officer, Edgewood Area, APG in September 1973. Since he had not been given the initial ICIP briefing, he was not given a progress report on 21 December 1973.

RICHARD L. GREIDER
Project Liaison Officer
Briefer

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP P. O. BOX 113 FALLS CHURCH, VA. 22046

ICGP-H/PCF-SOS

13 December 1973

SUBJECT: CENTURY SQUAD (U)

Commander

United States Army Intelligence Command

ATTN: ICDO-OP

Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

1. Reference letter, USAINTC, ICDO-OP, 15 October 1973, subject: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (C).

Recapitulation of Operational Progress:

- a. Official Military Personnel Files (OMPF) for ten (10) individuals appearing to meet the criteria for recruitment as a confidential source have been received from The Adjutant General's Office (TAGO). Meticulous review of these files is currently in progress.
- b. Local and National Agency Checks concerning these individuals have been requested through channels established by the Liaison Branch, 902d MI Group. It is anticipated that the results of these checks will be forthcoming during the next reporting period.
- c. Files maintained by the Civilian Personnel Office, The Pentagon, were examined concerning 17 individuals assigned to the target agency. Evaluation of the data contained in these files continues. Concurrently with this vetting process, Local and National Agency Checks were requested. It is anticipated that the results of the checks will be received during the next reporting period.
- d. Additional identifying data on selected individuals assigned to the target agency has been submitted to the Investigative Records Repository. This information should resolve the problems encountered in dossier retrieval.
- e. Attached as an inclosure is a report of counterintelligence inspection conducted at the target agency from 29 October to 5 November 1973.

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RICHARD-F., JUDGE

LEU, MI

Deputy Commander

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REPORT OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INSPECTION OF

United States Army Management Systems Support Agency Room BD 1028, The Pentagon

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION

1. An announced counterintelligence inspection of the United States Army Management Systems Support Agency (USAMSSA), Room BD 1028, The Pentagon was conducted during the period 29 October through 5 November 1973, by the following Special Agents of the Pentagon Counterintelligence Force, 902d Military Intelligence Group:

William H. J. Count

George M. Vaughn.

- 2. Captain James K. Clements, Security Manager, acted as contact for and assisted in coordinating the activities of the inspection.
- 3. The last counterintelligence service was conducted during the period-21 to 25 August 1972.

SECTION II. SCOPE

4. This inspection included an examination of the degree of compliance with DOD Information Security Program Regulation 5220.1R and AR 380-5 of the following offices of USAMSSA:

Headquarters, Management and Administrative Support Group Scientific Systems Division Systems Development Division Operations Division

5. USAMSSA has on hand approximately 850 SECRET documents and approximately 20 linear feet of CONFIDENTIAL material. No TOP SECRET documents are maintained within the USAMSSA.

SECTION III. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6. There are no uncorrected or repeated findings.
- 7. Current Findings: No major deficiencies or shortcomings were noted during the inspection. Minor administrative deficiencies were corrected on the spot.
- 8. Physical Security: Only those aspects of physical security relating to classified storage were inspected in conjunction with this service. Four of the containers utilized for the storage of classified material do not meet the minimum requirements set forth in paragraphs 5-101 and 5-102, DOD Information Security Program Regulation 5200.1R. USAMSSA has requisitioned approved security containers to replace the unapproved containers. The unapproved containers are under 24-hour observation by USAMSSA personnel.

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SECTION IV. COMMENTS

The overall security posture of the serviced area is excellent. The USAKSSA Security Education Program is considered adequate. Incoming personnel are briefed concerning the handling, storage, and transmission of classified information. In addition, all personnel are given a periodic review to determine their compliance with existing security regulations. USAMSSA is currently revising its existing SOP to enhance the overall security posture. Reproduction of classified material is held to a minimum consistent with operational necessity. A copy of the restrictions imposed on reproduction of classified material is posted near the reproduction machine. The USAMSSA requires a 100% monthly inventory of all SECRET documents recorded on the Division Log. Additionally, the USAMSSA requires a doublecheck of each item of equipment within the individual offices and that DAS Form 11 (doublecheck List) be signed and maintained on a daily working basis. The duty officer is required to carry numerous keys during his after duty checks. Master keys would better serve this purpose. The Pentagon Custodial Engineers have such master keys and arrangements could be made with them to obtain master keys for the offices within the unit. The USAMSSA needs to implement a preventive-maintenance program on its security containers, as handles on several security containers are loose.

SECTION V. EXIT BRIEFING

10. All aspects of this service were discussed during an exit briefing on 5 November 1973 with Captain James K. Clements, Security Manager.

BYRON W. HUNT

LTC, MI

Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE ROBIN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

13 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 1

Period: 25 October 1973 to 13 December 1973

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

SUBJECT: Operation Lanyard Mood

1 CIRCUMSTANCES:

On 25 October 1973, OPLAN Lanyard Mood was formally re-activated in a visit to MAJ Clyde Bryant, Security Officer, Defense Language Institute East Coast (DLIEC), by MAJ D.N. Kappel, Commander WFO- CW3 Clarence E. Barker, Liaison Officer, WFO: and CW2 Guy J. Battiste II, Project Liaison Officer (PLO), DLIEC. On 30 Cctober 1973, PLO briefed MAJ Bryant on the CISP. It was agreed that the briefing of the Commander, DLIEC, should be delayed until the Oplan was rewritten and a positive approach to the program was developed. To date, all meetings with MAJ Bryant have been to further that purpose.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

Screening of personnel at DLIEC has begun for the purpose of identifying those individuals whose backgrounds and/or activities might fall within the scope of the EEI in the Oplan, as well as those individuals who may be considered prospective sources in the future.

3. (2) SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

Referred

4 (We) COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The revised Oplan for Lanyard Mood was submitted to Headquarters, 109th MI Group on 5 December 1973. Pending approval of the Oplan, the PLO will continue laying the groundwork for the operation at DLIEC, and coreening personnel files to determine those personnel who might be of operational interest. The formal briefing of the Commander, DLIEC, has not been scheduled, but a target date for the briefing is within the first two weeks of January 1974. DLIEC has proven in the past to be a successful CISP target,

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and can be as productive in the future if approached properly. The structure of DLIEC, being divided into separate departments for each language, results in the departments becoming cliques of persons from similar backgrounds or countries, and therefore the instructors have little contact with persons outside their own department. This creates a more delicate situation than normal, and means that the operation must be approached slowly and positively, as rushing into something might result in a case of bad judgement and turn the situation from delicate to explosive.

GUY J. BATTISTE II

CW2. MI

Project Liaison Officer

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SYRACUSE-SENECA FIELD OFFICE
109TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
PO BOX 73 SYRACUSE NEW YORK 13201

ICGP-B-SY

11 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 1
Period 1 October 1973 to 31 December 1973

SUBJECT: Operation CANINE PLATE (U)

WARRING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVALVED

CIRCUMSTANCES: On 16 November 1973, an initial briefing was given concerning the CISP at Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, New York, 14541, code named CANINE PLATE. Present for the briefing were COL Allen H. Light, Jr., Depot Commander; HAJ Noel L. Weaver, former Syracuse-Seneca Field Office Commander; CPT Denis F. Ausflug, present FO Commander; and CM2 Francis L. McGinn, Jr., CANINE PLATE Project Liaison Officer.

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD: In the briefing of 16 November, COL Light was informed of the intent and aims of CANINE PLATE, reference MFR, 6 December 1973, re: CANINE PLATE. No other overt activity has taken place. See paragraph 4 below for additional remarks.

3. (U) SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED: None.

COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The project liaison officer has been on station since December 1972. In the past year, through associations formed at social activities at the Seneca Army Depot Officers Club, the only area in which the PLO has sufficient reason for contact with depot personnel, three or four likely prospects for conventional sources have been spotted. An approach will be made as soon as one very significant problem has been resolved. It is almost certain, because of the very high degree of security consciousness of depot personnel, that any approach by the PLO will be treated with suspicion and reported to the depot security officials as a possible penetration attempt, or as a test of their SAEDA reporting system. This is directly against the wishes of COL Light, who wants knowledge of CANINE PLATE to be confined to himself. This leads to the conclusion that all prospective sources, at the time of recruitment, must be directed to ask COL Light any questions they may have concerning the PLO's veracity. This would reveal the identity of the sources

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to the Depot Commander. The chances of having the project revealed with subsequent embarrassment to the Depot Commander and to the 109th LI Group are too likely to be ignored. Disclosure of the identity of conventional sources, when necessary, does not appear to contravene existing regulations; the same situation would apply to confidential sources although disclosure of their identity can only be done with the permission of the Commander, USAINTC. Fuller discussions of this matter will be held on 14 December 1973 with the Commander, Northern Area Control Office; at which time opinions and advice will be solicited.

CPT, MI

FIELD OFFICE COMMANDER

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TOEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS 115TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94129

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:

ICGP-F-SO

14 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 1 .

For the Period 10 September 73 to 10 December 73

SUBJECT: ICIP CENTAUR RACE (U) SENSITIVE SOURCES AND MERHODS INVOLVED

1. CIRCUMSTANCES: On 5 December 1973, MAJ Glen E. Robinson, Fort Lewis Field Office Commander, briefed LTC Homer Pickens, ACofS, 9th Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, representative of the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, on the progress of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) CENTAUR RACE.

2(4)

RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

- a. A study concerning insertion of sources into the Fort Lewis military community has been completed and results will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
- b. Aggressive screening, spotting, and assessment of Installation conventional sources and potential Confidential Sources is continuing and has been expanded to include all targets on Fort Lewis.
- c. The first Source Lead and Development Report (SLDR) for ICIP CENTAUR RACE will be prepared and submitted within 30 days.

SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED: There has been no significant counterintelligence information developed through the ICIP to date due to the lack of formally recruited sources.

COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: LTC Pickens, ACofS. 9th Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, continues to have an interest in ICIP CENTAUR RACE, and has cooperated with Fort Lewis Field Office to the fullest extent. It is the desire of the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division and Fort Lewis, not to be present for briefings unless significant counterintelligence information is to be discussed.

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EUGENE F. OVERHOLT
MAJ, MI
Acting Operations Officer

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3 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2

CENTAUR SALE

Period 13 October 1973 to 28 November 1973

1. (U) CIRCUMSTANCES:

On 28 November 1973, CW3 James E. Harnish, Project Liaison Officer (FLO), MERDC, provided Colonel Tehno R. Hukkala, Commander, MERDC, Leslie L. Askew, Security Officer, MERDC, and Edna T. Payne, Assistant Security Officer, MERDC, with the 2nd Quarterly CISP Briefing. The briefing was presented one week earlier than projected due to the uncertainty of the Commander's pre-holiday December schedule. The briefing was well received with no problems encountered.

2. RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

Six prospective Sources were spotted during this period.

3. SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

During this period	three Agent Reports	were produced. These i	eports were
as follows: b6		o6	SSG
b6 , report sub	mitted 26 October 19	73, concerned suitabil	lity due to
indebtedness; b6	, PDOB:	b6	
b6 CIV b6	•	November 1973, concern	ed suit-
ability due to alcohol	drinking problem;	b6 DPCB:	b6
b6		eport submitted 21 Nov	ember 1973,
concerned a threatening	telephone call.		
4. COMMENTS, R	EMARMS, AND RECOUNED	DATIONS:	


At the present time there is no approved CPLAN available for this project at the Washington Field Office. The next Quarterly Briefing of the Commander, MERDC, will be within the first two weeks of March 1974, and will realign the briefing schedule. NERDC is a good CISP target, and has the potential for a successful project, however the PLO's time on site is limited due to being PLO at another installation also. To be more effective MERDC must be a full time project.

	James & Harnish
Chassified By CO USAINTC Enempt Wars COT, Uniquelly Order 11652	JAMES E. HARNISH
Exemption oned_ory: _2	Project Liaison Officer

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3 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2

SUBJECT: CENTAVO KID

Period 12 October 1973 to 12 November 1973 WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SCURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

(U) CERCUESTANCES:

On 12 November 1973, the Commander, Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), was briefed on the revised CENTAVO KID OPLAN. Present at the briefing were, Colonel David W. Einsel, Commander, HDL, Major D.N. Kappel, Commander, WFO, 109th MI Group, Major Thomas R. Mooney, Executive Officer, HDL, CW3 James E. Harnish, PLO, Alfred F. Schneider, Security Officer, HDL, and James H. Yeick, Assistant Security Officer, HDL. Due to the close proximity between this briefing and the December Quarterly Briefing, both were combined. The briefing was well received and no problems were encountered. The next Quarterly Briefing will be delivered within the first two weeks of March 1974, and will realign the briefing schedule.

2. RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD:

Since the approved and revised OPLAN has been available, six potential Sources are undergoing Local Agency Checks. A problem in cooperation as indicated in Quarterly Progress Report Humber 1 within the HDL Security Office has been resolved and cooperation from the Security Office has improved.

SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED:

One Agent Report was produced during this periodas follows: LAMERS, Guillermo B., DPGB: 29 January 1935, Buenos Aircs, Argentina, CIV b6 report submitted 19 October 1973, concerned suitability information.

4. (U) COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

Classified by CO USAINTL Exempt from CDD. Liepudyo Order 11552. Exemption category: A. Declassify on: FREETELAURE

JAMES E. HARNISH

Project Liaison Officer

Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5280 1R

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORT CARSON FIELD OFFICE 115TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO 80901

ICGP-F-CA

10 December 1973

QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 1.

PERIOD: 11 September 1973 to 10 December 1973

MANUAL CONTROL CENTER MANUEL CONTROLS AND MORNINGS THROUGH

SUBJECT: Operation Canary Stone (U)

1. (10)

CIRCUMSTANCES.

Effective 1 December 1973, the Dugway Proving Ground Resident Office was established and became operational. SFC Pete A. Gonzales (PLO) has been assigned to the Dugway Resident Office. and will documented as a linear Office. For operational purposes. To date, the PCO has not been assigned to Operation Canary Stone, therefore, no progress briefing was presented to the Commander, Dugway Proving Ground, pertaining to the past quarter's activities.

2. (U) RECAPITULATION OF OPERATIONAL PROGRESS DURING PERIOD.

No operational assets were utilized during the reporting period.

3. (U) SIGNIFICANT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DEVELOPED.

None has been developed during the reporting period.

4. (U) COMMENTS, REMARKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

The Dugway Resident Office is located in Room 2204, Building 5234, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah. The Intraservice Support Agreement between the 115th MI Group and Dugway Proving Ground has been finalized and is in the process of being signed by appropriate unit representatives.

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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Jemoting E. Werling CPT

FOR: JOHN C. SINS, JR

LTC, MI

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As of 18 Sep 85 all material included (Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently in effect.

(Signature) (Date Signed)

Delmar Smith GS5
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IA (HQ) Form 2214 (1 Sep 78)

Replaces MIIA Fm 315, 1 Jun 75, which may be used until supplies are exhausted.

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Best Copy Available



CONTENTS

TAB	TITLE	DATE
A	Memo for VCSA from USofA, SUBJ: ICIP	21 Jan 75
В	Memo thru VCSA for USofA, SUBJ: ICIP	4 Feb 75
C	1st Ind to USAINTA, Approval of CANTER RIDE	7 Mar 75
α	Ltr from USAINTA, Evaluation of Selected Installations in Panama Canal Zone	28 Apr 75
B	Quarterly Report, 1st Qtr, CY 75	27 May 75
F	Ltr to Cdr, APGapproving continuation of GONDOLA STAR	11 Jul 75
G	Ltr to Cdr, PCF, disapproving OPlan	1 Aug 75
н	Quarterly Rpt, 2nd Qtr, CY 75	16 Sep 75
I	1st Ind to USAINTA, Approval of revised OPLAN CANABY EFFORT	15 Sep 75
j	Quarterly Rpt, 3d Qtr, CY 75	20 Hov 75
K	Memo for Record, SUED: ICIP CANARY EFFORT	21 Nov 75
L	Msg to USATEU on proposed ICIP	19 Nov 75
м	po to USAINDA Cuerterly TOTP Reports	17 Dec 75



ICIP'S TERMINATED, AS OF FEB 75

- 1. CANAL ROPE US Army Communications Command, Ft Huachuca, AZ
- 2. CAHARY STONE Dugway Proving Ground, UT
- 3. CANTINA ARCH US Army Air Defense Center, Ft Bliss, TX
- 4. CAMYON ROSTER Umfatilla Army Depot Activity, Hermiston, Oregon
- 5. CENTAUR SALE US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Ft Belvoir, VA
- 6. CEMTRAL TAXI USArmy Electronics Command, Ft Monmouth, NJ
- 7. CENTURY SQUAD US Army Management Systems Support Activity, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
- 6. JONDOLA FLAG US Army Electronics Proving Ground, Ft Huachuca, AZ
- 9. LANYARD MOOD Defense Language Institute East Coast, Wash. Navy Yard
- 10. LEND TONE Picatinny Arsenal Armaments Command, Dover, NJ
- 11. LENIENT CLOUD US Army War College, Carlisle Harracks, PA
- 12. GONDOLA STAR Reinstated for 6 Months.

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ON SEP -5 1997_
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-803 DOD 5200.1-R

DAMI-DOE

Quarterly ICIP Reports (U)

CDR, USAINTA ATTN: MIIA-SO FT MEADE NO 20755 DAMI-DOH

3 LTC Haendle/mib/56159

(U) Reference, message, DAMI-DOR, 0321152 Dec 75.

2 Attached for your files is a copy of the IMPORMATION MEMORANDUM to the Under Secretary of the Army (less inclosures) which forwarded summaries of the nine ongoing COMUS ICIP operations as submitted by your headquarters. The summary pertaining to a proposed ICIP by the 66th MI Group in support of USASA was not included in this submission. Upon receipt of a response to the above referenced message, a decision will be made whether to include that operation in the mext quarterly report.

In staffing the Quarterly MCIP Report within CACSI, the Acting Director of Intelligence Operations noted that many of the summeries of on-going actions contained too many details of individual character/behavior issues. In future quarterly reports, suitability-type information pertaining to individuals covered by the ICIP project should be either eliminated or summerized in general comments.

On a separate matter, when the ACSI reinstated the ICIF CONDOLA STAR in July 1975, he indicated he would review the ICIP in six months to determine if significant information had been developed to warrant continuation of the project. It is requested that your headquarters conduct a review of this ICIP and furnish your comments and recommendations to this office by 9 January 1975.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

(sgd) L. A. E. ..

1 Incl as

L. A. SFIRITO Colonel, GS Chief, HUMINT Division

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
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
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SUBJECT: INTERNAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (ICIP) (W)

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USAINTO ICDO-OP #517#32 JUN 73 (C)+.

BASED ON THE NEW POLICY CONTAINED IN REF A, THIS OFFICE N'S FOR ALL USAREUR ICIP'S, ONGOING AND PLANNED MR AGEI APPROVAL. HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF DETAILED ARMYMYDE CUIDANCE ON HEIP, IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHICH USAREUR
OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS NEET THE CRITERIA AND DEFINITION OF
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M MJUN 75 AND BY ODCSI, USAREUR ON 15 JUL 75- THE ICIP IS IN

MS EARLY STACES OF IMPLEMENTATION AND WHILE A NUMBER OF COUNTER
NTELLIGENCE RECRUITMENT LEADS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, NO FORMAL
BECRUITMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES HAS YET BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

B. GROUP BAND: CI PROJECT BASED UPON REF F AND G INVOLVING UBAINTA RECRUITHENT OF 10 STERILE SOURCES IN CONUS FOR INSERTION INTO 56TH ARTY BDE, USAREUR FOR COLLECTION OF COUNTERSUBVERSION AND COUNTERSABOTAGE INFO. THE END OF US DIVOLVEMENT
IN VIETNAM AND THE CONCOMITANT SHARP DEGREESE IN SUBVERSION/
SABOTAGE INCIDENTS VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED THE NEED FOR THESE
SOURCES. NORMAL ATTRITION HAS RESULTED IN ONE REMAINING GROUP
BAND SOURCE IN USAREUR WHO IS CURRENTLY HANDLED AS A CASUAL
DEFENSIVE COUNTERESPIONAGE SOURCE.

C. CERTAIN SMILE: AN ICIP IMPLEMENTED IN 1973 WITHIN CERTAIN KEY STAFF OFFICES AT HQ USAREUR IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON SEP -5 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOL/PO AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R LEADANT CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO BOLS EXPLOITATION. THE BEAUTION PROTECTION OF STREET AND STREET WAS EVENTUALLY DEEMED AND AN ARTICLE OF ACTIVITIES. CLETAIN SHILE WAS EXPLOSED AS AN ICLY IN 1975 AB IT'S ASSETS REDIRECTED TO-WAS A SELECTED TO-WAS AN ARTICLE OF CONCUSARIOR APPROVAL WHICH WILL IN-WASTERN ADDRESS THE SUSPECTED WOIS THREAT AGAINST HE BEARS BEARDENS.

D. CAREFREE TALENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BERLIN BASED

OFCO'S HAVE REVEALED INTENSE INTEREST BY SIS IN DET A.

PECIAL PORCES UNIT STATIONED IN WEST BERLIN. HORSOVER, SIS

CASE OFFICERS HAVE DISCLOSED SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF DET A TO

RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL SIS PENTETRATION OF DET

A BASED ON A REQUEST BY COR, BERLIN BBE, A CONCEPT OF OPERA
TIGHS (COPO) WAS POSMULATED, DESIGNED TO FULLY IDENTIFY,

MEUTRALIZE ON ELPLOIT THIS APPARENT HIS TRACK THROUGH DEPONSIVE

AND OFFICERY COUNTERESPIONAGE ASSETS, INCLUDING JUDICIOUS

BECAUTH DAY OF SUMMERS WITHIN SPECIAL PORCES RANKS. THE COPO

BE APPROVED BY OBCSI DEAREUR FOR IMPLIBITATION ON 12 SEP 73.

E. CARDINAL FLIGHT: BERLIN OFCO'S HAVE ALSO REVEALED KEEN

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AUTH PARA 1-603 Ded 5200:1-R

O PREPARE A COME SESSENCED TO NEUTRALIZED OR EXPLOIT THIS SIS

ALTHOUGH ACIP IN COMUS IS TREATED AS A CI SERVICE, THOSE MARCHE PROCRAME/PROJECTS DESCRIBED IN PARA 1, SUPRA, WITH THE CEPTION OF COMP HAND, ARE CONSIDERED DEFENSIVE COUNTERESPIONAGE PRATISOES INITIATED AS THE RESULT OF DEMONSTRATED OR MERICARD HOIS THREATS. IN ALL CASES, APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS WE SEEN PRIEFED ON THE PERCEIVED HOIS THREAT AND HAVE EITHER DEGREES OR CONCURRED WITH THE CI NEUTRALIZATION PLAN.

- ALSO WILL BE FURNISHED
- LECTS DESCRIBED IN PARA 1D AND 1E, SUPRA MEET THE CRITERIA FOR ICIP AND THUS REQUIRE ACSI APPROVAL.
- POLICY AND PROCEDURES BE FURNISHED AT AN EARLY DATE.
- AEAGB-CI(30), ME 7354 (AUTOSEVOCOM 6742).

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP					
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REMARKS	Par com	fonecon 2	10 Dec 75	stroped 4	3

Per our fonecon 29 Dec 75, attached is the e of ICIP Status report from USAREUR. One of our people was given the copy during a visit to Arlington Hall Station.

Huggsy New Year

Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.

Phou

JA Pennett Spec Act Sect, SOD

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29 Dec 75

OPTIONAL FORM 48 AUGUST 1947 SEA FRANCI 41CFR MA-11 20A

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WHITED STATES ABOVE SECURISE AGENCY FIELD STATION, AUGSBURG APO NEW YORK 09458 .

INEASC

15 December 1975

Internal Counterintelligence Program Quarterly Status Report (U)

EXCLUSIVE FOR

Colonel William B. Holden Deputy Chief of Staff Security Headquarters U.S. Army Security Agency Arlington Hall Station Arlington, Virginia 22212

(U) Attached at inclosure 1 is the first Quarterly Status Report, for the period ending 15 October 1975.

) Your attention is invited to potential source B58,786 referred to in paragraph 5. Appropriate coordination will be effected by the 66th Military Intelligence Group, this Command and your Headquarters before utilization is effected.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Captain MI

Assistant Adjutant

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED HERMANEN UNIVERSON FONPO ON CORUSAINSCON COOR BY LUM UDAINDOUNT CONFU 1-R AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

Classified by: Para 4b.AR381-12.180c174 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DEGLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF ELECTRIVE ORDER 11632 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2 HECLASSIFY ON Notification of ACSI

24 October 1975

AEU/11-N-CE D03120-518-75

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

(QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT) (QSR)

Consider 66th Hilltary Intelligence Group ATTH: AEINI-T-CI (EXCLUSIVE FOR ICIP CONTROL OFFICER)

Referènces:

- GPLAM, 511th HI Battalion, AEUNI-N-CE, 1-75, 1 May 1975
- AEAGB-CI(SO), DTG 151640Z July 1975, ICIP
- 2. (U) This is the first ICIP Quarterly Status Report, in accordance with references, covering the period ending 15 October 1975.

General:

- a. Activity at the target is in the drawdown stage, pending automation in early 1976 under the LA FAIRE VITE Program. Since I July 1975. personnal manning has been reduced to about 50 percent of previous target strength; most personnel have been reassigned to USASAFS fugsburg. In June 1975, an official release was made by letter to the Buergermeister (mayor) of Richach, which provided details of the withdrawal. Portions of the letter were reportedly published in area newspapers. A copy of the English translation of the letter to the mayor's office is attached as Inclosure 1.
- b. Contrary to the letter inclosure. It appears that some target personnel in excess of the programmed approximately seven (7) individuals who will maintain and guard the automated site, may remain in the area for varying periods up to 1 July 1976. These include all personnel who

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SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

24 October 1975

are scheduled for DEROS or ETS in FY76 as funding is not available for two PCS moves in a single fiscal year. Ho figures were available at the time of the QSR preparation as to how many personnel would be affected, nor had it been determined what would be their duties during the approximate period 1 March-30 June 1976.

- The USAF communications site (6913th USAF Security Squadron)
 Tocated in the same area is scheduled to close at about the same time the
 target is automated; no USAF personnel will remain in the area. As far
 as can be determined, the French and Bundoswehr sites will continue to
- 4. The seven or eight personnel scheduled to remain at the target personnelly will be billeted at the top of Hount Hoherbogen, in a newly constructed building, adjacent to the present operational area. The senior individual will be an HCO, grade E6 or E7, who will probably have one of the supervisory communications equipment maintenance HOS's. Other personnel stationed there will be equipment and antenna array repair and maintenance specialists and guards. All personnel will be single or unaccompanied. At the writing of this report, none of the permanent party had been selected.

Operational Matters:

- a. SMLM-F makes a reconnaissance of the Rimbach area approximately once a month. The sightings usually involve travel along the PRA perimeter roading leading north and south out of Rimbach. Perimeter roads of PRAs, excluding Autobahnen, are off limits to SMLM-F vehicles. On 3 June 1974, a SMLM-F vehicle was disabled on the access road leading to the target operational site, well within a PRA, and was assisted by a Chief Harrant Officer assigned to the target, who was not aware of the correct PRA boundary. There have been no SMLM-F detentions in the area, and none are likely, since the closest Military Police are located at Hohenfels Training Area (GTA), 80 kilometers away.
- b. In March11975, during a liaison visit with MAJ Richard Douma,

 the target commander, the PLO was advised that MAJ b6

 b6 had been transferred to Ramstein, FRG after appearing before a board to face charges of homosexuality.
- c. In April 1975, SP4 b6 reported a possible SAEDA incident (Group Case 75-061P); during the subsequent investigation it was determined she had reported to Eleld Office Augsburg a similar approach by the same individual a year earlier. Target personnel were dubious as to the veracity of statements made by b6 who was transferred to USASAFS, Augsburg on 1 August 1975.

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24 October 1975

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

- d. In Hay 1975, HAJ Douma advised the PLO that some of the target personnel had a tendency to talk too openly about their jobs in public, and that his solution had been constant reiteration to unit personnel on the dangers of loose talk. Ho specifics were provided on individuals concerned. The PLO did not press for details as he considered it a command matter. HAJ Douma believed the security posture of the target was steadily improving.
- The preliminary investigation of | b6 continued, however. in low key due to the lack of credible specific allegations. b6 operates the Hoherbogen Restaurant, situated near the target administrative area. He allegedly travels regularly to CSSR to visit relatives and to primarily because of its convenient location. b6 was never reliably reported to have shown undue curlosity about target operations and personalities, but remains, nevertheless, well-informed because of overheard conversations of target personnel-customers. In June11975, b6 the PLO he was not looking forward to the departure of the Americans because he would have to "put up" with local German customers, who were much more troublesome than target personnel. In October 1975, b6 remarked to KAJ Douma that he had made several trips to Augsburg to negotiate the purchase of a tavern there. | b6 | said he intended to sell the Hoherbogen Restaurant and move to Augsburg, where he will open a tavern/restaurant two kilometers from the "ASA kaserne," Activity of b6 will continue to be monitored in the Rimbach area, and if he moves to Augsburg, he should be made a target of continuing interest by Field Office Augsburg.
- f. In July 1975, CPT (Chap) $\boxed{b6}$ Protestant Chaplain at IITA, advised that an individual assigned to the target had sought his spiritual guidance as a result of extreme emotional anxiety, due to his/her involvement with a group 65 USASA personnel who were engaged in satanic religious practices at the target. $\boxed{b6}$ revealed no details nor identities, due to the sensitivity of communications to a chaplain, however, the identity of the individual involved is believed to have been established (see para 4j, below).
- g. In July 1975, two target personnel applied for Military Intelligence duties in ACGP-97. One (SP5 b6 was assisted in completion of required forms and processing/interview is in progress. The other individual (SP4 b6 will not be able to apply until December 1975, when he has 12 months remaining to DEROS. He expects to be transferred to USASAFS. Augsburg prior to that time and has been advised to initiate his processing at Field Office Augsburg.

- marin de la fireb

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SUBJECT: Internal CounterIntelligence Program (ICIP)

24 October 1975

h. In July 1975, USASAFS, Augsburg requested agency checks on the
German national intended species and relatives of SP4 00
Subsequently, during a subject interview, b6 stated that his fiancee
Subsequently, during a subject interview, b6 stated that his flancee had contact, through an acquaintance, with b6 a photographer/
: recorter for a Furth-im-Wald newspaper and that he suspected DO Was
receiving money from the CSSR for photographs of facilities in the Rimbach
area. b6 had no specific reason to back up his suspicion and said
It was common knowledge among target personnel. (b6 was the subject
of a bilateral MI/MAD investigation in 1973 and 1974, during which none
of the allegations of possible intelligence activity were substantiated.)
b6 also said he personally was suspicious of fau b6 a former
member of the target unit, who operates "b6 's Club" in Koetzting.
b6 is curious as to the status of US installations at Rimbach and
uses his US citizenship and former Army service as a method of gaining
access to information from US Forces members who patronize his establishment
investigation and not determined to warrant further investigation. b6
is a non-DoD affiliated US citizen.)
18 4 HONI-DOD ATTITUDE US CITIZEN.)
4 - In July 1075 HCACAE Augebung proported agreey chacke in
f. In July 1975, USASAE, Augsburg requested agency checks in Koetzting on b6 and Dr. b6 who were friendly with target
where the had been brown to be a resided defence in forms
personnel and who had become knowledgeable of classified defense informa-
tion as a result of this relationship. There was no indication any of
the b6 s had attempted to elicit defense information. Agency checks
failed to reveal any derogatory information concerning the b6 family;
Dr. b6 was a practicing dentist in Koetzting. In early August 1975,
MAJ Douma advised the PLO that in early 1975, SP4 b6 and her
dependent husband, b6 , a US citizen, had attempted to establish
a German-/merican Club between target personnel and the local communities.
In this connection, the b6 s mentioned being acquainted with a dentist
in Koetzting, nfi. Nothing of consequence ever came of the attempt to
form an organization. Later, date unknown, Douma was advised by Commander,
Forward Operations Battalion, Augsburg (his supervisor) of a report that
b6 had discussed classified information with German acquaintances.
In an interview of b6 by Douma, she admitted having discussed
details of LA FAIRE VITE with her husband in early 1975, and to have
mentioned the project in the presence of one b6, a German
national acquaintance residing in Munich. b6 was subsequently given
a written reprimand in connection with the compromise. b6 mentioned
nothing about any other German acquaintances, and denied compromising any
classified information to any other foreign nationals. No information
was made available to Douma when he was tasked by his higher headquarters
to investigate the incident, as to the identity of the German acquaintances
who were supposed to have received the classified defense information.
b6 departed the target on 19 July 1975 for CONUS and separation
from active duty

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AEUHI-H-CE SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) ZA OCTOBEL 1970

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j. In August 1975. HAJ Douma advised the PLO that SP4 66
attached to the target from the 50%d ASA Group as a Czech linguist Voice
Intercept Specialist (9862LCX), had exhibited severe mental trauma inne-
diately following the departure of a close female acquaintance from the
target on 30 June 1975, and had been placed on extended leave status.
be consulted CPT (Chap) be at IITA and the USASAFS Augsburg
staff chaplain, but had allegedly declined psychiatric counselling. On
her return from leave, her access to classified material was to be sus-
pended and Douma could direct be to receive counselling, as he was
very concerned about her emotional stability. 66 had a DEROS of
September 1975.


- the logust 1975, the PLO advised FAJ Douma that a German agency had reported a US soldier named be was trafficking in drugs in the logusting. After the PLO provided descriptive data obtained from a FRG agency. Douma identified be as SP4 be a Russian-linguist Voice Intercept Specialist, attached from the 502d ASA Group. Douma was requested to watch be activities closely and pass any information to CID at HTA. DEROS is June 1976, putting him in the category of those mentioned in paragraph 3b, above, who may remain at the target without any specific duties.
- 1. In September 1975, B58,786 (who is undergoing preliminary source assessment) advised that in approximately April 1975, a female soldier traffic analyst assigned to the target, whose name he could not recall, had compromised a TOP SECRET/CRITIC/CODENORD message to be dependent and GS-2 clerk typist in the unit administrative office. be had only a Confidential clearance. The compromise although known by the target commander, was not reported to USASAFS, Augsburg.
- m. No specific information has been reported to indicate that Hostile Intelligence agencies are in contact with any target personnel.

Source Activity:

- a. One potential source (B58.786), has been spotted at the target and is being assessed. Name traces are not yet complete. He is scheduled for reassignment to USASAFS. Augsburg on approximately 15 December 1975. In accordance with paragraph 3b of reference a, a Lead Development Report is being prepared and will be forwarded separately, recommending his possible utilization as a defensive installation source in Augsburg.
- b. The lack of identification of any personnel who will make up the permanent party at the target has inhibited any meaningful spotting/assessing activity to date.

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AEUMI-N-CE

24 October 1975

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

6. (e) Comments:

- a. The PLO was indoctrinated for SI on 9 October 1975. Request Special Operations Detachment determine if any more Quarterly Security Inspections are scheduled for target, and arrange for prior notification and coordination so that the PLO may accompany the inspecting team. Any insight gained into security problem areas not evident from routine liaison contacts would be of great value to the PLO in accomplishment of his mission.
- b. The PLO has reported that he is unable to pursue a more aggressive approach with the target commander concerning identities of personnel who will remain at the target, without arousing suspicion as to his true motives. Request Special Operations Detachment attempt to identify those individuals as soon as the determination is made.
- c: The short period remaining of continued operations at the target raises the question as to whether the project would be justified at that focation in the long term. As presently visualized, according to available information, any source recruited at the target would be primarily reporting on six or seven other personnel, with whom he is living in a very close, restrictive environment. It can be expected the majority of the information reported will be of an adverse suitability nature. Further, it can be expected that with target automation, Hostile Intelligence efforts at the target will take a lower priority inasmuch as product expolitation through the human exploitable factor will no longer be present. The Commander, USASAFS, Augsburg raised some of these points when reference a was staffed through his office.

l Incl

Tel: Nbg Hil (2621)-6446/Fost

CFADLO H MASSAENI
LTC. MI

Commanding

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wern Auroramedoter Jacob Cassun, to of Risbach

the number of this letter is to advice you, and therefore all dimbach confinity officials and businessmen, of a projected charge in the US stilling busture and presence in the community of himbach, houst nonerpoyen, and the surrounding area.

- of the american military community in this area now consists of elements of toth the United States arm and the United States Air Force, as well as a significant number of wives and dependent children. The total american oppulation currently is just over three numbers people.
- 3. (makencing in August 1975, the American community will decrease in fize, ith the largest majority of our people departing on or about 1 November and 15 December respectively. By 1 march 1970 there will be approximately seven US Army personnel and probably no wive: and children remaining in the area. They will live in a UL Army owned facility on too of mount hoherbogen on Echatein hidge).
- h. This transformation is the result of a programmed technical change in the american communications function located in this area.
- in at this time, and with this announcement, please accept my personal protitude, as well as that of the US army and the US air Force, for the inderstanding and warmth which has been no practiously extended to the indrican military forces and their families over these many years by ou, the Airoach Community official Staff, and the entire community of limbuch. He will Go all that we can to insure that the small force remaining continues to appreciate and help maintain the relationship that is nave enjoyed.

nlimma with A
EAU, EI
Installation Coordinator

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	AC ON SHEETO HALL	HALL THE	TOUTUS	SEP -5 SAINSCUP	VI ESUD	1-R
SUBJECT	VVIII		DAI	II-DOH	SUSPENSE	
	Counterintelligence Program (ICIP	r) (T)	18	November	1975	
To advise	USARRUR of the Quarterly Report	requirement	for ICIP	•		
Minipalanta Po	is ancome. (Describe briefly the requirement, backgro- resource to other secreta.)	and and oction takes	ar sucummendi	d. Must be suffi	ciently details.	i so identify
i (Witch	CRGROUND:				•	78.4
ISTITUTE OF THE PROPERTY OF TH	(TAB C), outlines the ACSI's sta	75 (TAR R), a draft OFI DR, USASA ap ared by forme	ODCSI, U: AN of an oproved the er ICIP as	SAREUR Ted ICIP in a the propose ction offi	quested support of ed Operat	of ions
	eration plans for the ICIP.	•				
	At TAB D is a Memorandum to t my which outlines the requirement					Secreta
2.(U) (C)	DISCUSSION:					
Augsburg	6) The USAREUR proposed ICIP in marks the first extension of the ACSI has validated the OPIAN for	program over	seas. T			ion:
and reque	U) This action advises USAREUR bests the OPIAN be forwarded for AC erly report requirement to the Un	CSI review.	The messi	I's policy age furth	y on the er advise	ICIP :
3. (U)	RECOMMENDATION: That the Acting SARBUR at TAR A.	Director of	Operation	ns sign tl	he me ssa	ge 30 E
						
	· (Centions	e on plate bond)	- ·- <u></u>			5
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CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY//AEAGB-CI//

INFO: CDR USAINTA PT MEADE MD//MIIA-SO//

SUBJ: INTERNAL COUNTERENTELLIGENCE PROGRAM {ICIP} {U}

- A. USAREUR MSG 191755Z JUN 75 (SSO MESSAGE)
- B. USAINTA MSG OLLSWEZ JUL 75 (SSO MESSAGE)
- C. DISCUSSION MG DILLARD/MR KELLY. 23 NOV 75

 LEE REFS A AND B PERTAIN TO AN ICIP FOR THE USASA FIELD

 STATION. AUGSBURG. FRG WHICH INDICATED CDR USASA HAD APPROVED AN OPLAN PREPARED BY 66 MI GP. DURING REF C MR KELLY BRIEFED MG DILLARD ON BACKGROUND AND SPECIAL CONTROLS PERTINENT TO ICIP.
- IN EIGHT OF YOUR POSSIBLE ENTRY INTO THE ICIP FIELD. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS FURNISHED AS BACKGROUND: (U)
- A. {U} THE PRESENT ICIP {FORMERLY KNOWN AS ACIP} IS A CI SERVICE TO VARIOUS SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS IN CONUS UNDER USAINTA'S MONITORSHIP AND CONDUCTED BY THE TWO CONUS MI GROUPS. SINCE THE PROGRAM HAS BEEN PRIMARILY A CI SERVICE CONDUCTED BY USAINTA. THERE IS NO DETAILED ARMY-WIDE GUIDANCE ON ICIP. THE NEWLY PUBLISHED

F. LOYES

LTC HAENDLE/DAMI-DOH/S6159/2 DEC 75

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ON SEP 5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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
NO

AR 381-20 MENTIONS ICIP AS A CI SERVICE BUT DOES NOT CONTAIN POLICY OR PROCEDURAL SPECIFICS.

BY MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY, DATED B FEB 72. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY DIRECTED THAT QUARTERLY REPORTS ON THE ICIP BE FURNISHED HIS OFFICE BASED UPON HIS CONCERN AT THE TIME FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE VARIOUS DOD AND DA DIRECTIVES PERTAINING TO THE PROTECTION OF NON-AFFILIATED US CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS. THESE QUARTERLY REPORTS HAVE BEEN REGULARLY FURNISHED SENCE MARCH 3472.

USAINTA THAT ICIPS WOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY AT THE MOST SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS OR ACTIVITIES. HE PERSONALLY REVIEWED THE EXISTING PROJECTS AND DIRECTED THAT THEIR NUMBER BE REDUCED FROM 19 TO 8. LATER REINSTATING ONE ON AN INTERIM BASIS. HE ALSO ASSURED THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY THAT HE WOULD PERSONALLY APPROVE ALL NEW USAINTA ICIP PROJECTS.

THE PROPOSED ICIP IN SUPPORT OF THE USASA FIELD STATION IN FRG WOULD EXTEND THE PROGRAM OUTSIDE CONUS FOR THE FIRST TIME. IN VIEW OF THE ACSI'S COMMITMENT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY, ARMY-WIDE



Spar

NO

the two can be a constituted that the transfer of

PROCEDURES NEED BE ESTABLISHED WHEREBY PROPOSED ICIPS ARE REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE ACSI AND QUARTERLY REPORTS OF ON-GOING ICIPS ARE FURNISHED THE UNDER SECRETARY.

USASA FIELD STATION. IT IS REQUESTED THAT A COPY OF THE FINALIZED

OPLAN BE FORWARDED FOR ACSI REVIEW. ATTN: DAMI-DON. AFTER ACSI

APPROVAL. INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMAT FOR THE QUARTERLY REPORT WILL BE

BURNISHED ALONG BITH SAMPLES OF PREVIOUS REPORTING. XGDS-2005

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BY CDR USAINSCOM 5200.1-R
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FROM COL IALEROSA, CHIEF, CI DIV, OBCSI, USAREUR FOR LTC GRIMES, CLR, SO LET, USAITTA; INFO MR KELLY, LEP DIR OPS, OACSI, LA.

SUBJECT: INTERNAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (ICIP) (U)

A. INT 1126-74 TOPIC, 182138Z SEP 74 (U).

OPERATIONS PLAN (OPLAN) TARGETTING AN ELEMENT OF THE USASA FIELD

C STATION, AUGSBURG, FRG (USASAFSA). ON 28 MAY 75, FINALIZED OPLAN

WAS PROVIDED S-2, USASAFSA, FOR COORDINATION AND COMMENT THEN TO BE

RETURNED TO GOTH MI GP FOR FORWARDING THRU ODCSI USAREUR TO USAINTA

FOR FURTHER COORLINATION WITH USASA. CONTRARY TO SPECIFIC REQUEST BY

66TH MI GP, COMMANUER, USASAFSA, FORWARDED OPLAN DIRECT TO DEPUTY

CHIEF OF STAFF SECURITY, HEADQUARTERS, USASA, ARLINGTON HALL STATION

FOR COORLIMATION AND GUILANCE.

ORDINATION OF OPLAN, RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE OFFICE AT USASA BE
CONTACTED IN EFFORT TO OBTAIN COPY OF OPLAN AND EFFECT COORDINATION.

ON SEP BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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USAREUR ACTION OFFICER IS MR BENJAMIN J. ROSETO, (SECURE PHONE 6742) HEIDELBERG MILITARY 2121-7354. XGLS-2

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BY COR USAINSCOM FOUPO AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 6200.1-Pl

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SUBJECT: TYTERYAL COUNTERPYTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (ICIP) (U)

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O OPLAY AND EMPURIENCE GAINED BY THIS HE CONTUCTING ICIP:

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PROVIDE MECESSARY AUTHORIZATION FOR ICIP.

C C. INCLUDING AS REF, AR SECTED, ACQUISITION AND STORAGE OF INFO CONCERNING NON-AFFILIATED PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

C 1. AND INFO LIVELOPED THAT BECOMES OFCO OR APPEARS TO HAVE OFCO EMPLOITABLE POTENTIAL SHOULD BE REPORTED THRU OFCO CHANNELS.

C 3. (U) THIS HE IS PRIPARED TO REMEDIE ADDITIONAL

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RE ELVELOPMENTS THIS ICIP. XQLS-2(U5)

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O CONTRACTOR

DAMI-DOI-C

27 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

BUBJECT: ICIP Briefing for Under Secretary of the Army (U)

1. On 25 September 1974 MG Aaron briefed Mr. Herman Staudt, on the ICIP. Mr. Staudt expressed reservations about operational control within the program and concern about the sudden rapid growth. He wanted assurances that the program was carefully monitored precluding the possibility for embarranement.

2. General Aeron assigned the following tasks to USAINTA through Mr. Leslie Hime, the USAINTA representative at the meeting.

- a. Prepare all the operations plans for review; General Aaron will personally re-validate each plan.
- b. Prepare source dossiers for review. General Aaron wants to be able to personally be assured that all sources are of such maturity and stability that they would not cause any embarrassment to the Army.
- 3. General Aaron will personally validate and approve all future operations plans and will assume command and control of the program. Only essential plans will be approved and permitted to continue. General Aaron did not consider the operation at the War College to be essential.
- (U) Operations plans and dossiers will be reviewed on 4 October 1974.

RICHARD EBERSOLE

Major, GS

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ISDORATION FOR THE VICE CHIEF OF STAFF United States Army

SUBJECT: Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations

On 4 December 1971 you forwarded to me a memoranium from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intellimence, SUGJECT: Counterintelligence Policy Quidance, which informed me of the ACSI's decision to reactivate certain Aggressive Counterintelligence Program (ACIP) Operations. Attached to the memorandum was the operation plan for one such operation. I have reviewed that memorandum and the attached plan, and although I appreciate the conscientious steps which have been taken to assure adherence to current policies in this area, I remain concerned that this program may be placing us in a highly valuerable position.

DoD Directive 5200.27 and the implementing Army policy latter dated 1 June 1971 impose two restrictions which are particularly relevant to ACIP operations. First, they require that there be "no govert or otherwise deceptive surveillance or panelyctica of civilian organizations without the prior approval of the Chairman, DIEC (now the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)). Second. they prohibit assigning BoD personnel "to attend rublic or trivate" meetings, demonstrations, or other similar activities for the purpose of acquiring information the collection of which is authorized without my prior approval, except in emergency situa**tions.** These prohibitions apply whether or not the formal 'target' of the operation is affiliated with the Department of Defense. Although the ACSI letter approving the first reactivated ACIP speration incorporates these restrictions by reference (paragraph 3x), the operation plan and related documents obviously assume that confidential sources working in the operation may obtain and report information which they receive in the course of activities off military installations. While the plan prohibits extending the collection effort "directly" to non-hob personnel (paragraph 4a(a)), and while the ACSI approval latter prohibits making mon-900 personnel targets of off-post surveillance. I would assume that it is entirely possible that in the course of their off-neat activities confidential sources might obtain and report information

OSA,OGC-ont OSA,ASS USA-ant Mr. Greene

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on non-affiliated civilians. Although such activity plant not in all situations be forbidden by DoD Directive \$200.27, it is clearly on the borderline, and I therefore feel it is very important that these operations be closely supervised and tightly controlled.

In order to make an informed decision about whether further controls are necessary (including possible Under Secretary or DIRG review of each operation). I would appreciate your taking the following steps:


- 1. Beginning March 31, 1972, I would like to receive a quarterly report containing the following information on each ACIP operation in progress at any time during the reporting period. Date approved. code-name, location, number of confidential sources weed during reporting period, number of instances in which information on non-affiliated civilians is obtained off post and reported, and a brief parrative Statement exploining whether useful information was obtained during the reporting poriod, whether the operation is to be continued, and if so, why. There reports may be submitted 30 days after the close of the calendar quarter which they cover,
- 2. With the second quarterly report, which will be due July 31, 1972, I would like to receive a full . Snalyais of this program, including its value in terms of producing useful information and the edequary of the controls which have been imposed. Recommendations for may further necessary controls should be included.

(sgd) Kenneth E. Belieu

Xenneth E. Delies Under Socretary of the Army

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HE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DASM-666-75 2 December 1975

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, FURT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755


Subject: ICIP Coverage

- 1. Reference is made to J3M-1994-74, dated 26 November 1974, subject: Request for Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Coverage (C).
- 2. Subject program authorized by the reference is hereby rescinded.

PETER O'BRIEN
Colonel, USA
Director,
Administrative Services

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Classified by Chief, ANMCC EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY - Indefinite



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MERRILL T. KELY: Acting Director of Intelligence Operations.	3/	Jan

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OPTIONAL FORM 41 AUGUST 1967 GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 100-11.204

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO

Mr Kelly

MG Aaron

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DATE

MRITIALS

1. Re: MG Aaron's question attached Ops 41, the individual who met with the JCS Security Officer was CWO Garry Peisen, FI. Ritchie RO, 902d MI Gp, and not a representative of PCF as previously reported. A PCF representative escorted Peisen to the JCS Security Office but

did not participate in the discussions.

2. Mr. Guerrieri has still not determined if any sort of briefing will be required and will advise this office when a decision is reached.

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L. A. SPIRITO, COL, GS Chief HUMINT Dision

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25 Nov 75

OPTIONAL FORM 41 AUGUST 1867 GBA FPMR (#1CFR) 100-11.206 GPO: 1973 OF-529-336



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

21 Nov18

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KELLY, ACTING DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATION

SUBJECT: Discussions with JCS Security Officer on ICIP CANARY EFFORT

1. (C) At the request of LTG Grimes, Special Operations Detachment, USANNTA LTC Haendle from this office visited Mr. Guerrieri, Chief, Security Office, JCS on 20 Nov 75 to determine if he had requested briefings for the Director of the Joint Staff and the J3, JCS. LTC Grimes had learned that the 902d MI Group was preparing to brief on the ICIP CANARY EFFORT at Fort Ritchie, MD and questioned the need for such briefings.

2. (C) Mr. Guerrieri stated that he had learned in passing conversation with a member of the PCF that Army was providing ICIP support to Joint Activities at Fort Ritchie, MD. He was disturbed about the potential embarrassment of such activities and stated he had not previously been aware of this type of support. He had requested that various JCS offices be briefed. He read from a letter prepared by the Commander, Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) to the Commander, USAINTA, dated November 1974 which had requested ICIP support and indicated this request had not been cleared with either his predecessor or the J3, JCS. (This request was never forwarded to OACSI so far as can be determined).

3 (C) It was explained that an existing ICIP CANARY EFFORT in support of Army organizations at Fort Ritchie, MD had recently (Sep 75) been revalidated by the ACSI resulting from a reorganization of the supported command. Included in the revised OPLAN was overlapping support to the ANMCC and its Support Directorate. However, the ICIP, which has been in existence for several years, was primarily in support of Army activities.

4 (C) Mr. Guerrieri indicated he would prefer that no such operation existed in support of JCS activities at Fort Ritchie and would so recommend this to his supervisor, COL O'Brien, Director of Admin Services, JCS. It

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SUBJECT: Discussions with JCS Security Officer on ICIP CANARY EFFORT


was agreed that a USAINTA representative would brief Mr. Guerrieri and COL O'Brien at their convenience on ICIP CANARY EFFORT. Further that no higher representatives need be briefed unless it was determined to be necessary after the initial briefing. Mr. Guerrieri would inform DAMI-DOK when (or if) a briefing on the ICIP was required.

L. A. SPIRITO Colonel, GS Chief, HUMINT Division

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KELLY, ACTING DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Discussions with JCS Security Officer on ICIP BANARY EFFORT

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2. Whr. Guerrieri stated that he had learned in passing conversation with a member of the PCF that Army was providing ICIP support to Joint Activities at Fort Ritchie, MD. He was disturbed about the potential embarrassment of such activities and stated he had not previously been aware of this type of support. He had requested that various JCS offices be briefed. He read from a letter prepared by the Commander, Alternate National Military Command Center (AMMCC) to the Commander, DSAINTA, dated November 1974 which had requested ICIP support and indicated this request had not been cleared with either his predecessor or the J3, JCS. (This request was never forwarded to OACSI so far as can be determined).

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4. Mr. Guerrieri indicated he would prefer that no such operation existed in support of JCS activities at Fort Ritchie and would so recommend this to his supervisor, COL O'Brien, Director of Admin Services, JCS. It

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SUBJECT: Discussions with JCS Security Officer on ICIP CANARY EFFORT

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
Signed / Wilt
L. *. SPIRITO
Colonel, GS
Chasf, HUMINT Division

NOTE:

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AT 0845 HCS, 4 DEC 75, COL SPIRITO ADVISED COL STUBBLEBINE, CDR 907.0 MT GP, THAT HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO COL STUBBLEBINE DEALING DIRECT WITH THE SECURITY OFFICER, JCS TO DISCOSS ICTA SUPPORT

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DAMI-DOH

2 1 Nov 19/5

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: ICIP CANARY EFFORT

1. (U) On 19 Nov 75, LTC Grimes USAINTA requested that I visit a Mr. Guerrieri, Chief, JCS Security Office, 1A688, The Pentagon to determine if Guerrieri had requested briefings on CANARY EFFORT for the Director of the JCS and J3. LTC Grimes indicated he had just learned the 902d MI Gp was ginning up for these briefings which he considered unnecessary. LTC Grimes advised the 902d MI Gp to hold up until informed otherwise.

2. Mr. Guerrieri was not in his office on 19 Nov 75 and was not visited until 1430 hours, 20 Nov 75. In the meantime, the undersigned determined that a request for an ICIP had been initiated by the Commander, Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) to the Commander, USAINTA in November 1974. Correspondence between USAINTA and the 902d MI Gp established that the existing ICIP CANARY EFFORT could be expanded to provide coverage to the ANMCC. (None of this correspondence was discussed at OACSI level so far as could be determined). In the meantime the 902d determined that the OPIAN for CANARY EFFORT required revision due to a reorganization of the Supported Army Command. It was decided to add target coverage to the ANMCC as well as the AJCC, ANMCCSD, and ECTC, all at either Pt Ritchie (Site R) or Pt Detrick. The revised OPIAN was approved by the ACSI on 15 Sep 75.

In conversation with Mr. Guerrieri, it was determined that he learned of the ICIP in passing during a conversation with a representative of the PCF. He was more than a little disturbed that no one in JCS, particularly the Security Office, was aware of the project. He reiterated at great length that he recognized the Army was merely responding to a legitimate request, prepared on JCS stationary, but that the potential for embarrassment from such an operation clearly disturbed him. The undersigned discussed briefly the fact that the Army ICIP in support of Army activities at Ft Ritchie had existed for many years. Even though the ANMCC request for support occurred in 1974, the expansion of the Army Security service to include joint activities was not approved by the ACSI until Sep 75.

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DAMI-DOH

SUBJECT: ICIP CANARY EFFORT

Director of Admin Services, JCS.

Further, from correspondence received at OACSI, the indications were that the ICIP still supported Army commands in the main, but could be of assistance to the ANMCC if serious breeches of security were uncovered which affected joint activities in adjoining areas. Mr. Guerrieri reiterated his concern for the Privacy Act impact upon such security operations and generally gave the impression he was concerned that the ICIP would cause his office headaches in the future. He would prefer that no such operation supported JCS

activities and would so recommend this to his boss, COL O'Brien, USA,

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4. (U) It was agreed that a USAINTA representative would brief Mr. Guerrieri and COL O'Brien at such time as he preferred. No higher or other JCS representatives would be briefed unless it was decided to be necessary after the initial briefing. Mr. Guerrieri will contact DAMI-DOH to arrange for a briefing.

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LTC, GS DAMI-DOH

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AUGUST 1987 GBA FPMR (41CFR) 100-11-208

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

0 4 DEC 1975

DAMI-DOH

MEMORANDUM THRU:

Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) MILITARY

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

During the part quarter, five of the ongoing operations provided information which served to enhance the security at the facilities concerned. Personnel participating in ICIP operations at Harry Diamond Laboratories, Virginia, and Fort Ritchie, Maryland, identified security hazards which required follow-up investigative action.

With the revalidation of the ICIP at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland in July 1975 for a period of six months, the total number of active ICIPs in CONUS was raised to nine. The ICIP OPLAN at Fort Ritchie, Maryland was revised on 15 September 1975 to reflect target area realignment resulting from the reorganization of the US Army Communications Command.

(U) Summaries of the nine on-going CONUS ICIP operations are inclosed.

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Major Constal, GS AGoiS for Intelligence

8 DEC 1975

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON CORUSAINSCOM FOUPO AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD \$200.1-R

WILLIAM G. HARME

Major, GS

Assistant to the Director of the Army Staff

LTC Haendle/56159 Typed by T. Shamblen

1.

CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) At an undetermined time within the past year, the Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC) requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Communications Center provide the PTC with a magnetic tape containing test messages recorded by the Burroughs D825 Automated Message Processing System, a system used by the JCS, in order for the PTC to devise a coding system which would provide compatibility between the PTC's IBM 360/50 System and the Burroughs System used by the JCS. The JCS Communications Center could not provide the test message tape because of technical factors. This led to the Telecommunications Directorate, Site R, Ft Ritchie, receiving the tasking for the test tape preparation. A number of innocuous, unclassified messages were prepared by the communications personnel at Site R on a 2,500 foot reel of magnetic tape, which was sent to the PTC, where, because the messages were unclassified, it lay in open storage, unsecured, for about six weeks. During the processing which followed to make the two systems compatible, it was discovered that the tape also contained fragments of highly sensitive, classified messages which had been picked up from residual magnetism on the drums or reels of the Burroughs equipment when the test messages were recorded. A source of this ICIP reported this information believing that a compromise could have occurred when the test tape was not secured. The information was reported to the Commander, US Army Communications Center Operations Command, who initiated an investigation of the incident which resulted in a change of security procedures for the handling/storage of computer tapes, reels, and discs. Since the PTC is a secure area in itself, it is believed that the information in question had not been compromised.
- (2) During the reporting period, sources surfaced adverse suitability information on 47 individuals assigned to Fort Ritchie and the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC), Site R. In the majority of instances, the adverse suitability information dealt with drug abuse. Information was brought to the attention of the ICIP Coordinator of the supported command. Individuals concerned are being monitored, and an investigation was requested on one individual.

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e. Operational Status:

- (1) The revised CANARY EFFORT Operations Plan which reflected target realignment resulting from reorganization of the USACC into the 7th Signal Command was approved by the ACSI on 15 September 1975. A request has been submitted for assignment of an additional Great Skills PCO to provide more adequate coverage of the increased target areas which have resulted from this reorganization.
- (2) On 1 July 1975, CPT Richard E. Graff, Project Liaison Officer (PLO), CENSUS TIME, was introduced to COL Donald E. Clark, Commander, USACC Operations Command, at the AJCC, Site R. COL Clark had been previously briefed on the ICIP on 18 March 1975, but the purpose of this meeting was to acquaint COL Clark with the ICIP CENSUS TIME which is conducted at the Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), prior to his assumption of command at the PTC. On 1 August 1975, the CENSUS TIME and CANARY EFFORT Project Liaison Officers briefed COL Clark at the USACC PTC on both of these ICIPs since both of them involve USACC Operations Command and its subordinate elements.
- (3) On 18 August 1975, the CANARY EFFORT PLO and COL Stubblebine, Commander, 902d MI Group, visited the USACC East Coast Telecommunications Center (ECTC), Ft Detrick, MD, for a facility briefing, since the facility is now being covered in the revised CANARY EFFORT OPLAN. The introductory briefing on the ICIP was presented to LTC Jackie L. Manbeck, Commander, USACC ECTC, and CW2 George S. Trivett, OIC, Security Division, USACC ECTC. The CDR, 902d MI Group, and the PLO also made a courtesy visit to COL J. A. Pastore, CDR, Fort Detrick.
- (4) On 27 August 1975, COL John S. Eberle, CDR, USACC Site R Tele-communications Center, was provided an introductory briefing on the ICIP CANARY EFFORT.
- (5) On 18 September 1975, the Quarterly Progress Briefing was presented to the CDR, USACC Operations Command, COL Clark, at the USACC Operations Command, USACC PTC, Wash, DC, in conjunction with the CENSUS TIME Quarterly Progress Briefing because of the inter-relationships of both ICIPs.
- (6) On 25 September 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to the supported command with the following in attendance: COL Harold G. deMoya, CDR, Ft Ritchie; COL John S. Eberle, CDR, USACC Site R Telecommunications Center; COL John J. Plosay, Jr., Deputy CDR, Fort Ritchie, and ACSI&S, 7th Signal Command. All of the above officials expressed their appreciation and continued enthusiasm for the ICIP and made laudatory comments concerning the counterintelligence support rendered during the reporting period.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUPO
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2. CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD) Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: On 23 September 1973, COL Alden L. Cox, Commander, Seneca Army Depot, was given the ICIP Quarterly Progress Report which included the history of CANINE PLATE from its inception. COL Cox assumed command of Seneca Army Depot on 4 Sep 75 from recently promoted BG Alan A. Nord. With the PLO now having full, unescorted access to Directorate for Special Weapons and the Special Weapons Storage Area, the prime target area, source recruitment has increased with six (6) conventional sources being used. Additionally, initial assessment was made of one potential source. With the favorable attitude toward ICIP operations evinced by COL Cox it is anticipated that development of the operation will continue. COL Cox stated that he was happy with present state of the operation; he did caution that under no circumstances did he want any "flap" over the program.

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
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
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
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- 3. CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval 4 Mar 75)
- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal,
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians;
 None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Source continues to provide substantial information concerning eight of the persons who were subjects of the allegations which led to the request for the operation. Although Source has been unable to absolutely confirm or refute the allegations made, he has been able to develop associations with all of the individuals involved, to include being invited to social functions at which these persons were in attendance. Fragmentary information provided thus far has caused reason to doubt certain of the allegations, but investigation continues and further information will be reported as received.
- (2) Source continues to monitor the security posture of the target area, reporting security infractions, hazards and weaknesses as they occur. Source has reported a renewed practice of poor housekeeping, and a continued lack of compartmentation, lack of control of production facilities, absence of control of hand baggage brought into and out of the target area, and possible compromise of the present badge system due to loss and improper exposure off-post. In an attempt to contribute to the security posture of the target area, Source, in his official capacity as the Administrative Technical Assistant to the Director, Advance Sensors Directorate (ASD), has created and published a complete guide to current security regulations and policies. Copies of the publication were distributed throughout ASD with specific distribution to those persons involved with the storage, creation, or control of classified defense information.
- (3) Source is attempting to monitor the duty-hours activities of an individual of Jordanian birth presently employed in ASD as a DAC. This employee appears to be of possible CI interest because of his alleged enthusiastic involvement with other Arabic linguists and his reported recurring trips to New York City, ostensibly for the purpose of purchasing items for his off-duty business interests.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) COL Arthur G. Lange, Jr., Chief of Staff, USAMICOM, was briefed on the information provided by Source during the 25-26 June meetings on





18 July 1975 by the PLO and on information provided during the 6-7 August meetings on 22 Aug 75 by the PLO. Information provided during the 17-18 September meetings will be provided to COL Lange during the next reporting period. COL Lange expressed his appreciation for the information provided, noted the security weaknesses developed, and indicated that he would examine ways to improve the security posture of USAMICOM. COL Lange was cautioned that corrective actions must be taken in such a manner as to protect the Source.

(2) COL Axelson, former Deputy Director, US Army Missile Research, Development and Experimental Laboratory (USAMRDEL), retired on 31 Jul 75 and was replaced by COL William P. Gojsza on 2 Sep 75. The PLO briefed COL Gojsza on the background of the operation and the individuals involved on 25 Sep 75. MG Vincent H. Ellis, USAMICOM Commander, was succeeded by MG George E. Turnmeyer on 1 Oct 75. The PLO will brief MG Turnmeyer on the ICIP during the next reporting period after coordination has been conducted with COL Lange, CofS, USAMICOM.

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4. CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), US Army Materiel Command, Herlong, CA
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source was recruited during the reporting period. In addition, three conventional sources are currently being used to provide coverage in the target area. The quarterly progress report to SIAD officials has been delayed until 28 October by the direction of the Commander, 525th MI Group. The Commander, SIAD, continues to be interested in suitability information especially about the illegal use of drugs among SIAD personnel and has requested the Project Liaison Officer to continue to emphasize such requirements to Sources. In addition, the commander was provided support to augment depot security during exercise Golden Gloves which terminated 29 September 1975.

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5. CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians; None
- d. Useful Information Obtained: The Commander, PTC, has reassigned the civilian employee reported in the Fourth Quarter FY 1975 Quarterly Report as having questionable suitability characteristics and conduct to a new job within PTC requiring minimum contact with classified information. Supervisors will continue to monitor his conduct and activities. An Army NCO assigned to PTC attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. The NCO reportedly did so in a moment of deep despair and depression over personal and financial problems. Local police officers, investigating the suicide attempt, reported that the NCO denied being in financial straits and produced his wallet for the officer showing him about \$2,000.00 in \$100 denominations. The investigating officer observed a screen in the NCO's apartment, of the type believed to be used by marijuana dealers. All information regarding the incident was provided PTC. The NCO's access has been suspended and the Security Officer of PTC has requested that a limited investigation be conducted.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 18 July 1975, COL Donald E. Clark assumed command of PTC. COL Clark formerly had been at Site R, Ft Ritchie, one of the primary targets of the ICIP CANARY EFFORT. In his initial briefing on CENSUS TIME on 1 August 1975, COL Clark indicated to LTC Chad B. White, CDR, PCF/NCR Field Office, 902d MI Gp, that he desired to have an evaluation of the current security posture of PTC. During the period 8-12 August 1975, a courtesy Security Vulnerability Analysis (SVA) was conducted and provided the supported command.
- (2) During the reporting period, PTC was directed by its higher head-quarters to comply with Army Regulation 50-5, Human Reliability Program, in conjunction with their storing of two-man control items. The PTC Security Manager requested implementation assistance from the PLO. The PLO, by means of liaison with the US Army Nuclear and Chemical Surety Group, Fort Belvoir, VA, provided PTC with the requested direction and guidance.

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
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(3) On 18 September 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Briefing on the progres of the ICIP to COL Clark, CDR, PTC, and Mr. Daniel E. Thompson, Technical Director, PTC.

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


6. CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Washington, DC
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) During the reporting period no additional information was developed since the previous quarter concerning the visits of the First Secretary, USSR Embassy, Washington, DC to meetings of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, a professional society for engineers, which were held in the HDL auditorium. COL Einsel, Commander, HDL, made a determination that the society could no longer hold meetings at HDL in order to preclude any potential security threat and any potential for a repeat of the incident.
- (2) The Security Officer, HDL, took several actions in response to recommendations contained in the Courtesy Security Inspection report submitted during the last quarter. These included a pilot 100% inventory of SECRET material to determine feasibility of a complete inventory at HDL, guard force personnel were shifted to new areas and security routines were considerably tightened because of laxness; a study was completed or possible new badges for HDL and security lectures were presented.
- (3) On 5 and 17 September 1975, unidentified light aircraft flew over the test site, Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), HDL, where a series of tests on foreign equipment under the ROUGE-EMORY program was in progress. In both instances the aircraft circled over the ROUGE-EMORY test site for about 5-7 minutes. During the years WRF has been at its present location no known overflights of this type have been reported. The overflights are being investigated in coordination with the FBI.
- (4) On 8 Aug 75 a civilian employee, HDL, was referred to the PLO by the FBI. The employee claimed that she was being followed by members of the HDL Security Office, who were involved with a homosexual group at the Van Ness Avenues Facility, HDL. She named a number of persons at HDL as being involved in the group. After investigating her story the Commander, HDL, believed that she is suffering from psychiatric problems. The Commander plans to have employee visit a psychiatrist for a complete evaluation.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) A final decision has not been reached by the Secretary of the Army on the creation of the Harry Diamond Developmental Center, a decision

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had been expected by the middle of September 1975. Criticism by a state congressional delegation to the move, which would result in the loss of 1200 jobs in the state, has delayed a final decision.

(2) On 17 September 1975, COL Thomas McGregor, Commander, HDL, who replaced COL Einsel, MAJ Kenneth F. Keller, HDL, and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL were briefed on the quarterly progress of the ICIP. COL McGregory, an MI Officer showed considerable interest in the ICIP. It is expected that the excellent attitude toward the program that was shown by COL Einsel will be continued by COL McGregor.

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7. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Revalidation - 11 Jul 75)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Aberdeen, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight confidential sources
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:

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- (1) Sources reported that on 13 August 1975, an unknown number of Swedish citizens visited the US Army Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) The PLO determined that the visit had been fully coordinated with the proper officials. A Source reported on 26 September 1975 that seven Swedish citizens visited the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA), APG. The PLO determined that the visit had not been properly coordinated, but that AMSAA had taken steps to insure that the visitors would not be given access to classified information until guidance was provided by HQ, US Army Materiel Command (AMC).
- (2) Sources reported three instances of foreign travel during the period. A civilian pharmacologist employed at the Biomedical Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, attended the Sixth Congress of the International Union of Pharmacologists (IUPHAR) in Helsinki, Finland, held from 20 to 25 July 1975 and attended a luncheon during the Congress hosted by a representative of the USSR. After the Congress, the employee took part in a five-day tour to Leningrad, USSR, sponsored by IUPHAR. This information is being exploited as a DOMEX lead. In another instance, a civilian employee of the Development and Engineering Directorate, Edgewood Arsenal, visited Poland and Czechoslovakia for about one month in June and July 1975. The employee and his spouse allegedly visited relatives in both countries. The employee will be debriefed by USAINTA. In the third instance, a civilian employee of the Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL), APG, planned to take part in a National Geographic Society tour of the USSR in October 1975. The employee will be debriefed by USAINTA after his return.
- (3) A source reported three instances of alien enlistees who were assigned to the Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL), APG. Follow-up action by the PLO determined that the Installation Intelligence Officer was aware of the status of the three, that they did not have security clearances and had no access to classified information. In the case of one of the enlistees who allegedly suffers from periods of amnesia, action was taken to deny him a security clearance.

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- (4) Source reported three instances of civilian employees of Edgewood Arsenal and one employee of AMSAA, APG, who allegedly engaged in extramarital affairs with other civilian employees. The situations are being discreetly monitored to determine if there is any substance to the allegations before investigations are conducted. An official source reported that an Army officer assigned to AMSAA was allegedly an alcoholic, was cohabitating with a female secretary of AMSAA and had engaged in sexual relations with an Israeli female captain assigned to act as the officer's interpreter during an Oct 74 TDY trip to Israel. Follow-up action disclosed that the officer had been transferred to the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency. A Summary of Information has been prepared and will be forwarded to that Agency. A source reported that a physical scientist employed in the Chemical Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, displayed indications of mental and emotional instability. Follow-up by the PLO revealed that the employee had been directed to undergo a "fitness for duty" physical examination which includes a psychiatric evaluation.
- (5) An official source reported to the PLO rumors that a civilian employee of the BRL, APG, was involved in difficulties with the police. Follow-up revealed that the Havre de Grace Police Department, Havre de Grace, MD has seven charges on file against the employee ranging from possession of marijuana to grand larceny and assault and battery. The employee is absent without leave. An investigation for suitability of the employee is underway.
- (6) A source reported that a high ranking civilian employee of the Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL), APG, brought his eight-year old son in a controlled access area where a classified test was being conducted and remained overnight. The incident was reported to the APG Security Officer and the employee was admonished and counselled by his supervisor. The same source reported that within the HEL classified reports were being typed on one-time typewriter ribbons and carbon that were not being handled as classified waste. The Security Officer, HEL, has stopped the practice and these items are now being disposed of with the classified waste. Another source reported ten separate situations at AMSAA which constituted security hazards or violations. Brought to the attention of the AMSAA Security Officer, all have been corrected.

e. Operational Status:

(1) Following revalidation of the ICIP on 11 July 1975, both the PLO and the PCO concentrated their efforts on reactivating and expanding the ICIP. During the latter half of July, the six confidential sources which had been used previously were recontacted and reactivated, one CIRL whose

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recruitment had been postponed when the project was suspended was recruited on 5 Aug 75; a Source Lead Development Report on another CIRL was approved and this source was recruited on 4 Sep 75. These two sources were the first ones recruited in the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA), a critical sensitive activity at APG. The PLO reestablished liaison contacts with local, state, and federal agencies in addition to maintenance of contacts with ICIP coordinators and security officers of those activities receiving ICIP support at APG. The PLO also established new casual sources in critical areas of the ICIP-supported activities at APG and vetted two new CIRLS who are under initial assessment.

- (2) On 22 Aug 75, COL Kenneth L. Stahl, CDR, Edgewood Arsenal, was provided an up-date briefing by the PLO on the status of the ICIP and informed that the ICIP would require revalidation in six months. COL Stahl named CPT Vincent J. Falconio, Security Officer, Edgewood Arsenal, as the new ICIP Coordinator and requested that he be given the initial ICIP briefing. CPT Falconio was given the initial ICIP briefing and a status report on GONDOLA STAR on 22 Aug 75. COL Stahl advised that COL Burt Dall had been assigned as Deputy Commander, Edgewood Arsenal, and requested that COL Dall be given a briefing.
- (3) On 17 September 1975, presented the initial ICIP briefing to COL Dall. In the absence of COL Stahl, who was on leave, COL Dall and CPT Falconio, Edgewood Arsenal Security Officer, were also given the Quarterly Progress Briefing on 17 September 1975.
- (4) The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, Commander, APG; and Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG. Both COL Stahl and COL Ungerleider expressed their pleasure that the CONDOLA STAR ICIP had been reinstated by the ACSI for an additional six months.

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8. LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Revalidated - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
- e. Operational Status: One additional confidential source was recruited during the reporting period and one individual is presently under assessment as a potential confidential source. On 30 September 1975, the Project Liaison Officer presented the Quarterly Progress Report to MG O. L. Tobiason, Commanding General, WSMR. The following personnel were also present at the briefing: LTC Charles I. Davis, Chief, Security Office, WSMR; LTC Arthur D. McQueen, Operations Officer, 525th MI Gp, CPT Marcel Hull, SAIC, Ft Bliss Resident Office, 525th MI Gp and GS-13 William F. Arket, Chief Intelligence Division, WSMR. Since MG Tobiason was unfamiliar with the Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP), the ICIP was explained in detail from its initiation to the present at WSMR. MG Tobiason was pleased with the ICIP LENS HOLDER.

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
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9. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)


- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight (8) confidential sources
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) The temporary instructor in the Chinese-Mandarin Department, previously reported in the 4th Quarter, FY 75 Quarterly Report, who questioned her students about their future duties and expressed her displeasure at teaching Chinese to students to enable them to spy on the People's Republic of China, submitted her resignation on 4 September 1975. Her last working day was 5 September and she departed the Presidio of Monterey area.
- (2) The instructor in the German Language Department, previously reported in the 4th Quarter, FY 75 Quarterly Report, who travelled to Bast Germany without notifying the DLI Security Officer, has been officially admonished by the Chairman of the German Language Department. She was advised that any future disobedience of DLI Regulations will be punished with a 10 day suspension in accordance with Civil Service Regulations.
- (3) An ICIP source developed information that an instructor in the Russian Language Department is a former member of the Soviet Army's equivalent to the US Army Security Agency and that he had received special training in the English language while in the Soviet Army. This individual left the Soviet Union in Apr 74 and was hired at DLI in Oct 74. This instructor was recently joined by a former coworker in the Soviet Union. The new instructor left the Soviet Union in Apr 75 and was hired at DLI in Jul 75. These two individuals taught together at the Leningrad Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad, USSR in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Messages of inquiry concerning these individuals were sent to USAREUR and a request was sent to the 525th MI Group to conduct discreet checks on the first individual and the Civilian Personnel Office, DLI, submitted a NAC request on the second individual.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) During the reporting period three sources were terminated due to their graduation and five sources were recruited. Four students and a

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Technical Language Assistant are presently being assessed.

- (2) On 5 Sep 75, COL Samuel L. Stepleton, who replaced COL Koenig as Commandant of DLI, received his first Quarterly Briefing on ICIP LENTIL MONKEY. As a result of the briefing, COL Stapleton directed his security officer to prepare a videotape security lecture to be given to all students on their arrival at DLI. COL Stapleton further directed his security officer to closely coordinate the videotape with the Project Liaison Officer in order to insure coverage of all aspects of the security situation at DLI and to determine the most expeditious was to obtain background investigation for all instructors who have not previously had such investigations. The Security Officer was instructed to investigate the possibilities of having bring-up investigations conducted on previously checked instructors; in addition, he is to coordinate with the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate procedures whereby the hiring of new instructors would be contingent on their receiving favorable security checks. In attendance with COL Stapleton at the Quarterly Briefing was MAJ Richard A. Erickson, Security Officer, DLI.
- (3) On 5 Sep 75, subsequent to the Quarterly Briefing, a visit was made to DLI by USAINTA personnel concerning the ICIP. The purpose of the visit was to acquaint the incoming DLI Commandant with some of the potential security problems at DLI which have arisen in the past from the varied, foreign backgrounds of the instructors and the fact that the students are destined for intelligence assignments. The Commandant indicated that he believed the ICIP would prove to be a valuable adjunct to the DLI security program and that he would support the program wholeheartedly. Key personnel in attendance were COL Stapleton; COL William F. Strobridge, CDR, 525th MI Group; LTC Grimes, CDR, Special Operations Detachment, USAINTA; MAJ Richard A. Erickson, Security Officer, DLI; and Mr. Jeremy H. Hughes, PLO.







DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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MIIA-SO-SA

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

HODA (DAMI-DOI-C/MAJ KEERSOLE) WASH DC 20310

During September 1975, at the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), Harry Diamond Laboratories, personnel conducted a series of classified tests on foreign equipment under the ROUGE-EMORY Program. Since HDL is supported by the ICIP CENTAVO KID, the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) provided assistance to WRF to determine times when the air space over WRF would be free of satellites. The storage area was checked for security and the PLO made several suggestions concerning the camouflaging of the test material while it was in the open. WRF adopted the suggestions. On 5 September, a light aircraft identified only as a Piper Cherokee lhO, flew over the test site at which the ROUGE-EMORY material was located, circling and hovering over the site from 5-7 minutes. On 17 September, an unidentified light aircraft again flew over the WRF, particularly circling over the area where the ROUGE-EMORY test equipment had been set up previously. Light aircraft normally avoid the WRF because of the numerous antennas and towers at the Facility. During the time WRF has been at its present location, no known overflights of this type have been reported. The overflights are being investigated in coordination with the FBI.

2. The ICIP providing support to activities located at Edgewood Arsenal and Aberdeen Proving Ground was reactivated during the reporting period as a result of revalidation action by the OACSI on Il July 1975, raising the total number of active ICIPs in CONUS to nine. The ICIP OPLAN at Fort Ritchie was revised on 15 September to reflect target area realignment resulting from reorganization of the US Army Communications Command (USACC).

3. USAINTA is monitoring an ICIP started on about 1 July 1975 at the Army Security Agency (ASA) Augsberg Field Station, Federal Republic of Germany. USAINTA reviewed the operations plan for the ICIP, coordinated

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MIIA-SO-SA SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

the plan with ASA, and notified ODCSI, USAREUR that the ICIP was approved by the CG, ASA. During the reporting period, no information was received concerning the ICIP.

4. (U) Brief status reports for each ICIP operation reported upon are attached as inclosures.

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SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

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(9) During September 1975, at the Woodbridge Research Radlity (WHF), Harry Dismond Laboratories, personnel conducted a series of elegatified tests on foreign equipment under the ECUIE-ENORY Program. Mince ML is supported by the ICIP CKMIAVO KID, the Project Lisison Officer (PLO) provided assistance to WEF to determine times when the air space over MHF would be free of satellites. The storage area was checked for security and the PLO made several suggestions concerning the canouflaging of the test material while it was in the open. WEF adopted the suggestions. On 5 September, a light aircraft identified only as a Piper Cherokee 140, flew over the test site at which the ROUGE-EXCEY material was located, circling and hovering over the site from 5-7 minutes. On 17 September, an unidentified light aircraft again flew over the WAF, particularly circling over the area where the MANZ-RHOMI test equipment had been set up previously. Light alreaft mermally avoid the WRF because of the numerous antennas and towers at the Pacility. During the time WRF has been at its present location, no known overflights of this type have been reported. The overflights are being investigated in coordination with the IMI.

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the plan with ARA, and notified ORCSI, URAREUR that the ICIP was approved by the CG, ARA. During the reporting period, no information was received concerning the ICIP.

h. (W) Brief status reports for each ECIP eperation reported upon are attached as inclosures.

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Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operation	11 September 1975
ACTION REQUIRED CANARY EFFORT (U)	ramma .
To furnish ACSI, DA approval of subject OPLAN to CDR, USAI memoraneous ros secono. (Describe briefly the requirement, beckground and action taken or rec	NIA .
BACKGROUND: By letter dated 9 September 1975, so Director of Operations, USAINTA (MIIA-GPC-SO) forwarded to review and approval, a revised operations plan for CANARY continuation of the existing ICIP at Fort Ritchie, Marylan OPIAN was necessitated by the reorganization and redesignations Command (USACC) - CONUS as the 7th Signal Command experience of the revised OPIAN are as follows (1) Realignment of target areas and increased coverage Directorate, the Alternate Joint Command Center (AJCC), the Command Center (ANMCC), the Alternate National Command Center (ANMCCSD), and the East Coast Telecommunications Center (APICC) and the purposes of counterintelligence support Fort Detrick and the other activities are all at Fort Rit (2) The Execution Phase of the revised OPIAN remains for the addition of a Project Case Officer (PCO) at Fort I coverage for the ECTE. (3) The OPIAN provides that each source and individuand control of the operation will sign a certificate statiand understands the provisions and constraints imposed by	abject as above (TAB B), the CACSI (DAMI-DOH) for EFFORT (U) which provides for ad. Revision of the existing ation of the US Army Communication of the US Army Communications are Alternate National Military ater Support Directorate ECTC). All are considered to the ECTC is located at the chie. essentially unchanged except Detrick to assist in providing all involved in the conducting that he has been briefed
b. There is no significant change in the objectives	of the OPLAN.

3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That the ACSI approve the revised OPIAN and sign the 1st Indorsement to the USAINTA letter at TAB A.

 (Continue on plain bond) MO 🔲 MIPLICATIONS YES 🔲 Y26 🔲 ₩0 🗀 BUDGET YES 🗀 COORDINATIONS APPROVALS OFFICE NAME PHONE PHITIALS DATE BR DIY DIR ΕX ACSI ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SIDE OR CONTINUATION SHEET tainala K. V. Haenelle, LTC, GS/56159 ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

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1910. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, ATTES

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the attached Miss, subject as show, is approved.


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

U 9 SEP 1975

MI 1A-GPC-SO(SA)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C/LTC HAENDLE) WASH DC 20310

The 1 July 1975 reorganization and redesignation of the US Army Communications Command (USACC) - CONUS as the 7th Signal Command resulted in a realignment of target areas of the ICIP CANARY EFFORT (U) at Fort Ritchie, Maryland. Attached as inclosure 1 is a revised operations plan for CANARY EFFORT (U) which provides for continuation of the existing ICIP and reflects the changes brought about by this reorganization.

The new 7th Signal Command reorganization has necessitated a change in the mission of the ICIP to provide increased coverage for the Alternate Joint Command Center (AJCC) and those activities designated by the Commander, 7th Signal Command, as listed in paragraph 4, below, and Annex A. There is no significant change in the objectives. The activities listed in Annex A will be considered Priority I for purposes of counterintelligence support. The Execution Phase of the revised OPLAN remains essentially unchanged except that an additional PCO will have a base of operations at Fort Detrick, MD, to assist in providing coverage for the East Coast Telecommunications Center (ECTC), which is located at Fort Detrick. The revised OPLAN provides that each source and individual involved in the conduct or control of the operation will be thoroughly briefed on the provisions and constraints of AR 380-13 and additionally will be required to sign a certificate stating that they have been briefed and understand the limits imposed by AR 380-13.

3. (U) Four organizational charts which show the former and present command and staff organization by line charts of the 7th Signal Command are attached as inclosure 2. These charts illustrate the principal internal changes occurring as a result of the 1 July 1975 reorganization.

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BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUPO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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DECLASSIFY ON 34 DEC. 2005

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U 0 PEF 1975

MIIA-GPC-SO(SA)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

4. CC: The Telecommunications Directorate, primary target for the present ICIP, was formerly under the operational control of the Commander, Fort Ritchie. With the reorganization, the Telecommunications Directorate, as well as USACC Site R Telecommunications Center and all other USACC Telecommunications Centers in CONUS, are under the operational control of the newly established USACC Operations Command. In addition to the USACC Operations Command elements indicated, the following additional activities will be supported by the revised operations plan:

- a. Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC).
- b. Alternate National Military Command Center Support Directorate (ANMCCSD).
 - c. East Coast Telecommunications Center (ECTC).
- 5. (U) Recommend approval of revised plan at inclosure 1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Director of Operations

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
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AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 6200.1-R

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Internal (Counterintelligence Program (I	CIP) (U)	DA.		-
				3 Sep 75	
ACTION REQUIRE				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	approval of the quarterly ICI			1 1 10 11 0	
	on success. (Describe briefly the requirement, be received to other sources.)	ckground and action take	a of recommen	des. Boust be suff	iciently detailed to identify
1. (U) E of the Arm	Background: By memorandum date my requested that the VCSA pro	d 8 February 19 vide a quarterl	72 (TAB y report	B) the Und on all IC	er Secretary IP operations.
2. L	Discussion:				
Proving Gr	oring the past quarter, in restound, the ICIP which had been onths. This operation will be	terminated at	that ins	tallation	was revalidated
	emorandum at TAB A provides th my for the remaining eight ICI		equired	by the U n d	er Secretary
3. (U) F	Recommendation: That memorandu	m at TAB A be a	pproved	and signed	
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

MILA-GPC-SO

JUL 17 1975

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C) WASH DC 20310

Three incidents of counterintelligence interest involving Soviets or persons tentatively identified as Soviets were reported upon during the fourth quarter of FY 1975. One such report was that a First Secretary of the USSR Embassy visited an auditorium in the Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), on two occasions to attend evening meetings of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., (IEEE), a professional society for engineers. The Soviet official attended one IEEE meeting, but was refused entrance to a second meeting. Although only unclassified matter is presented at these meetings, the potential security dangers are self evident. Details of the incident were reported to the FBI.

Two other incidents involving persons tentatively identified as Soviets occurred in the Fort Ritchie area. The first report, which was in April 1975, concerned an individual bearing a strong resemblance to a KGB member who paid an unusual amount of attention to a shipment of sensitive equipment destined for Fort Ritchie. The second incident concerned an individual assigned to Fort Ritchie who reported that a man representing himself as a contract employee attending a DOD-sponsored conference in Pennsylvania claimed extensive contact with Soviets in Hagerstown, MD. Although the latter incident occurred in 1974, because of the sensitivity of Ft Ritchie, both incidents have been reported to the FBI with a request for an investigation to include a determination if there is any relationship between the two incidents.

Correspondence was submitted on the ICIP GONDOLA STAR at Aberdeen Proving Ground which was reported in the 3d Qtr, FY 75, as scheduled for termination, requesting that the Operation be reconsidered for continuation. Excluding this ICIP, there were eight active ICIPS at the close of the reporting period.

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MIIA-GPC-SO

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

4. (U) Brief status reports for each ICIP operation reported upon are attached as inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


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ALBERT N. WEIDHAS Colonel, MI Director of Operations

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. (20810 .-

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MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY-

MEMORANDUM

NOTED BY

24 SEP 1975

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) -- INFORMATION SUBJECT:

During the past quarter, three incidents surfaced as a result of MCIP operations which involved known or suspected Soviets. One report concerned a USSR Embassy official who visited an auditorium at the Harry Diamond Laboratories on two occasions, to attend evening meetings of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. The official attended one meeting, but was denied entrance on a second occasion. The other two incidents occurred in the Fort Ritchie, MD area. One concerned a report of an individual bearing a strong resemblance to a KGB member who was particularly concerned about a shipment of sensitive equipment destined for Fort Ritchie, while the other involved a man representing himself as a contract employee attending a DOD-sponsored conference in Pennsylvania, who claimed extensive contact with Soviets in Hagerstown, MD. All three incidents were reported to the FBI.

- 2. In response to a request from the Commander, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, I have revalidated GONDOLA STAR for a six-month period. I plan to closely monitor the results of this operation, and will make a final determination in January 1976 as to whether or not it should continue.
- (U) Summaries of the eight on-going ICIP operations are inclosed.

18 SEP 1975

RECOMMEND APPROVAL - VCSA

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HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS ACofs for Intelligence

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
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1. (C) CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources.
- c. Information obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Information was surfaced pertaining to the alleged abuse of drugs on the part of seven (7) individuals assigned sensitive/critical duties. Additionally, adverse suitability information concerning nine (9) individuals was reported. This information involved indebtedness, alcohol abuse, moral improprieties and mental instability. As a result of the information furnished, four individuals had their access to classified information suspended; investigations were requested on three individuals; and the activities of the other individuals are being monitored.
- (2) Information was reported concerning an individual who resembled a suspected KGB member. The individual has paid an inordinate degree of attention to the activities of a US civilian firm and a sensitive shipment destined for Fort Ritchie. Another individual reported conversations that occurred in August 1974 in a bar in Waynesboro, PA where he learned that an individual believed to be a contract employee claimed to have had contacts with Soviets who worked in Hagerstown, MD. Both incidents were reported to the FBI with a request for investigation.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 25 June 1975, the PLO briefed COL Harold G. deMoya, Cdr, Fort Ritchie, and COL John J. Plosay, Jr., Deputy Cdr, Fort Ritchie.
- (2) COL Donald E. Clark assumed command of the 7th Signal Command (which includes the Pentagon Telecommunications Center) on 18 July 1975 and was briefed on CANARY EFFORT. The 902d MI Group which is conducting the ICIP at Fort Ritchie prepared a revised operations plan reflecting changes in mission and target areas which resulted from the reorganization of the US Army Communications Command (USACC) into the 7th Signal Command. Prior to the reorganization the Telecommunications Directorate, located at Site "R" and the primary target for the ICIP, was under the operational control of the Cdr, Fort Ritchie. Under the new organization, the Telecommunications Directorate, as well as the telecommunications centers throughout CONUS, are under the operational control of a new established activity, the USACC Operations Command.

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


2. CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: On 6 May 1975, COL Alan A. Nord, recently assigned as Commander, Seneca Army Depot, was provided an initial briefing on the ICIP Operation CANINE PLATE (U). COL Nord stated that he favored the expansion of the Operation and the PIO should be allowed full, unescorted access to the Directorate for Special Weapons and the Special Weapons Storage Area. The last change would permit spotting and assessing potential sources in areas not open previously to the PLO except by peripheral contact. During the reporting period, contact was made with four conventional sources. Additionally, initial assessments were made of two potential sources, one in the Transportation Division and one in the Directorate for Quality Assurance. The PLO has been involved with providing informal counterintelligence assistance to the Military Police Company responsible for the physical security of SAD. Since the initial briefing on the ICIP was presented to the Commander on 6 May 75, a subsequent Quarterly Progress Report was not given. With the expanded latitude and favorable attitude toward ICIP operations evinced by COL Nord it is anticipated that development of the operation will be accelerated.

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3.(C) CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: The ICIP confidential source provided substantial information on security weaknesses within the supported command to include poor housekeeping practice, lack of control of reproduction facilities, lack of proper control of area access, lax security attitudes and possible compromise of security badges through continued loss. As a result of the information provided by the source, the Director, US Army Missile RD&E Lab, directed that poor housekeeping practices be corrected prior to 1 July 1975 subject to his personal inspection. Source will continue to monitor the security posture of the target area. Additional information has been obtained on the personalities involved in the previous investigation under provisions of AR 15-6 which led to the initiation of the operation for the insertion of a Confidential Source into the target area. Information provided has resulted in the initiation of credit checks and local agency checks to confirm or refute allegations.
- e. Operational Status: On 16 April 1975, confidential source, a Military Intelligence warrant officer was inserted into the target area as an administrative officer. This source appears to be very well received within the target area and has provided substantial information to include information noted in paragraph 1d above. His outgoing, friendly manner coupled with his professional intelligence background will increase the potential of the ICIP operation. COL Arthur G. Lange, Jr., Chief of Staff, USAMICOM, was briefed on the implementation of the operation on 7 April 1975. He was subsequently briefed on 9 June and will be briefed subsequent to each meeting with the confidential source. The briefing given COL Lange after each meeting with the confidential source will be given in lieu of the Quarterly Progress Briefing since this will keep USAMICOM informed of the progress of the operation on a more current basis than would be the case if briefing were confined to Quarterly Progress Reports. The PLO's briefing was well received by COL Lange, who indicated that he would inform MG Ellis.

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4. (V)

CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), US Army Materiel Command, Herlong, CA
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- Operational Status: Four conventional sources are currently being used to provide coverage in the Priority I Targets which are Exclusion Area I, Storage Area for Special Weapons; and Exclusion Area II, Maintenance and Calibration Facilities for Special Weapons. Recruitment of one confidential source is pending and a second potential source in Exclusion Area II is undergoing initial assessment. The Quarterly Progress Report was presented by the PIO on 3 July 1975 to the following SIAD officials: COL Robert Hawlk, Commander, SIAD; LTC Bernard Render, Dep CDR, SIAD; MAJ John Jolley, Provost Marshal/ Security Officer, SIAD; CPT Wayne Herringer, Intelligence Officer, SIAD; and Mr. Anthony Tornabene, Asst Intelligence Officer, SIAD. The Commander, SIAD, requested that the PIO brief him on the nature of the EEI levied on sources in the ICIP. The Commander indicated that he is interested in determining if the remoteness of the area and the type of duty has any bearing or influence on the number of suitability cases among SIAD personnel. The Commander feels that there may be a number of suitability cases among his present personnel involving such factors as sexual promiscuity, alcohol or drug abuse, or excessive indebtedness. By identifying these individuals, the Commander will strive to reduce personnel problems at SIAD. COL Hawlk indicated that he was satisfied with the progress being made in efforts to develop the ICIP and make it a more viable operation.



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
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CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: An ICIP source reported that a PTC civilian employee's effeminate gestures and high pitched voice were responsible for office gossip that the employee was a homosexual. The employee, who is currently employed as a relay operator, was transferred from the coding and decoding section because he allegedly coded an obscene message that was to be sent to an overseas user. The ICIP source provided other information concerning possible security violations involving the employee. The employee's dossier was examined and it was noted that during a background investigation conducted approximately ten months ago, there were recommendations that the employee not be considered for positions of trust and responsibility. Investigative efforts are continuing to verify or refute allegations concerning the employee.
- e. Operational Status: The reorganization of the US Army Communications Command at Ft Ritchie into the 7th Signal Command has had an effect on the operational status at the PTC. COL Clark, who has a positive attitude toward the ICIP assumed command of PTC in July, and was given a full progress report of this operation. All personalities in the operation have changed. In addition to the new commander who is amiable to the program, there is a new security manager, CPT Richard Pederson, who gave the program support previously when he was assigned to the Defense Language Institute, East Coast, Washington, DC. A new PLO has also been assigned to the operation. With the above personnel changes and COL Clark's encouraging attitude, this ICIP is now afforded an excellent opportunity to expand and be more productive.

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
CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Washington, DC.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated
 Civilians None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) It was reported that a First Secretary at the USSR Embassy in Washington, DC had attended a meeting of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, a professional society for engineers, which was held in the HDL auditorium. The subject matter presented during the evening was unclassified. When the Soviet official attempted to attend a second meeting of the society, he was denied entry. Both incidents were reported to the FBI. The Commander, HDL was advised that the use of the auditorium by outside groups would render it insecure until appropriate security checks were conducted.
- (2) The PLO noted and called to the attention of the HDL Security Officer several minor security problems during the period. These were either corrected on the spot, or recommendations for correction were made.
- e. Operational Status: The final report for the reorganization of HDL into the Harry Diamond Developmental Center (HDDC) was submitted to Congress and the Secretary of the Army. It was expected that the Secretary of the Army would make a final decision by September 1975. The consolidation of various electronics facilities under the control of HDDC will make HDDC the prime center for electronics research and development in Department of the Army. If approved, the consolidation at HDL would begin in October 1976. COL Einsel, Cdr, is scheduled to depart HDL about September 1975. His replacement will be COL Richard H. Sawyer, who is now serving as the Commander of the Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York. On 11 June 1975, COL Einsel, Cdr, HDL, and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL, were briefed on the quarterly progress of the ICIP.

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7. (Y)

LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One confidential source was utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: The following information on WSMR personnel reported by the confidential source in this ICIP was reported to the Chief. Intelligence Division, WSMR, who took action as indicated:
- (1) A report to the Security Officer, Army Missile Test and Evaluation (ARMTE) Directorate that an ARMTE employee frequently left his security container open and unattended resulted in a special briefing on WSMR Regulation 380-5 (Security Regulation) for all ARMTE employees who also were required to sign certificates that they understood the requirements of the security regulation.
- (2) The civilian firm which contracts for security guards at WSMR permitted an enlisted man to work part-time as a guard in the Exclusion Area of TRASANA without having the proper security clearance for that area. The Security Office, WSMR, has now insured that the enlisted man has been processed for the proper clearance by the contractor.
- (3) Reports of several instances of laxity on the part of TRASANA security guards at night and instances of classified material left in in/out boxes after duty hours. The Security Officer took immediate action upon receiving this information to re-orient guards and personnel on their security obligations. Source has reported a noticeable improvement in security since the earlier reports.
- (4) Reports of an Army Officer assigned to the Office of Missile Electronics Warfare (OMEW) who allegedly was misappropriating computer and electronics equipment to build his own computer at home were passed in a Summary of Information to the Sixth Region US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command for action by that agency.
- e. Operational Status: One confidential source was recruited early in the reporting period. A second confidential source is in the final stages of assessment in the Office of Missile Electronics Warfare. On 17 June 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to MG R. J. Proudfoot, Commanding General, WSMR. The following personnel were also present at the briefing: COL William F. Strobridge, Cdr, 525th MI Group, LTC Charles I. Davis,

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Chief, Security Office, WSMR, and Mr. William F. Arket, Chief, Intelligence Division, WSMR. MG Proudfoot indicated that he was pleased with the progress of LENS HOLDER and stated that WSMR needed this type of program.

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8. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Six (6) confidential sources.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:

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- (1) A Source in the Chinese-Mandarin Language Department furnished information concerning a temporary instructor of that department who closely questioned her students about their knowledge of their future duties and expressed her displeasure at teaching Chinese to students to enable them to "spy" on the People's Republic of China. A DCII check, made to review the instructor's USAIRR Dossier, revealed no dossier in the files. The instructor who was born in Canton China and is a British citizen, will not have her employment contract with DLI renewed when it expires in September 1975.
- (2) Information was reported concerning the travel of an instructor of the German Language Department to East Germany without the required notification to the DLI Security Officer. The DLI Security Officer plans to permit the instructor to perform the travel and upon return to DLI will question her concerning non-compliance with DLI regulations.
- (3) A Technical Language Assistant in the Russian Language Department reported a visitor to that Department in late May. The visitor requested copies of training material used in the Russian Dept, claiming he wanted it for training purposes in his reserve unit. The visitor was given two training exercises which were unclassified and taken largely from Russian language periodicals. The visitor, who was told to return later because additional material was not readily available did not return. Sufficient identifying data was not obtained on the visitor but an attempt is being made to obtain fuller identification. As a result of the incident the Director DLI, at a staff meeting placed special emphasis on the responsibilities of all staff members to be alert for unauthorized visitors. In addition, visitor requirements and restrictions were published and distributed throughout DLI.



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MEDICRAMBIEN POR: COMMANDER, PENTACON COUNTERINTELLICENCE PORCE

SWELECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)

1. (W) Subsequent to the submission of the inclosed operations plan, the entire ICIP was critically reviewed. The result of this review was the termination of operations at installations and facilities where degree of sensitivity of the facility, or the type information developed did not justify the expanditure of resources.

2. (C) The QACSI Communications Section, while an extremely sensitive eigenst of QACSI, is staffed primarily with senior MCO's and a number of civilians who have been employed in the same area for considerable periods of time. The number of personnel employed in the Communications Section is approximately 30, and these individuals men the area on a 24 hour basis. They process large volumes of sail and messages each month and there is considerable pressure exerted continually to insure correspondence handling is correct. Considering the size of this element, and the working conditions under which they operate, the security of an ICIP is doubtful. Further, the pressures and frustrations could be expected to increase if there were any indications of the existence of an ICIP.

3. (c) The activities of this element have been examined, and other than the sensitivity of the facility, there is no indication as to why this element would be a more lucrative target for an ICIP than any other element in QACSI.

4. (U) The attached operations plan is not favorably considered became the target is not considered sufficiently appropriate for an ICI?.

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Signed

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E. R. THOMPSON


Brigadier General, GS Director of Intelligence Operations

i Incl as (CONFIDENTIAL)

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 2005

HUMINT DIVISION 427 RECORD COPY





OPERATIONAL PLAN

SUBJECT: Operations Plan, Internal

DATE:

5 November 1974

Counterintelligence Security Program, Office Chief of Staff

REPORT NO:

for Intelligence, The Pentagon,

washington, DC

PROJECT NO:

REFERENCES: (U)

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a. Chapter 5, Section III, USAINTC Regulation 381-100, 1 March 1974 (C)

b. Chapter 2, USAINTC Regulation 381-100-1, 8 February 1974 (S) ...

- c. DOD Directive 5100.49, dated 3 December 1965, Subject: Pentagon Counterintelligence Program.
- d. AR 381-115, dated 2 July 1969, Subject: Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.
- e. AR 381-130, with changes 2-4, Subject: Counterintelligence Investigations, Supervision and Control.
- f. FM 30-17, dated January 1972, Subject: Counterintelligence Special Operations.
- g. FM 30-17A, dated February 1973, Subject: Counterintelligence Special Operations (C).
- h. AR 380-13, dated 30 September 1974, Subject: Acquisition and Storage of information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations.

1. (g) MISSION:

a. Requirement: The mission of the OACSI, Administrative Office, Communications Section is to process incoming and outgoing mail; provide mail pick-up and delivery; world wide attache pouch support via coordination with the State Department. The Communications Section also maintains a registered mail record; a TOP SECRET Control Office; and operates a NATO, SEATO and CENTO sub-registry. There are approximately twenty thousand messages per month up to and including collateral TOP SECRET handled by this section.

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHOOLE OF EXHIBITIVE ORDER 11652

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
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- b. Objective: This operation will provide the ACSI with a concentrated, aggressive security service within the confines of the Pentagon Reservation, and will provide a fast factual reporting system of any imminence of activities which would necessitate immediate command action and possibly pose a direct threat to the security of OACSI Communications Section. In order to accomplish the objective of this operation, an effective and coordinated use of overt and covert counterintelligence sources and techniques will be implemented which are designed to detect, neutralize, and eliminate the following elements and factors which pose a direct threat to the security of the Communications Sections.
 - (1) Acts of espionage, sabotage, or subversion.
 - (2) Hostile foreign intelligence activities.
- (3) Disloyalty, disaffection, and other threats to the security of OACSI.
- (4) Character weakness, habits, or improper conduct which makes personnel assigned to the Communications Section vulnerable to coercion or blackmail.
- (5) Acts of the Communications Section personnel affiliated with anti-Army dissident organizations which seek to disrupt the maintenance of good order, discipline, and morale within the Pentagon.
- c. <u>Base of Operations</u>: Special Operations Section, Pentagon Counterintelligence Force/National Capital Region Field Office, 902d MI Group, Room BE 800, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310.

2(U)(c) PERSONNEL:

- a. Confidential Source Personnel: To be selected from personnel assigned to the Communications Section, OACSI.
- b. <u>US ARMY Intelligence Personnel</u>: The following personnel of PCF/NCR FO will function in the capacities indicated:
 - (1) Project Officer: CPT Kenneth R. Schlag
 - (2) Project Control Officer (PCO): CW2 Shawn M. Sandlin
 - (3) Alternate PCO: CW2 Leonard NMN Gross
 - (4) Project Liaison Officer (PLO): CPT Kenneth R. Schlag
 - (5) Alternate PLO: SFC George E. Perry
- 3. (C) COVER AND DOCUMENTATION: (SEE ANNEX A)





- * a. The ICIP rroject Officer and PLO will function in a completely overt manner. No attempt will be made to conceal their affiliation with military intelligence.
- b. The PCO will employ shallow cover in his contacts with confidential sources. He will not disclaim affiliation with US Army Intelligence, since to do otherwise would alarm prospective sources.

4(U)c) EXECUTION:

a. Concept of Operations:

- (1) The ICIP will be implemented by using the coordinated employment of overt liaison contacts and confidential source(s). Only confidential sources will be used in this operation due to the small size of the target area.
- (2) A concerted effort will be exerted towards the collection of information concerning military personnel assigned to the Communications Section. Collection will not extend to non-DoD personnel. In the event any individual not affiliated with DoD is identified as posing a threat against the Cables Section, the provisions of reference h will apply and prompt coordination will be effected with the appropriate authority. Each individual and source involved in the conduct or control of the operation will be briefed on current policies and constraints pertaining to counterintelligence activities as they concern persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD, reference h.
- (3) The PLO will be the point of contact between the ACSI and PCF. The PLO will present to the ACSI or his designated representative, a quarterly briefing on the progress of the operation. In the event the PLO receives information requiring immediate action by OACSI, the information will be released to the ACSI and the Commander, 902d MI Group. Such information will be sanitized or otherwise protected to insure continued operational viability and source utilization.
 - (4) Specific EEI to be pursued are:
- (a) Determine the existance of espionage, sabotage, or subversion within the target or directed against the target.
- (b) If espionage, sabotage, or subversion is known or suspected, identify the perpetrators, the nature and scope of their activities, their methods of operation, and the foreign or domestic organization controlling such activity.
- (c) Determine the prevalence of dissident activity within the target area, identify military or civilian personnel involved, and resolve whether such activity is supported or directed by elements outside the OACSI.

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- (d) Detect and report adverse suitability information. foreign contacts by Cables Branch military members, and other significant matters which may be exploited by hostile intelligence services.
- a. The following activities and types of individuals will be subjected to continuous and intensive counterintelligence coverage:
 - (1) Known or suspected security risks.
- (2) Persons who are known or suspected to associate with persons who are known or suspected members of hostile intelligence or subversive organizations.


c. Implementation:

- (1) Overt Phase: The overt phase will begin immediately upon approval of this plan. Close liaison will be maintained with selected OACSI Staff and security personnel. The PLO will be primarily responsible for the spotting and assessment of prospective confidential sources. The spotting will be continuous throughout the operation so as to assure an adequate bank of prospective sources for possible covert utilization. The PLO will conduct the overt functions as necessary to include investigative activities and quarterly briefings concerning the status of the ICIP.
- (2) Covert Phase: The covert phase will be the responsibility of the PCO with the assistance of the Alternate PCO. This phase will include the exploitation of confidential sources who have been recruited from among the military personnel. The PCO is also responsible for vetting, recruitment, targeting, training, and disposition of confidential sources. The objective of this phase will be the development of, timely reporting of credible information relating to the detection, neutralization, or exploitation of factors or individuals who pose a direct threat to the security of the Cables Branch, and thus the United States.

COMMUNICATIONS: (SEE ANNEX B)

- a. Communications between the Project Officer and PCO/PLO will be conducted almost exclusively through personal meetings; telephone will serve as an alternate.
- b. Primary communications with confidential sources will be through personal meetings at pre-selected safe sites in the Washington Metropolitan area, or the Pentagon.
- c. Alternate means of communications with confidential sources will be via US Mail, using Post Office boxes in the Arlington, Virginia area. A Post Office box may also be used by the confidential source, if circumstances at his residence indicate a possibility of other persons gaining access to his personal mail.

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d. Emergency means of communications from confidential sources to PCO will be by telephone to an existing unlisted telephone number located in the office of the Special Operations Section, PCF/NCR. After duty hours, the confidential source will leave a message for the PCO at a telephone located in the PCF. This telephone is manned 24 hours a day, and night personne will be briefed concerning their actions should a source telephone and ask to speak to the PCO. The source will be asked to leave his name (cover name) and a telephone number where he may be reached. PCF night personnel will then immediately pass the information to the PCO, or if the PCO is unavailable the alternate PCO. From PCO to source, emergency communications will be by telephone call to sources home or office, as appropriate.

6 (Lite) TRAINING:

Training of confidential sources will be continuing process and a portion of each meeting will be devoted to instruction. Emphasis will be placed on security of the operation and the source and reporting procedures. Observation and description, targeting, and related subjects based on source's role will also be included. Each indivudual and source involved in the conduct of the operation will be briefed on current policies and constraints pertaining to counterintelligence operations and activities as they concern persons and organizations not affiliated with DOD, Reference h. The training administered to source(s) will be in the quantity necessary to develop the maximum information from the target comensurate with the previous intelligence and experience of source(s).

7. % FINANCE AND LOGISTICS: (SEE ANNEX C)

b1

8. (C) TERMINATION: (SEE ANNEX D)

- a. Confidential sources recruited under this plan will be terminated when their usefulness to the plan ceases, when they show indicators of insecure security practices which would jeopardize the operation, are no longer amenable to control, or when the operation is terminated by proper authority. Circumstances under which termination is effected will determine whether termination is with or without prejudice.
- b. The only commitments made to confidential sources employed in this operation will be assurance of personnel and job safety through anonymity, and of reimbursement of any legitimate expenses incurred during the operation.





- c. Knowledgeability of confidential sources will be limited to the following:
 - (1) Name and physical description of the PCO and Alternate PCO.
 - (2) Location of meeting sites as well as that of PCF.
- (3) Means of alternate and emergency contact with PCO: Namely the Post Office Box number(s) and the telephone number(s) where PCO may be contacted in the event of an emergency.
- (4) The approach method used by the PCO in his initial contact with confidential sources.
- d. As a control factor, confidential sources will be required to sign a statement evidencing their willingness to cooperate and attesting to the fact that all facets of security will be strictly adhered to. This will not be construed to be a contractual agreement, but will be used as a physhological instrument to enhance the security of the operation.
 - e. Security considerations are contained in ANNEX E.
- 9. (Lic)- COORDINATION AND LIAISON:

Liaison with designated OACSI officials and other appropriate Pentagon Agencies will routinely be effected the PLO.

- 10. (U) REPORTING:
- a. Formats for operational reports are contained in Chapter 5, Section III, USAINTC Regulation 381-100 (reference a.)
 - b. Production reports will be in Agent Report Format.

ANNEX A-Cover and Documentation (6)

ANNEX B-Communications (2)

ANNEX C-Finance and Logistics (2)

ANNEX D-Termination (C)

ANNEX E-Security Considerations (%)

ANNEX F-Knowledgeability List (U)

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
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ANNEX A - Cover and Documentation

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ANNEX B - Communication

1. (2)

Communication:

- a. Primary: The primary means of communication between the PCO and the source(s) will be personal meetings at selected safe sites in the Pentagon building or in the surrounding area of Northern Virginia or the District of Columbia. Personal meetings will be held to the absolute minimum consistent with operational requirements. Details of future meetings will be established at each meeting or through telephonic communication initiated by either the PCO or source(s) to previously exchanged telephone numbers.
- b. Emergency: To establish an unscheduled meeting on a priority basis, Source will call the PCO through an unlisted commercial number on the PCF/NCR FO call director. Source(s) will identify himself through a prearranged code name (cover name) and ask to speak to the PCO. If the PCO is not in available at the time of the call, the message will be transmitted to the PCO by PCF personnel as soon as possible. The PCO, to establish an unscheduled meeting with source(s), will contact source(s) by a pre-established telephone number in conformance with source(s) work schedule or off duty habits.

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.
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ANNEX D - Termination

1. (c) Termination of the operation: Termination will be accomplished based upon an objective evaluation of the effectiveness of continued utilization of source towards the accomplishment of the goals of this operation, with the final decision to terminate resting with OACSI, Department of the Army.

2. Termination of source(s) with prejudice: In the event source(s) violate basic security practices and are terminated for that reason, they will be prosecuted for violation of the appropriate statute or directive, should such an action be deemed feasible and advisable in connection with the nature of the violation and their activities in support of the operation. Should prosecution be inadvisable, source(s) will be required to execute a debriefing statement, and detailed instructions will be given regarding the possible consequences should they reveal their MI affiliations and activities.

3. (f) Termination of source(s) without prejudice: Upon termination of this operation or at such time as source(s) are considered to be of no further value within the scope of this plan, and provided source(s) have committed no flagrant violations of security, they will be paid all outstanding reimbursable expenses incurred. A detailed security briefing concerning disclosure of information concerning their MI affiliations and activities will also be administered. If deemed advisable at the time of termination, source(s) may be presented a properly sanitized letter of commendation/appreciation or other appropriate recognition for their cooperation.

4. (c) Commitments: No commitments other than those relating to reimbursement of legitimate operation expenses incurred during the course of the operation will be made. Source(s) will be given assurance of personal safety and protection of careers and reputations.

Knowledgeability: Source(s), during the course of the operation will be knowledgeable of the following:

- a. PCO: by name and status as Special Agent, US Army Intelligence.
- b. Facilities: Source(s) will not be routinely exposed to facilities housing PCF during the course of their covert activities. However, the existence of PCF is common knowledge throughout the Pentagon, and the likelihood that source(s) will, at a minimum, know the location of PCF is unavoidable.
- c. Modus Operandi: Source(s) will be exposed to modus operandi only in direct relation to the requirement levied by the PCO.
 - Location of meeting sites.

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Box numbers and locations and telephone numbers where PCO can be reached in an emergency.

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
ANNEX E - Security Considerations

1. (C) The activities engaged in by individuals assigned to OACSI which may be considered to be disruptive of military operations, contrary to good order and discipline, and posing a threat to military security are unknown at this time. The number of military personnel engaged in activities relative to active and/or passive resistance to the military is also unknown.

- a. The inter-relationship of military and civilian community in the National Capital area is such that it can be expected to present a degree of security risk in that confidential source(s) covert activities could be revealed through indiscretions on the part of source(s) in deviating from normal routine of activities normally associated with the work environment. This risk will be substantially limited by extensive training of source(s) in the areas of personal security and operational security. Further, close monitoring of all activities of source(s) for the purpose of determining the presence of or lack of derogatory security indicators will preclude unexpected security developments and will provide a means by which source(s) may be further trained, guided, and controlled in their activities.
- b. Project Control Officer/Confidential Source relationship could be revealed inadvertently by the passive element of the military establishment, thus posing a threat to the security of the operation. This possibility will be reduced by close adherence to fundamentals of security in the conduct of personal meetings, telephone calls, and all other contacts between PCO and source(s).
- 2. (C) In the event that either source(s) or this operation are compromised, USAINTA will not confirm the existence of such an operation, the employment of source(s), or interest in organizations/personalities involved in alleged subversive activities. Should source(s) be compromised PCO will immediately instruct source(s) to cease all operations; activity, and will debrief in detail concerning all aspects of the possible compromise. Based upon an evaluation of the situation, source(s) may be terminated and the operation may be suspended pending an analysis of the compromise and its ramifications. All sources so terminated will be administered the appropriate security debriefing.

 $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{F}}$ Security measures must assure:

- a. Strict need-to-know restructions concerning the existence of this operation and the methods by which it is implemented will be applied. A PCF Knowledgeability list will be maintained. (See ANNEX F)
- b. Briefings on the existence of this operation will be given only to the ACSI or his designated representative.



ANNEX F - Knowledgeability List (U)

1.	LTC Byron W. Hunt	Commander, PCF
2.	MAJ Kenneth G. Hetzel	Operations Officer, PCF
3.	MSG Daniel W. Leber Jr	Operations NCOIC, PCF
4.	CPT Kenneth R. Schlag	PCF
5.	CW2 Shawn M. Sandlin	PCF
6.	CW2 Leonard NMN Gross	PCF
7.	SFC George E. Perry	PCF

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Retention of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) ANT 3 July 1975 A July 1975 To reapond to a request from the Commander, APG for continuation of ICIP. BECOMMENDATION: (Describe inerty the commander, APG for continuation of ICIP. BECOMMENDATION: During the last quarter, calendar year 1974, the ACSI commander of the ICIP, and based on the results of this review, he directed the nation of 12 of the 19 onegoing operations. The operations terminated were those were less productive or conducted at installations of lesser sensitivity. Amony operations terminated was GONDOLA STAR which had been conducted in the Aberdeen Ground (ARC)/Edgewood Arsenal (EA) area. At RED TAR B is a recommendation from Commander, APG indorated by the Commander, Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) at Commander, APG indorated by the Commander, Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) at Commander, APG indorated by the Commander, Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) at Proposition of the DISCUSSION: a. The APG request advises that they recognize information developed in GON STAR has been of limited C1 value in the past, however, they consider even negative reporting to be significant. The TECOM indorsement emphasizes the probable signincrease in travel during the Bicentennial period and the proximity of APG/FA to York and Mashington would make those facilities more vulnerable to hostile interested in the approach of the Approximation of the operation for a six-month trial period to determine if any more significant mation can be developed to indicate a hostile threat to APG/FA. On 2 July 1975. Deputy Under Secretary of the Army indorsed this proposal. c. Letter at RED TAB A advised the Commander, APG of the ACS1's decision to continue the operation for another six months and then reassess its progress. 3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That letter at RED TAB A be approved and signed. Continue on plan band. SCHEDLIE OF EXECUTIVE ONDER 1 ACS1. PARCELLE OF EXECUTIVE ONDER 1 ACS1. PARCELLE OF EXECUTIVE ONDER 1 ACS1. PARCELLE OF EXECUTIVE O	ADED 5 1397	DOD 5200. WETTON SHEET				TROL NUMBER	
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WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED

DOCUMENT

DAMI - DOH

11 JUL 1975

SUBJECT: Retention of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

THRU:

Commender

US Army Materiel Command 500l Eisenhouer Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Commander

US Army Test and Evaluation Command Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005

TO:

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Commander

Aberdeen Proving Ground

Maryland 21005

1. (U) Reference letter, STEAP-IN, subject as above, 17 April 1975, with indorsements.

2. Puring the past several years, the ICIP effort has grown rapidly. Unfortunately, sufficient resources to conduct these operations have not always been available. In order to make optimum use of these scarce, highly trained resources, it became necessary to conduct a total review of the program and make adjustments. This review revealed that GONDOLA STAR was a marginal operation and I directed its termination.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUPO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD \$200.1-R

Sources and Methods have referred

Classified by ACSI, DA

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2

DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 2005

4-12





DAMI-DOH SUBJECT: Retention of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

3. (U) In light of your request that this operation be continued, and considering the fact that the Commander, USAINTA has advised me that new sources with improved access have been recruited, I will revalidate GOWDOLA STAR for a six-month period. In January 1976, I will assess the progress of this operation and will then determine if we will be able to continue this effort.

(sgd) Harold R. Aaron

HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS ACots for Intelligence

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSOOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD \$200.1-R

<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>

AMCSS (17 Apr 75) 2d Ind (U) SUBJECT: Retention of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) 29 April 1975

HQ, US Army Materiel Command, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333 29 April 1975

TO: HQDA (DAMI) WASH DC 20310

Forwarded for your consideration. This headquarters supports the requests and recommends favorable consideration be given to the continuation of the program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT L. KIRWAN

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Staff

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CONFIDENTIAL

PEGRACED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED

-CONFIDENTIAL

AMSTE-SE (17 Apr 75) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Retention of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)

Headquarters, U. S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005 **\$ 5** APR 1975

TO: Commander, U. S. Army Materiel Command, ATTN: AMCSS, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

- 1. (U) I recommend that GONDOLA STAR be continued as an active counterintelligence operation in the Aberdeen Proving Ground area.
- 2. (C) The conditions set forth by the Commander of Aberdeen Proving Ground I feel support this continued operation. The recently revised ACSI EEI reveals that the weapons, tanks, and chemical defense RDT&E conducted in the Aberdeen Proving Ground area, to include Edgewood Arsenal, are of interest to Communist Bloc intelligence agents. With the advent of the Bicentennial year, Aberdeen Proving Ground will be open to significantly more tourists visits commencing on 14 June and extending throughout the Bicentennial period. During that year, the closeness of Aberdeen Proving Ground and Edgewood Arsenal to the New York City and Washington, DC areas make it vulnerable to hostile intelligence gathering agencies and their desire to exploit the situation to secure EEI. I conclude that security of USAAPG will be vulnerable and that ICIP will be of greater importance than ever during this coming period. I intend to maintain all normal internal security measures and ICIP support on a continuing basis would be a valuable supplement to these measures.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 15 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD \$200.1-R

> WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE TELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVELVED

CHARLES P. BROWN
Major General, USA
Commanding

Classified by Cdr, USAINTA Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of EO 11652 Exemption Category 2 Declassify on 31 Dec 2005

-CONFIDENTIAL





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY US ARMY ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND 21005

4Ph 1 1975

STEAP-IN

SUBJECT: Retention of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Commander

US Army Test and Evaluation Command

1. This headquarters has been advised by your Security Officer at a meeting held on 9 April 1975 that the Internal Counterintelligence Program for Aberdeen Proving Ground, Operation GONDOLA STAR (U), is scheduled for termination. It is understood that the AMC Security Officer desires a review of the impact of such an action upon this installation.

2. It is recognized that specific information of counterintelligence value developed by Operation GONDOLA STAR has been somewhat limited in the past; however, it must be acknowledged that even negative reports are significant provided that effective coverage of critical target areas has been maintained. In some cases, reports received from ICIP sources have served as useful early warnings of developing situations on which corrective action could be promptly initiated. If this operation is terminated, the sensitivity and espionage potential of this installation would remain whereas one tool for building a strong security posture would be removed.

3. The importance of Aberdeen Proving Ground as an espionage target is obvious. Research and testing programs generate information of world-wide intelligence interest, and scientific personnel have frequent contacts with foreign nationals. The diversified missions of several tenant activities include projects which have been reported to have high priority among Soviet intelligence collectors. Therefore, ICIP support would be a useful supplement to our normal internal security measures.

4. It is recommended that GONDOLA STAR be continued as an active counterintelligence operation and strengthened with such resources as may be feasible.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD \$200.1-R

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE ANTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED ALVIN D. UNCERLEIDER Colonel, Armor

Commanding

Classified by Cmdr, USAINTA Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of EO 11652 Exemption Category 2 Declassify on 31 Dec 2005.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-DOH

2 7 MAY 1975

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY WTK & MAY 1975

FOR: -UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY- NOTED . USA

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) -- INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

During the past quarter, action was initiated to terminate 12 ICIP operations that were considered to be relatively unproductive or located at less sensitive installations. Eleven operations have been terminated and the twelfth will be terminated in the near future.

A new operation, CANTER RIDE, was initiated at the US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, AL, raising the total number of active operations to eight.

Three of the ongoing operations continue to provide information which serves to enhance security at the facilities concerned. LENTIL MONKEY, at the Defense Language Institute, continues to be the most active operation, surfacing security weaknesses involving both instructor and student personnel at that facility.

(U) Status reports for each operation are inclosed.

8 Incl as (CONFUDENTIAL) HAROLD R. AARON
Major General, GS
ACofS for Intelligence

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 6200.1-R

DAMI - ZA

Classified by

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHUDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 1:652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2

Page 1 Page 1

DECLASSIFY ON 31 December 2005

MAJ Ebersole/74087/19 May 75 Typed by J. Lukasik

CONFIDENTIAL

102/22 Mar 75)

2-1-1-45

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

10 Jun 75

MG Harold R. Aaron ACofS for Intelligence Rm 2E464 Pentagon

Noted and returned.

R.P.S.

Whatty USBINIA

449





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY **HEADQUARTERS** U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

MIIA-SO

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program

(ICIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C) WASH DC 20310

(C) Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations during the third quarter of FY 1975 were characterized by a large scale slowdown of activity in all operations as those operations selected for termination early in the quarter were phased out. By 31 March 1975, ll ICIPS, with supporting confidential sources, were terminated and one additional ICIP is scheduled for termination.

(C) Upon completion of the termination actions described above, seven ICIPS remained active. One new ICIP operation providing for insert of an agent in a covert status in the US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL, was approved on 4 March 1975. The USAMICOM operation, which has the nickname CANTER RIDE (U) raises the total of active ICIPS to eight at the close of the quarter.

3. (U) Brief status reports for each ICIP operation reported upon, including both those terminated and those continued, are attached as inclosures.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

20 Incl

as

Cherry Werdhas ALBERT N. WEIDHAS Colonel, MI


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
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DECLASSIFY ON 31 DECLASSIFY

CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Approval - 16 Feb 72)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three sources were used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Information surfaced pertaining to the use of drugs and moral improprieties on the part of a civilian employee assigned to the Office of the Comptroller prompted a suitability investigation of the employee. The employee's access to classified information has been suspended. Adverse suitability information consisting of drug abuse, indebtedness, moral misconduct and mental instability on the part of six military policemen assigned at the Alternate Joint Command Center and Fort Ritchie was provided the Provost Marshal and the Director of Security, US Army Communications Command (USACC). Investigations of the allegations are being made. Information reported on an Army NCO assigned to the Engineering & Installation Office, USACC, alleging excessive gambling and unexplained affluence is being checked prior to requesting that a limited investigation be conducted.
- e. Operational Status: On 18 Mar 75, the PLO briefed COL Donald E. Clark, interim Director, Telecommunications, on the ICIP. COL Clark is scheduled to become Commander, USACC Operations Command, after the reorganization of USACC on 1 Jul 75. On 20 March 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Briefing to COL Harold G. deMoya, Commander, Fort Ritchie, and COL John J. Plosay, Jr., Deputy Commander, Fort Ritchie. COL deMoya expressed his appreciation for the support provided by the ICIP at Fort Ritchie.





2 (CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Approval - 18 Sep 73)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: On 13 Jan 75, COL Alan A. Nord assumed command of Seneca Army Depot. The Commander, 902d MI Group, had scheduled a briefing on the ICIP CANINE PLATE for COL Nord in mid-March 1975. That briefing was cancelled and is now scheduled for the following quarter. Operational progress has been stalemated during this reporting period pending the briefing of the new Depot Commander. Subsequent to that briefing, it is anticipated that development of the operation can be accelerated.

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CANTER RIDE: (CACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal (RSA), AL.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: During the past year several significant security weaknesses surfaced at USAMICOM, prompting the USAMICOM Chief of Staff to request an ICIP operation at that facility. These weaknesses included mishandling and loss of classified documents and allegations concerning suitability of some employees. Considering the sensitivity of the facility and the evident security weaknesses, a degree of urgency in initiating this operation was apparent. Unlike previous ICIP operations, the planning for this operation envisioned the use of a trained military intelligence warrant officer, a "Great Skill" officer, as the principal confidential source in order to expedite the initiation of this operation. The source has been selected for insertion in the target area (the US Army Missile Research, Development and Engineering Laboratory (USAMRDEL)), and has been provided administrative and operational training to enable him to function in his cover capacity as an administrative officer. The source will be assigned in the target area in April 1975. On 14 March 1975, the Commander, Redstone Resident Office, 902d MI Group, briefed COL R. A. Axelson, Director, USAMRDEL, informing him that the requested counterintelligence special support had been approved on 4 Mar 75 and it was proposed to insert an agent by mid-April 1975.

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
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4. CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Approval - 8 Mar 74)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), Herlong, CA.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: A new Project Liaison Officer (PLO) was assigned to this operation and arrived on station in January 1975. The PLO will perform the functions of both the PLO and the Project Case Officer (PCO). The PLO has been engaged in familiarization and orientation with SLAD and will perform spotting and assessment of potential sources in the coming weeks. On 20 March 1975, the Quarterly Briefing was presented by the PLO to the supported command. Those in attendance at the briefing were COL Robert Hawlk, CDR, SLAD; LTC Bernard Render, Dep CDR, SLAD; and MAJ John Jolley, Security Officer, SLAD.



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- 5. (CENSUS TIME: (QACSI Approval 5 Feb 74)
- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One source was used during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.

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e. Operational Status: This operation is conducted by representatives of the Pentagon Counterintelligence Force (PCF). Early in the quarter, it was necessary to divert virtually the entire strength of PCF from their normal functions to a files screening project at the Counterintelligence Analysis Detachment and the Special Security Group. Both the PLO and PCO were assigned to the files screening project and were able to devote only a limited amount of time to this ICIP operation. This precluded any significant expansion or development of the ICIP. The supported command requested that an attempt be made to obtain information on several persons assigned to PTC suspected of drug abuse. Sources have failed to surface any concrete information to date in this connection. On 1 April 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Briefing to COL Joseph T. Adinaro, Commander, PTC.

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
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CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Approval - 18 Oct 73)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Washington, DC.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained: Investigation of allegations of misconduct on the part of a DAC employee of HDL while the employee was on TDY were inconclusive, but the HDL Security Officer and the employee's supervisor are continuing to monitor the employee's activities. The PLO called the attention of the HDL Security Officer to several minor security problems during the period which were corrected on the spot.
- e. Operational Status: During the period approximately 400 HDL personnel were moved from the HDL offices at Connecticut and Van Ness Avenues, NW, Wash, DC, to HDL facilities in White Oak, MD. The move is part of a reorganization and centralization of US Army electronics research facilities into one organization which will be named the Harry Diamond Developmental Center. On 5 March 1975, the PIO presented the Quarterly Briefing to COL D. W. Einsel, Jr., Commander, HDL, and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL.

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- 7. LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Approval 7 Aug 74)
 - a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
- e. Operational Status: The Project Liaison Officer (PLO) for this operation will also perform the Project Case Officer (PCO) function when Source assets are obtained. One prospective source has been identified in the Missile Electronic Warfare Technical Area (MEWTA), and recruitment is planned for the next quarter. On 18 March 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Briefing to Mr. William F. Arquette, Chief, Intelligence Div, WSMR. Mr. Arquette, speaking for the Commander, WSMR, expressed satisfaction with the progress of the ICIP to date.

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- 8. (2, LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Approval 26 Oct 71)
- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five confidential sources were utilized during the quarter.
- c. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) An instructor in the Chinese-Mandarin Language Dept may have had contact with personnel of the Peoples Republic of China during a business conference in Jan 75. The instructor, who has several commercial enterprises, allegedly attended a conference in Dallas, Texas, where the Chinese were present. An effort is being made to obtain further details.
- (2) Sources of the operation provided information which established the existence of contacts between an instructor of the Arabic Language Dept and officials of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The instructor, who is a US citizen, allegedly utilizes a Lebanese passport when he travels in the Middle East. Summaries of Information containing details have been passed to the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
- (3) Sources in the project surfaced a series of reports on a USAF student, who, through his Czech language instructor, has socialized with citizens of Czechoslovakia. By USAF regulations, the NCO was to have reported promptly any contact with citizens of a Communist Bloc country. The NCO failed to make the necessary report. The information was passed to the OSI by Summaries of Information and the OSI is now conducting an investigation of the USAF student.
- (4) Suitability information concerning DLT students was passed to the Security Officer, DLT.
- e. Operational Status: Of the five confidential sources used in the operation, two were terminated during the period due to their graduation. The remaining three provide coverage in the Russian, Czech, and Serbo-Croatian Language Department. Prospective confidential sources are being assessed in the Russian, Czech, Polish, and Chinese-Mandarin Departments. In addition to the confidential sources, 21 conventional sources are providing coverage in ten language departments. All sources are concentrated in the Priority I language departments. The PLO provided the Quarterly Briefing on 21 March 1975 in the Office of the Director, DLI. Those





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attending the briefing were COL James R. Koenig, Director, DLI; COL Avery Kay, Deputy Director, DLI; and MAJ Richard Erickson, Security Officer, DLI. COL Koenig stated that he believed the information gained from the ICIP had been particularly helpful and had been largely responsible for several command letters published by DLI in an effort to improve internal security at DLI. The Director also stated that as a result of information provided by the ICIP, the teaching texts and materials of all DLI courses are being reviewed to eliminate politically contentious materials from the language courses.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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2 8 APR 1975

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Selected Installations in Panama Canal Zone (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C) WASH DC 20310

During a 19 Feb 75 visit by the ACSI to the 902d MI Group, the 902d was tasked to explore the possibility of the need for an ICIP operation in the Panama Canal Zone. The 902d MI Group has conducted a review of five key installations/units for evidence of past and present HoIS threat indicators.

The five installations/units which were assessed are 470th MI Group (TAB A); 193d Infantry Brigade (TAB B); USASA Det, SOUTHCOM, and 408th ASA Det (TAB C); Armed Forces Courier Station - Panama (TAB D); J-2/3 Directorates' Warning and Operations Centers - SOUTHCOM (TAB E). A threat assessment common to all activities, units, or installations in the Canal Zone is attached as TAB F.

(C) Commanders of the installations concerned in each instance have stated that current counterintelligence support is adequate to maintain a proper security posture and an ICIP operation is not warranted at this time. The Commander, 902d MI Group concurs in this position and recommends that an ICIP operation not be initiated at any of the five units assessed. USAINTA also concurs in this recommendation.

6 Incl 1-6. TABS A thru F

WILLIAM S. Colonel, MI Commanding HASSEL L. PARKER COLONEL, MI

DEPUTY COMMANDER

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470th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP

1. (6) GENERAL: The 470th Military Intelligence Group (MIGP) is a subordinate unit of the 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone). This unit consists of 67 military and 18 civilian personnel. There are 80 personnel
assigned to the Group Headquarters, Fort Amador (FA), Canal Zone (CZ),
on the Pacific side of the isthmus, and 5 stationed at the Atlantic Field
Office, Building 214, Fort Gulick (FG), CZ, on the Atlantic side. Due to
the importance and sensitivity of its mission, the 470th MIGP is considered
a CRITICAL SENSITIVE activity.

2. (U) HISTORY: The 470th MIGP was born on 12 July 1944, as a Counter-intelligence Corps Detachment. It was first picked up on the Army's active duty roles on 31 July 1944, at the post of Quarry Heights, CZ. The 470th Intel Corps Detachment was redesignated and reorganized into an Intel Corps Group in September 1964, with a Security Service Detachment, the 508th MID in support of the 193d Infantry Brigade, the 610th MID, and the 471st MID in Puerto Rico. Two years later, in 1966, the unit was renamed the 470th MIGP, its present designation.


3. MISSION: The mission of the 470th MIGP is to detect treason, sedition, and disaffection; to detect, prevent, and neutralize espionage, subversion, and sabotage directed against the United States Army, its personnel and installations; to conduct counterintelligence (CI) operations; and to collect intelligence through conduct of HUMINT operations.

4. (FOUO) SECURITY HISTORY/PRESENT SECURITY POSTURE: Building 47, FA, where the headquarters, 470th MIGP is located, is a two-story masonry structure used for administrative office space. The 470th MIGP has a photographic laboratory located on the first floor of Building 46, a motor pool located in Buildings 96 and T95, a Liaison Office located at Building 49, all at FA, and an Atlantic Field Office located at Building 214, Ft Gulick, CZ. A Counterintelligence Survey was conducted on the 470th MIGP on 12 December 1966, to establish basic security requirements. Subsequent CI inspections disclosed no major deviations from requirements established in the Survey. Security Assistance Visits are utilized by the 470th MIGP in maintaining a good security posture. There have been no acts of espionage, sabotage or subversion detected in the unit.

5. SECURITY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES: There are several US military and civilian activities in the CZ that render direct or indirect intelligence and CI support, external physical security support, security assistance, and police services to the 470th MIGP. These support activities augment the internal security procedures of the 470th MIGP and assist it in accomplishing its mission. The units or activities which provide direct or indirect support to the 470th MIGP are as follows:

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- a. Canal Zone Field Office (CZFO), 902d MIGP, Fort Amador, CZ:
 Conducts Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) in the CZ. Provides CZ
 based surveillance and counter-surveillance support operations. Provides
 Security Assistance services in support of the 470th MIGP's mission. Conducts CI surveys, inspections, technical surveys and inspections, SAEDA
 lectures, penetration inspections, and CI related advice and assistance
 in support of the Group's security objectives.
- b. United States Army Security Agency (USASA) Detachment-USSOUTHCOM, Fort Clayton (FC), CZ: Provides advice and assistance on capabilities and limitations of EW and SIGINT. Evaluates intelligence requirements in terms of USASA mission capabilities and maintains a continuous estimate of the local CRYPTOLOGICAL situation. Provides COMINT during contingency situations.
- c. Kaval Intelligence Service, PA, CZ: Provides information of intelligence and CI interest on local hostile activities and potential threats in functioning as a member of the Delimitation Committee.
- d. Office of Special Investigations, US Air Force, Howard Air Force
 Base, CZ: Provides intelligence and CI information regarding hostile
 organizations and their activities as well as threat information of interest. Functions as a local member of the Delimitation Committee.
- e. Provost Marshal Office, 193d Infantry Brigade, FC, CZ: Assists in preventing unauthorized vehicle and personnel entry in and adjacent to US Army installations and structures in the CZ. Provides additional security guard and personnel restrainment force when required. Conducts Physical Security Surveys and Inspections. Maintains criminal investigation files for review and use during the conduct of PSIs. Assists in preventing overt acts of sabotage by having mobile and foot Military Police patrols.
- f. Criminal Investigations Detachment, Corozal, CZ: Provides information of intelligence interest uncovered during criminal investigations. Maintains files of all investigations conducted which are available for use during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes.
- g. Internal Security Office, Canal Zone Government, Balboa Heights, CZ: Maintains files which are available for review during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes. Within the constraints of DA policies, provides information regarding intelligence matters of mutual benefit on US, Panamanian, Central and South Americans, as a local security agency.
- h. Immigration and Naturalization Service (IN), District Court House, Ancon, C2: Provides information regarding citizenship status on US naturalized citizens who are DOD-affiliated and of intelligence interest or the subjects of PSIs. Provides possible threat information of interest uncovered during normal IN functions.
- 6. (U) THREAT: See Tab F which is classified SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMI-NATION.

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7. (U) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION: The 470th MI GP advised that current CI support rendered by the CZFO, 902d MI GP is considered adequate in maintaining a good security posture. In the event a problem develops which falls within the purview of the Internal Counterintelligence Program or any other security support operation, a request for that service will be submitted.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION: A detailed and minute search of the files of the Security Manager, 470th MI GP, as well as our own files, failed to disclose any history or current trend of bad security practices, disaffection, espionage, sabotage or subversion within the unit. Administrative security deficiencies found during the course of routine CI inspections had been corrected. The main threats, as pointed out in paragraph 6 above, are external rather than internal in nature and are targeted against by the entire intelligence community in the CZ. The commander clearly feels that current CI support rendered is adequate and has no desire for an ICIP operation at the present time. Based on the facts presented above, it is believed that an ICIP operation is presently neither warranted nor justified in the 470th MI GP. Recommend that an ICIP operation not be instituted in the 470th MI GP at this time.

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193D INFANTRY BRIGADE (CANAL ZONE)

- 1. GENERAL: Within the Headquarters, 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone), Fort Amador (FA), Canal Zone (CZ), and its subordinate units or elements, only the Brigade Command Group (BCG), the Directorate of Intelligence (DINTEL), the Directorate of Operations, Plan and Training (DOPT), and the 470th Military Intelligence Group (MI GP), were considered as falling in the category of CRITICAL SENSITIVE. BCG, DINTEL and DOPT are all located at Building 1, FA, and will be dealt with in this Tab. The 470th MI GP is located at Building 47, FA, and is addressed separately in Tab A.
- 2. (U) HISTORY: On 1 July 1917, US Army personnel in the CZ were formed into a separate command and designated as the "Panama Canal Department". With the formation of a unified Caribbean Command in November 1947, the US Army element in the CZ was designated the US Army Caribbean Command with its Headquarters located at Quarry Heights (QH), CZ. In 1949, the Headquarters was moved to FA, its present location. On 6 June 1963, the US Army Caribbean Command was redesignated the US Army Forces Southern Command (USARSO), and remained so for 11 years. With the disestablishment of USARSO on 31 October 1974, the 193d Inf Bde assumed all command functions and was redesignated Headquarters, 193d Inf Bde (CZ).

3. (U) MISSIONS:

- a. BCG: The BCG, under the direction of the Commanding General, US Army Forces Command, (FORSCOM), Atlanta, Georgia, commands all subordinate US Army units and activities in the CZ; maintains a combat-ready operational posture; provides support to the unified command as directed by CINCSO; and exercises operational control over USACC Agency-Panama.
- b. DINTEL: The DINTEL, manages the collection, evaluation and processing of information into intelligence and the establishment of required intelligence, counterintelligence (CI) and security programs in support of the installation command's mission.
- c. DOPT: The DOPT prepares, maintains and supervises the execution of policies and directives for the tactical security and defense of the Brigade's area. Plans, directs and coordinates for the Commander all CZ defense operations required of the Brigade including joint operations. Monitors and reports operational readiness. Formulates and coordinates estimates, plans, policies and functions pertaining to force structure, organization, equipment, and training of subordinate units. Supervises and coordinates reserve component matters within the Brigade. Advises on and supervises all Army Aviation matters. Supervises the activities of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

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5. SECURITY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES: There are several US military and civilian activities in the CZ that render direct or indirect intelligence and CI support, external physical security support, security assistance, and police services to the 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone). These support activities augment the internal security procedures of the Brigade and assist it in accomplishing its mission. The units or activities which provide direct or indirect support to the Brigade are as follows:

- a. Canal Zone Field Office (CZFO), 902d MI GP, FA, CZ: Conducts Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) in the CZ. Provides CZ based surveillance and counter-surveillance support operations. Provides Security Assistance services in support of the Brigade's mission. Conducts CI surveys, inspections, technical surveys and inspections, SAEDA lectures, penetration inspections, and CI related advice and assistance in support of the Group's security objectives.
- b. 470th Military Intelligence Group, FA, CZ: Provides intelligence operations and services to detect treason, sedition and disaffection and to detect, prevent and neutralize espionage, subversion and sabotage directed against the US Army, its personnel and installations in the CZ. Conducts CI operations and collects intelligence through conduct of HUMINT operations.
- c. United States Army Security Agency (USASA) Detachment-USSOUTHCOM, Fort Clayton (FC), CZ: Provides advice and assistance on capabilities and limitations of EW and SIGINT. Evaluates intelligence requirements in terms of USASA mission capabilities and maintains a continuous estimate of the local CRYPTOLOGICAL situation. Provides COMINT during contingency situations.
- d. <u>Naval Intelligence Service</u>, FA, CZ: Provides information of intelligence and CI interest on local hostile activities and potential threats.
- e. Office of Special Investigations, US Air Force, Howard Air Force
 Base, CZ: Provides intelligence and CI information regarding hostile

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organizations and their activities as well as threat information of interest.

f Provost Marshal Office, 193d Infantry Brigade, FC, CZ: Assists in preventing unauthorized vehicle and personnel entry in and adjacent to US Army installations and structures in the CZ. Provides additional security guard and personnel restrainment force when required. Conducts Physical Security Surveys and Inspections. Maintains criminal investigation files for review and use during the conduct of PSIs. Assists in preventing overt acts of sabotage by having mobile and foot Military Police patrols.

(U) g Criminal Investigations Detachment, Corozal, CZ: Provides information of intelligence interest uncovered during criminal investigations. Maintains files of all investigations conducted which are available for use during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes.

h. Unternal Security Office, Canal Zone Government, Balboa Heights, CZ: Maintains files which are available for review during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes. Within the constraints of DA policies, provides information regarding intelligence matters of mutual benefit on US, Panamanian, Central and South Americans as a local security agency.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (IN), District Court House, Ancon, CZ: Provides information regarding citizenship status on US naturalized citizens who are DOD-affiliated and of intelligence interest or the subjects of PSIs. Provides possible threat information of interest uncovered during normal IN functions.

- 6. (U) THREAT: See Tab F which is classified SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMI-NATION.
- 7. (U) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION: The 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone) advised that the current support rendered by the CZFO, 902d MI GP, is considered adequate in maintaining a good security posture for the Brigade. Should a problem arise which falls within the purview of the Internal Counterintelligence Program, or any other security support operation, a request for that service will be initiated.
- 8 (W)(e) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION: To gather the information necessary to make a recommendation, a complete review of the files of the BCG, DINTEL, and DOPT was made. It was determined that there was no evidence of any security problems which could not be corrected by routine CI support. The review did not disclose any trends which might lead to weakening of the security posture. Based on information and facts already stated, and the feelings of the commander that his security posture is adequate, it is felt that at the present time, an ICIP operation is neither warranted nor justified. It is recommended that an ICIP operation not be instituted at this time.

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US ARMY SECURITY AGENCY DETACHMENT SOUTHERN COMMAND

AND 408TH ARMY SECURITY AGENCY DETACHMENT

- 1. GENERAL: The US Army Security Agency Detachment Southern Command (USASADSC), which includes the 408th ASA Detachment is a subordinate unit of the US Army Security Agency, Arlington Hall, Virginia, and is a tenant unit in support of the 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone). USASADSC has its Headquarters in Building 220, Fort Clayton (FC), CZ. Due to the extreme sensitivity of its mission, the USASADSC is considered a CRITICAL SENSITIVE activity.
- 2. (U) HISTORY: Headquarters, US Army Security Agency Southern Command was established in the Canal Zone in June 1949. The headquarters was located in Building 220, FC, CZ, with an operational site located at Chiva Chiva, CZ. On 31 March 1971, it was redesignated USASADSC, and the site at Chiva Chiva was closed. All operational functions were consolidated in Building 220. With the redesignation, the 408th ASA Detachment was formed to enable the headquarters to assume its increased tactical role.

MISSIONS:

- a. USASADSC: The USASADSC operates as the senior USASA element in Latin America for command and control purposes. Conducts liaison between local forces and USASA elements in the CZ and higher USASA Headquarters. Operates and maintains a CRITICOMM terminal station, and coordinates and furnishes advice and assistance to US Military Forces in the CZ on capabilities and limitations of EW and SIGINT. Evaluates supported command intelligence requirements in terms of USASA mission capabilities, and maintains a continuous estimate of the cryptologic situation.
- b. 408th ASA Det: The 408th ASA Det. provides a separate US Army Brigade with direct communications intelligence (COMINT) during contingency situations and issues intelligence information reports to SSO, Panama. Provides, within the limits of its capabilities, COMINT information to an ASA Battalion, Group, or Theater Headquarters in support of the national intelligence effort.
- 4. (FOUO) SECURITY HISTORY/PRESENT SECURITY POSTURE: The USASADSC and its subordinate unit, the 408th ASA Det, are administratively and operationally located in Building 220, FC, CZ. Counterintelligence Services support is primarily the responsibility of the Technical Services Activity (TSA), US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA), Fort Meade, Maryland. Locally, the Canal Zone Field Office, (CZFO), 902d Military Intelligence Group (MI GP) furnishes routine investigative support and emergency technical support. The last CI Inspection/Technical Service was conducted during December 1974 by TSA and disclosed no major security problems. A check of local files and those of USASADSC did not indicate any weakness in their security posture, or trends which could lead to security weaknesses. It was found that USASADSC continuously check and upgrade the

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integrity of their security program. There have been no acts of espionage, sabotage or subversion detected in the unit's history.

- 5. (C) <u>SECURITY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES</u>: There are several US military and civilian activities in the CZ that render direct or indirect intelligence and CI support, external physical security support, security assistance, and police services to the USASADSC. These support activities augment the internal security procedures of the Agency and assist it in accomplishing its mission. The units or activities which provide direct or indirect support to the Agency are as follows:
- a Lizzo, 902d MI CP, Fort Amador (FA), CZ: Conducts Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) in the CZ. Provides CZ based surveillance and countersurveillance support operations. Provides Security Assistance services in support of the USASAD's mission. Conducts CI surveys, inspections, technical surveys and inspections, SAEDA lectures, penetration inspections, and CI related advice and assistance in support of the Agency's security objectives.
- b 12.70th Military Intelligence Group, FA, CZ: Provides intelligence operations and services to detect treason, sedition and disaffection and to detect, prevent and neutralize espionage, subversion and sabotage directed against the US Army, its personnel and installations in the CZ. Conducts CI operations and collects intelligence through conduct of HUMINT operations.
- c. Waval Intelligence Service, FA, CZ: Provides information of intelligence and CI interest on local hostile activities and potential threats.
- d (Opffice of Special Investigations, US Air Force, Howard Air Force

 Base, CZ: Provides intelligence and CI information regarding hostile organizations and their activities as well as threat information of interest.
- e Provost Marshal Office, 193d Infantry Brigade, FC, CZ: Assists in preventing unauthorized vehicle and personnel entry in and adjacent to US Army installations and structures in the CZ. Provides additional security guard and personnel restrainment force when required. Conducts Physical Security Surveys and Inspections. Maintains criminal investigation files for review and use during the conduct of PSIs. Assists in preventing overt acts of sabotage by having mobile and foot Military Police patrols.
- (U)f Criminal Investigations Detachment, Corozal, CZ: Provides information of intelligence interest uncovered during criminal investigations. Maintains files of all investigations conducted which are available for use during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes.
- h. Unternal Security Office, Canal Zone Government, Balboa Heights, CZ: Maintains files which are available for review during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes. Within the constraints of DA policies, provides information regarding intelligence matters of mutual benefit on US, Panamanian, Central and South Americans, as a local security agency.

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h. Immigration and Naturalization Service (IN), District Court House, Ancon, CZ: Provides information regarding citizenship status on US naturalized citizens who are DOD-affiliated and of intelligence interest or the subjects of PSIs. Provides possible threat information of interest uncovered during normal IN functions.

- i. United States Army Security Agency, Arlington Hall Station,
 Arlington, VA: CI and technical security support is provided USASADSC
 by scheduled visits from its higher headquarters in Arlington, Virginia.
- j. TSA, USAINTA, Fort Meade, Maryland: Provides technical and counter-intelligence services to field activities of ASA by programming and scheduling inspections worldwide. Responding to field elements in semi-critical case, to insure proper security measures are being complied with, in order to maintain field elements in a high state of operational readiness.
- 6. (U) THREAT: See Tab F which is classified SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.
- 7. (U) <u>COMMANDER'S EVALUATION</u>: The Commander, USASADSC, advised that the CI support received from TSA, the CZFO, 902d MI GP, and his own internal security personnel is considered adequate in maintaining a good security posture. In the event a problem develops which falls within the purview of the Internal Counterintelligence Program or any other security support operation, a request for assistance would be submitted through his Headquarters.
- 8. W(c) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION: A detailed search of the security files of USASADSC, to include the 408th ASA Det, failed to disclose any weakness in their security posture or indicate a trend in that direction. Past CI services by TSA indicated some minor deficiencies, but those had been corrected shortly after the service was completed. Due to the extreme sensitivity of the unit, the Commander maintains a constant check of his unit s security program. This program is felt to be adequate. The main threats, as pointed out in paragraph 6 above, are external rather than internal in nature, and are targeted against by the entire intelligence community in the CZ. In evaluating the ICIP program, the Commander asked for guidance from his Headquarters in the US. The guidance he received agreed with his determination, that he had no desire for an ICIP operation at the present time. Based on the facts presented above, it is believed that an ICIP operation is presently neither warranted nor justified, and it is recommended that an ICIP operation not be instituted in the USASADSC at this time.

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UNITED STATES ARMY COURIER STATION - PANAMA

- 1. GENERAL: The United States Army Courier Station Panama (USACS-P) is a subordinate activity of the Office of the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., with its office located at the Air Freight Terminal, Howard Air Force Base (HAFB), Canal Zone (CZ). This activity consists of only two individuals, one officer and one NCO. Because of the activity's continuous mission of handling extremely sensitive Departments of State and Defense documents and material, it falls in the CRITICAL SENSITIVE category.
- 2. (U) HISTORY: On 15 January 1966, the United States Army Courier Service was organized under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Adjutant General, Washington D.C. At that time, the United States Army Courier Transfer Station, United States Army Forces Southern Command (USARSO), Fort Amador, CZ, was disestablished and the USACS-P created and located at HAFB, where it has been to present.

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- 3. (V) MISSION: The mission of the USACS-P is the secure and expedient transportation of material authorized protected handling by courier; to provide facilities for receiving, safeguarding, processing, delivering, and dispatching such material; to provide transportation facilities for TOP SECRET and CRYPTOGRAPHIC material to US Forces in the Panama Canal Zone, the Panama Canal Company, Federal Aviation Agency, Oceanographic Representative, TUSS: Embassy Panama, ships or units of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the US State Department.
- /1N SECURITY HISTORY/PRESENT SECURITY POSTURE: The Air Freight Terminal, HAFB, where USACS-P is located is a one-story concrete block office and warehouse structure used for the storage, maintenance and administration of in-transit freight and related material. USACS-P has a steelfeinforced concrete vault facility which meets the physical security requirements for storage of TOP SECRET material. An initial CI Survey was conducted on 28 April 1966, with recommended security requirements subsequently implemented. USACS-P's most recent CI inspection was conducted on 13 April 1973, with no major deviations from recommended requirements recorded. A search of the activity's files failed to reveal any history of security violations. There is no reason to believe USACS-P personnel have been involved in any security infractions. There are no reasons to believe the security objectives of USACS-P are not being met. USACS-P is scheduled for a routine CI inspection in 1975 by its parent organization, Headquarters, Armed Forces Courier Service (AFCS), Washington D.C., 20314.
- 5. (c) SECURITY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES: There are several US military and civilian activities in the CZ that render direct or indirect intelligence

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and CI support, external physical security support, security assistance, and police services to the USACS-P. These support activities augment the internal security procedures of the USACS-P and assist it in accomplishing its mission. The units or activities which provide direct or indirect support to the USACS-P are as follows:

a <u>(U)Canal Zone Field Office (CZFO)</u>, 902d MI GP, Fort Amador (FA), CZ: Conducts Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) in the CZ. Provides CZ based surveillance and counter-surveillance support operations. Provides Security Assistance services in support of the USACS-P mission. Conducts CI surveys, inspections, technical surveys and inspections, SAEDA lectures, penetration inspections, and CI related advice and assistance in support of the USACS-P security objectives.

b 470th Military Intelligence Group, FA, CZ: Provides intelligence operations and services to detect treason, sedition and disaffection and to detect, prevent and neutralize espionage, subversion and sabotage directed against the US Army, its personnel and installations in the CZ. Conducts CI operations and collects intelligence through conduct of HUMINT operations.

c United States Army Security Agency (BSASA) Detachment-USSOUTHCOM, Fort Clayton (FC), CZ: Provides advice and assistance on capabilities and limitations of EW and SIGINT. Evaluates intelligence requirements in terms of USASA mission capabilities and maintains a continous estimate of the local CRYPTOLOGICAL situation. Provides COMINT during contingency situations.

d Naval Intelligence Service, FA, CZ: Provides information of intelligence and CI interest on local hostile activities and potential threats.

e. Woffice of Special Investigations, US Air Force, Howard Air Force
Base, CZ: Provides intelligence and CI information regarding hostile
organizations and their activities as well as threat information of interest.

f. Provost Marshal Office, 193d Infantry Brigade, FC, CZ: Assists in preventing unauthorized vehicle and personnel entry in and adjacent to US Army installations and structures in the CZ. Provides additional security guard and personnel restrainment force when required. Conducts Physical Security Surveys and Inspections. Maintains criminal investigations files for review and use during the conduct of PSIs. Assists in preventing overt acts of sabotage by having mobile and foot Military Police patrols.

mation of intelligence interest uncovered during criminal investigations. Maintains files of all investigations conducted which are available for use during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes.

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- h. Internal Security Office, Canal Zone Government, Balboa Heights, CZ: Maintains files which are available for review during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes. Within the constraints of DA policies, provides information regarding intelligence matters of mutual benefit on US, Panamanian, Central and South Americans as a local security agency.
- i. Immigration and Naturalization Service (IN), District Court House, Ancon, C2: Provides information regarding citizenship status on US naturalized citizens who are DOD-affiliated and of intelligence interest or the subjects of PSIs. Provides possible threat information of interest uncovered during normal IN functions.
- j. Headquarters, Armed Forces Courier Service, Washington, D.C.: Provides CI services and support in forms of surveys, inspections, and visits. Provides intelligence and security information and guidance through directives, regulations, and staff visits. Coordinates with local commands for additional CI and security support when required. Provides assistance in matters of security as a higher headquarters.
- 6. (U) THREAT: See Tab F which is classified SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMI-NATION
- 7. (U) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION: The Commander, USACS-P, advised that USACS-P consists of only two persons and that the present counterintelligence services provided USACS-P are adequate and meets his security requirements. USACS-P does not desire additional CI support at this time.
- 8. (FOUO) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION: An examination of security and administrative files failed to disclose information that USACS-P's security posture was anything but sound and secure. In addition, security checks provided by Headquarters (HQ), AFCS, revealed that USACS-P was performing its mission, to include maintaining a good security posture, in an outstanding manner. An in-depth study of the local hostile threat and the mission of USACS-P conducted with the Commander, USACS-P, failed to indicate that an on-going or potential internal security threat exists. There are no reasons to believe that the normal CI support and service provided USACS-P by HQS, AFCS, in conjunction with local intelligence and security agencies, CZ, is not adequate coverage to identify and neutralize any CI threat to USACS-P. In view of the existing CI coverage of the USACS-P, and that there are only two persons assigned to it, additional CI support is not recommended for USACS-P at the present time.

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J-2/3 DIRECTORATES' WARNING AND OPERATIONS CENTER

1. (U.C.)— GENERAL: The J-2/3 Directorates' Warning and Operations Center (J-2/3 DWOC) is a subordinate joint activity of the J-2 and J-3 Directorates, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Quarry Heights (QH), Canal Zone (CZ). The J-2/3 DWOC is housed in Building 81, "The Tunnel", a building that is tunneled into a hillside in QH, and is a combined service activity manned by US Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel. Because of its communication capabilities and functions within USSOUTHCOM, and its support to the JCS, the J-2/3 DWOC is considered a CRITICAL SENSITIVE facility.

2. (U) <u>HISTORY</u>: Caribbean Command, a Unified Command under the JCS, had its genesis in the World War II Caribbean Defense Command which was organized in early 1942 and was composed of the Panama Canal and Puerto Rican Departments of the Army, the 10th and 15th Naval Districts of the Navy, the Trinidad Base Command, and the Panama Canal. The Caribbean Command was established at QH, CZ, on 1 November 1947, by authority of the JCS. The Component forces assigned to Caribbean Command consisted of the Army and Air Force elements of the Caribbean Defense Command and, with the exception of certain fleet facilities and bases, of the Navy's Caribbean Sea Frontier. On 6 June 1963, the Caribbean Command was redesignated USSOUTHCOM.

3(U)(FOUO) MISSIONS:

- a. J-2 Warning Center: The J-2 Warning Center supports the Director of Intelligence through the operation of the Warning Branch by preparing and disseminating current intelligence and warning indications and through the preparation of current and long range estimates, studies and assessments. Provides supervision and personnel for the J-2 element of the Battle Staff and the Emergency Relocation Site (ERS) when activated.
- b. J-3 Operations Center: The J-3 Operations Center implements JCS emergency action procedures within USSOUTHCOM; prepares, coordinates, and disseminates USSOUTHCOM Emergency Action Procedures (EAP) in support of the JCS. In addition, prepares, coordinates, disseminates and implements USSOUTHCOM Control of Civil Disturbance Posture, USSOUTHCOM EAP, VOL III. Supervises the manning and operation of the emergency actions section of the Joint Operations Center and the ERS. Prepares, reviews, coordinates and supervises plans within the USSOUTHCOM command and control system to insure interface and capability with the Worldwide Military Command and Control Systems.

4(1) FOUND - SECURITY HISTORY/PRESENT SECURITY POSTURE: Building 81, the Tunnel, where the J-2/3 DWOC is located, is constructed of steel reinforced concrete embedded in sub-strata rock in Ancon Hill, QH, CZ, with

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the building extending through the hill. The entrance to the tunnel is manned by armed guards and unauthorized access to it could result in exceptionally grave danger to the US. The J-2/3 DWOC is a highly sensitive operational activity and is the coordination nerve center of USSOUTH-COM. A CI Security Survey was conducted on the tunnel in 16 June 1961, to determine the security measures necessary to limit or deny unauthorized access to it. Subsequent CI inspections and Security Assistance Visits have been conducted to insure compliance with the procedures established in the Security Survey. There are no known on-going internal threats in the J-2/3 DWOC.

- 5 (LC) SECURITY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES: There are several US military and civilian activities in the CZ that render direct or indirect intelligence and CI support, external physical security support, security assistance, and police services to the J-2/3 DWOC. These support activities augment the internal security procedures of the J-2/3 DWOC and assist it in accomplishing its mission. The units or activities which provide direct or indirect support to the J-2/3 DWOC are as follows:
- a. Canal Zone Field Office (CZFO), 902d MI GP, Fort Amador (FA), CZ: Conducts Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) in the CZ. Provides CZ based surveillance and counter-surveillance support operations. Provides Security Assistance services in support of the J-2/3 DWOC mission. Conducts CI surveys, inspections, technical surveys and inspections, SAEDA lectures, penetration inspections, and CI related advice and assistance in support of the Group's security objectives.
- b. 470th Military Intelligence Group, FA, CZ: Provides intelligence operations and services to detect treason, sedition and disaffection and to detect, prevent and neutralize espionage, subversion and sabotage directed against the US Army, its personnel and installations in the CZ. Conducts CI operations and collects intelligence through conduct of HUMINT operations.
- c. United States Army Security Agency (USAS) Detachment-USSOUTHCOM, Fort Clayton (FC), CZ: Provides advice and assistance on capabilities and limitations of EW and SIGINT. Evaluates intelligence requirements in terms of USASA mission capabilities and maintains a continuous estimate of the local CRYPTOLOGICAL situation. Provides COMINT during contingency situations.
- d. <u>Naval Intelligence Service</u>, FA, CZ: Provides information of intelligence and CI interest on local hostile activities and potential threats.
- e. Office of Special Investigations, US Air Force, Howard Air Force Base, CZ: Provides intelligence and CI information regarding hostile organizations and their activities as well as threat information of interest.

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frovost Marshal Office, 193d Infantry Brigade, FC, CZ: Assists in preventing unauthorized vehicle and personnel entry in and adjacent to US Army installations and structures in the CZ. Provides additional security guard and personnel restrainment force when required. Conduct Physical Security Surveys and Inspections. Maintains criminal investigation files for review and use during the conduct of PSIs. Assists in preventing overt acts of sabotage by having mobile and foot Military Police patrols.

(U) g. Criminal Investigations Detachment, Corozal, CZ: Provides information of intelligence interest uncovered during criminal investigations. Maintains files of all investigations conducted which are available for use during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes.

h Winternal Security Office, Canal Zone Government, Balboa Heights, CZ. Maintains files which are available for review during the conduct of PSIs or for intelligence purposes. Within the constraints of DA policies, provides information regarding intelligence matters of mutual benefit on US, Panmanian, Central and South Americans as a local security agency.

i. Immigration and Naturalization Service (IN), District Court House, Ancon, CZ: Provides information regarding citizenship status on US naturalized citizens who are DOD-affiliated and of intelligence interest or the subjects of PSIs. Provides possible threat information of interest uncovered during normal IN functions.

- 6. (U) THREAT: See Tab F which is classified SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.
- 7. (U) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION: The CINC, USSOUTHCOM, advised that CI support presently being received from the C2FO, 902d MI GP, together with the internal security programs and checks, are adequate in maintaining a good security posture. If at any future date, problems develop which would be considered within the purview of the Internal Counterintelligence Program or any other security support operation, a formal request for assistance would be submitted.
- 8. (Light Conclusions and Recommendation: After completing a review of the files concerning the J-2/3 DWOC security situation, it was determined that the security posture of the J-2/3 DWOC was adequate. No espionage, subversion or sabotage activities have been detected, and no trends seem to be developing which would lead to weakening the security posture. Taking into consideration the sensitivity of the area and the strict controls utilized by personnel of the activities, it is felt that the routine CI support now being given J-2/3 DWOC is adequate. Based on the information and facts stated, an ICIP operation in the DWOC at the present time is neither warranted nor justified. It is recommended that an ICIP operation not be instituted in the J-2/3 DWOC at this time.

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THREAT

(S/NFD) THREAT: A current assessment of the threat to the Canal Zone (CZ)

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f. The ever-present controversy over Canal negotiations provides a hostile threat from dissatisfied US employed local nationals. Their dissatisfaction might cause disaffection and subversion among US personnel sympathetic to the Panamanian cause.

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H PARA 1-603 DOD 5200 ACTION SHEET	CONTROL NUMBER	
M LVI A.	OFFICE SYMBOL	SUSPERSE
	DAMI-DOI-C	
CANTER RIDE (U)	DATE	
	6 March 197	5
To inform the CDR, USAINTA subject OFLAN (1	CIP) approved by ACSI, DA.	
EMORANDUM FOR RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, background	nd and action taken or recommended. Must be suffi	ciently detailed to
he action without recourse to other sources.)		

- a. By letter dated 25 February 1975, subject as above (ORANGE TAB B), CDR, USAINTA (MIIA-SO), forwarded to DAMI-DOI-C for review and approval of 902d MI Group Operation Plan OP-001-75-902, subject: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U), (Project Canter Ride)(U).
- b. By Memorandum Thru DAMI-DO for ACSI, DA, subject as above, dated 28 February 75 (ORANGE TAB C), DAMI-DOI recommended that the OPLAN be approved. On 4 March 1975, the ACSI, DA approved the OPLAN.
- 2. (U) DISCUSSION: By 1st Indorsement to USAINTA letter, DAMI-DOI advises the CDR, USAINTA that the ACSI, DA approved subject OPLAN on 4 March 1975.
- 3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: The attached 1st Indorsement to USAINTA (ORANGE TAB A) be approved and signed.

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
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(Continue on plain bond) **IMPLICATIONS** CIMPO YES [NO [PRIM PROGS YES 🔲 NO 🔲 BUDGET YES [MO [] COORDINATIONS APPROVALS MAME PHONE 914 DIR ACSI DISPATCHED (DT6) SHOW ADDSTRUKAL COOMPRHATION ON MEYENSE SADE OR CONTINUATION SHEET ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature)

ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

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MEMORANDUM THRU: BRIGADIER GENERAL KELLEY

FOR: MAJOR GENERAL AARON_

SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE (U)

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2. (C) Most of the personnel assigned to ASD are scientifically oriented, and it is this scientific orientation that has been considered the primary cause for an uncooperative and lackadaisical attitude toward security. This attitude, coupled with prevailing unfavorable opinions of intelligence personnel in general, results in an environment not suitable to a conventional ICIP operation. b1

3.(4C) A Sensitive Activity Vulnerability Estimate dated 5 February 1974, conducted at the US Army Missile Command, surfaced a number of security shortcomings. Other investigative efforts at this facility have revealed alleged questionable suitability activities on the part of some individuals assigned to ASD.

4(U)(C) A review of the Sensitive Installation listing reveals that all activities at Redstone Arsenal (with the exception of the US Army Missile and Munitions Center and School) are considered "highly sensitive." A review of the Hostile Intelligence EEI maintained at CIAD revealed that information on missile technology continues to be a high priority Hostile Intelligence EEI.

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SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE (U)

5. It is recommended that the attached OPlan be approved.

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LEONARD A. SPIRITO

Colonel, GS

Chief, Counterintelligence and Collection Division

Disapproved

See Me

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DAMI-DOI-C (25 Feb 75) 1st Ind SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE

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MODA (DAMI-DOI-C), WASH DC 20310

TO: Commander, US Army Intelligence Agency, ATTN: MIIA-SC, Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

The attached OFLAN, subject as above, was approved by the ACSI on 4 March 1975.

POR THE ASSISTANT CRIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

2 Incl

Brigadier General, GS Director of Intelligence Operations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS

U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

MIIA-SO

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SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOI-C) WASH DC 20310

1. (C) Forwarded for your review and approval is 902d MI Group Operation Plan OP-001-75-902, subject: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U), (Project CANTER RIDE (U)) (TAB A).

2. (6)

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This specialized counterintelligence support was requested by CG, USAMICOM, to enhance the security of the Directorate and determine the extent, if any, of hostile intelligence penetration of Redstone Arsenal. A feasibility study is at TAB B and provides additional detailed background information.

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WILLIAM'S. WOLF

Colonel, MI Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, 902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP FORT MEADE, MARY LAND 20755

MILA-GPB-AC(SP)

OPERATION PLAN

DATE:

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

REPORT NO: OP-001-75-902

PROJECT: CANTER RIDE (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

- a. AR 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-affiliated Persons and Organizations, 30 September 1974.
- b. USAINTA Regulation 381-100-1, Counterintelligence Special Operations, 8 February 1974.
- c. Memorandum, Redstone Resident Office, 902d MI Group, Subject: Request for Counterintelligence Special Operations, 23 September 1974.
- d. LTR, AMSMI-X, Headquarters, US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Subject: Request for Special Counterintelligence Support, 30 September 1974.
- e. Feasibility Study, MIIA-IA-O, Subject: CANTER RIDE Feasibility Study (U), 12 November 1974.
- f. See Annex A (Doctrinal References for references relating to doctrine, modus operandi and operational restrictions.)

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (c) MISSION:

a. Requirement: The 902d MI Group, with the assistance of the Composite Intelligence Activity (COMPIA), USAINTA, will develop and implement an Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operation b1 The operation is designed to provide special counterintelligence support to the Commanding General, US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal (RA), Alabama, in response to reference d above. The 902d MI Group will be responsible for the planning, operational control and monitorship of the operation while COMPIA will provide for the

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OP-001-75-902

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

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Further information pertaining to the target is contained at Annex I (Target Information).

b. Objective:

- (1) To enhance the security of the directorate by identifying those activities, practices and personnel employed within the target area which have been, and may continue to be, involved in the existent security weaknesses affecting the security of classified defense information within USAMRDEL. Further information pertaining to existent security weaknesses of the target area is contained at Annex J (Security Weaknesses).
- (2) To determine the extent, if any, of Hostile Intelligence Service (HoIS) penetration of Redstone Arsenal. Any information pertaining to this subject developed by the operation will be expeditiously passed to the appropriate office of the US Army Intelligence Agency for possible exploitation under the provisions of AR 381-47.
 - c. Base of Operation: Redstone Arsenal, AL
- d. Each individual and source involved in the conduct or control of the operation will be briefed on current policies and constraints pertaining to counterintelligence operations and activities as they concern persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense.
- e. The scope of the operation will not be expanded to cover off-post targets not affiliated with the Department of Defense Without prior approval IAW provisions of Appendix B, AR 381-13, dated 30 September 1974, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations.

2. (c) PERSONNEL:

a. Agent Personnel: [See Annex B (Agent Personnel)]

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- b. US Army MI Personnel: [See Annex C (Knowledgeability List)]
- (1) Case Officer: A "Great Skills" member of the Military Intelligence Officer Excepted Career Program (MIOCP) utilized under the provisions of AR 614-115, dated 1 November 1974, is required.
 - (2) Alternate Case Officer: Commander, Redstone RO, 902d MI Group.



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OP-001-75-902

SUBJECT: Internal (Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)
3. (e) cover and	DOCUMENTATION: [See Annex D (Cover and Documentation)]
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
OP-001-75-902

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)

b1 (2) Security Considerations: (1) (2) **b1**

5(UKG) COMMUNICATIONS:

a. This OPlan provides for the use of personal meetings, US Postal Service and telephonic contacts to effect necessary communications. The communications system will be designed to assure a continuous and secure means for the transmission of information and will provide for a primary, alternate and emergency channel as follows:



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SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)

- (1) Primary: Used for normal requirements.
- (2) Alternate: Used to prevent overloading of the primary system or in the event that the primary channel cannot be used.
- (3) Emergency: Used only in such instances which require the urgent transmission of information when the primary or alternate systems will not suffice.
- b. Details of the communications systems are contained in Annex E (Communications) to this OPlan.
- 6.(1)(c) TRAINING: The source will be trained jointly by the 902d MI Group and COMPIA in the skills necessary to accomplish his assigned tasks in a secure and effective manner. Source training will be continuous and will be dictated by the experience and background of the source and the operational situation within the target area. Specific minimal training requirements to include the provisions of AR 380-13 and standard Essential Elements of Information (EEI) are contained in Annex F (Training) to this OPlan.

7. (c)

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8. (c) TERMINATION:

- a. Termination with or without prejudice: The source recruited for this operation will be terminated when his usefulness to the operation ceases, he shows indications of insecure practices which could compromise the operation, he is no longer amenable to control, or the operation is terminated. Circumstances under which termination is effected will determine whether termination is with or without prejudice. The terms "with or without prejudice" do not indicate the manner in which the source will be terminated, but rather whether or not the source would be considered for use in future operations of this nature. Circumstances under which termination is effected are outlined in Annex H (Termination) to this OPlan.
- b. Commitments: The only commitments to be made to the source will be assurance of personal security and reimbursement for expenses incurred at the direction of the C/O. At termination a severance statement will be obtained from the source in the appropriate format and will include a provision that the source has no further claim.

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OP-001-75-902

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)

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9. (U) c) COORDINATION AND LIAISON:

- a. Coordination between Headquarters, 902d MI Group; the Atlanta Field Office; Redstone Resident Office; COMPIA, USAINTA and appropriate personnel at RA has been established and will be maintained on a continuing basis.
- b. Coordination and liaison between COMPIA and DA personnel assignments branches has been established to ensure the identification and procurement of a suitable agent for utilization in the operation.
- c. Coordination with additional personnel at RA may be determined to be necessary in the accomplishment of the operation. Consideration is presently being made to the possible briefing of the Chief, COMPACT, RA, to ensure proper assignment of the agent. However, as the operation will be conducted under strict "close-hold" rules, the briefing of additional personnel at RA will be accomplished only when deemed absolutely necessary, and upon the approval of the 902d MI Group Commander.

10. (c) Reports:

- a. Source administration, operational reports and periodic status reports will be submitted in accordance with reference b.
- b. Appropriate USAMICOM representatives will be informed of the information gleaned from the operation as it is developed.

ANNEXES:

- A Doctrinal References
- B Agent Personnel
- C Knowledgeability List
- D Cover and Documentation
- E Communications
- F Training
- G Finance and Logistics
- H Termination Plan
- I Target Information
- J Security Weaknesses
- K b1 Plan

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Annex A (Doctrinal References) to OPlan OP-001-75-902

- (2) References contained in this Annex are those which affect the administration and conduct of the operation, as opposed to those which establish the requirements for the operation and are listed under REFERENCES in the heading of this OPlan.
- 1. Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 58-11, Vol II.
- 2. Field Manual (FM) 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations, January 1972.
- 3. FM 30-17A, Counterintelligence Special Operations, February 1973.
- 4. Army Regulation (AR) 381-141, Provisions for Administration, Eagurvision, Control and Use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (U), 22 November 1965 with changes 1 through 4.
- 5. AR 614-115, Assignments, Details and Transfers Military Intelligence Officer Excepted Career Program (U), 1 November 1974.
- 6. USAINTA Regulation 381-1, Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control and Use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (U), 20 August 1974.
- 7. USAINTA Regulation 381-100, Counterintelligence Activities and Procedures, 13 February 1974.
- 8. 902d MI Group OPlan QUIZ TALK (U).
- 9. LTR, AGAM-P(M), ACSI, DSCI, Subject: Availability of Special Counterintelligence Support, dated 17 September 1965, and Chapter 5, Subject: b1 (C) to AR 381-102 (S), Subject: Intelligence Cover and Operational Support Activities (U), November 1974.

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Annex C (Knowledgeability List) to OPlan OP-001-75-902

- 1. US Army Missile Command:
 - a. MG Vincent H. Ellis, Commanding General
 - b. COL Arthur G. Lange, Jr., Chief of Staff
 - c. Dr John L. McDaniel, Director, USAMRDEL
 - d. COL R. A. Axelson, Deputy Director, USAMRDEL
- 2. 902d MI Group: (Additional personnel of the 902d MI Group will be briefed of the operation only upon the approval of the Group Commander).
 - a. COL Albert N. Stubblebine III, Commander
 - b. LTC Dale L. Hartig, Deputy Commander
 - c. LTC Alton R. Westrick, Operations Officer
 - d. MAJ Hugh W. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Asst Operations Officer
 - e. CW4 Edward P. Clark, Special Investigations Desk
 - f. CW2 Benjamin W. Struchen, Special Operations Desk
 - g. CPT Rodney J. Sollenberger, CDR, Atlanta Field Office
 - h. CPT Bobby E. Gipson, CDR, Redstone Arsenal Resident Office
- 3. Case Officer Personnel:
 - a. Primary: (to be determined)
 - b. Alternate: CPT Bobby E. Gipson

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APPENDIX I to ANNEX C, OPLAN OP 001-74-902

DATE: 29 January 1975

PROJECT NAME: CANTER RIDE (U)

SUBJECT: Knowledgeability List

- 1. The following personnel have full knowledge of the operation:
 - a. 902d MI Group Personnel
- (1) CW4 William Johnson, Chief, Liaison Branch, Pentagon Counterintelligence Force.
 - (2) SGT Dave Horn, Liaison Branch, Pentagon Counterintelligence Force.
 - b. USAINTA Personnel
 - (1) COL William S. Wolf, CDR.
 - (2) COL Hassel L. Parker, DCDR.
 - (3) COL William T. Singleton, Chief, CI Div.
 - (4) LTC Donald B. Grimes, Chief, Special Ops Br.
 - (5) James Hession, GS-13, Chief, Intel Div.
 - (6) Gordon Huff, GS-13, Exec Asst to Chief, COMPIA.
 - (7) Les Hime, GS-12, Civ Adv to Chief, Special Ops Br.
 - (8) Rocco Melo, GS-13, Civ Adv to Chief, Special Ops Br.
 - (9) MAJ Joseph S. Kieffer, Chief, COPIA.
 - (10) CPT Lawrence A. Edell, Chief, Svcs Sec, COMPIA.
 - (11) CPT Richard A. Govoni, Chief, Ops Sec, COMPIA.
 - (12) 1LT James A. Holliday, Svcs Sec, COAPIA.
 - (13) CW2 Mellberth Bowling, Alternate Project Officer, COMPIA.
 - (14) CW2 John McNulla, Ops Sec, COMPIA.
 - (15) WOI Donald J. Rander, Project Officer, COMPIA.

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29 January 1975

- (16) Dolores J. Crounse, GS-5, Admin Sec, COMPIA.
- (17) Judy C. Howard, GS-5, Admin Sec, COMPIA.
- (18) SFC James D. Blessing, Admin Sec, CCMPIA.
- (19) SFC Robert J. Snyder, Ops Sec. CCMPIA.
- (20) SSG William R. Quinton, Svcs Sec, COMPIA.
- (21) SP5 Douglas B. Miller, Svcs Sec, COMPIA.

c. Other MI Personnel

CW3 Ralph W. Ochs, Assignments Officer, MI Br, OPD, MILPERCEN.

2. The following personnel have limited knowledge of the operation:

a. USAINTA Personnel

- (1) Autmer Ackley, Jr., GS-12, b1 Signit Officer.
- (2) CPT Noel Jones, Special Cps Br.
- (3) CW3 Robert J. Finch, USAASD.
- (4) CW2 Paul B. Maison, USAASD.

b. Other Personnel

- (1) COL Ransom Barber, Chief, MI Br, OPD, MILPERCEN.
- (2) CAPT Donald B. Polatty, USN, Dir, Personnel & Administration Div, DNA.
- (3) LTC C. P. Joiner, Jr., CDR, 901st MI Det.
 - (4) LTC Floyd W. Cox, Jr., Chief, Admin Services Div, DNA.
 - (5) MAJ David A. Harrison, Chief, Mil Pers Div, DNA.
 - (6) CPT Doneld Howell, Chief, Mail & Records Br, DNA.
 - (7) CW3 Darrell Graf, Assignments Officer, AG Br, OPD.

APPENDIX I to ANNEX C, OPLAN OP 001-74-902

29 January 1975

- (8) CW3 Charles B. Decker, Deputy Chief, US Army Staff Officer Personnel Div, TAG.
- (9) SGM Edward J. Poucette, Jr., US Army Staff Officer Personnel Div, TAG.
 - (10) MSG Larry C. Duke, F&AO, Fort Myer, VA.
 - (11) LTC C. F. Fry, USAINTA Liaison officer to the Army Material Command.

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Appendix 1 (Standard Essential Elements of Information) to Annex F (Training) to OPlan OP-001-75-902. b1 2. b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 7. 8. b1 9. b1 10.

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Appendix 1 to Annex F to OPlan OP-001-75-902

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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	Information has	been	withheld	in	its	entirety	iı		

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

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Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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
Page(s) 503-504

Aunex H (Termination Plan) to OPlan OP-001-75-902

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2. U(C). The source may be terminated with or without prejudice, which indicates a recommendation for future utilization only.

- a. A source may be terminated with prejudice for any of the following reasons:
 - (1) Control by Hols.
 - (2) Complete ineptitude.
- (3) Unwillingness to accept direction or guidance from the C/O, or continuous disregard for security instructions.
- (4) Compromise as a result of his own actions, in violation of the C/O's instructions.
 - (5) Deliberate distortion or fabrication of information.
 - (6) Eabitual law violation.
- (7) Inability to give satisfactory explanations for long absences or suspicious actions.
- b. A source may be termin ated without prejudice for any of the following reasons:
 - (1) Compromise through no fault of his own.
 - (2) loss of placement and/or access.
 - (3) Desire of the source to terminate for non-operational reasons.
- (4) Deterioration of health of the source to a degree that he cannot continue his efforts.
 - (5) Recruitment of other assets who have better placement and/or access.
 - (6) Termination of the operation.



Annex H (Terminatio to OPlan OP-001-75-902

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

3 USC 552 (b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

- Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
- Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 507-508

Annex I (Target Information) to OPlan OP-001-75-902

Guidance Technology Office (OGTO), which is an office within the Advanced Sensor Directorate (ASD) located in Building 5400, a restricted area located on Redstone Arsenal (RA). Mr J. Ducote is the director of OGTO and Mr W. J. Linberg is the director of ASD. Neither of these persons is aware of the operation. ASD is one of several directorates under the US Army Missile Research, Development and Engineering Laboratory (USAMRDEL) which is responsible for developing concepts for new missiles. Dr J. McDaniel, Director USAMRDEL, and COL R. A. Axelson, Deputy Director USAMRDEL, have been briefed on the operation. USAMRDEL is, in turn, one of nine directorates which are collectively responsible for the developing, testing and procurement of missiles for the US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM). The CG, USAMICOM, Major General Vincent H. Ellis and the CofS, COL Arthur G. Lange Jr., are aware of the operation.

2. (U) Further information pertaining to RA, USAMICOM, Huntsville and a map of RA are provided in Appendices to this Annex.

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THE COMMANDS

U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM)

U.S. Army Missile and Munitiens Center and School (MMCS)

U.S. Army Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC)

Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command (BMDSCOM)

U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville

Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center (EMDATC)

Redstone Readiness Group

Redstone Arsenal is a combination of two U.S. Army amenals established in 1941, for the production of artillery shells. Today it is in nerve center of the Army's missile and rocket programs.

The 38,659 scres were designated the center of research and development activities for rockets and related items in October, 134 Recruitment of technical and professional personnel began in January, 1949, and a Research and Development Division was established.

Redstone Arrenal was declared an active installation by the Department of the Army on June 1, 1949. Some of the Army's rocket experience had been working at Ft. Bliss. Texas were moved to Redstone in April, 1950. This included the team of scientists and engineer handed by Dr. Wernher von Braun.

Six lipsfor Army agencies are now located on Redstone and in neighboring Huntsville. Based on the arsenal are the U.S. Army Missi Command and the U.S. Army Missile and Munitions Couter and School. The George C. Marshall Space Flight Center of the Nation Aeronautics and Space Administrative is also sited on the amenal as well as a government-owned, contractor-operated facility engaged: special propellant research and manufacture — the Huntsville Division of Thiokol Chemical Corporation.

In nearby Huntsville are the Army's Saliistic Missile Defense Systems Command and Pallistic Missile Defense Advanced Technolog Center, The U.S. Army Engineer Division, Huntsville, and the Redstone Readiness Group.

The arsenal's land area includes these minor mountains, 94 miles of railroads, more than 330 miles of roads and more than 7.00 buildings. There is a jet length airfield and modern carno docks on the Fennessee River, the arsenal's southern boundary. Army building and equipment at Fedstone are valued at more than 3030 million.


An average of 20,000 vehicles pass through Redstone's gates each day. In an average month, some 8,000 transient visitors are bedge through the control (scilities to do business or tour one or more of the government agencies on the installation.

The arsenal has a duly government and contractor working population of about 25,000. Although no civilians live on the assessal, mother 1,000 military families reside in approximately 1,500 children of military personnel residing on the installation attend schools in Huntsville.

Civilian employees working for the Li-partment of the Army at Redstone and in Huntsville number about 10,000. Approximately 4 % soldiers are assigned to the various Army communis and agencies. The total Army payroll at Redstone and in Huntsville exceeds \$1 million.

Rearly 52 hillion was spent lest year by the Army at Redstone and in Huntsville. About 65 percent of the amount went to American industry, principally through contracts to companies for missile system research, development and production.

This is an excerpt from Redstone Arsenal, dated 1974, an unofficial guide published by Military Publishers, a private firm in no way connected with the Department of the Army.



paintered; a major corner only commend of the U.S. Army Material Command, has no cheeologies at Redomine Surerial and also runs the installation.

MICOM is responsible for missiles and rockets and the supporting equipment required to field them as weapon systems. The command's mission includes: research, development, such sering, testing, procurement, production and logistics support of operational missile and rocket systems.

Activated in 1962, MICCAM combines the facilities, personnel and considers of several predecessor Army argumizations which, of the same location, have directed the Army's expanding calculation and rocket activities at Redstone Arrenal for more

than 25 years.

Rs presidensians fielded the farmy's first generation missile and couled systems and make major contributions in the late. 1950's to early American space exploitation eithers — including the lambhing of our first scientific earth satellite. NASA's major speak vehicle development organization, the Murshell Space Flight Contention to the Murshell Space Flight Contention to the late. Redstone, was entivated in 1950 from a nucleus of former Armys (vijin employees at Redstone. The Sufeguard ABM system also begon as a research and development program managed by one of MICOM's predecessors.

MICOM's programs to the halleds a full spectrum of weapon syll this rating from man podable ground-this in and anti-tank missiles to the 400-mile more forshing. Missile, its research and to be legiment term plane and the color technology of "smort" or processor goldful munitions, artiflery shells, bosons, the set and missiles that home on its or leasts.

MICOM is also the centre of Alarmy effort to advance high energy to be tachnology.

Although the commonate's responsibilities are world-wate, most of its experience, team of about euron soldiers and civilians are at Recisions Aronal. The commands test ranges, levendories, buildings, and highly specialized equipment comprise a too investment of about Silve million, its annual budget everages more than one billion dollars including fonds covering acquisition of missiles and rockets for two U.S. Army as well as many allied nations which also employ U.S. Army misules and rockets.

Missiles and rockets are not manufactured at Redscore Arsonal. Traditionally, the Army has formed to American industry and mislaces for their manufacture, a task manufact by MICOM.

MICCM supports an Army Materiel Command element based at Redstone Assenal: the project office directing the SAM-D advanced air delense system.

Soldiers at Redstone Assenal work with some of the most advance loguisment in the Army Tacir daily tasks may range from a reasench project to training new members of the Army how to repair compenions of the missile systems. Here, the soldiers perform the technical side of their jeb and contribute their part toward making their Army traily according

This is an excerpt from Redstone Arrenal, dated 1974, an unofficial guide published by Military Publishers, a private firm, in no way connected with the Department of the Army.

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HUNTSVELL

A Good Place to Live

Huntsville, pro when from a form of about 20,000 persons to more than 140,000 store 1936, crossed many of determinent and shrintenents will be an pleasant endough. They consoliument and blend with the oil. The city's roote on planted or you in the part, yet it is a vital part of the challenging andere. When we actions for every age, it is actional story analyses under place to it. The city itself is progressive, fast growing, beautiful and beaution the city itself is progressive, fast growing, beautiful and beautiful the city section, it is convenient to one of the forement of a decay in the South. For the history enther, ist, the nature lower that hunter, the fisherman, the student, the engineer, the business seem the club woman — it is the place to be and the place to itself.

Many military families reside in the city. Assist to a bottle new family moving into town is available in the Housing Referral Office at Redstone Arshoal. The office maintains like of routals and homes for purchase in Building 3495. Phone 246-7471. With this referral assistance, the new family can get refined rapidly.

Huntsville offers achooling through coilege level, as well as special education classes through high school for those who require it. There are three colleges in tiuntsville and a subject can work toward a degree by the many night courses offered.

This is an excerpt from Redstone Arsenal, dated 1974, an unofficial guide published by Military Publications, a private firm, in no way connected with the Department of the Army.

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Appendix 3 to Annex I (Target Information)

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

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Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

3 USC 552 (b)(1)

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- Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 5/3

Annex J (Security Weaknesses) to OPlan OP-001-75-902

Command (USAMICOM) has requested a counterintelligence operation be initiated within USAMICOM to ensure the security of that command with emphasis on security of classified defense information. The chain of event, list of persons involved, and allegations which fostered the request are as follows:

a. Chain of Events:

(9)

b6

- (1) On 14 May 1974, a SECRET document entitled "Vunerability Assessment of Army Electro Optical Missile Systems (U)", copy 7, dated 7 December 1973, was determined to be missing and has not been found. Compromise was not considered remote.
 - (2) On 16 May 1974, a CONFIDENTIAL document entitled "Internal Technical Note RE72-35, Digital Simulation of the Texas Instrument's Cannon Launched Guided Projectile (U)", dated 24 October 1972, was found in a desk drawer of Mr b6, a member of OGTO. The document was found in the desk during an after-hours check for SECRET material referred to in para la(1) above. The classification markings had been excised from the document. During the investigation for this incident, b6 admitted in his sworm statement that he had found another CONFIDENTIAL document in his desk on 12 June 1974.
 - (3) During the week of 20 September 1974 another SECRET document entitled "Laser countermeasures/counter counter measures (U)", Progress Report, Pitran Dunn Laboratory, Frankfort Arsenal, was found to be missing and could not be accounted for. The investigation is ongoing and it is anticipated that b6 | will be considered responsible and may receive a letter of reprimand and/or a day's loss of pay.
 - b. Personnel within OGTO and ASD who may be of counterintelligence interest include the following:
 - **(1)** b6 , GS15, Supervisor, OGTO. (2) <u>b6</u> , GS12, Physicist, formerly assigned OGTO, (3) b6 , GS14, Aerospace Engineer, OGTO. **(4)** b6 GS4. Typist. nee: b6 (5) b6 , GS14, Engineer, OGTO. (6) b6 GS15, Physicist, OGTO. **(7)** b6 GS12 (formerly 1LT), Engineer, OGTO. (8) b6 Nee: | b6 , GS5, Clerk, OGTO.

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GS11, Electronics Technician, OGTO.

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Annex J (Security Weaknesses) to OPlan OP-001-75-902 c. During an investigation into the loss of documents listed above, certain allegations were made which reflected adversely on persons assigned to OGTO, ASD and USAMICOM. In general, the allegations are as follows: had a romance although each was and b6 married. conducted herself in a manner to suggest that she was "available" or as a practical joke by sitting in b6 during office meetings. was so mad that he claimed he would "kill" b6 for "screwing his girl" in reference to b6 placed CONFIDENTIAL documents in b6 (4) | b6 believes b6 deak because of jealousy. alleges there is a meeting place for sexual activities b6 and other members of the office. **by** | b6 (6) Pornographic films shown in this meeting place during office lunch hours. and b6 took two secretaries to this meeting place during (7) b6 lunch. (8) Office calls and contacts with a Marge Cleveland, now deceased, who was called "Bucking Bronco". .(9) Homosexual tendencies by b6 intoxicated on the job. (10) b6 used to place persons under obligation. (π) **b**6 (12) b6 and b6 procuring secretaries for sex.

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the motor. | b6

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2. (U) Further information to include sworn statements are on file at

's truck and damaged

(13) Someone placed sugar in the gas tank of | b6

Headquarters, 902d MI Group, and COMPIA, USAINTA.

alleges that it was b6

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DATE: 29 January 1975 ANNEX K to OPLAN 001-74-902 PROJECT NAME: CANTER RIDE (U) PROJECT NUMBER: IA-74-001 SUBJECT: (U) AUTHORITY/REFERENCE: OPLAN OP 001-74-902, dtd 21 Nov 74, Subject: Special Counterintelligence Support, and references cited therein. BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES: b1 3. *(e)* CONCEPT OF OPERATION: **b**1

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
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ANNEX K to OPLAN 001-74-902

29 January 1975



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MIIA-IA-O

12 November 1974

SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE Feasibility Study (U)

(U) References:

- a. Letter, Redstone Resident Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 902d Military Intelligence Group, MIIA-GPR-RS, dated 23 September 1974, Subject: Request for Counterintelligence Special Operation (U), with inclosures.
- b. Letter, Headquarters, US Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Redstone, Alabama, AMSMI-X, dated 30 September 1974, Subject: Request for Special Counterintelligence Support (U), with 1st indorsement, Headquarters, 902d Military Intelligence Group, Fort Meade, Maryland, dated 9 October 1974.
- c. Discussions between representatives of the 902d Military Intelligence Group and the Composite Intelligence Activity (COMPIA), on 27 September and 4 October 1974.
 - d. Chapter 5, AR 381-102 (S).
- 2. (2) Section I. Purpose of Study. During the period 16 to 17 October 1974, COMPIA Project Officers, Mr. Mellberth Bowling and Mr. Donald J. Rander, visited the Redstone Resident Office, 902d MI Group, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, for the purpose of compiling the necessary information

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into the Optical Guidance Technology Office (OGTO), Advanced Sensors Directorate (ASD), US Army Missile Research, Development and Engineering Laboratory (USAMRDEL), US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. In addition, the study was conducted to determine the feasibility of providing assistance to the Commander, USAMICOM, through the use of a to improve the security posture of the Command.

3. (e) Coordination.

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12 November 1974

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4. (L) Section II. Findings.

USAMICOM, a subordinate command of the US Army Materiel Command (AMC) is commanded by Major General Vincent H. Ellis, and has been classified as a "Highly Sensitive" Class II Installation by the Department of Army. In addition to the requisite Table of Organization and Equipment, logistical, and administrative support elements, USAMICOM consists of various US Army Missile Systems project offices, a contingent of missile systems Liaison Offices with foreign allied military forces to include Senior Staff Technical Representatives stationed at CONUS and OCONUS installations, a complement of special activities, such as the US Army Metrology and Calibration Center and the Missile Intelligence Agency, and six sensitive Directorates, three of which are considered "critically sensitive" by USAMICOM. This category applies to the USAMRDEL, the Directorate for Procurement and Development (DPP), the Directorate for Product Assurance (DPA), and the Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA). The mission of these Directorates is directly related to the crucial phases of research and development of all current and future missile systems in the US Army and to the contracting to appropriate firms for production. The Advanced Sensors Directorate (ASD) of the USAMRDEL is of specific interest to this study as indicated in references listed in paragraph 1, above.

b. USAMICOM has a significantly large number of civilian employees and assigned military personnel, who by the nature of their duties, require access to critically classified defense information and material. Suitability chortcomings such as drug and alcohol abuse, possible homosexuality and immoral activity, and excessive indebtedness, all of which have been alleged against USAMRDEL personnel, serve to create a fertile field for Hostile Intelligence (HoIS) offensive intelligence operations against the Command. The human element of USAMICOM, therefore, must be considered particularly vulnerable to the security of the Command. The desirability of advanced knowledge of the US Army missile systems must be considered lucrative to HoIS. By obtaining this type of information, the efficiency of these systems in a future battlefield environment could be impaired and thereby adversely affect the national defense of the United States. In a Sensitive Activity Vulnerability Estimate (SAVE), dated 5 February 1974, conducted at USAMICOM, a number of violations and shortcomings were noted in the above critical directorates. A synopsis of the SAVE and other incidents which have occurred in USAMRDEL subsequent to the SAVE, follows:

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12 November 1974

SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE Feasibility Study (U)

- (1) In MIA, SECRET material was discovered in containers which also contained unclassified material. SECRET documents were also stored in unauthorized security containers. Accountability for classified documents in MIA is maintained on Automatic Data Processing (ADP) equipment which is also used extensively for routine office functions. This practice has been continued despite the fact that the classified document custodians are not properly trained in ADP security procedures.
- (2) Most document custodians are not knowledgeable of the provisions of DoD Regulation 5200.1-R or AR 380-5 and other AMC and USAMICOM security regulations.
- (3) Personnel of USAMICOM are not receiving proper security indoctrination instructions in accordance with applicable regulations. There is a general lack of security consciousness throughout the Command, but is especially evident amongst the civilian, scientific-oriented personnel, who refuse to properly wear and display their security badges or assist in sound security practices and procedures.
- (4) Conference rooms utilized to discuss classified information are not properly secured and maintained. No record of CI Technical inspections for sensitive areas and conference rooms was available.
- (5) There is an inadequate number of qualified Security Support Specialists assigned to USAMICOM. USAMRDEL shares such a support officer with three other Directorates or project offices.
- assigned as an "extra duty". This practice fosters resentment of the responsibility on the part of personnel assigned the task. This has resulted in poor administration of the control of classified documents, a factor which significantly contributed to the loss of seven SECRET documents in USAMRDEL. In each case, it was determined that the fault was an administrative error on the part of the custodian. Subsequent to the above incidents, on 14 May and 20 September 1974, two more classified documents were discovered missing from OGTO, the office within USAMRDEL referenced in 1a, above. The 14 May violation was discovered during a non-duty hours check. In this instance, a CONFIDENTIAL document was found in a desk. The classified markings had been removed. The 20 September incident occurred after a 100% inventory and resulted in a reprimand and possible loss of one day's pay for 66

 GS-15, upon whom the responsibility for the loss was fixed.

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(7) Uncleared personnel have access to Building 5400, a RESTRICTED AREA, which houses in part USAMRDEL and in particular, the Advanced Sensors Directorate and OGTO. The Building's Cafeteria employees do not have security clearances yet they have entrance badges. These badges do not identify the bearer since they have neither the picture nor the name of the individual. No roster is maintained of these personnel.

Singularly, the above infractions and violations do not justify the use of a SCOPI asset. Collectively, however, these security problems constitute a serious threat to the security of the Command as similar situations exist in most of the other critically sensitive Directorates. In addition to the above security problems, the Request for Special CI Support, reference in 1b, above, outlines a serious suitability problem which allegedly involves the entire office staff of OGTO.

5.U(c) Analysis.

a. Based upon the Findings as outlined above, a SCOPI is believed to be the most advantageous investigative tool to assist the requestor Command because the local Military Intelligence personnel are highly visible in the area and do not have at their disposal the resources necessary to provide the Commander of USAMICOM indepth CI support. The RRO has two enlisted agent personnel and one MI Officer present for duty. This office conducts 36 CI Inspections and Checks of USAMICOM and the US Army Munitions School and Center units annually. The inspected elements have an aggregate of over 100,000 SECRET documents and approximately three linear miles of CONFIDENTIAL material. About 350 classified document custodians routinely maintain these documents. In addition to being tasked to conduct SAVE studies, the RRO is tasked with normal liaison contact, suitability investigations, incident investigations, occasional PSI investigations, and security indoctrination briefings when time permits. Even though these accumulative services benefit the Commander in terms of CI Support, RRO personnel have noted that corrective follow-up actions concerning reported infractions have proven to be of a temporary nature. This has been evidenced by the recurrence of similar violations and infractions during a short period of time following the conduct of CI services. The local CI effort has been hampered by the existence of a large number of uncooperative and apathetic scientifically oriented personnel in the Command. The attitude of these personnel toward sound security practices and procedures can only be described as uncooperative and lackadaisical. It is therefore considered highly unlikely for the RRO to be successful in conducting an ICIP operation in the area. Additionally, past intelligence related investigations concerning USAMICOM personnel has fostered an unfavorable attitude toward intelligence personnel in general. The following details the procedures through which personnel are acquired in USAMRDEL.

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- b. There are 162 civilian personnel assigned to the Advanced Sensors Directorate. The director is Mr. William J. Lindberg, GS-15. Seven of these civilians normally perform duties in the Optical Guidance Technology Office. which is the specific target area of the requested support as outlined in above references, under the supervision of Mr. b6 General Schedule rating of the Directorate's employees range from GS-1 to GS-16. The majority of ASD personnel perform duties related to research and development which are highly technical in nature. When deemed necessary, all personnel of USAMRDEL are subject to being required to perform functions in other Directorates and Offices to fulfill specific project requirements. However, in instances wherein additional manpower must be procured from resources outside of USAMICOM, the request for Personnel Action (SF Form 52) may be initiated by the respective office supervisor or the Director of the Directorate concerned. The request must be staffed through the appropriate chain of command within the Directorate to the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO), USAMICOM. The request is then reviewed by the CPO Technical Services Branch, where it is recorded in the Personnel Control Roster. Following this action, the request must be reviewed by the CPO Position/Pay Management Branch, where it is closely reviewed to determine the correctness of the pay grade and job description. From that Branch, the request is forwarded to the Recruiting and Placement Branch for recruitment action. In any event, positions are normally filled from personnel listed on the DoD Stopper List, local RIF lists, internal promotion, lateral transfer or direct hire.
- c. Requisitions for military and civilian personnel for assignment to USAMICOM are unique in terms of routine requisition assignments in other commands of the US Army. All assignments to USAMICOM are dictated on the basis of current and future project requirements which fluctuate according to the mission, necessity, and special qualifications of desired personnel. This system is known as Project REFLEX. It provides authority to fill temporary or permanent positions for the duration of a specific project at the completion of which the individual may be reassigned or shifted to another office within USAMICOM.
- d. There are only three authorized military positions within the Advanced Sensors Directorate. One of these positions is a LTC, MOS 2157 (Research and Development Coordinator), located at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The remaining two, a 2LT, MOS 7302 (Physicist) and a CPT, MOS 7601 (Electrical Engineer) are assigned to Redstone Arsenal. These positions are currently filled. Requisitions for US Army personnel assigned to ASD or the USAMRDEL are submitted by the Consolidation of Military Personnel Activities (COMPACT), USAMICOM to AMC on a Projected Requisition Authority (PRA). The need for personnel is determined by COMPACT, who subtracts or adds gains and losses using current personnel strength figures which are compared with the

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PRA account. Should it be determined that a shortage of personnel exists, COMPACT may then submit the requisition to AMC who, in turn, submits the request to DA. Personnel can be assigned either directly to the USAMRDEL, or to COMPACT on DA orders for further assignment within the Command.

- e. As a minimum, a SECRET security clearance is required for all civilian and military personnel assigned to USAMRDEL. Upon arrival of military personnel in the Command, the Clearance and Intelligence Branch, Internal Security Division, COMPACT reviews the individual's 201 file, Medical and Dental Records. This is a routine procedure conducted to determine the person's eligibility for a security clearance. The individual must fill out a locator card, a request for security clearance statement, and a local office personnel data card. COMPACT determines the degree of clearance required, based on the sensitivity of the position to which the individual is to be assigned. If a valid DA Form 873 (Certificate of Clearance and Security Determination) is in the individual's file, and no derogatory information is revealed in the files review, a SECRET clearance is normally granted. Should the file not contain a valid 873 form, appropriate action is initiated for verification of security clearance data through USAIRR. Although contrary to routine procedures, the USAIRR Dossier may be requested for review.
- f. Due to the highly technical nature of the civilian positions within ASD it is not considered feasible to into any of these positions. Because the three authorized military positions within ASD are currently filled, an alternate military position must be considered for The viability of utilizing a SCOPI asset in ASD under the guise of a Classified Document Control Officer (CDCO) appears highly favorable since the Command plans to centralize the classified document control unit within ASD and acquire a properly trained classified document custodian to maintain the documents. This position has Command sanction as it would serve to decrease the recurrent difficulties experienced by the Command in the control of classified material and would be widely accepted by ASD personnel because of their dislike for performing the extra duties as a CDCO. Through the use of Project REFLEX,

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SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE Feasibility Study (U)

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
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- (1) Age: 35 to 40 years.
- (2) Marital Status: Unmarried.
- (3) Race: Caucasian.
- (4) Ethnic background: Preferably born in the Southern region of the United States.
 - (5) b1
 - (6) b1
 - (7) Rank: WO, CW2 or CW3.
 - (8) Training and experience:

b1

As most of the local personnel are Caucasian and from the Southern region of the United States, these characteristics are deemed beneficial to mission accomplishment. Operational control of the SCOPI will be executed by the 902d MI Group, who will be responsible for writing the Operations Plan. A CI Inspection of ASD is currently in progress by the RRO, 902d MI Group. Significant findings will be reported to COMPIA if deemed relevant to the proposed requested Special CI Support.

6. (C) Conclusions. In view of the collective security shortcomings noted in the Command, the highly sensitive nature of the mission of the Command,



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12 November 1974

SUBJECT: CANTER RIDE Feasibility Study (U)

and the severely limited options available to local MI activity in the area,

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(C) Recommendation.

RICHARD A. GOVONI

CPT, MI Chief, Operations Section, COMPIA

MIIA-IA-O CANTER RIDE (U) FROM Chief, COMPIA ATTN: Mr. Ackley 1. Your attention is invited to paragraph is Annex of OPO01-75-902. 2. Request your concurrence and recommendations. 1 Incl Ltr 902d MI Gp 21 Nov 74 w/incl MIIA-IA-O CANTER RIDE (U) FROM Chief, COMPIA FROM Chief, COMPIA ATTN: Mr. Ackley 1. Your attention is invited to paragraph is Annex of OPO01-75-902. MAJ, MI	DATE 3 Feb 73 Rander/dic/6364 G; and paragraph 6, Annex K
ATTN: Mr. Ackley 1. Your attention is invited to paragraph 1; Annex of OP001-75-902. 2. Request your concurrence and recommendations. 1 Incl. JOSEPH S.	Rander/dic/6364 G; and paragraph 6, Annex K KIEFRER
ATTN: Mr. Ackley 1. Your attention is invited to paragraph 1; Annex of OP001-75-902. 2. Request your concurrence and recommendations. 1 Incl. JOSEPH S.	Rander/dic/6364 G; and paragraph 6, Annex K KIEFRER
of OP001-75-902. 2. Request your concurrence and recommendations. JOSEPH S.	KIEFRER
2. Request your concurrence and recommendations. 1 Incl JOSEPH 5.	KIEFRER
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	mposite Vinterlingence Activity
Chief, Con	
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TO: ·Chief, COMPIA FROM: bi Office 1. Concur with the proposed utilization of	DATE: 4 Feb 75 CMT 2
þ1	
b. If payment of partial per diem is considered then it must be authorized by classified orders and office. c. It is true that partial per diem is authorized hours per day away from a persons normal cuty stathat the daily training time be adjusted so as to reless than 10 hours per day.	paid through CPT Denny's ized for duty in excess of ation; however, it is suggested
2. Funds are available to support this project for	the remainder of FY 75.
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Megraded Company TAL DAC, GS-1	2 ement Officer
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MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

HEHORANDAN FOR: LENDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SWARECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

1. (U) This is in response to your Memorandum on 17 January 1975 to the Vice Chief of Staff in regard to subject and serves as the Quarterly ICIP Report for the 2d Quarter, FY 2975.

- 2. (c) On 2 October 1974, I directed a review of the entire ICIF program with a view towards the elimination of those no longer considered of sufficient merit to warrant retention. The criteria used in evaluating each ICIP operation was: (a) The sensitivity of the installation/ activity is such that some type of special counterintelligence support is required or (b) There is a known threat of sufficient magnitude to the installation/activity to warrant a need for some type of special counterintelligence support and (c) The information desired cannot be obtained except through the use of confidential sources.
- (C) Based on this review and considering your 17 January guidance. I directed the termination of 12 ICIP operations at the following headquarters:
- a. Hq. US Army Communications Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona (CANAL ROPE).
 - b. Dugway Proving Ground, Utah (CANARY STONE),
 - c. US Army Air Defense Center, Fort Bliss, Texas (CANTINA ARCH).
 - d. Unatilla Army Depot Activity, Mermisten, Oregon (CANYON ROSTER),
- US Army Mobility Equipment Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (CENTAUR SALE),

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SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIF) (U)

f. Hq, US Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey (CENTRAL TAXI).

- g. US Army Management Systems Support Agency, The Pentagon, Washington, DC (CENTURY SQUAD).
- h. US Army Electronics Proving Ground, Fort Huachuca, Arizona (COMPOLA FLAC).
 - i. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland (GONDOLA STAR).
- j. Defense Language Institute East Coast, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC (LANYARD MOOD).
- k. Picatinny Arsenal, Armament Command, Pover, New Jersey (LEND TONE).

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
- 1. US Army War Collage, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (LENTENT CLOUD).
- 4. (U) The remaining seven ICIPs are worthy of retention as they meet your criteria. Reviews of these seven operations are attached at Incl 1. Reviews of the 12 to be terminated are at Incl 2.

(Sgl, Hill old R. Asron

2 Incls

HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS ACofS for Intelligence





ACTION SHEET	CONTROL NUMBER						
Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP (U)	DAMI -DOT -C	SUSPERSE					
ACTION REQUIRED To respond to tasking from the USofA pertaining to ICIP.	31 January 19	/ >					
memonantum ron record. (Describe briefly the requirement, background and action taken or the action without records to other sources.)	recommended. Must be sufficien	tly detoiled to identify					
1. BACKGROUND:							
a. At the direction of the USofA quarterly reporting to him through the VCSA since February 1972. In a memore the VSofA suggests that in more than half of the ongoing mation was developed. He directed a detailed review of the program over the last two years.	randum to the VCSA g operations, no us	(<u>RED_TAP_B</u>), seful_infor-					
b. On 29 January 1975, the ACSI directed the termin operations. They will be terminated on a time phase bas nated by 31 March 1975.	b. On 29 January 1975, the ACSI directed the termination of 12 of the 19 ongoing operations. They will be terminated on a time phase basis with all 12 being terminated by 31 March 1975.						
2. DISCUSSION: At RED TAB A is a memo through the VCSA the comments of USofA and providing the requested inform program.	to the USofA replation pertaining	lying to to the					
3. RECOMMENDATION: That the memo at RED TAL A be appro	oved and signed.						
		_					
(Continue on plan (ond)							
IMPLICATIONS GINFO YES NO PRIM PROGS YES COORDINATIONS	APPROVA	ES NO					

OFFICE NAME PHONE DIV 010/1//-£٦ DISPATCHED (DTG) SHOW ADDITIONAL COORDINATION ON REVERSE SEDE OR CONTINUATION SHEET

ACTION OFFICER (Name, grade, phone and signature) MAJ EBERSOLE/56074/th ficularie (Latoris (

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ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

DOCUMENT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

17 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ABMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

I have received and reviewed the latest quarterly report of ICIP operations during 1974 as requested. In 1972 the Under Secretary authorized a trial run of this subject program. Judging from this report, the program has grown considerably and includes installations that I did not appreciate were considered sensitive. A cursory review of the data presented suggests that in more than half the cases, no useful information was obtained.

It would appear to me appropriate to review the results of this experiment to date in order to establish that the program is in fact of such a value that it should be continued in the future.

I would therefore appreciate a detailed report documenting all of the benefits, information, etc., that have been obtained through this program over the last two years. It would also be helpful to have a statement for each listed installation of the sensitive character of the mission that necessitates an ICIP operation. Finally, I would appreciate an indication of your subjective judgment as to how many of the issues that arose from these ICIP efforts would not have otherwise come to our attention.

Inclosure

Memo, 29 Nov 74,

Subj: ICIP Operations

Herman R. Staudt Under Secretary of the Army

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

29 November 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SECELLING WILLIAM

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (17)

1. (U) Reference is made to memorandum, Under Secretary of the Army. dated & February 1972, subject as above.

2. O During the third quarter of CY 1974, the ICIP at Edgewood Arsenal Maryland (CANAL LOOP) was combined with the Aberdeen Proving Ground ICIP (GONDOLA STAR). The nickname GONDOLA STAR was retained.

Washington and in the absence of a specific on-post threat, the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division requested that the Fort Levil ICIP (CENTAUR RACE) be terminated. This ICIP was inactivated on The During the same time frame, LENS HOLDER, a new ICIP development. White Sands Missile Range was approved on 7 Aug 74. With the implication of this ICIP, the total number of active ICIP operations at close of the quarter was 19. Brief status reports are attached.

After briefing you on 25 September 1974 on the states of a program, the Assistant Chief of Staif for Intelligence personally viewed and revalidated each on-going operation. Each operation will revalidated on an annual basis hereafter. Additionally, MC Agree is initiated a systematic review of all source dessions to insure the sources possess sufficient maturity and stability to enable them function efficiently and effectively in ICIP operations.

Note:

1 Incl
as (CONFIDENTIAL)

MANGER T. REPWYN, W. General, United States to Vice Chief of Staff

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VAN 138033 773 CRO 387 40 30. 140 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310 January 197: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY MEMORANDUM FOR: SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) I have received and reviewed the latest quarterly report of ICIP operations during 1974 as requested. In 1972 the Under Secretary authorized a trial run of this subject program. Judging from this report, the program has grown considerably and includes installations that I did not appreciate were considered sensitive. A cursory review of the data presented suggests that in more than half the cases, no useful information was obtained. It would appear to me appropriate to review the results of this experiment to date in order to establish that the program is in fact of such a value that it should be continued in the future. I would therefore appreciate a detailed report documenting all the benefits, information, etc., that have been obtained through this program over the last two years. It would also be helpful to have a statement for each listed installation of the sensitive character of the mission that necessitates an ICIP operation. Finally, I would the appreciate an indication of your subjective judgment as to how many of the issues that arose from these ICIP efforts would not have otherwise come to our attention. Herman R. Staudt Inclosure Under Secretary of the Army Memo, 29 Nov 74, TOTE Operations 22 Jan 75 DAVIS ocsA2 4 Feb 1975 USofA Memo for VCSA, dated 17 Jan 75. wex USofA 4 Feb 1975 Internal Counterintelligence Subject: Program (ICIP) "不是一个代码" ROUTING A-Action ACTION **Finformation** XX DIRECT REPLY WITH DCSOPS ACSFOR COET СМИ to USofA TSG: DCSPER ACSL TAG MILPERCEN CUBAR TJAG " DCSLOG ACSC-E TPMG CITE WHITE HOUSE CONTRO 4 COA CORC CNGB CAR CRO TIG CINFO CCH REMARKS

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DOSSIER NO. <u>ZF0119</u> **46** Vol 5 of 7 Vols

As of 18 Sep 85 all material included (Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently in effect.

(Signature) 18 Sep 85 (Date Signed)

Delmar Smith GS5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

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3	ICIP Careless Token - Approval	25 Feb 76
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2. Of the operations cited in Ref B above, only CARELESS TOKEN (U) appears to meet the concept of the ICIP as a security service in support of an installation's (or command's) security program. Ref C forwarded the ACSI's approval for this ICIP. We concur with the views expressed in Ref B that CARDINAL FLIGHT (U) and CAREFREE TALENT (U) are defensive CE operations which are not within the scope of the ICIP.

Request you provide a summary of the ICIP CARELESS TOKEN

(U) for the next ICIP quarterly report by 20 Apr 76 in the following format:

10. CARELESS TOKEN (ACSI Revalidation 25 Feb 76)

- A. LOCATION:
- B. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE UTILIZATION: (NUMBER OF SOURCES USED)
- C. INFORMATION OBTAINED OR REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED CIVILIANS: (NORMALLY "NONE")
- D. ' USEFUL INFORMATION OBTAINED:
- (1)
- (2) ETC

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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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(Contains a summary of information obtained in the operation which should not exceed two pages. Content varies by project, but numbers and types of incidents/occurrences reported by sources such as poor security practices, suitability of personnel, suspicious activities and other CI indications are normally included.

Names of individuals are not included unless particularly significant.)

- E. Operational Status: (Source lead development, results of briefings to supported commanders, anticipated or past changes in the operation, etc).
- 4. (U) A copy of the summary as rewritten by this office and approved by the ACSI will be returned to you for future guidance.


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- A. HRG 1691 TOPIC 0215252 Apr 76.
- B. HBG 0072 TOPIC 061755 Jan 76.
- C. ARAGB-CI (SO) OPIAN 1-75, 5 May 75, with 5th Ind, ACS1, DA,
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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

K.V. Haendle, LTC(P), DAMI-DOH/56159

J. L. HEISS III, COL, GS/DAMI-DOR/56074

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02 of 03

2(NG) Of the operations cited in Ref B above, only CARRLESS TOKEN (W) appears to meet the concept of the IGIP as a security service in support of an installation's (or command's) security program. Ref 6 forwarded the ACSI's approval for this BCIP. We secure with the views expressed in Ref B that CARDINAL FLIGHT (W) and CARRYREE TALKET (W) are defensive CE operations which are not within the scope of the ICIP.

Request you provide a summary of the ICIP CARELESS TOKEN

(E) for the next ICIP quarterly report by 20 Apr 76 in the following formet:

16 (We) CARELESS TOKER (ACSI Revalidation 25 Feb 76)

- A. LOCATION:
- B. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE UTILIZATION: (MUMBER OF SOURCES USED)
- C. INFORMATION OBTAINED OR REPORTED ON NON-AFFILIATED
 CIVILIANS: (MOSMALLY "MONE")
- D. DERFUL IMPORMATION OBTAINED:
- (1)
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(Contains a summary of information obtained in the operation which should not exceed two pages. Content varies by project, but numbers and types of incidents/occurrences reported by sources such as poor security practices, suitability of personnel, suspicious activities and other CI indications are normally included. House of individuals are not included unless particularly significant.)

- 2. Operational Status: (Source lead development, results of briefings to supported commanders, anticipated or past changes in the operation, etc).
- 4. (9) A copy of the summary as rewritten by this office and approved by the ACSI will be teturned to you for future guidance.

 MCDS-2 31 Dec 2006, AR 381-47.

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D'MI-DOH (10 Jun 75)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

E.D., Office of the 4Coff for Intelligence, Weshington, DC 20310

TO: Commender, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, "TIM: DCS for Intelligence, 1PO New York 09403

- 1. (6) The Operations Plan for NCIP CARLESS TOREN (U) in support of Detachment N, US Army Security Agency, Field Station, Augaburg, FRG is approved.
- 2. (U) 's indicated in earlier correspondence, a Memorandum to the Under Secretary of the 'rmy is prepared quarterly by the Office of the 'ssistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, D' Staff which includes a brief summary of each ongoing ICIP. Field input is re uested by the 15th of the month following the end of the quarter. A copy of the previous quarterly report is attached as an added enclosure to this correspondence.

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Internal Counterintelligence Program	(ICIP) (U)		12_	July 1976		
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement,	beckgrou	end and ac	tion taken	or recommend	ed. Must be outlic	inally details.	d to identify
the action without recourse to other sources.)						•	
1. (U) Background:							
Para 3, DAMI-DOH ltr, 8 June 25 Jun 76 (TAB C). Discussion:	76 <u>(T</u>	AB B)	and US	AINTA re	ply, MITA-	SO-SA 1t	r,
Cdr, 902d MI Group revie effective 30 June 76.	ewed I	CIP, G	ONDOLA	STAR and	d requeste	d termin	nation
o Confidential sources	s used	in GO	NDOLA	STAR term	minated.		
o (U) Supported commanders concurred in termination. Commanders Cdr, 525th MI Group review (White Sands Missile Range), and LEM determine possible termination and/or constant on 31 Aug 76. A DSCCP will be established by them. Present techniques used support to Defense Language Institute LEMTIL MONKEY revaluation: That 1tr (1)	iewed FILE M r repl ds ter lished by LE e. LE	be su CANVAS ONKEY acemen minati for S NTIL M NTIL M effec	TAX ((Defent with on CAN ierra ONKEY ONKEY	Sierra Ause Langua progra WAS TAX Army Depute best sui continue. July 76	d MI Group rmy Depot) age Instita am similar and LENS Hot and Whi ted to prost to be pro-	under I , LENS H ute) to to DSCO OLDER en te Sands vide rec oductive	OSCCP. HOLDER Efective S
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HOG-IMAG

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (B)

Commander
US Army Intelligence Agency
ATTN: MIKA-80
Port Meade, MD 20755

1. References:

- a. Letter, MIIA-SO-SA, USAINTA, dated 25 June 1976, subject as above.
- b. Letter, DAMI-DOH, dated 8 June 1976, subject as above.
- 2. Your recommendation, reference a, paragraph 4, to terminate ICIP, GONDOLA STAR (U), effective 30 June 1976, is approved.
- 3. Your recommendation, reference a, paragraph 6, to terminate ICIP, CANVAS TAX (U) and LENS HOLDER (U) effective 31 August 1976, is approved.
- . ICIP, LENTIL MORKEY (U) is revalidated effective 1 July 1976.

trich John .. Smith to

JOHN A. SMITH, JR Brigadier General, CS Acting ACofS for foliations of

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ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

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SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

(U) Recommendation: That ltr TAR A be approved by the ACSI and signed

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY COR USAINSCOM FOUPO OM AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

8 JUN 1976

DAMI-DOE

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Commander
US Army Intelligence Agency
ATTR: BIIA-SO
Fort Mende, Maryland 20755

- 1. (U) Reference, 3d Quarter, FY 1976, ICIP Operations Report, wherein you recommended termination of three ICIP operations.
- 2. CIP operations, CANIKE PLATE (U), CENSUS TIME (U), and CENTAVO KID (U) are formally terminated as recommended.
- 3. (U) Request that a full review of the remaining four active CONUS ICIP operations be conducted to determine the need for their continuance or discontinuance, and the results, with your recommendations, be forwarded to this office NLT 2g June 76.

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
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CONFIDENTIAL



ICIP REPORT



1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY.
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76: There was no significant information obtained during the period and there were no indications of any overt threat to the installation.
- d. Operational Status: CANINE PLATE was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 18 Sep 73. During the reporting period 400 manhours were expended in the ICIP. However, there were no reports submitted, no funds expended, neither TDY nor ICF. There were no confidential sources utilized, only conventional sources.
- e. Comments: The installation's mission remains the same, a supply depot for missile and artillery weapons systems with a nuclear capability. The Depot is considered a critical and sensitive installation; therefore, remains as a potential target for HOIS. However, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the ICIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CANINE PLATE be terminated but that increased overt liaison with additional security support be provided the installation commander.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD \$200.1-R

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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

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CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)


- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During the Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:
- (1) An ICIP source reported that a PTC civilian employee was transferred from the coding and decoding section because he had coded an obscene message that was to be sent to an overseas user. Additionally, the ICIP source provided information concerning possible security violations involving the employee. Because of the employee's questionable suitability characteristics and conduct he was assigned to a job in PTC requiring minimum contact with classified information. Supervisors will continue to monitor his conduct and activities.
- (2) An Army NCO assigned to PTC attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. As a result of the information gained concerning the suicide attempt a Limited Investigation was initiated. The NCO was assigned to the Logistics Branch, PTC, pending results of the investigation. The investigation revealed that the NCO has a large number of outstanding debts, has lied on loan applications, and had ordered a 1976 automobile which cost in excess of five thousand dollars. Interviews concerning the NCO revealed alleged drug usage and homosexuality. The Limited Investigation was completed and referred to PTC for adjudication. The decision was made not to revoke the NCO's security clearance since he left the service on 9 April 1976 and will not be allowed to re-enlist.
- (3) Adverse suitability information was reported on two additional NCOs assigned to PTC. Based on medical reports and rebellious attitudes one NCO was released from the Army by board action. The second NCO after a night of heavy drinking began hitting his wife when she tried to arouse him after he had "passed out." The wife filed assault charges with the Military Police but withdrew them later. The PTC commander counselled the NCO on his drinking and marital problems and assigned him duties where he has no access to classified information.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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
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- (4) During the course of an investigation of an enlisted WAC member of PTC who was away-without-leave (KAWOL Investigation), it was discovered that the CID was also investigating her for theft and trafficking in drugs. The MI representative and CID agents coordinated their mutual investigations. PTC has suspended the WAC's access to classified material pending completion of the investigation.
 - d. Operational Status:
- (1) CENSUS TIME was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 5 Feb 74.
- (2) During the period of 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976, 726 manhours were expended, no TDY nor ICF funds were used. The operation produced seven information reports. One confidential source was used during the period but was terminated during the latter part of the period.
- e. Comments: The PTC operations include an extremely high volume of multimedia ultra sensitive compartmented classified traffic processed at the highest level of the military establishment command group being served, and includes the cryptographic operation, maintenance and logistical mission and support rendered to the JCS, the NMCC, departments and executive agencies of the government allied embassies, and the United Nations Building in New York. The installation remains as a potential target for HOIS; however, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the ICIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation and implementing an overt direct support comprehensive counterintelligence program. In view of the above the continuation of an ICIP is not warranted at this time.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENSUS TIME be terminated and an increased overt liaison with additional direct security support be provided the installation commander.

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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CENTAVO KID:

(OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, (HDL), Adelphia, MD


b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None

- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 -31 Mar 76:
- (1) Information was received that a First Secretary at the USSR Embassy, Washington, DC had visited HDL on two occasions. On one occasion he attended a meeting of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, INC., a professional society for engineers which was held in the auditorium of HDL. The subject matter presented during the meeting was unclassified. At a second meeting of the society the provided to the FBI and the Commander, HDL, made a determination that the society could no longer hold meetings at HDL in order to preclude any potential security threat.
- (2) On two occasions an unidentified light aircraft flew over the test site, Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), HDL, where a series of tests on foreign equipment under the Range Emory program was in progress. In both instances the aircraft circled over the Range Emory test cite for about 5-7 minutes. The overflights are being investigated in coordination with the FBI.
- (3) An employee, HDL, made allegations of immoral activities by members of the HDL Security Office and a group at the Van Ness Avenue Facility, HDL. The employee claimed that she was being followed by members of the HDL Security Office. After investigating the employee's story, the Commander, HDL, believed that she was suffering from psychiatric problems and would have her visit a psychiatrist for a complete evaluation.
- (4) Suitability information concerning an employee of the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF) a branch of HDL located in Woodbridge, VA, involved a problem of alcohol abuse. After counseling, the employee participated in a rehabilitation program.

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Chartes and Con Control 2



(5) A courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted and revealed several security weaknesses which were corrected by the supported command. As a result of the test a number of security guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. In addition a new magnetic coded badge was approved for purchase in FY 77. As a follow-up implementation of "Lessons Learned" in the penetration test the ICIP Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and the HDL Security Officer prepared and delivered a series of lectures and classes to the HDL guard force on the penetration test. Additionally, the PLO delivered lectures on the penetration test to the faculty and students of the Counterintelligence Dept, US Army Intelligence Corps School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

d. Operational Status

- (1) During the reporting period 880 manhours were expended, 18 information reports were submitted and 41 memorandums were prepared and provided to the supported commander.
 - (2) No TDY or ICF funds were expended.

e. Comments

- (1) ICIP CENTAVO KID was approved by OACSI, DA, 18 Oct 73 and the supported commander was briefed on the implementation of the operation on 12 November 1973.
- (1) The mission of the HDL includes critical sensitive research and development activities in support of the US Army. Some of the more sensitive activities include research into the hardening of communications equipment against nuclear weapons radiation; tests of nuclear warhead and missile systems to determine their ability to withstand nuclear weapons radiation; develop fuses for use with nuclear warheads and conducts development and testing of radiation hardened systems for Minutemen and Poseidon Missiles.
- (3) The installation remains a potential target for HOIS and the hostile intelligence service have an interest in the research and development activities of the type conducted at HDL. However, the amount of significant information surfaced by the ICIP does not warrant the expenditure of manhours at this time to continue the ICIP.
- (4) The MI Group is reviewing the ICIP with a view of terminating the program and instead implementing an overt direct support counterintalligence program.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENTAVO KID be terminated and an overt direct support counterintelligence program be implemented.

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902d MI Greap Pamphlet 381-3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Headquarters, 902d Military Intelligence Group Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

902d MI Group Pamphlet

22 April 1976

Military Intelligence DIRECT SUPPORT COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (DSCCP) --(U)

- 1 (U) REFERENCES: See APPENDIX A.
- 2, ([]) PURPOSE: This pamphlet establishes policy, guidance, and standardized procedures for the conduct of all-source, multi-discipline counterintelligence support within the 902d MI Group's area of operation.
- 3. (U) GENERAL:
- The Commander, 902d MI Group, has the responsibility to notify commanders of army installations and units in the group's area of operation
- (1) Any situation or condition exists that poses a threat to the internal security of that Army element.
- (2) Any situation exists that might adversely affect the commander's capability to perform his mission. 19年11年12日
- (3) Information indicates a probable employement of military resources to counter a threat to the installation.

In order to acquire information of situations or conditions that may pose a threat to the supported commander, field elements must aggressively seek it and not wait for it to be reported through normal sequence of events. This is particularly essential for those units/installations declared to be critical sensitive.

The DSCCP is one of a series of graduated intensity counterintelligence programs designed to provide the proper coverage based on the security vulnerability of a particular installation. In relationship to other graduated counterintelligence programs listed in USAINTA Regulation 381-100, the DSCCP-would, in certain instances, serve as a means of identifying the need for programs of greater intensity such as SVAs, or SAVEs, or, in other instances, may serve as follow up support subsequent to such intensified services. It provides the broad spectrum of coverage to include a multidiscipline approach with provisions that the information gathered be reported expeditiously to the responsible commander. The program systematically focuses on providing threat information on the most critical area within the target installation in order to provide the required information to the supported commander. CLASSIFIED BY: CDR USAINTA

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE OFFICE 11652

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
c. This program is not synonymous with, nor is it identifiable with, the Internal Counteriotelligence Program, Special Operations as defined in FM 30-17A, or the Special Covert Operational Personnel Insertion (SCOPI) as defined in USAINTA Regulation 381-100.

4. (U) CONCEPT:

- a. The Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP) is an overt, dedicated counterintelligence Security support program with the objective of detecting or anticipating situations and factors from any source (HUMINT/SIGHT/FHOTINT) which are or may become detrimental to the security posture of the supported installation. It employs a Direct Support Special Agent (DSSA) in an evert continuous rele of acquiring information and providing at to the commander in a timely manner, while concurrently providing sound recommendations for the reduction and/or elimination of security hazards, vulnerabilities on threats posed by hostile factors.
- b. The DSSA obtains the required information from overt investigative activities and from a number and variety of sources and confacts within and in the vicinity of the supported installation. Confidential sources are not utilized. He is fully supported in this tack by the intervenies, echalons at Field Offices, Group, and USANATA.
- c. The DECCP is a complementary service provided to the supported communder to assist him in improving the security posture of his factal-lation. It is not intended to duplicate nor to esurp the functions and responsibilities of the G-2 or of the Security Espages.

5. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES:

- a. The Commander, 902d MI Group, is the approving authority for all DSCCP operations conducted within the group's area of operation.
 - b. The S3, 902d MI Group is responsible for the following:
- (1) Coordinating the selection of units/installations as candidates for DSCCP with the appropriate USAINTA staff elements.
- (2) Monitoring DSCCP operations on a continuing basis and periodically informing appropriate USARUMA staff elements of their progress.
- (3) Conducting an annual review of each DSCCP operation to determine if it is still necessary and if so, to asure that it remains viable.
 - c. Field Office Commanders are responsible for the following:
- (1) Initiating proposed DSCCP operations for installations located within their areas of operation.



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
- (2) Conducting DSCCP operations within their area after approval by the Group Commander and coordination with the supported commanders.
- (3) Designating the DSSA for each DSCCP operation, providing followup support; and arranging for DSSA clearance and access to compartmented information as required.
- (4) Briefing of the supported commanders on the results of DSCCP operation at regular intervals per mutual agreements.
- (5) Establish procedures to maintain continuity of the program during absences of the DSSA. When possible, an alternate DSSA will be massigned.
 - 6. CP PROCEDURES AND SCOPE:
- a. (U) The designation of installations or Army elements as candidates for the DSCCP will be a coordinated action between the Field
 Office Commander and the supported commander. In some cases, the action
 may be directed by the Group Commander or USAINTA following a request for
 special counterintelligence support from a major commander. Regardless
 of the origin of the request, DSCCP operations will always be conducted
 with the full consent and knowledge of the supported commander.
- b. The selection of installations to be considered for the DSCCP must be discriminatory and based on a genuine need for this manpower intensive service in order to avoid over-commitment of easets. The target installation must be one that is on the ACSI Sensitive Installation and Unit List (SIUL) and one that is a potential or actual target of hostile intelligence services. It is recognized that some field offices and resident offices have numerous sensitive installations in their area, many of which may be categorized as critical.

 Therefore, it is essential that each FO/RO maintain a listing of these installations in order of priority. In determining the order of priority, factors such as mission sensitivity, and impact of compromise on the security of the United States, etc., will all have to be analyzed and a value judgement must be made based upon actual knowledge of the local conditions, as to which installation has a greater need for special support. The installations heading the list will get first consideration.
- by letter for approval. The letter will indicate the installation commander's concurrence in the program. The concept will contain a listing of missions, sensitivities, and those internal and external factors which may pose a threat to the installation. Vulnerabilities to human sources,

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communications intercept, overhead and ground photography, and o her appropriate technical/scientific factors will be included if known. This information will be extracted from the target analysis (Para 7a) or from the SVA if one has been completed. The concept rust address actions to be taken to detect and counter these threats.


- d. (U) Occasional expenditures of ICF in support of this progres is authorized and will be processed in compliance with the provisions of AR 381-141 and USAINTA Regulation 381-1. Recurring expenditures will be only-ported by a formal request for authority if such expenditures are authority pated.
- e. (U) The conduct of investigations of and storage of information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Dapa trent of Defense are prohibited unless authorized ender the provisions of AR 380-13.

7(U) GUIDELINES:

The actions listed below are considered to be minimum essential for the implementation of this program and are not to be considered as ull-encompassing. They should be modified as appropriate to meet situations and modes popular to the supported installation. Common sense and experience will likely dictate additional or supplementary means to be employed in order to successfully attain the objective.

- a. (U) Conduct a target analysis of the unit/installation to identify, in order of priority, the most critical and velnerable areas and the multi-discipline threats to which they are exposed. Reference will be made to the following: USANTA Security Support Bellicins, "This AT Eactuals, completed SVA/SAVE Reports, CI Survey and Inspection Reports, TW/WD Crims Statistics and Incident Reports, and Communications Security Reports, when available and applicable. The original copy of the analysis will be maintained at the FO/RO level. Appropriate data will be extracted and included in the initial Quarterly Progress Report. The analysis should be reviewed and updated periodically in subsequent Quarterly Progress Reports.
- b. (U) Assign a mature, experienced MI Special Agent as a Direct Support Special Agent (DSSA) to provide all-source direct support to the supported commander or his designated representative. The DSSA must become intimately knowledgeable of the supported command's mission, functions, security status and vulnerabilities. As the program will be overt in nature, the DSSA will be known as the primary USAINTA point of contact to all within the supported units/installations. The DSSA will require a TOP SECRET clearance and an SI/SAO special access.

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- of sources of information to provide the best possible coverage to the unit/installation and personnel of the element to detect security vulnerabilities, and make sound recommendations for their reduction and/or elimination. The DSSA should work closely with the security manager to coordinate appropriate matters and to avoid duplication of effort. However, care should be taken not to duplicate or usurp functions and responsibilities rightfully assigned to the security manager.
- (I) Human sources of information will include Conventional Sources (Incidental, Casual, and Official) and Dialson Contacts as described in Chapter 6, FH 30-17. Confidential Human Sources will not be utilized. Anonymity may be provided through the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 when the source so requests. The association between the DSSA and Conventional Sources or Liaison Contacts will not normally be classified.
- Materiel Sources to include, but not be limited to, SATRAN Messages, Department of the Army intelligence publications and/or bulletins; USAINTA Security Support Bulletins and "THREAT" Manuals; SAVE/SVA reports; Military Police Reports, and Serious Incident Reports. Special attention should be paid to message traffic concerning alerts, advisories or warnings concerning events or situations affecting the supported command.
- d. (1016) A contact card file will be maintained at the supporting office to identify conventional sources and liaison contacts. This file will be integrated into the existing contact card file already established for use in the routine mission of the FO/RO. It must be readily available for DSSA personnel at all times. Individual cards will be annotated when the contact is in support of a specific DSCCP operation. IACs will be conducted on casual sources with the results reflected in the contact card file.
- e. (1900) Consideration should be given to conducting a systematic review of the dossiers of personnel occupying key and sensitive positions to insure that all such personnel have been properly cleared and to determine if unresolved security matters exist. This issue will be discussed with the supported commander if such a review is deemed necessary, the DSSA should recommend that the commander undertake the action. If the commander requests that the review be conducted by the DSSA, then the matter will be referred to group headquarters where resolution will be made in conjunction with the appropriate USAINTA staff elements. The DSSA may assist the supported command in the review of dossiers but may not take any investigative action to resolve issues. He will advise the supported command to submit requests to USAINTA whenever investigative action is indicated.


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f. (6) Reporting of Information:

- (1) (U) To the local commander: Information of counterintelligents interest affecting the security posture of the unit/installation will be reported to the supported commander or his designated representative in a timely and complete manner. The information may be reported outly, by Agent Report format, or by Summary of Information (SOI) format, as appropriate. While most items of information will be passed on an oral basis only, there may be certain instances when the commander will desire written reports from the DSSA to be later attached as backup information to his Request for Investigation. In these instances, Arm containing the adverse allegation may be passed when the full consent of the sources of the information has been obtained. However, when a source of information desires confidentiality, to protect the source, the DSSA can then pass in the information only on an oral basis or by SOI format. Regardless of the manner in which the information was passed to the supported command, a report of the information provided to the supported command will be summarized in the Quarterly Progress Report to this headquarters with an indication of the actions taken by the supported command (see Para 7h below).
- (2) (0) Other: Information of counterintelligence interest to the intelligence community or other agencies will be reported in accordance with established procedures utilizing normal reporting vehicles such as oral reports, Agent Reports, Spot Reports or Summaries of Information as appropriate. Information reports will be classified according to their content. Such reports will indicate when and to them the information was passed and what action the command has taken by plans to take. Subject blocks, special warning notices and Privacy Act cavouts, etc., will be those utilized in established investigative activity procedures. (AR 381-20 and USAINTA Reg 381-100).
- (3) (U) When fragmentary information of counterintelligence interest is initially surfaced, the DSSA will attempt to determine whether or not the information is credible prior to reporting it to the supported Commander. Preliminary checks may be made only to the extent authorized in para 3-6, USAINTA Reg 380-100. Should this prove to be insufficient to establish the credibility of the information, the DSSA will then refer the matter to group headquarters for coordination with USAINTA. Credible information concerning a member of the supported command should be used to support a formal Request for Investigation to USAINTA.
- (4) The supported commander or his designated representative will be orally briefed on all items of threat information concerning his command, or be provided written reports as appropriate. Examples of the types of threat information include satellite overflights, Soviet bloc

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




country commercial overflights, communications intercept capabilities/vulnerabilities from air, ground or water, personnel security vulnerabilities and others as listed below. Depending upon the source of the information and its previous distribution within the intelligence downwinty, the information may be passed laterally or to higher echelons in accordance with established reporting requirements. All information gleaned from the operation will be briefly summarized in the Quarterly Progress Report.

- g. (U) A list of EEI will be developed by the DSSA in order to focus specialized coverage on the specific requirements of the local situation and the supported commander. Examples of EEI are attuched at APPENDIX B. It should be noted that the EEI contain items of specific interest to the supported commander and other items that pertain to lead ematerial for use by the US Army intelligence community. A copy of the developed EEI list will be attached to the initial Quarterly Progress Report.
- h. (U) A Quarterly Status Report in the format contained at APPENDIX C will be submitted to Group Headquarters no later than 10 working days following each calendar quarter. The first report will be due after the completion of the first full quarter of operation after initiation. The report should reflect the developments and progress of the operation, problems encountered, information obtained during the reporting period, future actions contemplated and lessons learned or recommendations as appropriate.
- (U) Reducing Vulnerabilities: Once a security weakness of hazard has been identified, the DSSA than has the responsibility to make sound recommendations for corrective actions to be taken by the supported commander to reduce or eliminate them. In making these recommendations, the DSSA must use good judgement based upon his background and experience, cost verses absolute security, knowledge of similar instances, common sense, and an intimate knowledge of those technical and/or specialized security services and/or investigations available to the supported commander from other USAINTA clements. Each corrective action must be viable, made on its own merit, be practical and be within the capability of the supported command. USAINTA Security Support Bullating contain excellent examples of "quick-fix" solutions. In those rare instances when corrective actions cannot be accomplished due to cost restrictions or limited resources available to the command, the commander must be made aware of, and accept the possible security risk(s) involved. LW)
- 9. (f) It is visualized that situations, incidents or conditions may be uncovered which could have serious deleterious effect on the security

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posture of the installation and could not be recoived through the tochniques of the DSCCP. In these cases, the matter should be empeditionally referred to Group Headquarters where it will be brought to USAINTH's attention for resolution, considering JCIPs, SCOPIs, Special Operations, or other more sophisticated methods.

- 10. (U) The application of the DSCCP to a supported installation is a spatial effort and will probably require the nervices of the DSSA on a near full time basis with additional manhours of support furnished by PO and Croup Readquarters. Consequently, FO Commanders and RO SATCE should proposed with caution in offering this service to commanders to prevent over-extending their resources. Nevertheless, the DSSA approach of the DSCCP is sound and could well be applied to other installations in the area of operations but to a much lesser degree than in the DSCCP. This should be done as a routine matter and no formal approval is required. Thus, one MI Special Agent could become the 135A to several installations of lower priority.
- II. (B) This pasphlot provides policy and guidance for 902d NI Group personnel in the conduct of all-source, multi-disciplics counterintal-lighner support within the area of responsibility of the 902d NI Group. It complements existing US Army Regulations, USAISTA Engalations and ULLISTA policy and guidance. Nothing in this pamphlot shall be constrained to contravene or to be in conflict with existing US Army a USAISTA policy arise, the provisions of existing US Army and/or USAISTA policy will apply. Any quantions pertaining US Army and/or USAISTA policy will apply. Any quantions pertaining to possible conflict of the provisions of this purphish with existing policy will be addressed to this headquarters, August MITA-GPS-AC, for further stoffing with appropriate USAISTA stoff elements. Comments and recommerdations are encouraged and should be salurited on DA Form 2023 (Recommended Changes to Publications) to this brad parters for consideration and staffing.

3 Incl

Appandix A - References

Appendix B - Ebl

Approach C - Quarterly Report

HASSEL L. PARKER

Colonel, MI Commanding

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APPENDIX A TO 902D MI GROUP PAMPHLET 381-3

REFERENCES

1. Army Regulations:

- a. AR 18-7, Army Information and Data Systems, Data Processing Installation Management, Procedures, and Standards.
 - b. AR 190-13, the Army Physical Security Program
 - c. AR 340-21, Office Management, The Army Privacy Program.
- d. AR 380-5, Security, Department of the Army Supplement to DOD 5200.1-R (DODISPR).
- e. (6) AR 380-10. Department of the Arag Policy for Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments (8).
- f. Ak 380-13, Security, Acquisition and Storage of Infrarection Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations.
 - g. AR 380-150, Access to and Dissemination of Rostricted Data.
 - h. (S) AR 381-3, Signal's Intelligence (SIGINT) (U).
 - i. ZR 381-11, Military Intelligence, Threat Analysis.
- j. AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Aumy and Deliberate Security Violations (Short Title: SAEDA).
 - R. (A) AH 381-12-1, Processing of SAEDA Incidents (U).
- 1. (c) AR 381-14, Counterintelligence Technical Surveillance Countermadaures (U).
- m. (0) AR 381-15, Hilitary Intelligence, Domestic Emploitation Program (0)
- n. AR 381-20, Military Intelligence, US Army Counterintelligence (C1) Activities.
- o. (a) AR 381-141, Military Intelligence, Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control and use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) (U)

- P. AR 530-1, Operational Security (U).
- q. (9) AR 530-2, Communications Security (U).
- r. (C) AR 530-3, Electronics Security (U).
- s. (4) AR 530-4, Control of Compromising Emanations (U).
- t. AR 604-5, Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and Material.
 - u. AR 604-10, Military Personnel Security Progress.

2. DOD Publications:

- a. DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation.
- b. (SI) DOD 5200.1F (M-2) Special Security Manual
- c. DOD 5200.28-M, ADP Security Manual
- d. DOD 5220-22-M, Industrial Security Manual for Safegmerding Classified Information.
- e. DIAM 50-3, Physical Security Standard: for Sensitive Compartmented Information Pacilities.

3. Field Manuals:

- a. FE 19-30, Physical Security.
- b. FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations.
- 4. ACSI, DA Publications.
 - a. OACSI Sensitive Installation and Unit List (SIUL).
 - b. AARGRAMS (as applicable).


5. USAINTA Publications.

- a. USAINTA Reg 10-2, Organization and Functions Manual.
- b. (9) USAINTA Reg 381-1, ICF (U)
- c. USAIRTA Reg 381-100, Counterintelligence Activities and Procedures.
- d. (%) USAINTA Security Support Bulletins (U).

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- e. (S) USAINTA Security Support Program Manual "THAHAT" (U)
- f. (C) USAINTA Security Support Program Manual "Operations" (U)
- g. USAINTA Security Support Program Computer Security Manual.
- h. USAINTA Daily Operational Reports (as applicable).

- i. USAINTA Supplement to AR 380-5.
- 6. 902d MI Group Publications:
- a. (6) 902d EI Group Pamphlet 380-2, Security, SATEAN Reports (U).
 - b. 902d MI Group Daily Operational Reports (as applicable).




APPENDIX E TO 902D MI GROUP PAMPHLET 381-3

ESSINTIAL DIEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI)

- GENERAL: In devising EET applicable to the supported installation, each one of the multi-discipline threats must be examined in conjunction with the mission and situation of the particular target. The actual or potential vulnerabilities thereby conceived become RMI affecting the supported installation. Since each installation has its own specific situation, it is imperative that the DSSA work very closely with a representative of the supported installation in order to arrive at an EEI listing tailored to the specific needs of the command. The references listed at APPENDIX A provide background information and quidance in devising DEI. Many of the areas covered by these references, which heretofore have been of little concern to the Special Agent, are now essential elements of knowledge to the DSSA if he is to successfully accomplish his mission under the DSCCP concept. This is particularly necessary in the areas of SIGINT, PHOTINT, OPSEC and Computer Security. Listed below are sample ED) for each category. There ER1 are hopic and are only a partial listing provided as an aid in developing a list peculiar to the supported command. Some of the live a may not be germane to every DSSA but are included as nuclei for possible developeant of new or related ideas. The final REI list propered by the DSSA should include the source or sources that can provide the required information.
- 2. RUMINT: The following elements are those normally attributed to collection or exploitation by human intelligence sources. The information will usually be obtained by various HUMINT sources, personal observation by the DSSA and liaison contacts:
- a. HOIS subscriptions or regular acquisition of local and post newspapers and periodicals. Sources: LNG contacts and USAINTA.
- b. Deliberate compromise of classified information or unsuthorized release of military information to representatives of foreign governments (ARs 380-5, 380-10, 381-12 and 381-12-1)
- c. Public information releases and local newspaper articles revealing unclassified but useful (to HOIS) information regarding the command.
- d. Theft, suspected theft, or unauthorized reproduction of classified documents and or material.
- e. Reported or suspected blackmail or coercion of individuals employed within the supported command.

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
- f. Actual or attempted physical breaches of restricted area perimeter security, external or internal.
- g. Early detection of persons whose activities and/or character weaknesses may render them vulnerable to hostile intelligence exploitation. Suitability factors may include:
 - (1) Excessive indebtedness or recurring financial difficulties.
 - (2) Unexplained affluence.

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- (3) Conduct rendering the individual vulnerable to pressure, such that homosexual, criminal or immoral acts.
 - (4) Excessive use of alcoholic beverages or improper use of drugs or narcotics.
 - (5) Mental or emotional instability or history thereof.
 - (6) Those who attempt to commit suicide.
 - (7) Drastic changes in behavior to indicate possible unexplained pressures being brought to bear.
 - h. Personnel who regularly and voluntarily work during non-duty hours when unobserved access to classified data is possible.
 - i. Sudden unexplained or inadequately explained absences from work.
 - j. Membership in, or association with members of organizations constituting a local threat against the US Army as defined in AR 380-13.
 - k. Unsolicited correspondence from individuals, organizations or addressees known to be a threat to the US Army.
 - 1. Allegations or denunciations of espionage or sabotage on the part of sensitive installation personnel.
 - 3. PHOTINT: This pertains to intelligence obtained by means of photography, mainly through HOIS satellites or HOIS commercial aircraft. Also included must be threats posed by hand-held cameras operated from low-flying private aircraft and ground-level photography conducted from areas outside the perimeter of the installation. Photography from seaborne platforms should be considered at installations located near international waters. Sources of information for this type of data are documentary sources such as SATRAN messages, schedules of tests, operations and troop movements, as well as results of liaison contacts and personal observations. Some sample EEI are as follows:

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




- a. Following activities during periods of scheduled overflights by HOIS satellites and commercial aircraft:
 - (1) Large and significant training exercises.
 - (2) Testing of equipment and/or techniques in the open.
 - (3) Uncamouflaged new or sensitive equipment.
 - (4) Other significant movements and activities.
- (5) Concentration of transportation equipment, i.e., transports, etc.
 - b. Build up of major item stockpiles in the open.
 - c. Gradual build up of facilities at a test site.
- d. Repeated violation of air restricted zones by commercial/private planes.
- e. Appearance of private aircraft during classified, or significant tests/demonstrations.
- f. Placing, operating or testing of new, significant or classified equipment in areas exposed to the public.
- g. Sudden appearance of camera-carrying "tourists" in the vicinity, coinciding with the scheduling of new, unusual and/or classified activity.
- h. Unobstructed windows and apertures in areas where classified matters are handled, permitting observation and photography from uncontrolled areas.
- i. Foreign vessels, particularly from East Bloc Countries, appearing off-coast of installations near international waters.
- 4. SIGINT: Signal intelligence is derived from the intercept and analysis of communications, COMINT, and from communications electromagnetic radiations, ELINT. HOIS SIGINT collection against US facilities is accomplished from air-borne, sea-borne, and land-based platforms. HOIS capabilities in this field are described in the USAINTA Threat Manual and additional information as to specific threat to the supported installation may be found in reports of SVAs and SAVEs and/or requested from USAINTA. The field of SIGINT is a very complex and specialized one. Adequate protection of a command/installation from HOIS SIGINT collection requires.

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
the application of Signal Security (SIGSEC) which includes Coursenfeations Security (COMSEC), and Electronic Security (ELSEC). COMSEC measures with applied to telecommunications systems and has four components; crypto security, physical security, transmission security and esmission security. PLSEC pestains to protective measures applied to electrosagnetic radiation. of non-communications equipment and systems to prevent the interception, analysis or exploitation of those radiations by foreign intelligence. The DSSS must become sufficiently familiar with the above subjects in order to recognize vulnerabilities, and know when to recommend a request for tech. 'cal assistance. References lh, l, p, q, r, s, and 5d and e in APPENDIX & will provide additional information. Furthermore, the DSSA must work closely with the staff element having responsiblity for SIGSEC of the supported installation. The EEI selected will be the type that can be fulfilled by human sources, preferably located in communication/electronics work areas. Some EEI common to SIGINT are located in para lc, Appendix to AR 530-1. Other sample EEI follow:

- a. Conducting tests on new or sensitive radars and other non-communication emmitters within range of land based, air-borns or sea-borns BOIS ELINT platforms.
- b. Installing and operating electrically operated, informationprocessing equipment which handles classified information without the application of compromising emanations control measures.
 - c. Poor telephone security to include:
- (1) Discussion of classified matters over Autovon and communical telephone systems.
- (2) Discussions of upcoming events which can provide tipoffs to classified activities.
 - (3) Use of double talk in reference to classified measurges.

(4) Reading/quoting verbatim portions of classified matters.

5. OTHER EET: The following items are of interest to the US Army intelligence community and will be forwarded to this headquarters by Agent Report format for appropriate action. A statement in Agents Model will indicate if and how the information has been reported through other appropriate channels. As the information will be passed to USALNEW for possible exploitation bt the Special Operations Detachment on the Director of Operations as appropriate, the Agent Reports will be classified CONFIDENTIAL-NO FOREIGN DISSIM. Normally this information is not passed to the local commander other than to insure that other proper reporting

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procedures are being followed by the command.

- a. Identification and extent of foreign contacts of military and DOD civilian personnel, with emphasis on Soviet bloc countries.
- b. Intended foreign travel of military or DOD civilian personnel to Soviet bloc countries or attendance at social or official functions at which Soviet bloc countries are present.
- c. Foreign business or professional connections and the critent thereof of military and DOD civilian personnel and their families, with emphasis on Soviet bloc countries.
- d. Solicitation by foreign national or organizations of personal or official information through official or unofficial channels.
- e. Invitations by non-US Government organizations or ind/viduals to members of the supported command to Participate in conferences or symposia or to submit papers for publications in profession: 'journals on activities related to their government employment.

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APPINIDIX C TO 902D MI GROUP PARPHLET 381-3

DSCCP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT

- 1. (U) IDENTIFY: (Name of 902d MI Group Field Element providing support).
- 2. (U) SUPPORTED COMMAND: (The activity(ies) receiving the support and the major command(s) involved.)
- 3. () TARGET ANALYSIS: (In the initial report summarize the results of target analyses conducted for all activities, installations, or separate elements designated and included in the program, by order of priority of support. Subordinate elements large enough to be designated sub-targets will be listed in subparagraphs. In subsequent reports, indicate only changes as they occur.)

4. () QUARTURLY BRIEFING OF SUPPORTED COMMAND

- a. Circumstances: In brief narrative form, city date(s), identities of all persons present, and subjects discussed and results of the briefing(s).
- b. Recapitulation of Operational Progress During the Period: In as many subparagraphs as may be required, cite significant development as pertain to development of the program, improvements in target cover; posed any operational readjustments made during the period. In citing specific items of interent, identify each by making reference to the appropriate reports made during the reporting period which contained details of the topic discussed with the commanders, if applicable.
- c. Significant Counterintelligence Information Developed: In as many subparagraphs as may be required, cite identities of personalities, incidents, or groups discussed with reference to the report previously submitted.

5. () INFORMATION SUBMITTED:

a. To the local commander and actions implemented on taken as a result:

Subject Type Information Developed Action Taken Date of Action

b. To the intelligence community;

Subject Type Information Developed To whom reported

6. () COMMENTS, REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

In this paragraph, indicate any general remarks or indications of special

interest shown by the supported command that are not covered in alove paragraphs. These remarks should reflect the commander's automoment of the viability of the program, whether it is meeting the objectives and achievements as he sees them, and any problems and/or recommendations. Also indicated the extent with which the commander or his representative has cooperated with the Fo/RO and/or this group and any portional remarks which could serve to improve the DSCCP support to the command. Where problem areas have been encountered, findings and recommended solutions will be provided. Lessons learned should be included to assist in the planning and implementation of other operations. A statement will be extered as to whether any information concerning non-affiliated DOD divilians or organizations was reported (AR 380-13). If affirmative, reference specific report or attach copy. Utilize subparagraphs to emphain or amplify information or data reported.

NOTE: Classify each paragraph according to its content. Because of the distribution of this report, care must be taken to insore that the contents of the report do not reveal SI/SAO access enterial. An enempte of this would be to include the Statement "three items of PHOPTLE information, reference messages , , and , were received and passed to the supported command. Appropriate actions were taken", without revealing the SI/SAO information contained within the reference transages.





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY **HEADQUARTERS** FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON. U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BY COR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

MIIA-SO-SA

JUN25 1976

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH/Miss Brannan) WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References:

a. Letter, MIIA-SO-SA, USAINTA, subject: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U), 11 May 76.

b. Letter, DAMI-DOH, subject as above, 8 Jun 76.

Recommendations concerning the current four active ICIP operations are submitted in compliance with paragraph 3, reference lb.

- The 902d MI Group requested that its sole remaining ICIP at Aberdeen Proving Ground, GONDOLA STAR (U) be terminated effective 30 June 1976. Confidential sources utilized in the ICIP have been terminated. Supported commanders at Edgewood Arsenal and Aberdeen Proving Ground were briefed on the termination of the ICIP and the concept of direct, overt, all-source counterintelligence support which the 902d will provide under the Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP).
- 4. (U) Recommend that GONDOIA STAR be terminated effective 30 June 1976.
- The 525th MI Group reviewed each of its three active ICIPS. CANVÁS TAX (Sierra Army Depot), LENS HOLDER (White Sands Missile Range), and LENTIL MONKEY (Defense Language Institute) for consideration of possible replacement with a program similar to the DSCCP of the 902d MI Group. As a result of this review the CDR, 525th MI Group believes that a program similar to the DSCCP can be established which would provide requisite support to Sierra Army Depot, CA and White Sands Missile Range, NM, which will permit termination of ICIPS at



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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

MIIA-SO-SA

JUN25 1976

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH/Miss Brannan) WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References:

a. Letter, MIIA-SO-SA, USAINTA, subject: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U), 11 May 76.

b. Letter, DAMI-DOH, subject as above, 8 Jun 76.

2. Recommendations concerning the current four active ICIF operations are submitted in compliance with paragraph 3, reference 1b.

The 902d MI Group requested that its sole remaining ICIF at Aberdeen Proving Ground, GONDOLA STAR (U) be terminated effective 30 June 1976. Confidential sources utilized in the ICIP have been terminated. Supported commanders at Edgewood Arsenal and Aberdeen Proving Ground were briefed on the termination of the ICIP and the concept of direct, overt, all-source counterintelligence support which the 902d will provide under the Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP).

4. (U) Recommend that GONDOIA STAR be terminated effective 30 Jun_{Φ} 1976.

5. The 525th MI Group reviewed each of its three active ICIPS, CANVAS TAX (Sierra Army Depot), LENS HOLDER (White Sands Missile Range), and LENTIL MONKEY (Defense Language Institute) for consideration of possible replacement with a program similar to the DSCCP of the 902d MI Group. As a result of this review the CDR, 525th MI Group believes that a program similar to the DSCCP can be established which would provide requisite support to Sierra Army Depot, CA and White Sands Missile Range, NM, which will permit termination of ICIPS at

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MIIA-SO-SA

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

those locations. Because of the transitory nature of the military community and the makeup of the civilian community at DLI, the present techniques used in ICIP LENTIL MONKEY are believed best suited to provide the necessary support to the commander. LENTIL MONKEY has been very productive under existing operational concepts and should continue to provide significant developments in the future.

The 525th MI Group recommends that, based on the above, CANVAS TAX and LENS HOLDER be terminated on 31 Aug 76 at which time a substitute support program will become effective. The 525th MI Group further recommends that, based on the above and the yearly analysis submitted with reference la, IENTIL MONKEY be revalidated and permitted to remain in effect.

7. (U) USAINTA concurs in the recommendations of the 525th Mi Group.

Special Assistant (OPS)

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Ride?"	DATE	SIGNATURE
1. The Commander, 902d MI Group made the that the Project Control Officer (the in handles the sources) for Canter Ride be MQ 902d MI Group at Fort Meade, Maryland at Redstone Arsenal. 2. The Operations Plan for Canter Ride specified funding for the Project Control to be located at Fort Meade, Maryland, was approved at this level. 3. The Commander's decision undoubtedly sensitivity of certain activities of emp MICOM.	dividu locate , and specif l Offi The OF	al who ed at not Cically Cor TAN
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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE CHEEK 11852





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF: DAMI-DOH

1 6 JUN 1976

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) --

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

During the 3d Quarter, January-February-March 1976, two of the on-going ICIP operations, CANTER RIDE at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and CANARY EFFORT at Fort Ritchie, Maryland, were terminated effective 31 March 1976. Although these operations were terminated, the United States Intelligence Agency will continue to provide overt counterintelligence support to the sensitive elements at Redstone Arsenal and Fort Ritchie.

The total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the 3d Quarter was seven. Summaries for each of these operations, plus the two which were terminated, are attached as Inclosure 1.

3. The Under Secretary of the Army commented on our 1 April 1976, 2d Quarter ICIP Information Memorandum that an analysis of each ICIP operation for the past year, to include statistics, be provided with this quarterly review. In compliance with this requirement, an analysis of each ICIP operation has been made for the past year and is attached as Inclosure 2. Also, attached as Inclosure 3, are the statistics for the ICIP operations referred to in Inclosure 2. These statistics provide a recapitulation of pertinent production, costs and manhours for these operations.

4. After reviewing the 2d Quarter ICIP Report, I have directed that three more operations be terminated: CANINE PLATE (U) at Seneca Army Depot, Romulus, New York; CENSUS TIME (U) at Pentagon Telecommunications

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BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
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SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Center; and CENTAVO KID (U) at the Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi, Maryland. Overt counterintelligence support will continue to be provided these installations by elements of the appropriate Military Intelligence units. Before the end of June 76, the four remaining cases will be reviewed again for retention.

Our goal is to assist the Army commander in improving the operations security (OPSEC) posture of his installation through the use of the complete spectrum of counterintelligence services. I am expanding the use of overt counterintelligence services and want to use the ICIP very selectively to ferret out espionage activities of hostile intelligence services.

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3 Incl as (C) HAROLD R. A470N Major General, GS ACofs for Intelligence

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CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) On 15 January 1976, the Project Liaison Officer (PLO), as a result of a liaison visit with the Baltimore Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained data on the presence of Sino-Soviet Bloc personnel travelling within the environs of the target areas and information on those Sino-Soviet Bloc personnel residing temporarily in the environs of the target area.
- (2) On 28 January 1976 a member of the 572d Military Police Co, Ft Ritchie, was approached by an unidentified individual at Hagerstown Junior College, Hagerstown, MD, who claimed to be employed at Site R. The individual described Site R in general terms, but made no attempt to elicit information from the soldier. Investigative efforts failed to identify the individual. All available information was provided the Hagerstown Resident Office of the FBI. A USAINTA investigation of the incident is continuing.
- (3) On 28 January 1976, an unidentified individual approached a soldier assigned to the US Army Communications Command East Coast Telecommunications Center (USACCECTC) and requested a tour of that facility. The individual appeared interested in the antenna configuration of Satellite Communications/Direct Communication Links (SATCOM/DSL). The request for the tour was denied. All available information was provided the Hagerstown Resident Office of the FBI. USAINTA investigation of the incident is continuing.
- (4) During the reporting period information was developed on a Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) employee who is a bartender employed at the Ft Ritchie NCO Club. The bartender allegedly told the patrons that she was in the employ of both "Military Intelligence" and the 'CIA." An investigation is being conducted by USAINTA.
- (5) On 18 March 1976, a US Army NCO assigned sensitive duties in the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) volunteered information concerning his entering into correspondence with an agency of the East German Government. The NCO, who has been researching his family history for the last six years, was attempting to obtain a record of the military service of his great-great grandfather in the period circa 1810. In the course of an inquiry to the Federal Republic of

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


Germany (FRG) Ambassador in Washington and the FRG Government, he was advised to contact the German Historical Central Archives in East Germany. The NCO volunteered the information to make it a matter of official record. He was given a SAEDA briefing under the provisions of AR 381-12 with special emphasis on reporting procedures. The NCO will inform Army Intelligence should he be contacted by any East Germany Agency and will provide copies of any correspondence he receives. At present the exploitation opportunities are unknown, pending any East German Intelligence Service overture. The Chief, ANMCC was briefed on the incident.

e. Operational Status:

- (1) In February 1976, the 902d MI Group selected Operation CANARY EFFORT for termination. Supported commanders were briefed on the termination in conjunction with the scheduled quarterly briefings. All confidential sources used in this ICIP have been terminated. The effective termination date for CANARY EFFORT is 31 March 1976.
- (2) During the quarter, the PLO presented 21 SAEDA/Threat/Security Awareness briefings to personnel assigned to supported activities at Fort Detrick and Fort Ritchie.
- (3) The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to LTC Dale S. Cockle, CDR, USACC ECTC, on 30 March 1976.
- (4) The PLO, on 1 April 1976, presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL John S. Eberle, CDR, US Army Communications Command (USACC) Site R.
- (5) On 5 April 1976, the PLO gave the Quarterly Progress Briefing to the supported command, HQ, 7th Signal Command and Fort Ritchie, with the following officials present: COL Harold G. deMoya, CDR, Ft Ritchie; COL John J. Plosay, Jr., Deputy CDR, Ft Ritchie and Mr. Joseph J. Carroll, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, 7th Signal Command and Ft Ritchie.

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CANINE PLATE (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
 - e. Operational Status:

Five conventional sources are contacted on a recurring basis by the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) in this operation; one of these plans retirement in July 1976. One newly contacted official source is in a position to assist in spotting potential new sources. No threat information was surfaced during this quarter. On 5 March 1976 the PLO provided the Quarterly Briefing to LTC Earl Hain, Acting Depot Commander. LTC Hain was designated by COL Alden Cox, CDR, SAD, to receive the briefing during the absence of COL Cox.

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CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
 - e. Operational Status:

On 18 February 1976, COL Hassel Parker, CDR, 902d MI Group, with the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) in attendance, provided a special briefing on this operation to MG Turnmeyer, CDR, USAMICOM. COL Lange, USAMICOM Chief of Staff, was also present during the briefing. As a result of the briefing, it was agreed by the participants that since the operation had accomplished its objective it should be terminated and the insert source should be extracted to reduce the risk of compromise. The CDR, USAMICOM expressed his deep appreciation for the information provided by the operation and concurred with the suggested termination. The source used in this operation has been debriefed and reassingned. The effective termination date for CANTER RIDE is 31 March 1976.

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4. (2) CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), Herlong, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) The two confidential sources are providing coverage of the Priority I activities of SIAD which are Exclusion Areas I and II. Two conventional sources and one casual source cover the Priority II activities which are the staff and security organizations of the Depot. One individual assigned to the Special Weapons Section, Exclusion Area II is under assessment as a potential source.
- (2) The Quarterly Progress Report for the 2d Quarter, FY 76, which had been postponed at the request of the CDR, SIAD, was presented by the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) on 13 Feb 76 to the following SIAD officials: COL Robert Hawlk, CDR, SIAD; LTC Robert Render, Deputy CDR; MAJ Robert Folster, Security Officer; CPT Wayne Heringer, Intelligence Officer and Mr. Anthony Tornabene, Assistant Intelligence Officer. The following personnel from the 525th MI Group also attended the briefing: COL Donald Bradbury, CDR; LTC Arthur McQueen, Operations Officer, and MAJ Trevor Bissey, CDR, San Francisco Field Office.
- (3) ICIP Sources have been tasked to report any significant counter-intelligence EEI or indicators of hostile intelligence activity impacting on Operation Rocking Force (U), a special weapons project presently in progress at SIAD.
- '(4) The Quarterly Progress Briefing for the 3d Quarter, FY 76, will be presented by the PLO on or about 30 April 1976 to the SIAD officials listed in paragraph 4e(2), above.

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- 5. (C) CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation 4 Feb 75)
- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) The Limited Investigation reported in the last quarter on the PTC NCO who had attempted suicide and allegedly had involved himself in financial troubles, drugs, and homosexuality was completed and referred to PTC for adjudication. The decision was made not to revoke the NCO's security clearance since he left the service on 9 April 1976 and will not be allowed to re-enlist.
- (2) During the course of an investigation of an enlisted WAC member of PTC who had a SECRET security clearance and who was Absent-Without-Leave, was discovered that Criminal Investigation Command (CID), Ft Meyer was also investigating her for theft and trafficking in drugs. The Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and CID agents coordinated their mutual investigations. Drug charges are pending the results of laboratory tests of substances purchased from the WAC by CID informants. PTC has suspended the WAC's access to classified material pending completion of the investigation.
- (3) The PLO arranged with appropriate 902d MI Group elements to present formal SAEDA briefings to all PTC personnel, including the PTC elements in the Hoffman and Forrestal Buildings. This project is scheduled for completion in the next quarter.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) The Hoffman Telecommunications Center has been brought under coverage of this ICIP, as requested by COL Donald E. Clark, PTC Commander, in the previous quarter.
- (2) On 24 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Clark, CDR, PTC. CW2 Leonard Gross, Alternate PLO, was also present at the briefing.

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- 6. (2) CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation 4 Feb 75)
 - a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Adelphi, MD
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) As a follow-up implementation of "Lessons Learned" in the courtesy penetration test conducted at HDL's Adelphi Facility in the previous quarter, the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and the HDL Security Officer prepared and delivered a series of lectures and classes to the HDL Guard Force on the penetration test. The Guard Force is operating under new instructions designed to thwart attempted penetrations. A new HDL Badge and Pass System, utilizing a magnetic coded badge and a computer control device, will be started in mid-1976.
- (2) The PLO delivered lectures on the penetration test conducted at HDL to the faculty and students of the Counterintelligence Dept, US Army Intelligence Corps School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, on 20 and 21 January 1976.
- (3) The PLO, assisted by other 902d MI Group personnel conducted several technical inspections at HDL. The PLO provided advice and assistance at several design meetings concerning new buildings at HDL.
- (4) Other security advice was provided by the PLO to the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), Woodbridge, VA, and the Gaüthersburg Test Site (GTS), Gaithersburg, MD. The PLO assisted in devising Operational Security techniques at these sites, the only HDL facilities at which outdoor testing takes place.
 - e. Operational Status:

On 16 March 1976, the PLO presented the QuarterLy Briefing to MAJ Kenneth F. Keller, Executive Officer, HDL, and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL.

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
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7. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Revalidation - 11 Jul 75)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), and Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen, MD
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:

A confidential source identified an individual in the Biomedical Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, as an alien enlistee. Project personnel briefed the appropriate security personnel and a background investigation, to include a polygraph examination, was initiated. The investigation had not been concluded at the close of the quarter.

- e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 23 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, CDR, APG, on those activities pertaining to the Aberdeen area. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG, was present also.
- (2) On 25 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report on Edgewood Arsenal activities to COL Kenneth L. Stahl, CDR, Edgewood Arsenal, with CPT Vincent J. Falconio, Chief, Security Office, Edgewood Arsenal, also present.

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
LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) A confidential source reported that unknown persons had attempted on 11 January 1976 to penetrate the TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity (TRASANA). On 12 January 1976, it was reported that an unidentified individual claiming to be a colonel had been permitted to enter the TRASANA Compound. These incidents were reported immediately to the Security Officer, TRASANA. An investigation by TRASANA security personnel disclosed that there was no substance to the 11 January report and the person in the second incident of 12 January was identified and found to be a legitimate entrant into the facility. The incidents did serve to illustrate the security awareness of the source and the personnel involved.
- (2) A source surfaced information on 4 February 1976 that two enlisted soldiers at TRASANA were engaged in drug trafficking, but in separate individual operations. Local on-post investigation resulted in apprehension of one of the individuals. All available information on the second individual was reported to the Sixth Region, US Army Criminal Investigation (CID) Command for appropriate action.
- (3) A confidential source reported in March 1976 in three reports that such devices as radios, tape recorders, and "pocket" digital calculators were being brought into a TRASANA Exclusion Area by personnel having access to the area. These devices reportedly could affect the computers used in the area, some of which have classified data in storage. The Activity Security Officer has been briefed on these alleged practices and ICIP project personnel have been tasked to provide follow-up reports on action taken by the supported command. The information contained in the reports has been provided to the Counterintelligence Services and SAVE Team elements at USAINTA as a matter of interest.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) The two confidential sources provide coverage of TRASANA and the US Army Electronics Command, Office of Missile Electronics Warfare (OMEW), WSMR. One individual assigned to the US Army Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate is under assessment as a potential source.

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(2) The Quarterly Progress Briefing, postponed at the request of MG O. L. Tobiason, CDR, WSMR, will be presented during the next quarter.

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9. LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) The female instructor in the Czechoslovakian Language Department reported in the last quarter as preparing to resign her position and return to Czechoslovakia now is reportedly having serious health problems. It is unknown if her health will cause a change in her original plans, and the FBI to date has not indicated whether or not that agency has a continued interest in the instructor or her spouse.
- (2) A Polish Language Department instructor plans to visit his mother and a brother in Warsaw in mid-1976, a confidential source has learned. The instructor has submitted no formal request to DLI for the trip yet. The instructor's activities are monitored as a matter of intelligence interest because of his and his brother's travels. His brother, a medical doctor has visited in the US and Canada frequently over the last 20 years and was once detained by US Customs at the Canadian border for attempting to smuggle Communist propaganda into the US. During a 1974 visit to the US, the instructor's brother visited DLI, attended Polish Language Department functions, talked with and photographed the students. USAINTA is monitoring the instructor's activities.
- (3) A Czech language instructor is continuing his efforts to obtain the release of his children from Czechoslovakia. A confidential source surfaced the most recent information that the Czech Government has informed the instructor he could get his children out of the country if he pays the Czech Government \$66,000. (\$6,000 for the cost of his time in a Czech prison and \$60,000 as an educational tax on his and his wife's education.) Source did not have further information on this particular aspect, but reported that in mid-February 1976 the instructor gave many of the DLI Czech students a list of newly published books in the Czech language. The books are distributed by a Canadian firm, "Sixty Eight Publishers," Box 695 Station A, Toronto, Ontario M5W 1G2 Canada. The instructor told his classes that the Czech military had officially changed their method of counting for example, using "21" instead of "1 and 20." Insignificant in itself, this last item indicates that the instructor is maintaining ties with Czechoslovakian officials. USAINTA is monitoring the instructor's activities.

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(4) Information developed from official sources during the period disclosed that an instructor of the Russian Language Department (RLD) apparently is suffering from mental problems. The instructor has written letters to a California senator, a nationally syndicated columnist, and the FBI, alleging that he is under surveillance of Soviet and US intelligence constantly and that his life is in danger. The Commander, USAINTA, provided a summary report on the instructor to the ACSI. The instructor later sent a telegram to the President of the United States. Both the FBI and the Secret Service have made inquiries into the matter. On 23 March 1976, the Commandant, DLI, took administrative action directing the instructor to undergo psychiatric evaluation. The instructor refused initially and was administratively suspended from teaching. At the end of the quarter, the instructor agreed to the examination and final disposition of the matter is pending.

e. Operational Status:

- (1) As a result of the RLD incident described in d(4), above, the DLI Commandant has directed that the Civilian Personnel Office and Security Office screen records of faculty members for indications of mental problems. Once identified, action will be taken to obtain treatment for the individuals concerned.
- (2) Eight confidential sources were utilized during the quarter; three sources were terminated due to graduation. Four new confidential sources were recruited, including one Technical Language Assistant (TLA). Pifteen individuals are under assessment as possible sources, including one instructor and one TLA. In addition to the confidential sources, there are 16 conventional sources providing coverage of seven language departments and the DLI staff.
- (3) On 29 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Briefing to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI. Also present at the briefing were COL Donald K. Bradbury, CDR, 525th MI Group; MAJ Trevor Bissey, CDR, San Francisco Field Office, 525th MI Group; CPT Brendon A. Xiques, SAIC, Ft Ord Resident Office, 525th MI Group; and Mr. James Green, Asst Security Officer, DLI.

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1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(C, CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 April 75 31 March 76:
- (1) Confidential and conventional sources employed in the operation surfaced information on adverse suitability pertaining to 86 employees at Fort Ritchie, all of whom had security clearances and access to one of the sensitive activities supported. The suitability information included the entire spectrum in this category alcohol and drug abuse, moral improprieties and mental instability. In these instances investigative action was taken to refute or substantiate the allegations or the individuals were removed from access to classified information. About 50% of the cases reported involved some degree of drug abuse; these were referred to the Criminal Investigation Command (CID) for action.
- (2) Two separate reports were received concerning suspected Soviet Intelligence presence and interest in the activities of the supported installation. Details of these reports were provided the FBI in May 1975. In one instance an individual resembling a known KGB agent paid an unusual amount of attention to shipment of sensitive cargo to Fort Ritchie; in the second instance an individual assigned to Fort Ritchie reported that a second person whom he had met claimed to be in contact with the Soviets in Hagerstown, MD.

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(3) An ICIP source reported a possible compromise occurred when the Telecommunications Directorate, Site R, was tasked to prepare a special test tape containing test messages which could be used for coding and to devise compatibility between two computer systems. The test tape, though it consisted only of innocuous, unclassified messages, also contained fragments of sensitive, highly classified messages which had been picked up from residual magnetism on the reels of the equipment when the messages were recorded. This latter condition was not discovered until processing to make the systems compatible took place, after the tape had lain unsecured, in open storage, for about six weeks. A command investigation of the incident followed and a determination was made that apparently a compromise had not occurred, but as a result of the incident, changed security procedures were put into effect for the handling and storage of computer tapes, reels, and discs.


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- (4) Two possible SAEDA approaches to soldiers stationed at Fort Ritchie in January 1976 are currently under investigation by USAINTA and the FBI. Reports of a Fort Ritchie NCO Club bartender professing to be employed by the "CIA" and "military intelligence" are currently being investigated by USAINTA.
- (5) In March 1976, an Army NCO assigned sensitive duties at Fort Ritchie volunteered that he had contacted by letter æm agency of the East German Government. The NCO desired to make the matter of the contact part of official records in the event he should be later contacted by any agency or person from East Germany. Though the NCO's action was part of his research of his family history and ostensibly is an overt, sincere effort on his part, the East German Intelligence Services (EGIS) often take such opportunities to make intelligence approaches, especially if the US soldier-target has special clearances and access to sensitive information. The NCO is under instructions to report any responses to his letter.
 - d. Operational Status:
- (1) CANARY EFFORT was first approved for implementation by OACSI, DA, on 11 June 1965.
- (2) Operation CANARY EFFORT to be terminated effective 31 March 76. Supported commanders were briefed on the termination action during the quarter ending 31 Mar 76. All confidential sources used in the ICIP have been terminated.



- (4) The Operation yielded 69 information reports and 116 other reports which were chiefly verbal reports provided to the supported commanders.
- e. Comments: The ICIP at Fort Ritchie clearly has been a productive operation at a critically sensitive installation. Information obtained as a result of the ICIP and acted upon by the commanders concerned has served to strengthen the security of the installation. The 902d MI Gruop will continue to provide counterintelligence support to the installation under an overt comprehensive counterintelligence support program.

ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76: There was no significant information obtained during the period and there were no indications of any overt threat to the installation.
- d. Operational Status: CANINE PLATE was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 18 Sep 73. Five conventional sources are contacted on a recurring basis by the Project Liaison Officer (PLO). One official sources is in a position to assist in spotting potential new sources. During the last year, the PLO expended a total of 400 manhours in the program. No funds were expended. No information of counterintelligence significance was surfaced in this period. Only conventional sources have been utilized in this operation.
- e. Comments: The installation's mission remains the same, a supply depot for missile and artillery weapons systems with a nuclear capability. The Depot is considered a critically sensitive installation and a potential target for HOIS. However, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installatiom.


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1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

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CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (1) An inserted covert confidential source was employed in this operation to attempt to learn the existing situation in the Optical Guidance Technology Office (OGTO), Advanced Sensors Directorate, USAMICON, when reports received in 1974 alleged that lax security practices had led to loss and possible compromise of classified information and that several employees were engaging in sex orgies in offices during the day. In Sep 74, the CG, USAMICOM, condumcted a Command Investigation as a result of these reports under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6. As a result of that investigatiom, the CG, USAMICOM, requested that an ICIP operation be conducted in OGTO. The Source, once in place, had to rely chiefly upon elicitation to obtain his information because of his covert status, but during the period, did succeed in surfacing adverse suitability information on a civilian physicist with access to sensitive, SECRET information which indicated that he was probably the catalyst for the sexually-oriented activities of the OGTO employees. The employee, apparently obsessed with sex, had numerous extra-marital relations during the last five years. The Commander, USAMICOM, was provided a summary of information on the employee for appropriate command action. The employee transferred to another office in USAMICOM, which apparently broke up the clique and Source could uncover no new evidence of continuing activities among the remaining employees.
- (2) In addition to the above, the Source provided substantial information on security weaknesses in the supported command to include poor housekeeping practices, lack of control of reproduction facilities, lack of proper control of area access, lax security attitudes, and possible compromise of security badges through continued losses by individuals. Source provided such security weakness and hazard details to the Project Case Officer who relayed it to overt ME project personnel at Redstone. The Project Liaison Officer provided these reports to the USAMICOM Commanding General and appropriate security personnel who have taken actions to remedy the security weaknesses.

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d Operational Status:

(1) CANTER RIDE was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 4 Mar 75.

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(3) Whe operation yielded one Summary of Information and several oral reports on security weaknesses.

(4) (1) As the result of an 18 Feb 76 briefing presented to the USAMICOM Commanding General, the MI Group conducting the Operation, the project personnel, and the supported commander concurred in findings that the Operation had accomplished its original objective and should therefore be terminated. The CG, USAMICOM, declared that the operation was a success. The insert Source used in the operation has been withdrawn and reassigned. The CDR, USAINTA, and the ACSI verbally approved the termination of CANTER RIDE on 20 and 23 Feb 76, respectively with an effective date of 31 Mar 76.

e. (Comments: Counterintelligence support continues to be provided by elements of the MI Group stationed at USAMICOM.



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
1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(2) CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) Herlong, CA
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During the Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:
- (1) Reports alleged the use of illegal drugs by military personnel at SIAD. However, no details were available.
- (2) Information was reported that an exclusion area personal identification badge was missing and that an inquiry failed to find or determine how the badge was lost. As a result of the missing badge incident, new identification badges were issued.
- (3) An enlisted man assigned to SIAD was charged with malicious damage of a generator at SIAD and his security clearance was revoked by the Commander, SIAD.
 - d. Operational Status:
- (1) During the reporting period 616 manhours were expended and 14 Agent Reports were submitted.

(2)	TDY	funds	totalling	\$29.35	were	expended;	k	o1	
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- (3) At the end of the reporting period two confidential sources were being used.
 - e. Comments:
 - (1) This ICIP was administratively implemented in April 1974.



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CONSIDERTING



- (2) The mission of the Sierra Army Depot (SIAD) is the operation of the Depot for the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, and disposal of missile and artillery weapons with a nuclear capability. Included in the items handled by SIAD are ammunition, special weapons materials, propellants, explosive components of guided missiles, supplies, petroleum and chemical supplies, fire control test and measuring equipment, and other special weapons with a nuclear capability. SIAD also maintains a capability for systems modification in support of the joint AEC/DOD test firing programs.
- (3) Sierra Army Depot is the major storage areæ for special weapons in the western part of the US. The special weapons that formerly were located at the Safeguard anti-Ballistic Missile Site and Savanna Army Depot are now at SIAD, which elevates it to one of the most important special weapons repositories in the US. The Depot is located in a remote area and its contents make it not only of interest to hostile intelligence, but also a target of terrorist groups who are involved in nuclear theft and blackmail.
- (4) The Department of Army Sensitive Installation and Unit List, January 1976, lists SIAD as "Critically Sensitive (CS)."
- (5) A large portion of the work force is in exclusion areas so access to them on a daily basis is severely restricted for project personnel. Coverage of these areas by confidential sources thus becomes necessary for effective CI coverage. A 20 Sep 75 report of the Nuclear Defense Agency entitled "Adversary View and Support Nuclear Weapon Site Security; Adversary Capabilities," in assessing terrorist groups tactics employed to acquire a nuclear device and options available, cites the method most likely to succeed as one in which a member of the regular work force has been approached, recruited and is on the terrorist groups payroll. The detection of this type of activity among members of a work force in an exclusion area is greatly enhanced by employing a confidential source program. At the close of the reporting period, two confidential sources were being utilized in the operation to cover the Priority I Exclusion Area. A third individual is under assessment as a potential confidential source.
- (6) Hostile intelligence services have high priority collection objectives pertaining to such activities as those conducted at SIAD.
- (7) The SIAD, as outlined briefly in subpara (5) and (6), above, appears highly vulnerable to a double threat, that posed by the increasingly active terrorist groups who operate on a global scale and the ever present threat of HOIS penetration. The ICIP is necessary as an additional means to provide "early warnings" to assist the Commander in formulating necessary plans and taking proper action to protect the sensitive and highly-destructive special weapons stored at this location.

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ON SEP -5 1997
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
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(8) At the most recent Quarterly Briefing on 13 Feb 76, the SIAD Commander indicated that he was pleased with the type of support being provided and requested continuation of the ICIP.

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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During the Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:
- (1) An ICIP source reported that a PTC civilian employee was transferred from the coding and decoding section because he had coded an obscene message that was to be sent to an overseas user. Additionally, the ICIP source provided information concerning possible security violations involving the employee. Because of the employee's questionable suitability characteristics and conduct he was assigned to a job in PTC requiring minimum contact with classified information. Supervisors will continue to monitor his conduct and activities.
- (2) An Army NCO assigned to PTC attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. As a result of the information gained concerning the suicide attempt a Limited Investigation was initiated. The NCO was assigned to the Logistics Branch, PTC, pending results of the investigation. The investigation revealed that the NCO has a large number of outstanding debts, has lied on loan applications, and had ordered a 1976 automobile which cost in excess of five thousand dollars. Interviews concerning the NCO revealed alleged drug usage and homosexuality. The Limited Investigation was completed and referred to PTC for adjudication. The decision was made not to revoke the NCO's security clearance since he left the service on 9 April 1976 and will not be allowed to re-enlist.
- (3) Adverse suitability information was reported on two additional NCOs assigned to PTC. Based on medical reports and rebellious attitudes one NCO was released from the Army by board action. The second NCO after a night of heavy drinking began hitting his wife when she tried to arouse him after he had "passed out." The wife filed assault charges with the Military Police but withdrew them later. The PTC commander counselled the NCO on his drinking and marital problems and assigned him duties where he has no access to classified information.

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
(4) During the course of an investigative of an enlisted WAC member of PTC who was absent-without-leave (KAWOL Investigation), it was discovered that the CID was also investigating her for theft and trafficking in drugs. The MI representative and CID agents coordinated their mutual investigations. PTC has suspended the WAC's access to classified material pending completion of the investigation.

d. Operational Status:

- (1) CENSUS TIME was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 5 Feb 74.
- (2) During the period of 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976, 726 manhours were expended, no TDY or ICF funds were used. The operation produced seven information reports. One confidential source was used during the period but was terminated during the latter part of the period.
- e. Comments: The PTC operations include an extremely high volume of ultra sensitive classified traffic processed at the highest level, and includes the cryptographic support rendered to the JCS, the NMCC, departments and executive agencies of the government; allied embassies, and the United Nations Building in New York. The PTC remains a potential target for HOIS; however, there is no information reported to indicate the presence of any identified threat to the installation.

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2 602 CONFIDENTIAL



1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

h ses

CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, (HDL), Adelphia, MD
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reportæd on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Permod 1 Apr 7.5 31 Mar 76:
- (1) Information was received that a First Secretary at the USSR Embassy, Washington, DC had visited HDL on two occasions. On one occasion he attended a meeting of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, INC., a professional society for engineers which was held in the auditorium of HDL. The subject matter presented during the meeting was unclassified. At a second meeting of the society the Soviet Embassy official was denied entry. A report of the incidents were provided to the FBI and the Commander, HDL, made a determination that the society could no longer hold meetings at HDL in order to preclude any potential security threat.
- (2) On two occasions an unidentified light aircraft flew over the test site, Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), HDL, where a series of tests on foreign equipment under the Range Emory program was in progress. In both instances the aircraft circled over the Range Emory test cite for about 5-7 minutes. The overflights are being imvestigated in coordination with the FBI.
- (3) An employee, HDL, made allegations of immoral activities by members of the HDL Security Office and a group at the Van Ness Avenue Facility, HDL. The employee claimed that she was being followed by members of the HDL Security Office. After investigating the employee's story, the Commander, HDL, believed that she was suffering from psychiatric problems and would have her visit a psychiatrist for a complete evaluation.
- (4) Suitability information concerning an employee of the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF) a branch of HDL located in Woodbridge, VA, involved a problem of alcohol abuse. After counseling, the employee participated in a rehabilitation program.

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
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(5) From 7 October to 6 November 75, a courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted. The penetrations were successful and revealed several security weaknesses which were corrected by the supported command. As a result of the test a number of security guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. In addition a new magnetic coded badge was approved for purchase in FY 77. As a follow-up implementation of "Lessons Learned" in the penetration test the ICIP Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and the HDL Security Officer prepared and delivered a series of lectures and classes to the HDL guard force on the penetration test. Additionally, the PLO delivered lectures on the penetration test to the faculty and students of the Counterintelligence Dept, US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, A3.


d. Operational Status:

- (1) During the reporting period 880 manhours were expended, 18 information reports were submitted and 41 memorandums were prepared and provided to the supported commander.
 - (2) No TDY or b1 were expended.

e. Comments

- (1) ICIP CENTAVO KID was approved by OACSI, DA, 18 Oct 73 and the supported commander was briefed on the implementation of the operation on 12 November 1973.
- (2) The mission of the HDL includes critical sensitive research and development activities in support of the US Army. Some of the more sensitive activities include research into the hardening of communications equipment against nuclear weapons radiation; tests of nuclear warhead and missile systems to determine their ability to withstand nuclear weapons radiation; develop fuses for use with nuclear warheads and conducts development and testing of radiation hardened systems for Minutemen and Poseidon Missiles.
- (3) The installation remains a potential target for hostile intelligence services.

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL



ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(C) GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Revalidation - 16 Jan 76)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) and Edgewood Arsenal (EA), Aberdeen, MD
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (1) Confidential and conventional sources employed in the operation surfaced information on adverse suitability pertaining to 13 employees at Aberdeen Proving Ground/Edgewood Arsenal. The suitability information included alcohol and drug abuse, moral improprieties, fraudulent claim on a TDY voucher and mental instability. Action was taken to substantiate or refute the reported allegations.
- (2) Sources reported four instances of alien enlistees who were assigned to the sensitive installations. The Installation Intelligence Officer (IIO) was aware of the status of the four, that they did not have security clearances and had no access to classified information.
- (3) Sources reported three instances of foreign travel during the period. One of these DOD affiliated employees who traveled to the USSR after attending a scientific conference in Finland is being contacted by US Intelligence. In another instance, a DOD civilian employee visited Poland and Czechoslovakia for about one month in June-July 1975. The employee and his spouse allegedly visited relatives in both countries. The employee has been debriefed by USAINTA. Source reported that the employee plans to travel to these countries again in 1976. In another instance, husband and wife DOD employees took a Smithsonian Institution-sponsored tour to Moscow and Leningrad. The husband has been debriefed by USAINTA and the wife will be debriefed at her convenience. Source reported that the couple planned to take another trip to Russia in 1976.
- (4) Sources reported several instances of foreign contact by military and DOD civilian personnel in the supported activity. In one instance a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany was assigned on an exchange program to work until Sep 76. A report of a civilian DOD employee at Edgewood Arsenal with some unexplained periods of time in his background prompted a request for a Limited Investigation from the supported command.

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



- (5) Sources reported two instances of Swedish citizens visiting the installations. It was determined that the one visit had been fully coordinated with the proper officials. In the second instance, it was determined that the visit had not been properly coordinated but that steps had been taken to insure the visitors would not be given access to classified information until guidance was provided by higher head-quarters.
- (6) Sources reported numerous instances of security weaknesses or poor security practices. These included unattended offices in which security containers were left open, a CONFIDENTIAL document left unsecured over a three day weekend, poorly controlled access to a classified scientific conference, movement of an office into a building in which no technical survey had been conducted prior to the move, typewriter ribbons and carbon papers not being disposed of as classified waste, and high-ranking civilian employee bringing his eight year old son into a controlled access area where a classified test was being conducted and remaining overnight.

d. Operational Status:

- (1) GONDOLA STAR was first approved by OACSI, DA for implementation on 21 May 1965. On 18 Feb 75, the ACSI directed the termination of 12 ICIPS, including GONDOLA STAR, by 31 Mar 75. After reviewing correspondence initiated by the Commander, Aberdeen Proving Ground, which recommended that the ICIP GONDOLA STAR be continued, the ACSI reinstated the operation for a period of six months on 11 Jul 75, subject to a review after the six months elapsed. On 16 Jan 76, the ACSI approved continuation of the ICIP as an ongoing operation. The following statistics are for the period 11 Jul 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (a) During the reporting period 2,223 manhours were expended and 84 written information reports and 16 oral reports were submitted. b1

 no TDY funds were expended.
- (b) At the end of the reporting period eight confidential sources were being used in the operation.
- e. Comments: The ICIP has been a productive operation at a critically sensitive installation. Information obtained as a result of the ICIP and acted upon by the commanders concerned has served to strengthen the security of the installation. The 902d MI Group is conducting a comprehensive review of this operation for possible replacement of the operation by an overt counterintelligence support program.





1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976


(Ø) LENS HOLDER:

(OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (1) Several reports from confidential sources during the period indicated that employees in the TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity (TRASANA) and the Army Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate (ARMTED) were following poor security practices in daily activities and not adhering to security regulations for safeguarding sensitive classified information. These security hazards included leaving security containers open and unattended for periods during the day, failing to complete security forms affixed to classified material containers, leaving classified material in work boxes after duty hours, and laxity on the part of security guards during night shifts. Security Officers of both TRASANA and ARMTED after being provided reports on these weaknesses briefed all their employees on requirements of WSMR Regulation 380-5 (Security Regulation) and reoriented all guard personnel on their security obligations.
- (2) A confidential source reported that a US Army Officer assigned to the Office of Missile Electronics Warfare (OMEW) was misappropriating computer parts and electronic equipment which he was taking home to build his own computer. A summary of available information was provided the US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command for investigation by that agency. The same confidential source reported on 4 Feb 76 that two enlisted soldiers in sensitive positions in TRASANA were engaged in drug trafficking, but in separate operations. Local on-post investigation by the White Sands Missile Range Provost Marshal resulted in apprehension of one of the individuals. Information on the second soldier, allegedly involved in large-scale drug transactions and with criminal contacts, was reported to the Sixth Region, US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command for appropriate investigation.
- (3) A confidential source reported that unknown persons had attempted on 11 Jan 76 to penetrate TRASANA, which is an Exclusion Area. On 12 Jan 76, the source reported an unidentified individual claiming to be a colonel had been permitted to enter the TRASANA Compound without the required identification. Investigations by the TRASANA security personnel disclosed that there was no substance to the 11 January report and the

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person in the 12 January incident was identified and found to be a legitimate entrant into the facility. The incident did serve to illustrate the security awareness of the source and the personnel involved.

(4) A confidential source reported in March 1976 in three reports that devices, such as radios, tape recorders, and "pocket" digital calculators were being brought into a TRASANA Exclusion Area by personnel having access to the area. Many of the computers used in the area have classified information storage and the above-named devices allegedly can affect the computers' operations. The appropriate Security Officer has been appraised of these practices. ICIP project personnel have been tasked to provide follow-up reports on actions taken by the supported command. The information has also been provided as a matter of interest to the Counterintelligence Services and SAVE Team elements at USAINTA.


d. Operational Status:


- (1) LENS HOLDER was first approved by the ACSI, DA, for implementation on 16 Sep 74.
- (2) Two confidential sources provide coverage of the two principle supported activities, TRASANA and OMEW. An additional individual in the ARMTED is being assessed as a potential source.

(3)	Dui	ing	the	reporting period, 1,053 manhours were expended	l. b1
b1				there were no TDY outlays. The operat	
produced	36	writ	ten	information reports and 24 memorandums and ora	1
reports.					

e. Comments:

(1) The mission of the White Sands Missile Range has remained unchanged since the inauguration of the ICIP and the previous OACSI revalidation on 4 Feb 75. The mission of WSMR is to evaluate the Safeguard Missile System missile vulnerability studies, missile control systems, and perform pre-production tests and analyses of missile systems. The mission of WSMR makes it a prime target of hostile intelligence. Activities at WSMR which have Priority I requirements for support are TRASANA, OMEW, ARMTED, the National Range Operations Directorate, and the US Army Safeguard Systems Evaluation Agency. These elements develop electronic countermeasures techniques to nullify vulnerabilities discovered in missile systems, conduct pre-production tests of rocket and guided missile systems, operate a nuclear effects facility and operate National Range Facilities for tests conducted at WSMR.





(2) The operation to date has proven to have value as an adjunct to the installation security program. The isolation of the installation, dispersion of many of its facilities, and the extent and nature of its computer facilities and missile testing ranges present a lucrative target for hostile intelligence service (HOIS) penetration. USMR's proximity to the US-Mexican border renders it vulnerable to HOIS operations based in a foreign country. Admittedly, the operation to date has not surfaced hard evidence of HOIS presence or penetration, but the scope of the threat must be recognized. Details of activities conducted at the site are of current interest to HOIS. The two-pronged capability of the ICIP, that is, extensive use of overt sources of all types, plus the covert effort exemplified by the confidential sources, appears to be necessary coverage at this time with the best potential for detection and discovery of HOIS activities.

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ICIP REPORT

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1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(0) LENTII MONKEY:

(OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr.75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (1) A source in the Chinese-Mandarin Language Department furnished information concerning a temporary instructor of that department who closely questioned her students about their knowledge of their future duties and assignments. She frequently expressed her displeasure in the task of teaching Chinese to students which would enable them to "conduct spying activities" directed at the People's Republic of China (PRC). The instructor also displayed a rebellious and uncooperative attitude toward necessary DLI administrative requirements. Form in Canton, China, she was a British citizen and no evidence of a preemployment investigation could be found. DLI refused to renew her contract when it expired in Sep 75 and she departed DLI in that month.
- (2) A Confidential Source reported information on an instructor of the German Language Department who travelled to East Germany in mid-1975 without notification or permission from DLI authorities. Upon completion of the travel, the instructor was admonished officially and informed that any future violation of the DLI regulations on foreign travel would result in temporary suspension.
- (3) A visitor to the Russian Language Department in May 75 requested copies of training material used in the Russian Dept, claiming that he wanted it to use for language training in his reserve unit. The visitor was given two unclassified training exercises. Subsequent investigation identified the visitor and established that he was a former graduate of Russian at DLI, and additionally, that he was a bona fide member of a California-based Army Reserve unit. The incident, although not of a major significance as proven by the later investigation, did serve to underscore a need for better visitor control at DLI. The Director, DLI, placed special emphasis on this and the need for all personnel to be alert for unauthorized visitors and proper procedures for handling them. New visitor requirements and restrictions were published and distributed throughout DLI.

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ON SEP -5 1997
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- (4) An instructor in the Hungarian Language Department travelled to Hungary in Sep 75 with a stated purpose of visiting relatives. A review of the instructor's file revealed extensive foreign travel in Europe since 1971 and frequent contact with relatives and other persons in Hungary. File checks and inquiries of other agencies failed to reveal any substantial derogatory information concerning the instructor, but the potential hostage situation is evident in the continuing contacts. Monitoring of the instructor's activities continues.
- Language Department allegedly is a former member of the Soviet Army's equivalent to the US Army Security Agency who while in the Soviet Army received special training in English. This instructor left the USSR in Apr 74 and was hired at DLI in Oct 74. A coworker of the instructor left the Soviet Union in Apr 75 and was also hired as an instructor at DLI in Jul 75. Both of the instructors taught together at the Leningrad Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The sequence of these events illustrate how quickly these individuals are able to secure employment after leaving the USSR, employment in which they are placed in extremely close contact with US intelligence personnel. Monitoring of the activities of these individuals continues.
- (6) Two instructors in the Bulgarian Language Department who are man and wife were accused by fellow faculty members at DLI of being communists because of the unexplained details of their emigration to the West and the manner in which they left Bulgaria. The allegations led to charges and countercharges; full details of the incident were provided the FBI. The wife remains at DLI as an instructor, but as of the close of the reporting period on 31 Mar 76, the husband was employed elsewhere and no longer DOD-affiliated.
- (7) A DLI employee of the Hebrew Project at DLI also created considerable internal dissension and bickering within the Hebrew Department when he maintained close contact with the Israeli Consulate in San Francisco. This caused associates to become suspicious of his motives and high level contacts. The employee, an alien with an impressive background, including possible intelligence activities, later applied for employment with the National Security Agency (NSA), which has been provided all information available to USAINTA.
- (8) A confidential source reported that a Czechoslovakian Language Department (CLD) instructor was planning to withdraw her retirement fund money and return to Czechoslovakia with her two sons, allegedly to live there.

b1 Per FBI

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ON 20 MAR 1998

By CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO Auth Para 6-601 DOD 5200.1R SECRET 611

Constitution of



ht the close of the reporting period possible health problems appeared as a deterrent to the wife's original plans. but definite decisions in this regard are unknown.

D1 Per FB

- (9) A second CLD instructor has disclosed to several sources over the last two years his continuing efforts to obtain the release of his children from Czechoslovakia. The Czech Government recently informed the instructor that he could obtain the release of his children if he pays the Czech Government \$66,000 as reimbursement for the cost of the time the instructor spent in a Czech prison and an education tax on the education acquired in Czechoslovakia by the instructor and his wife. The instructor disclosed that the Czech military had changed its method of counting. The reports indicate that the instructor is maintaining close, continuing ties with Czech Government officials and that a hostage situation with his children exists. Monitoring of his activities continues.
- (10) Monitoring also continues on activities of a Polish Language Department (PLD) instructor who plans to visit his mother and a brother in Warsaw in mid-1976. The instructor has not applied formally to DLI for approval for the leave and the trip. The instructor frequently has travelled in the past to Europe. His brother, a medical doctor also travels extensively, and has been in the US and Canada often during the last 20 years. During a 1974 visit to the US, the instructor's brother visited DLI, attended PLD functions at DLI, talked with the US Army students at length and photographed many of the students in attendance. US Customs once detained the instructor's brother at the Canadian border for attempting to smuggle Communist propaganda into the US; US Customs confiscated the propaganda.
- (11) An instructor in the Russian Language Department apparently is suffering from mental problems. The instructor has written to a California US Senator, a nationally syndicated columnist, and the FBI, alleging that he is constantly under surveillance by the Soviet KGB and US intelligence and further, that his life is in danger. The instructor also has sent a telegram to the President of the United States. Both the FBI and the Secret Service have made inquiries into the matter and conducted local investigations of the instructor. On 23 Mar 76, the DLI Commandant directed the instructor to undergo psychiatric evaluation. Initially, the instructor refused and was suspended from his duties administratively. At the end of the reporting period the instructor agreed to the examination. The results and final disposition are pending.


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d. Operational Status:


	(1)) LENTIL	MONKEY	was	first	approved	bу	ACSI,	DA,	for	implementation
on	11 5	September	1967.								

(2)	During	the	reporting	period,	4,603	manhour	rs were	expended.
b1						no TDY		

- (3) Production consisted of 360 written information reports and 220 Memorandums and oral reports.
- (4) Eight confidential sources were active in the ICIP at the close of the period and additional coverage of language departments and administrative sections of DLI was obtained by 16 monventional sources.

e. Comments:

- (1) The mission of DLI is to train DOD intelligence and communications security specialists in every major foreign Language. Military attaches, employees of the CIA and FBI, as well as other federal agencies, are also trained at DLI, making it an extremely enticing target for hostile intelligence service operatives. The majority of the faculty of DLI have foreign backgrounds, some have only recently arrived from Communist Bloc countries and rapidly achieved employment in an installation where most of the students are in intelligence or destined for intelligence assignments upon graduation. Many of these instructors are in hostage situations by virtue of close, living relatives in the ComBloc countries with whom they maintain written contact and closer, if less frequent, personal contact. In maintaining contact with these ComBloc countries for any reason whatsoever, intelligence agencies of those countries in all likelihood have identified the instructors' place of employment and may have contacted them under one guise or another.
- (2) In addition to extensive and frequent contacts with the governments of HoIS, many instructors who probably are completely imbued with the American way of life and are now US citizens or who intend to become citizens, nevertheless are vulnerable targets. The instructors acquire personal acquaintances among many intelligence personnel and, in the course of teaching and associating with the military in year-long classes, learn of the students' future assignments and do in some instances correspond with DLI alumnae after graduation. This unique characteristic of conditions at DLI serves to make the Institute an even more attractive target for HoIS approaches.
- (3) As shown by statistics in paragraph d(2), and d(3), above, ICIP LENTIL MONKEY is the most productive of all the presently active ICIPS with a total of 360 written reports. Though 4,603 manhours were expended in the project, the actual cash outlay of b1 for the





year, the lowest cost figure for any of the active ICIPS. Viewed from the cost-yield ratio alone, this operation is an extremely successful, economical effort.


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Period: 1 Apr 1975 to 31 Mar 1976

INTERNAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

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	LENTIL MONKEY	ENS HOLDER	GONDOLA STAR	CENTAVO KID <u>2</u> /	CENSUS TIME 2/	CANVAS TAX	CANTER RIDE 1/	CANINE PLATE 2/	CANARY EFFORT 1/	ICIP
TOTAL	DLI, Pres of M, CA	White Sands Msle Rge, NM, TECOM, AMC	Aberdeen Proving Gd Aberdeen, MD	Harry Diamond Labs AMC, Wash DC	Pentagon Telecom Ctr USACC-CONUS, Wash DC	Sierra Army Depot, AMC, Herlong, CA	US Army Msle Cmd Redstone Arsenal, AL	Seneca Army Depot, AMC, Romulus, NY	USA Comm Cmd Ft Ritchie, MD	INSTALLATION
	I-SEP 67 R-FEB 75	I-SEP 74 R-FEB 75	I-MAY 65 R-JAN 76	I-NOV 73 R-FEB 75	I-FEB 74 R-FEB 75	I-APR 74 R-FEB 75	I-MAR 75	I-NOV 73 R-FEB 75	1-JUN 65 R-FEB 75	FIRST INITIATED (I) REVALIDATED (R)
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51	16		10	7	2	2		5	9	SOURCES AS OF 31 MAR 76 CONF CONVEN
589	360	36	84	18	7	14	1		69	INFO AR, SR SOI
447	220	24	16	41	6	24			116	INFO REPORTS , SR OTHER I MEMO/ORAL
14,453	4,603	1,053	2,223	880	726	919	697	400	3,255	MAN HOURS
1,425						29	1,315		<u>a</u>	TDY Z
b1	b1	b1)	b1	-	615		[b1]		[b1]	b1)S

1/ Terminated 31 Mar 76
2/ Terminated (Jun 76)
after period covered
by this report

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by CDR, USAINTA
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF ENERGY ORDER 11653
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2006





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-DOH

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

NOTED USA APR 13(6

FOR: UNDER SEGRETARY OF THE ARMY

COL John J. Todd. Exec., SAUS SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)--

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

- During the past quarter, six of the currently active Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations provided information on incidents involving personnel suitability and conditions reflecting poor security practices or weaknesses. Reports of these relatively minor conditions were furnished the commanders of the supported commands who took immediate corrective action.
- 2. (U) The total number of active ICIP operations remains at nine. Summaries of activity in these operations during the last quarter are inclosed.

9 Incl as (C)

HAROLD R. AARON Major General, GS ACofs for Intelligence

REGRADED UNICLASSIFIED ON SEP -5 1997 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUPO AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

OCT-DEC 75

Noted by the Under Secretary of the Army with comment: "On next quarter's review, please provide an analysis (of each ICIP for the past year) to include statistics."

Colonel, GS

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ON SEP -5 1997
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BY COR USAINSCOM 5200.1-R
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD \$200.1-R





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

MIIA-SO-SA

MAY 1 1 1976

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)
Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH/COL HAENDLE) WASH DC 20310

1. During the 3d Quarter, FY 1976, two of the on-going ICIP operations were terminated effective 31 March 1976, CANTER RIDE at Redstone Arsenal, AL, and CANARY EFFORT at Fort Ritchie, MD. The Commander, USAINTA, and the ACSI verbally approved termination actions on 20 and 23 February 1976, and separate correspondence requesting formal termination was submitted to ACSI, DA, on 8 April 1976. The total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the 3d Quarter was seven. Summaries for each of these seven operations, plus the two which were terminated, are attached as TAB A, which is the quarterly report for the period ending 31 Mar 76.


2. The former Project Liaison Officers (PLO) of the two terminated ICIPS, CANARY EFFORT and CANTER RIDE, are continuing to provide counterintelligence support to the sensitive elements at Redstone Arsenal and Fort Ritchie. These activities now receive comprehensive assistance through an overt, all-source, multi-discipline effort named the Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP). A review of ICIP Operations CANINE PLATE, CENTAVO KID, and CENSUS TIME is currently being conducted to determine which of these operations should be converted to the DSCCP concept.

3. (C) Through a comment on the DAMI-DOH Information Memorandum to the Under Secretary of the Army, subject: ICIP Program, dated 1 April 1976, the Under Secretary indicated that an analysis of each ICIP operation for the past year was to be provided with the next quarterly review. In compliance with those instructions, an analysis of each ICIP operation was made for the period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976. As a result of these analyses, five ICIPS (TAB B) are recommended for termination; four ICIPS (TAB C) are recommended for retention. At TAB D are statistics



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SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)


for each of the ICIP operations which are referred to in individual reviews. These statistics provide a recapitulation of pertinent costs, manhours, and production for the nine ICIP operations covered in this analysis.

5. (U) Recommend approval of termination and retention actions in TABS B and C.

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WILLIAM I. JENNINGS Special Assistant (OPS)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED SEP -5 1997 BY COR USAINSCOM FOUPO AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD \$200.1-R



MIIA-SO-SA

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)
Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH/COL RAENDLE) WASH DC 20310

During the 3d Quarter, FY 1976, two of the on-going ICIP operations were terminated effective 31 March 1976, CANTER RIDE at Redstone Arsenal, AL, and CANARY EFFORT at Fort Ritchie, MD. The Commander, USAINTA, and the ACSI verbally approved termination actions on 20 and 23 February 1976, and separate correspondence requesting formal termination was submitted to ACSI, DA, on 8 April 1976. The total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the 3d Quarter was seven. Summaries for each of these seven operations, plus the two which were terminated, are attached as TAB A, which is the quarterly report for the period ending 31 Mar 76.

The former Project Liaison Officers (PLO) of the two terminated ICIPS, CANARY EFFORT and CANTER RIDE, are continuing to provide counterintelligence support to the sensitive elements at Redstone Arsenal and Fort Ritchie. These activities now receive comprehensive assistance through an overt, all-source, multi-discipline effort named the Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP). A review of ICIP Operations CANINE PLATE, CENTAVO KID, and CENSUS TIME is currently being conducted to determine which of these operations should be converted to the DSCCP concept.

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MILA-SO-SA

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

for each of the ICIP operations which are referred to in individual reviews. These statistics provide a recapitulation of pertinent costs, manhours, and production for the nine ICIP operations covered in this amalysis.

5. (U) Recommend approval of termination and retention actions in TABS B and C.

4 Incl 85

WILLIAM I. JENNINGS Special Assistant (OPS)

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1. CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD

b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three

c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None

- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) On 15 January 1976, the PLO, as a result of a liaison visit with the Baltimore Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained data on the presence of Sino-Soviet Bloc personnel travelling within the environs of the target areas and information on those Sino-Soviet bloc personnel residing temporarily in the environs of the target area.
- (2) On 28 January 1976 a member of the 572d Military Police Co, Ft Ritchie, was approached by an unidentified individual at Hagerstown Junior College, Hagerstown, MD, who claimed to be employed at Site R. The individual described Site R in general terms, but made no attempt to elicit information from the soldier. Investigative efforts failed to identify the individual. All available information was provided the Hagerstown Resident Office of the FBI. A USAINTA investigation of the incident is continuing.
- (3) On 28 January 1976, an unidentified individual approached a soldier assigned to the US Army Communications Command East Coast Telecommunications Center (USACCECTC) and requested a tour of that facility. The individual appeared interested in the antenna configuration of Satellite Communications/Direct Communication Links (SATCOM/DSL). The request for the tour was refused; the soldier reported the incident. All available information was provided the Hagerstown Resident Office of the FBI. USAINTA investigation of the incident is continuing.
- (4) During the reporting period information was developed on a Non-Appropriated Fund (NAF) employee who is a bartender employed at the Ft Ritchie NCO Club. The bartender allegedly claimed to patrons that she was in the employ of both "Military Intelligence" and the "CIA." An investigation is being conducted by USAINTA.
- (5) On 18 March 1976, a US Army NCO assigned sensitive duties in the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) volunteered information concerning his entering into correspondence with an agency of the East German Government. The NCO, who has been researching his family history for the last six years, was attempting to obtain a record of the military service of his great-great grandfather in the period circa 1810. In the course of an inquiry to the Federal Republic of

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
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Germany (FRG) Ambassador in Washington and the FRG Government, he was advised to contact the German Historical Central Archives in East Germany. The NCO volunteered the information so it could be made a matter of official record in the event he should be contacted in any fashion by East Germany in the future. The Chief, ANMCC, was provided information on the above. The NCO was given a SAEDA briefing under the provisions of AR 381-12 with special emphasis on reporting procedures. The NCO will provide Army Intelligence with copies of any correspondence he receives in this regard. At present the opportunity for further exploitation appears minimal.

e. Operational Status:

- (1) In February 1976, the 902d MI Group selected Operation CANARY EFFORT to be terminated and replaced by a Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP) which is being developed by the 902d MI Group. Supported commanders were briefed on the termination in conjunction with the scheduled quarterly briefings as described below. All confidential sources used in this ICIP have been terminated. The CDR, USAINTA, and the ACSI indicated verbal approval of the termination on 20 and 23 February 1976, respectively. The effective termination date for CANARY EFFORT is 31 March 1976.
- (2) During the quarter, the PLO presented 21 SAEDA/Threat/Security Awareness briefings to personnel assigned to supported activities at Fort Detrick and Fort Ritchie.
- (3) The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to LTC Dale S. Cockle, CDR, USACC ECTC, on 30 March 1976.
- (4) The PLO, on 1 April 1976, presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL John S. Eberle, CDR, US Army Communications Command (USACC) Site R.
- (5) On 5 April 1976, the PLO gave the Quarterly Progress Briefing to the supported command, HQ, 7th Signal Command and Ft Ritchie, with the following officials present: COL Harold G. deMoya, CDR, Ft Ritchie; COL John J. Plosay, Jr., Deputy CDR, Ft Ritchie and Mr. Joseph J. Carroll, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Security, 7th Signal Command and Ft Ritchie.

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2. CANINE PLATE (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None ${f C}$
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
 - e. Operational Status:

Five conventional sources are contacted on a recurring basis by the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) in this operation; one of these plans retirement in July 1976. One newly contacted official source is in a position to assist in spotting potential new sources. No threat information was surfaced during this quarter. On 5 March 1976 the PLO provided the Quarterly Briefing to LTC Earl Hain, Acting Depot Commander. LTC Hain was designated by COL Alden Cox, CDR, SAD, to receive the briefing during the absence of COL Cox

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
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CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, ${\sf AL}$
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
 - e. Operational Status:

On 18 February 1976, COL Hassel Parker, CDR, 902d MI Group, with the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) in attendance, provided a special briefing on this operation to MG Turnmeyer, CDR, USAMICOM. COL Lange, USAMICOM Chief of Staff, was also present during the briefing. As a result of the briefing, it was agreed by the participants that since the operation had accomplished its objective it should be terminated and the insert source should be extracted to reduce the risk of compromise. MG Turnmeyer expressed his deep appreciation for the information provided by the operation and concurred with the suggested termination. The source used in this operation has been reassigned and will be debriefed subsequent to his 8 April 1976 reporting date. The CDR, USAINTA, and the ACSI, DA indicated verbal approval of the termination on 20 February and 23 February 1976, respectively. The effective termination date for CANTER RIDE is 31 March 1976.


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4. (c) CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), Herlong, CA
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) The two confidential sources are providing coverage of the Priority I activities of SIAD which are Exclusion Areas I and II. Two conventional sources and one casual source cover the Priority II activities which are the staff and security organizations of the Depot. One individual assigned to the Special Weapons Section, Exclusion Area II is under assessment as a potential source.
- (2) The Quarterly Progress Report for the 2d Quarter, FY 76, which had been postponed at the request of the CDR, SIAD, was presented by the PLO on 13 Feb 76 to the following SIAD officials: COL Robert Hawlk, CDR, SIAD; LTC Robert Render, Deputy CDR; MAJ Robert Folster, Security Officer; CPT Wayne Heringer, Intelligence Officer and Mr. Anthony Tornabene, Assistant Intelligence Officer. The following personnel from the 525th MI Group also attended the briefing: COL Donald Bradbury, CDR; LTC Arthur McQueen, Operations Officer, and MAJ Trevor Bissey, CDR, San Francisco Field Office.
- (3) ICIP Sources have been tasked to report any significant counter-intelligence EEI or indicators of hostile intelligence activity impacting on Operation Rocking Force (U), a special weapons project presently in progress at SIAD.
- (4) The Quarterly Progress Briefing for the 3d Quarter, FY 76, will be presented by the PLO on or about 30 April 1976 to the SIAD officials listed in paragraph 5e(2), above.

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
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
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- 5. (C) CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation 4 Feb 75)
- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) The Limited Investigation reported in the last quarter on the PTC NCO who had attempted suicide and allegedly had involved himself in financial troubles, drugs, and homosexuality was completed and referred to PTC for adjudication. The decision was made not to revoke the NCO's security clearance since he left the service on 9 April 1976 and will not be allowed to re-enlist.
- (2) During the course of an investigation of an enlisted WAC member of PTC with a SECRET security clearance who was Absent-Without-Leave, it was discovered that CID, ft Meyer was also investigating her for theft and trafficking in drugs. The Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and CID agents coordinated their mutual investigations. Drug charges are pending the results of laboratory tests of substances purchased from the WAC by CID informants. PTC has suspended the WAC's access to classified material pending completion of the investigation.
- (3) The PLO arranged with appropriate 902d MI Group elements to present formal SAEDA briefings to all PTC personnel, including the PTC elements in the Hoffman and Forrestal Buildings. This project is scheduled for completion in the next quarter.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) The Hoffman Telecommunications Center has been brought under coverage of this ICIP, as requested by COL Donald E. Clark, PTC Commander, in the previous quarter.
- (2) On 24 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progess Briefing to COL Clark, CDR, PTC. CW2 Leonard Gross, Alternate PLO, was also present at the briefing.

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6. (C) CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Adelphi, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) As a follow-up implementation of "Lessons Learned" in the courtesy penetration test conducted at HDL's Adelphi Facility in the previous quarter, the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and the HDL Security Officer prepared and delivered a series of lectures and classes to the HDL Guard Force on the penetration test. The Guard Force is operating under new instructions designed to thwart attempted penetrations. A new HDL Badge and Pass System, utilizing a magnetic coded badge and a computer control device, will be started in mid-1976.
- (2) The PLO delivered lectures on the penetration test conducted at HDL to the faculty and students of the Counterintelligence Dept, US Army Intelligence Corps School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, on 20 and 21 January 1976.
- (3) The PLO, assisted by other 902d MI Group personnel conducted several technical inspections at HDL. The PLO provided advice and assistance at several design meetings concerning new buildings at HDL.
- (4) Other security advice was provided by the PLO to the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), Woodbridge, VA, and the Gaithersburg Test Site (GTS), Gaithersburg, MD. The PLO assisted in devising Operational Security techniques at these sites, the only HDL facilities at which outdoor testing takes place. HDL requested to be placed on distribution for the SATRAN II system but had not received any output from the system as of the close of the reporting period.
 - e. Operational Status:

On 16 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Briefing to MAJ Kenneth F. Keller, Executive Officer, HDL, and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL.

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
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
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8. (2) LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None ${f N}$
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) A confidential source reported that unknown persons had attempted on 11 January 1976 to penetrate the TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity (TRASANA). On 12 January 1976, it was reported that an unidentified individual claiming to be a colonel had been permitted to enter the TRASANA Compound. These incidents were reported immediately to the Security Officer, TRASANA. An investigation by TRASANA security personnel disclosed that there was no substance to the 11 January report and the person in the second incident of 12 January was identified and found to be a legitimate entrant into the facility. The incidents did serve to illustrate the security awareness of the source and the personnel involved.
- (2) A source surfaced information on 4 February 1976 that two enlisted soldiers at TRASANA were engaged in drug trafficking, but in separate individual operations. Local on-post investigation resulted in apprehension of one of the individuals. All available information on the second individual was reported to the Sixth Region, US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command for appropriate action.
- (3) A confidential source reported in March 1976 in three reports that such devices as radios, tape recorders, and "pocket" digital calculators were being brought into a TRASANA Exclusion Area by personnel having access to the area. These devices reportedly could affect the computers used in the area, some of which have classified data in storage. The Activity Security Officer has been briefed on these alleged practices and ICIP project personnel have been tasked to provide follow-up reports on action taken by the supported command. The information contained in the reports has been provided to the Counterintelligence Services and SAVE Team elements at USAINTA as a matter of interest.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) The two confidential sources provide coverage of TRASANA and the US Army Electronics Command, Office of Missile Electronics Warfare (OMEW), WSMR. One individual assigned to the US Army Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate is under assessment as a potential source.
- (2) The Quarterly Progress Briefing, postponed at the request of MG O. L. Tobiason, CDR, WSMR, will be presented during the next quarter.

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GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Revalidation - 11 Jul 75)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), and Edgewood Arsenal, Aberdeen, MD
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:

A confidential source identified an individual in the Biomedical Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, as an alien enlistee. Project personnel briefed the appropriate security personnel and a background investigation, to include a polygraph examination, was initiated. The investigation had not been concluded at the close of the quarter.

- e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 23 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, CDR, APG, on those activities pertaining to the Aberdeen area. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG, was present also.
- (2) On 25 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report on Edgewood Arsenal activities to COL Kenneth L. Stahl, CDR, Edgewood Arsenal, with CPT Vincent J. Palconio, Chief, Security Office, Edgewood Arsenal, also present.

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8. (2) LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), MM
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) A confidential source reported that unknown persons had attempted on 11 January 1976 to penetrate the TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity (TRASANA). On 12 January 1976, it was reported that an unidentified individual claiming to be a colonel had been permitted to enter the TRASANA Compound. These incidents were reported immediately to the Security Officer, TRASANA. An investigation by TRASANA security personnel disclosed that there was no substance to the 11 January report and the person in the second incident of 12 January was identified and found to be a legitimate entrant into the facility. The incidents did serve to illustrate the security awareness of the source and the personnel involved.
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 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) The two confidential sources provide coverage of TRASANA and the US Army Electronics Command, Office of Missile Electronics Warfare (OMEW), WSMR. One individual assigned to the US Army Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate is under assessment as a potential source.
- (2) The Quarterly Progress Briefing, postponed at the request of MG O. L. Tobiason, CDR, WSMR, will be presented during the next quarter.

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9(8)(C) LENTIL MONKEY: (OACS) Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a (W)Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA

 $\mathfrak{b}(\mathcal{U})$ Confidential Source Utilization: Eight

c. (W)Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:

d. Useful Information Obtained:

(16) The female instructor in the Czechoslovakian Language Department reported in the last quarter as preparing to resign her position and return to Czechoslovakia now is reportedly having serious health problems.

Referred

(2) (2) A Polish Language Department instructor plans to visit his mother and a brother in Warsaw in mid-1976, a confidential source has learned. The instructor has submitted no formal request to DLI for the trip yet. The instructor's activities are monitored as a matter of intelligence interest because of his and his brother's travels. His brother, a medical doctor has visited in the US and Canada frequently over the last 20 years and was once detained by US Customs at the Canadian border for attempting to smuggle Communist propaganda into the US. During a 1974 visit to the US, the instructor's brother visited DLI, attended Polish Language Department functions, talked with and photograhed the students. USAINTA is monitoring the instructor's activities.

(3) WA Czech language instructor is continuing his efforts to obtain the release of his children from Czechoslovakia. A confidential source surfaced the most recent information that the Czech Government has informed the instructor he could get his children out of the country if he pays the Czech Government \$66,000. (\$6,000 for the cost of his time in a Czech prison and \$60,000 as an educational tax on his and his wife's education.) Source did not have further information on this particular aspect, but reported that in mid-February 1976 the instructor gave many of the DLI Czech students a list of newly published books in the Czech language. The books are distributed by a Canadian firm, "Sixty Eight Publishers," Box 695 Station A, Toronto, Ontario M5W 1G2 Canada. The instructor told his classes that the Czech military had officially changed their method of counting for example, using "21" instead of "1 and 20." Insignificant in itself, this last item indicates that the instructor is maintaining ties with Czechoslovakian officials. USAJNIA is monitoring the instructor's activities.

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(4) Information developed from official sources during the period disclosed that an instructor of the Russian Language Department (RLD) apparently is suffering from mental problems. The instructor has written letters to a California senator, a nationally syndicated columnist, and the FBI, alleging that he is under surveillance of Soviet and US intelligence constantly and that his life is in danger. The Commander, USAINTA, provided a summary report on the instructor to the ACSI. The instructor later sent a telegram to the President of the United States. Both the FBI and the Secret Service have made inquiries into the matter. On 23 March 1976, the Commandant, DLI, took administrative action directing the instructor to undergo psychiatric evaluation. The instructor refused initially and was administratively suspended from teaching. At the end of the quarter, the instructor agreed to the examination and final disposition of the matter is pending.

e. Operational Status:

- (1) As a result of the RLD incident described in d(4), above, the DLI Commandant has directed that the Civilian Personnel Office and Security Office screen records of faculty members for indications of mental problems. Once identified, action will be taken to obtain treatment for the individuals concerned.
- (2) Eight confidential sources were utilized during the quarter; three sources were terminated due to graduation. Four new confidential sources were recruited, including one Technical Language Assistant (TLA). Fifteen individuals are under assessment as possible sources, including one instructor and one TLA. In addition to the confidential sources, there are 16 conventional sources providing coverage of seven language departments and the DLI staff.
- (3) On 29 March 1976, the PLO presented the Quarterly Briefing to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI. Also present at the briefing were COL Donald K. Bradbury, CDR, 525th MI Group; MAJ Trevor Bissey, CDR, San Francisco Field Office, 525th MI Group; CPT Brendon A. Niques, SAIC, Ft Ori Resident Office, 525th MI Group; and Mr. James Green, Asst Security Officer, DLI.

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1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976


CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD

- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 -31 Mar 76:
- (1) Confidential and conventional sources employed in the operation surfaced information on adverse suitability pertaining to 86 employees at Fort Ritchie, all of whom had security clearances and access to one of the sensitive activities supported. The suitability information included the entire spectrum in this category alcohol and drug abuse, moral improprieties and mental instability. In these instances investigative action was taken to refute or substantiate the allegations or the individuals were removed from access to classified information. About 50% of the cases reported involved some degree of drug abuse; these were referred to the Criminal Investigation Division for action.
- (2) Two separate reports were received concerning suspected Soviet Intelligence presence and interest in the activities of the supported installation. Details of these reports were provided the FBI in May 1975 In one instance an individual resembling a known KGB agent paid an unusual amount of attention to shipment of sensitive cargo to Fort Ritchie; in the second instance an individual assigned to Fort Ritchie reported that a second person whom he had met claimed to be in contact with the Soviets in Hagerstown, MD. As of 31 Mar 76, the FBI investigations of the reports were inconclusive.
- (3) An ICIP source reported a possible compromise occurred when the Telecommunications Directorate, Site R, was tasked to prepare a special test tape containing test messages which could be used for coding and to devise compatibility between two computer systems. The test tape, though it consisted only of innocuous, unclassified messages, also contained fragments of sensitive, highly classified messages which had been picked up from residual magnetism on the reels of the equipment when the messages were recorded. This latter condition was not discovered until processing to make the systems compatible took place, after the tape had lain unsecured, in open storage, for about six weeks. A command investigation of the incident followed and a determination was made that apparently a compromise had not occurred, but as a result of the incident, changed security procedures were put into effect for the handling and storage of computer tapes, reels, and discs.

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(4) Two possible SAEDA approaches to soldiers stationed at Fort Ritchie in January 1976 are currently under investigation by USAINTA and the FBI. Reports of a Fort Ritchie NCO Club bartender professing to be employed by the "CIA" and "military intelligence" are currently being investigated by USAINTA.

(5) In March 1976, an Army NCO assigned sensitive duties at Fort Ritchie volunteered that he had contacted by letter an agency of the East German Government. The NCO desired to make the matter of the contact part of official records in the event he should be later contacted by any agency or person from East Germany. Though the NCO's action was part of his research of his family history and ostensibly is an overt, sincere effort on his part, the East German Intelligence Services (EGIS) often take such opportunities to make intelligence approaches, especially if the US soldier-target has special clearances and access to sensitive information. The NCO is under instructions to report any responses to his letter.

d Operational Status:

(10) CANARY EFFORT was first approved for implementation by OACSI, DA, on 11 June 1965.

(2) In Feb 76, the 902d MI Group selected Operation CANARY EFFORT to be terminated and replaced by an overt, direct support counterintelligence program. Supported commanders were briefed on the termination action during the quarter ending 31 Mar 76. All confidential sources used in the ICIP have been terminated. The CDR, USAINTA, and the ACSI verbally approved the termination on 20 and 23 Feb 76, respectively.


(3) During the reporting	period,	b1		·			-
b1			and	travel,	and	3,255	-
manhours were expended.	-	,					

(4)(1) The Operation yielded 69 information reports and 116 other reports which were chiefly verbal reports provided to the supported commanders.

e Comments: The ICIP at Fort Ritchie clearly has been a productive operation at a critically sensitive installation. Information obtained as a result of the ICIP and acted upon by the commanders concerned has served to strengthen the security of the installation. The 902d MI Group believes that effective counterintelligence support to the installation can be continued under an overt comprehensive counterintelligence support program, which replaced the present ICIP effective 31 Mar 76.

f(.())Recommendation: None.





1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a(U)Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY


b (Unformation Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None

 $c(\mathcal{U})$ Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76: There was no significant information obtained during the period and there were no indications of any overt threat to the installation.

de Operational Status: CANINE PLATE was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 18 Sep 73. During the reporting period 400 manhours were expended in the ICIP. However, there were no reports submitted, no funds expended, neither TDY nor b1 There were no confidential sources utilized, only conventional sources.

e.(1)Comments: The installation's mission remains the same, a supply depot for missile and artillery weapons systems with a nuclear capability. The Depot is considered a critical and sensitive installation; therefore, remains as a potential target for HOIS. However, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the ICIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation.

f(U)Recommendation: That the ICIP CANINE PLATE be terminated but that increased overt liaison with additional security support be provided the installation commander.



1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (1) An inserted covert confidential source was employed in this operation to attempt to learn the existing situation in the Optical Guidance Technology Office (OGTO), Advanced Sensors Directorate, USAMICOM, when reports received in 1974 alleged that lax security practices had led to loss and possible compremise of classified information and that several employees were engaging in sex orgies in offices during the day. In Sep 74, the CG, USAMICOM, conducted a Command Investigation as a result of these reports under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6. As a result of that investigation, the CG, USAMICOM, requested that an ICIP operation be conducted in OGTO. The Source, once in place, had to rely chiefly upon elicitation to obtain his information because of his covert status, but during the period, did succeed in surfacing adverse suitability information on a civilian physicist with access to sensitive, SECRET information which indicated that he was probably the catalyst for the sexually-oriented activities of the CGTO employees. The employee, apparently obsessed with sex, had numerous extra-marital relations during the last five years. The Commander, USAMICOM, was provided a summary of information on the employee for appropriate command action. The employee transferred to another office in USAMICOM, which apparently broke up the clique and Source could uncover no new evidence of continuing activities among the remaining employees.
- (2) In addition to the above, the Source provided substantial information on security weaknesses in the supported command to include poor housekeeping practices, lack of control of reproduction facilities, lack of proper control of area access, lax security attitudes, and possible compromise of security badges through continued losses by individuals. Source provided such security weakness and hazard details to the Project Case Officer who relayed it to overt MI project personnel at Redstone. The Project Liaison Officer provided these reports to the USAMICOM Commanding General and appropriate security personnel who have taken actions to remedy the security weaknesses.

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- d. Operational Status:
- (1) CANTER RIDE was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 4 Mar 75.
- (2) During the period, \$1,315 in TDY and travel expenses were incurred b1 A total of 697 manhours were expended in the operation.
- (3) The operation yielded one Summary of Information and several oral reports on security weaknesses.
- (4) As the result of an 18 Feb 76 briefing presented to the USAMICOM Commanding General, the MI Group conducting the Operation, the project personnel, and the supported commander concurred in findings that the Operation had accomplished its original objective and should therefore be terminated. The CG, USAMICOM, declared that the operation was a success. The insert Source used in the operation has been withdrawn and reassigned. The CDR, USAINTA, and the ACSI verbally approved the termination of CANTER RIDE on 20 and 23 Feb 76, respectively.
- e. Comments: Counterintelligence support continues to be provided by elements of the MI Group stationed at USAMICOM.
 - f. Recommendation: None.




1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(e) CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), US Army Materiel Command, Herlong, CA
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During the Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:
- (1) Reports alleged the use of illegal drugs by military personnel at SIAD. However, no details were available.
- (2) Information was reported that an exclusion area personal identification badge was missing and that an inquiry failed to find or determine how the badge was lost. As a result of the missing badge incident, new identification badges were issued.
- (3) An enlisted man assigned to SIAD was charged with malicious damage of a generator at SIAD and his security clearance was revoked by the Commander, SIAD.
 - d. Operational Status:
- (1) During the reporting period 616 manhours were expended and 14 Agent Reports were submitted.
- (2) TDY funds totalling \$29.35 were expended; there were no b1 expenses.
- (3) At the end of the reporting period two confidential sources were being used.
 - e. Comments:
 - (1) This ICIP was administratively implemented in April 1974.
- (2) The mission of the Sierra Army Depot (SIAD) is the operation of the Depot for the receipt, storage, issue, maintenance, and disposal of missile and artillery weapons with a nuclear capability. Included in the items handled by SIAD are ammunition, special weapons materials, propellants, explosive components of guided missiles, supplies, petroleum and chemical supplies, fire control test and measuring equipment, and other special weapons with a nuclear capability. SIAD also maintains a capability for systems modification in support of the joint AEC/DOD test firing programs.

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- (3) Sierra Army Depot is the major storage area for special weapons in the western part of the US. The special weapons that formerly were located at the Safeguard anti-Ballistic Missile Site and Savanna Army Depot are now at SIAD, which elevates it to one of the most important special weapons repositories in the US. The Depot is located in a remote area and its contents make it not only of interest to hostile intelligence, but also a target of terrorist groups who are involved in nuclear theft and blackmail.
- (4) The Department of Army Sensitive Installation and Unit List, January 1976, lists SIAD as "Critically Sensitive (CS)."
- (5) A large portion of the work force is in exclusion areas so access to them on a daily basis is severely restricted for project personnel. Coverage of these areas by confidential sources thus becomes necessary for effective CI coverage. A 20 Sep 75 report of the Nuclear Defense Agency entitled "Adversary View and Support Nuclear Weapon Site Security; Adversary Capabilities," in assessing terrorist groups tactics employed to acquire a nuclear device and options available, cites the method most likely to succeed as one in which a member of the regular work force has been approached, recruited and is on the terrorist groups payroll. The detection of this type of activity among members of a work force in an exclusion area is greatly enhanced by employing a confidential source program. At the close of the reporting period, two confidential sources were being utilized in the operation to cover the Priority I Exclusion Area. A third individual is under assessment as a potential confidential source.
- (6) Hostile intelligence services have high priority collection objectives pertaining to such activities as those conducted at SIAD.
- (7) The SIAD, as outlined briefly in subpara (5) and (6), above, appears highly vulnerable to a double threat, that posed by the increasingly active terrorist groups who operate on a global scale and the ever present threat of HoIS penetration. The ICIP is necessary as an additional means to provide "early warnings" to assist the Commander in formulating necessary plans and taking proper action to protect the sensitive and highly-destructive special weapons stored at this location.
- (8) At the most recent Quarterly Briefing on 13 Feb 76, the SIAD Commander indicated that he was pleased with the type of support being provided and requested continuation of the ICIP.
- f. Recommendation: In view of the above, recommend that ICIP CANVAS TAX be continued.

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1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During the Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:
- (1) An ICIP source reported that a PTC civilian employee was transferred from the coding and decoding section because he had coded an obscene message that was to be sent to an overseas user. Additionally, the ICIP source provided information concerning possible security violations involving the employee. Because of the employee's questionable suitability characteristics and conduct he was assigned to a job in PTC requiring minimum contact with classified information. Supervisors will continue to monitor his conduct and activities.
- (2) An Army NCO assigned to PTC attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. As a result of the information gained concerning the suicide attempt a Limited Investigation was initiated. The NCO was assigned to the Logistics Branch, PTC, pending results of the investigation. The investigation revealed that the NCO has a large number of outstanding debts, has lied on loan applications, and had ordered a 1976 automobile which cost in excess of five thousand dollars. Interviews concerning the NCO revealed alleged drug usage and homosexuality. The Limited Investigation was completed and referred to PTC for adjudication. The decision was made not to revoke the NCO's security clearance since he left the service on 9 April 1976 and will not be allowed to re-enlist.
- (3) Adverse suitability information was reported on two additional NCOs assigned to PTC. Based on medical reports and rebellious attitudes one NCO was released from the Army by board action. The second NCO after a night of heavy drinking began hitting his wife when she tried to arouse him after he had "passed out." The wife filed assault charges with the Military Police but withdrew them later. The PTC commander counselled the NCO on his drinking and marital problems and assigned him duties where he has no access to classified information.

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
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
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(4) During the course of an investigation of an enlisted WAC member of PTC who was away-without-leave (KAWOL Investigation), it was discovered that the CID was also investigating her for theft and trafficking in drugs. The MI representative and CID agents coordinated their mutual investigations. PTC has suspended the WAC's access to classified material pending completion of the investigation.

d. Operational Status:

- (1) CENSUS TIME was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 5 Feb 74.
- (2) During the period of 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976, 726 manhours were expended, no TDY nor b1 funds were used. The operation produced seven information reports. One confidential source was used during the period but was terminated during the latter part of the period.
- e. Comments: The PTC operations include an extremely high volume of multimedia ultra sensitive compartmented classified traffic processed at the highest level of the military establishment command group being served, and includes the cryptographic operation, maintenance and logistical mission and support rendered to the JCS, the NMCC, departments and executive agencies of the government allied embassies, and the United Nations Building in New York. The installation remains as a potential target for HOIS; however, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the ICIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation and implementing an overt direct support comprehensive counterintelligence program. In view of the above the continuation of an ICIP is not warranted at this time.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENSUS TIME be terminated and an increased overt liaison with additional direct security support be provided the installation commander.





1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

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CENTAVO KID:

(OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, (HDL), Adelphia, MD

b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None

- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 -31 Mar 76:
- (1) Information was received that a First Secretary at the USSR Embassy, Washington, DC had visited HDL on two occasions. On one occasion he attended a meeting of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, INC., a professional society for engineers which was held in the auditorium of HDL. The subject matter presented during the meeting was unclassified. At a second meeting of the society the Soviet Embassy official was denied entry. A report of the incidents were provided to the FBI and the Commander, HDL, made a determination that the society could no longer hold meetings at HDL in order to preclude any potential security threat.
- (2) On two occasions an unidentified light aircraft flew over the test site, Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), HDL, where a series of tests on foreign equipment under the Range Emory program was in progress. In both instances the aircraft circled over the Range Emory test cite for about 5-7 minutes. The overflights are being investigated in coordination with the FBI.
- (3) An employee, HDL, made allegations of immoral activities by members of the HDL Security Office and a group at the Van Ness Avenue Facility, HDL. The employee claimed that she was being followed by members of the HDL Security Office. After investigating the employee's story, the Commander, HDL, believed that she was suffering from psychiatric problems and would have her visit a psychiatrist for a complete evaluation.
- (4) Suitability information concerning an employee of the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF) a branch of HDL located in Woodbridge, VA, involved a problem of alcohol abuse. After counseling, the employee participated in a rehabilitation program.

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(5) A courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted and revealed several security weaknesses which were corrected by the supported command. As a result of the test a number of security guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. In addition a new magnetic coded badge was approved for purchase in FY 77. As a follow-up implementation of "Lessons Learned" in the penetration test the ICIP Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and the HDL Security Officer prepared and delivered a series of lectures and classes to the HDL guard force on the penetration test. Additionally, the PLO delivered lectures on the penetration test to the faculty and students of the Counterintelligence Dept, US Army Intelligence Corps School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

d. Operational Status

- (1) During the reporting period 880 manhours were expended, 18 information reports were submitted and 41 memorandums were prepared and provided to the supported commander.
 - (2) No TDY or b1 funds were expended.

e. Comments

- (1) ICIP CENTAVO KID was approved by OACSI, DA, 18 Oct 73 and the supported commander was briefed on the implementation of the operation on 12 November 1973.
- (2) The mission of the HDL includes critical sensitive research and development activities in support of the US Army. Some of the more sensitive activities include research into the hardening of communications equipment against nuclear weapons radiation; tests of nuclear warhead and missile systems to determine their ability to withstand nuclear weapons radiation; develop fuses for use with nuclear warheads and conducts development and testing of radiation hardened systems for Minutemen and Poseidon Missiles.
- (3) The installation remains a potential target for HOIS and the hostile intelligence service have an interest in the research and development activities of the type conducted at HDL. However, the amount of significant information surfaced by the ICIP does not warrant the expenditure of manhours at this time to continue the ICIP.
- (4) The MI Group is reviewing the ICIP with a view of terminating the program and instead implementing an overt direct support counterintelligence program.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENTAVO KID be terminated and an overt direct support counterintelligence program be implemented.



1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

GONDOLÁ STAR: (OACSI Revalidation - 16 Jan 76)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) and Edgewood Arsenal (EA), Aberdeen, MD
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported ob Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (1) Confidential and conventional sources employed in the operation surfaced information on adverse suitability pertaining to 13 employees at Aberdeen Proving Ground/Edgewood Arsenal. The suitability information included alcohol and drug abuse, moral improprieties, fraudulent claim on a TDY voucher and mental instability. Action was taken to substantiate or refute the reported allegations.
- (2) Sources reported four instances of alien enlistees who were assigned to the sensitive installations. The Installation Intelligence Officer (IIO) was aware of the status of the four, that they did not have security clearances and had no access to classified information.
- (3) Sources reported three instances of foreign travel during the period. One of these individuals who traveled to the USSR after attending a scientific conference in Finland is being exploited as a DOMEX lead. In another instance, a civilian employee visited Poland and Czechoslovakia for about one month in June-July 1975. The employee and his spouse allegedly visited relatives in both countries. The employee has been debriefed by USAINTA. Source reported that the employee plans to travel to these countries again in 1976. In another instance, husband and wife DOD employees took a Smithsonian Institution-sponsored tour to Moscow and Leningrad. The husband has been debriefed by USAINTA and the wife will be debriefed at her convenience. Source reported that the couple planned to take another trip to Russia in 1976.
- (4) Sources reported several instances of foreign contact by military and DOD civilian personnel in the supported activity. In one instance a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany was assigned on an exchange program to work until Sep 76. A report of a civilian DOD at Edgewood Arsenal with some unexplained periods of time in his background prompted a request for a Limited Investigation from the supported command.

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- (5) Sources reported two instances of Swedish citizens visiting the installations. It was determined that the one visit had been fully coordinated with the proper officials. In the second instance, it was determined that the visit had not been properly coordinated but that steps had been taken to insure the visitors would not be given access to classified information until guidance was provided by higher headquarters.
- (6) Sources reported numerous instances of security weaknesses or poor security practices. These included unattended offices in which security containers were left open, a CONFIDENTIAL document left unsecured over a three day weekend, poorly controlled access to a classified scientific conference, movement of an office into a building in which no technical survey had been conducted prior to the move, typewriter ribbons and carbon papers not being disposed of as classified waste, and a high-ranking civilian employee bringing his eight year old son into a controlled access area where a classified test was being conducted and remaining overnight.

d. Operational Status:

- (1) GONDOLA STAR was first approved by OACSI, DA for implementation on 21 May 1965. On 18 Feb 75, the ACSI directed the termination of 12 ICIPS, including GONDOLA STAR, by 31 Mar 75. After reviewing correspondence initiated by the Commander, Aberdeen Proving Ground, which recommended that the ICIP GONDOLA STAR be continued, the ACSI reinstated the operation for a period of six months on 11 Jul 75, subject to a review after the six months elapsed. On 16 Jan 76, the ACSI approved continuation of the ICIP as an ongoing operation. The following statistics are for the period 11 Jul 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (2) During the reporting period 2,223 manhours were expended and 84 written information reports and 16 oral reports were submitted. The operation cost \$700 in ICF, no TDY funds were expended.
- (3) At the end of the reporting period eight confidential sources were being used in the operation.
- e. Comments: The ICIP has been a productive operation at a critically sensitive installation. Information obtained as a result of the ICIP and acted upon by the commanders concerned has served to strengthen the security of the installation. The 902d MI Group is conducting a comprehensive review of this operation for possible replacement of the operation by an overt counterintelligence support program.
- f. Recommendation: Recommend that ICIP GONDOLA STAR be continued pending completion of the 902d MI Group review.

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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM

b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None

c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76:

- (1) Several reports from confidential sources during the period indicated that employees in the TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity (TRASAMA) and the Army Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate (ARMTED) were following poor security practices in daily activities and not adhering to security regulations for safeguarding sensitive classified information. These security hazards included leaving security containers open and unattended for periods during the day, failing to complete security forms affixed to classified material containers, leaving classified material in work boxes after duty hours, and laxity on the part of security guards during night shifts. Security Officers of both TRASAMA and ARMTED after being provided reports on these weaknesses briefed all their employees on requirements of WSMR Regulation 330-5 (Security Regulation) and reoriented all guard personnel on their security obligations.
- (2) A confidential source reported that a US Army Officer assigned to the Office of Missile Electronics Warfard (CMEV) was misappropriating computer parts and electronic equipment which he was taking home to build his own computer. A summary of available information was provided the US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command for investigation by that agency. The same confidential source reported on 4 Feb 76 that two enlisted soldiers in sensitive positions in TRASANA were engaged in drug trafficking, but in separate operations. Local on-post investigation by the White Sands Missile Range Provost Marshal resulted in apprehension of one of the individuals. Information on the second soldier, allegedly involved in large-scale drug transactions and with criminal contacts, was reported to the Sixth Region, US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command for appropriate investigation.
- (3) A confidential source reported that unknown persons had attempted on 11 Jan 76 to penetrate TRASANA, which is an Exclusion Area. On 12 Jan 76, the source reported an unidentified individual claiming to be a colonel had been permitted to enter the TRASANA Compound without the required identification. Investigations by the TRASANA security personnel disclosed that there was no substance to the 11 January report and the

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person in the 12 January incident was identified and found to be a legitimate entrant into the facility. The incident did serve to illustrate the security awareness of the source and the personnel involved.


(4) A confidential source reported in March 1976 in three reports that devices, such as radios, tape recorders, and "pocket" digital calculators were being brought into a TRASANA Exclusion Area by personnel having access to the area. Many of the computers used in the area have classified information storage and the above-named devices allegedly can affect the computers' operations. The appropriate Security Officer has been appraised of these practices. ICIP project personnel have been tasked to provide follow-up reports on actions taken by the supported command. The information has also been provided as a matter of interest to the Counterintelligence Services and SAVE Team elements at USAINTA.

d. Operational Status:

- (1) LENS HOLDER was first approved by the ACSI, DA, for implementation on 16 Sep 74.
- (2) Two confidential sources provide coverage of the two principle supported activities, TRASANA and OMEW. An additional individual in the ARMITED is being assessed as a potential source.
- (3) During the reporting period, 1,053 manhours were expended. The operation cost b1 there were no TDY outlays. The operation produced 36 written information reports and 24 memorandums and oral reports.

e. Comments:


(1) The mission of the White Sands Missile Range has remained unchanged since the inauguration of the ICIP and the previous OACSI revalidation on 4 Feb 75. The mission of WSMR is to evaluate the Safeguard Missile System missile vulnerability studies, missile control systems, and perform pre-production tests and analyses of missile systems. The mission of WSMR makes it a prime target of hostile intelligence. Activities at WSMR which have Priority I requirements for support are TRASANA, OMEW, ARMTED, the National Range Operations Directorate, and the US Army Safeguard Systems Evaluation Agency. These elements develop electronic countermeasures techniques to nullify vulnerabilities discovered in missile systems, conduct pre-production tests of rocket and guided missile systems, operate a nuclear effects facility and operate National Range Facilities for tests conducted at WSMR.





- (2) The operation to date has proven to have value as an adjunct to the installation security program. The isolation of the installation, disperson of many of its facilities, and the extent and nature of its computer facilities and missile testing ranges present a lucrative target for hostile intelligence service (HoIS) penetration. USMR's proximity to the US-Mexican border renders it vulnerable to HoIS operations based in a foreign country. Admittedly, the operation to date has not surfaced hard evidence of HoIS presence or penetration, but the scope of the threat must be recognized. Details of activities conducted at the site are of current interest to HoIS. The two-pronged capability of the ICIP, that is, extensive use of overt sources of all types, plus the covert effort exemplified by the confidential sources, appears to be a necessary coverage at this time with the best potential for detection and discovery of HoIS activities.
- f. Recommendation: Based on the above, recommend that $ICIP\ LENS\ HOLDER$ be continued.

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ON SEP -5 1997
ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD \$200.1-R



1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76:
- (1) A source in the Chinese-Mandarin Language Department furnished information concerning a temporary instructor of that department who closely questioned her students about their knowledge of their future duties and assignments. She frequently expressed her displeasure in the task of teaching Chinese to students which would enable tham to "conduct spying activities" directed at the People's Republic of China (PRC). The instructor also displayed a rebellious and uncooperative attitude toward necessary DLI administrative requirements. Born in Canton, China, she was a British citizen and no evidence of a preemployment investigation could be found. DLI refused to renew her contract when it expired in Sep 75 and she departed DLI in that month.
- (2) A Confidential Source reported information on an instructor of the German Language Department who travelled to East Germany in mid-1975 without notification or permission from DLI authorities. Upon completion of the travel, the instructor was admonished officially and informed that any future violation of the DLT regulations on foreign travel would result in temporary suspension.
- (3) A visitor to the Russian Language Department in May 75 requested copies of training material used in the Russian Dept, claiming that he wanted it to use for language training in his reserve unit. The visitor was given two unclassified training exercises. Subsequent investigation identified the visitor and established that he was a former graduate of Investigation, did serve to underscor control at DLI. The Director, DLI, placed unauthorized visitors and proper procedures for handling them. New visitor requirements and restrictions were published and distributed throughout DLI, placed.

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 Entire IRCHARGE AND COMPORTS. Russian at DLI, and additionally, that he was a bona fide member of a California-based Army Reserve unit. The incident, although not of a major significance as proven by the later investigation, did serve to underscore

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
- (4) An instructor in the Hungarian Language Department travelled to Hungary in Sep 75 with a stated purpose of visiting relatives. A review of the instructor's file revealed extensive foreign travel in Europe since 1971 and frequent contact with relatives and other persons in Hungary. File checks and inquiries of other agencies failed to reveal any substantial derogatory information concerning the instructor, but the potential hostage situation is evident in the continuing contacts. Monitoring of the instructor's activities continues.
- (5) An ICIP source reported that an instructor in the Russian Language Department allegedly is a former member of the Soviet Army's equivalent to the US Army Security Agency who while in the Soviet Army received special training in English. This instructor left the USSR in Apr 74 and was hired at DLI in Oct 74. A cowerker of the instructor left the Soviet Union in Apr 75 and was also hired as an instructor at DLI in Jul 75. Both of the instructors taught together at the Leningrad Herzen Pedagogical Institute in Leningrad in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The sequence of these events illustrate how quickly these individuals are able to secure employment after leaving the USSR, employment in which they are placed in extremely close contact with US intelligence personnel. Monitoring of the activities of these individuals continues.
- (6) Two instructors in the Bulgarian Language Department who are man and wife were accused by fellow faculty members at DLI of being communists because of the unexplained details of their emigration to the West and the manner in which they left Bulgaria. The allegations led to charges and countercharges; full details of the incident were provided the FBI. The wife remains at DLI as an instructor, but as of the close of the reporting period on 31 Mar 76, the husband was employed elsewhere and no longer DOD-affiliated.
- (7) A DLI employee of the Hebrew Project at DLI also created considerable internal dissension and bickering within the Hebrew Department when he maintained close contact with the Israeli Consulate in San Francisco. This caused associates to become suspicious of his motives and high level contacts. The employee, an alien with an impressive background, including possible intelligence activities, later applied for employment with the National Security Agency (NSA), which has been provided all information available to USAINTA.
- (8) A confidential source reported that a Czechoslovakian Language Department (CLD) instructor was planning to withdraw her retirement fund money and return to Czechoslovakia with her two sons, allegedly to live there.

b1 Per FBI

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ON 20 MAR 1998

By CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO Auth Para 6-601 DOD 5200.1R SEGRET



b1 Referred

At the close of the reporting period possible health problems appeared as a deterrent to the wife's original plans, but definite decisions in this regard are unknown.

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
- (9) A second CLD instructor has disclosed to several sources over the last two years his continuing efforts to obtain the release of his children from Czechoslovakia. The Czech Government recently informed the instructor that he could obtain the release of his children if he pays the Czech Government \$66,000 as reimbursement for the cost of the time the instructor spent in a Czech prison and an education tax on the education acquired in Czechoslovakia by the instructor and his wife. The instructor disclosed that the Czech military had changed its method of counting. The reports indicate that the instructor is maintaining close, continuing ties with Czech Government officials and that a hostage situation with his children exists. Monitoring of his activities continues.
- (10) Monitoring also continues on activities of a Polish Language Department (PLD) instructor who plans to visit his mother and a brother in Warsaw in mid-1976. The instructor has not applied formally to DLI for approval for the leave and the trip. The instructor frequently has travelled in the past to Europe. His brother, a medical doctor also travels extensively, and has been in the US and Canada often during the last 20 years. During a 1974 visit to the US, the instructor's brother visited DLI, attended PLD functions at DLI, talked with the US Army students at length and photographed many of the students in attendance. US Customs once detained the instructor's brother at the Canadian border for attempting to smuggle Communist propaganda into the US; US Customs confiscated the propaganda.
- (11) An instructor in the Russian Language Department apparently is suffering from mental problems. The instructor has written to a California US Senator, a nationally syndicated columnist, and the FSI, alleging that he is constantly under surveillance by the Soviet KGB and US intelligence and further, that his life is in danger. The instructor also has sent a telegram to the President of the United States. Both the FBI and the Secret Service have made inquiries into the matter and conducted local investigations of the instructor. On 23 Mar 76, the DLI Commandant directed the instructor to undergo psychiatric evaluation. Initially, the instructor refused and was suspended from his duties administratively. At the end of the reporting period the instructor agreed to the examination. The results and final disposition are pinding.

Regraded SECRET

ON 20 MAR 1998

By CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO Auth Para 6-601 DOD 5200.1R





d. Operational Status:

- (1) LENTIL MONKEY was first approved by ACSI, DA, for implementation on 11 September 1967.
- (2) During the reporting period, 4,603 manhours were expended.

 b1 there were no TDY outlays.
- (3) Production consisted of 360 written information reports and 220 Memorandums and oral reports.
- (4) Eight confidential sources were active in the ICIP at the close of the period and additional coverage of language departments and administrative sections of DLI was obtained by 16 conventional sources.

e. Comments:

- (1) The mission of DLI is to train DOD intelligence and communications security specialists in every major foreign language. Military attaches, employees of the CIA and FBI, as well as other federal agencies, are also trained at DLI, making it an extremely enticing target for hostile intelligence service operatives. The majority of the faculty of DLI have foreign backgrounds, some have only recently arrived from Communist Bloc countries and rapidly achieved employment in an installation where most of the students are in intelligence or destined for intelligence assignments upon graduation. Many of these instructors are in hostage situations by virtue of close, living relatives in the Combloc countries with whom they maintain written contact and closer, if less frequent, personal contact. In maintaining contact with these Comblec countries for any reason whatsoever, intelligence agencies of those countries in all likelihood have identified the instructors' place of employment and may have contacted them under one guise or another.
- (2) In addition to extensive and frequent contacts with the governments of HoIS, many instructors who probably are completely imbued with the American way of life and are now US citizens or who intend to become citizens, nevertheless are vulnerable targets. The instructors acquire personal acquaintances among many intelligence personnel and, in the course of teaching and associating with the military in year-long classes, learn of the students' future assignments and do in some instances correspond with DLI alumnae after graduation. This unique characteristic of conditions at DLI serves to make the Institute an even more attractive target for HoIS approaches.
- (3) As shown by statistics in paragraph d(2), and d(3), above, ICIP LENTIL MONKEY is the most productive of all the presently active ICIPS with a total of 360 written reports. Though 4,603 monhours were expended in the project, the actual cash outlay of ICF was \$372 for the



year, the lowest cost figure for any of the active ICIPS. Viewed from the cost-yield ratio alone, this operation is an extremely successful, economical effort.

f. Recommendation: In view of the above recommend that $\ensuremath{\mathbb{R}}\xspace \text{CIP}$ LENTIL MONKEY be retained.

ON SEP -5 1997 FOUPO BY COR USAINSCOM FOUPO AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

Period: 1 Apr 1975 to 31 Mar 1976

INTERNAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

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;	HOURS	3,255	400	697	616	726	880	2,223	1,053	4,603	14,45	
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	INSTALLATION	USA Comm Cmd Ft Ritchie, MD	Seneca Army Depot, AMC, Romulus, NY	US Army Msle Cmd Redstone Arsenal, AL	Sierra Army Depot, AMC, Herlong, CA	Pentagon Telecom Ctr USACC - CONUS, Wash DC	Harry Diamond Labs AMC, Wash DC	Aberdeen Proving Gd Aberdeen, MD	White Sands Msle Rge,	DLI, Pres of M, CA TRADOC	TOTAL	
	ICIP	CANARY EFFORT	CANINE PLATE	CANTER RIDE	CANVAS TAX	CENSUS TIME	CENTAVO KID	GONDOLA STAR	LENS HOLDER	LENTIL MONKEY	655	-

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
DAMI-DOH

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

3. (U) Recommendation: That ltr TAB A be approved by the ACSI and signed

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DAKI-DOR

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintalligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Counander

US Army Intelligence Agency

ATTR: MILA-SO

Fort Maade, Maryland 20755

1. (U) Reference, 3d Quarter, FY 1976, ICIP Operations Report, wherein you recommended termination of three ICIP operations.

2. (C) ICIP operations, CANINE PLATE (U), CERSUS TIME (U), and CERTAVO KID (U) are formally terminated as recommended.

2. (U) Request that a full review of the remaining four active CONUS ICIP operations be conducted to determine the need for their continuance or discontinuance, and the results, with your recommendations, be forwarded to this office NLT 2# June 76.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP -5 1997 FOVPO
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO
AUTH PARA 1-603 Dod 6200.1-R

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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY.
- Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76: There was no significant information obtained during the period and there were no indications of any overt threat to the installation.
- d. Operational Status: CANINE PLATE was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 18 Sep 73. During the reporting period 400 manhours were expended in the ICIP. However, there were no reports submitted, no funds expended, neither TDY nor b1 There were no confidential sources utilized, only conventional sources.
- e. Comments: The installation's mission remains the same, a supply depot for missile and artillery weapons systems with a nuclear capability. The Depot is considered a critical and sensitive installation; therefore, remains as a potential target for HOIS. However, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the IGIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CANINE PLATE be terminated but that increased overt liaison with additional security support be provided the installation commander.

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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(C) CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During the Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:
- (1) An ICIP source reported that a PTC civilian employee was transferred from the coding and decoding section because he had coded an obscene message that was to be sent to an overseas user. Additionally, the ICIP source provided information concerning possible security violations involving the employee. Because of the employee's questionable suitability characteristics and conduct he was assigned to a job in PTC requiring minimum contact with classified information. Supervisors will continue to monitor his conduct and activities.
- (2) An Army NCO assigned to PTC attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. As a result of the information gained concerning the suicide attempt a Limited Investigation was initiated. The NCO was assigned to the Logistics Branch, PTC, pending results of the investigation. The investigation revealed that the NCO has a large number of outstanding debts, has lied on loan applications, and had ordered a 1976 automobile which cost in excess of five thousand dollars. Interviews concerning the NCO revealed alleged drug usage and homosexuality. The Limited Investigation was completed and referred to PTC for adjudication. The decision was made not to revoke the NCO's security clearance since he left the service on 9 April 1976 and will not be allowed to re-enlist.
- (3) Adverse suitability information was reported on two additional NCOs assigned to PTC. Based on medical reports and rebellious attitudes one NCO was released from the Army by board action. The second NCO after a night of heavy drinking began hitting his wife when she tried to arouse him after he had "passed out." The wife filed assault charges with the Military Police but withdrew them later. The PTC commander counselled the NCO on his drinking and marital problems and assigned him duties where he has no access to classified information.

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(4) During the course of an investigation of an enlisted WAC member of PTC who was away-without-leave (KAWOL Investigation), it was discovered that the CID was also investigating her for theft and trafficking in drugs. The MI representative and CID agents coordinated their mutual investigations. PTC has suspended the WAC's access to classified material pending completion of the investigation.

d. Operational Status:

- (1) CENSUS TIME was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 5 Feb 74.
- (2) During the period of 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976, 726 manhours were expended, no TDY nor b1 were used. The operation produced seven information reports. One considential source was used during the period but was terminated during the latter part of the period.
- e. Comments: The PTC operations include an extremely high volume of multimedia ultra sensitive compartmented classified traffic processed at the highest level of the military establishment command group being served, and includes the cryptographic operation, maintenance and logistical mission and support rendered to the JCS, the NMCC, departments and executive agencies of the government allied embassies, and the United Nations Building in New York. The installation remains as a potential target for HOIS; however, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the ICIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation and implementing an overt direct support comprehensive counterintelligence program. In view of the above the continuation of an ICIP is not warranted at this time.
 - f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENSUS TIME be terminated and an increased overt liaison with additional direct security support be provided the installation commander.



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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(C) CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, (HDL), Adelphia, MD
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 -31 Mar 76:
- (1) Information was received that a First Secretary at the USSR Embassy, Washington, DC had visited HDL on two occasions. On one occasion he attended a meeting of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, INC., a professional society for engineers which was held in the auditorium of HDL. The subject matter presented during the meeting was unclassified. At a second meeting of the society the Soviet Embassy official was denied entry. A report of the incidents were provided to the FBI and the Commander, HDL, made a determination that the society could no longer hold meetings at HDL in order to preclude any potential security threat.
- (2) On two occasions an unidentified light aircraft flew over the test site, Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), HDL, where a series of tests on foreign equipment under the Range Emory program was in progress. In both instances the aircraft circled over the Range Emory test cite for about 5-7 minutes. The overflights are being investigated in coordination with the FBI.
- (3) An employee, HDL, made allegations of immoral activities by members of the HDL Security Office and a group at the Van Ness Avenue Facility, HDL. The employee claimed that she was being followed by members of the HDL Security Office. After investigating the employee's story, the Commander, HDL, believed that she was suffering from psychiatric problems and would have her visit a psychiatrist for a complete evaluation.
- (4) Suitability information concerning an employee of the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF) a branch of HDL located in Woodbridge, VA, involved a problem of alcohol abuse. After counseling, the employee participated in a rehabilitation program.

BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1

(5) A courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted and revealed several security weaknesses which were corrected by the supported command. As a result of the test a number of security guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. In addition a new magnetic coded badge was approved for purchase in FY 77. As a follow-up implementation of "Lessons Learned" in the penetration test the ICIP Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and the HDL Security Officer prepared and delivered a series of lectures and classes to the HDL guard force on the penetration test. Additionally, the PLO delivered lectures on the penetration test to the faculty and students of the Counterintelligence Dept, US Army Intelligence Corps School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

d. Operational Status

- (1) During the reporting period 880 manhours were expended, 18 information reports were submitted and 41 memorandums were prepared and provided to the supported commander.
 - (2) No TDY or b1 were expended.

e. Comments

- (1) ICIP CENTAVO KID was approved by OACSI, DA, 18 Oct 73 and the supported commander was briefed on the implementation of the operation on 12 November 1973.
- (2) The mission of the HDL includes critical sensitive research and development activities in support of the US Army. Some of the more sensitive activities include research into the hardening of communications equipment against nuclear weapons radiation; tests of nuclear warhead and missile systems to determine their ability to withstand nuclear weapons radiation; develop fuses for use with nuclear warheads and conducts development and testing of radiation hardened systems for Minutemen and Poseidon Missiles.
- (3) The installation remains a potential target for HOIS and the hostile intelligence service have an interest in the research and development activities of the type conducted at HDL. However, the amount of significant information surfaced by the ICIP does not warrant the expenditure of manhours at this time to continue the ICIP.
- (4) The MI Group is reviewing the ICIP with a view of terminating the program and instead implementing an overt direct support counterintelligence program.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENTAVO KID be terminated and an overt direct support counterintelligence program be implemented.



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ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

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Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) SUBJECT:


Recommendation: That ltr TAB A be approved by the ACSI and signed

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DAMI-DOR

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Commander
US Army Intelligence Agency
ATTR: MIIA-SO
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

1. (U) Reference, 3d Quarter, FY 1976, ICIP Operations Report, wherein you recommended termination of three ICIP operations.

2 ICIP operations, CANIRE PLATE (U), CENSUS TIME (U), and CANIAVO KID (U) are formally terminated as recommended.

3. (U) Request that a full review of the remaining four active CONUS ICIP operations be conducted to determine the need for their continuence or discontinuance, and the results, with your recommendations, be forwarded to this office NLT 28 June 76.


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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

(C) CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY.
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 to 31 Mar 76: There was no significant information obtained during the period and there were no indications of any overt threat to the installation.
- d. Operational Status: CANINE PLATE was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 18 Sep 73. During the reporting period 400 manhours were expended in the ICIP. However, there were no reports submitted, no funds expended, neither TDY nor b1 There were no confidential sources utilized, only conventional sources.
- e. Comments: The installation's mission remains the same, a supply depot for missile and artillery weapons systems with a nuclear capability. The Depot is considered a critical and sensitive installation; therefore, remains as a potential target for HOIS. However, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the ICIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CAMINE PLATE be terminated but that increased overt liaison with additional security support be provided the installation commander.

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ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
- b. Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During the Period 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976:
- (1) An ICIP source reported that a PTC civilian employee was transferred from the coding and decoding section because he had coded an obscene message that was to be sent to an overseas user. Additionally, the ICIP source provided information concerning possible security violations involving the employee. Because of the employee's questionable suitability characteristics and conduct he was assigned to a job in PTC requiring minimum contact with classified information. Supervisors will continue to monitor his conduct and activities.
- (2) An Army NCO assigned to PTC attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists. As a result of the information gained concerning the suicide attempt a Limited Investigation was initiated. The NCO was assigned to the Logistics Branch, PTC, pending results of the investigation. The investigation revealed that the NCO has a large number of outstanding debts, has lied on loan applications, and had ordered a 1976 automobile which cost in excess of five thousand dollars. Interviews concerning the NCO revealed alleged drug usage and homosexuality. The Limited Investigation was completed and referred to PTC for adjudication. The decision was made not to revoke the NCO's security clearance, since he left the service on 9 April 1976 and will not be allowed to re-enlist.
 - (3) Adverse suitability information was reported on two additional NCOs assigned to PTC. Based on medical reports and rebellious attitudes one NCO was released from the Army by board action. The second NCO after a night of heavy drinking began hitting his wife when she tried to arouse him after he had "passed out." The wife filed assault charges with the Military Police but withdrew them later. The PTC commander counselled the NCO on his drinking and marital problems and assigned him duties where he has no access to classified information.


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(4) During the course of an investigation of an enlisted WAC member of PTC who was away-without-leave (KAWOL Investigation), it was discovered that the CID was also investigating her for theft and trafficking in drugs. The MI representative and CID agents coordinated their mutual investigations. PTC has suspended the WAC's access to classified material pending completion of the investigation.

d. Operational Status:

- (1) CENSUS TIME was first approved by OACSI, DA, for implementation on 5 Feb 74.
- (2) During the period of 1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976, 726 manhours were expended, no 1DY nor b1 were used. The operation produced seven information reports. One confidential source was used during the period but was terminated during the latter part of the period.
- e. Comments: The PTC operations include an extremely high volume of multimedia ultra sensitive compartmented classified traffic processed at the highest level of the military establishment command group being served, and includes the cryptographic operation, maintenance and logistical mission and support rendered to the JCS, the MMCC, departments and executive agencies of the government allied embassies, and the United Nations Building in New York. The installation remains as a potential target for HOIS; however, there was no information reported to indicate the presence of any overt threat to the installation. The MI Group has been conducting a thorough review of the ICIP to determine the advisability of terminating the operation and implementing an overt direct support comprehensive counterintelligence program. In view of the above the continuation of an ICIP is not warranted at this time.
 - f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENSUS TIME be terminated and an increased overt liaison with additional direct security support be provided the installation commander.



ICIP REPORT

1 April 1975 to 31 March 1976

CENTAVO KID:

(OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories, (HDL); Adelphia, MD
- Information Obtained Off-Post and/or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None
- c. Significant Information Obtained During Period 1 Apr 75 -31 Mar 76:
- (1) Information was received that a First Secretary at the USSR Embassy, Washington, DC had visited HDL on two occasions. On one occasion he attended a meeting of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, INC., a professional society for engineers which was held in the auditorium of HDL. The subject matter presented during the meeting was unclassified. At a second meeting of the society the .. Soviet Embassy official was denied entry. A report of the incidents were provided to the FBI and the Commander, HDL, made a determination that the society could no longer hold meetings at HDL in order to preclude any potential security threat.
- (2) On two occasions an unidentified light aircraft flaw over the test site, Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), HDL, where a series of tests on foreign equipment under the Range Emory program was in progress. In both instances the aircraft circled over the Range Emory test cite for about 5-7 minutes. The overflights are being investigated in coordination with the FBI.
- (3) An employee, HDL, made allegations of immoral activities by members of the HDL Security Office and a group at the Van Ness Avenue Facility, HDL. The employee claimed that she was being followed by members of the HDL Security Office. After investigating the employee's story, the Commander, HDL, believed that she was suffering from psychiatric problems and would have her visit a psychiatrist for a complete evaluation.
- (4) Suitability information concerning an employee of the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF) a branch of HDL located in Woodbridge, VA, involved a problem of alcohol abuse. After counseling, the employee participated in a rehabilitation program.

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(5) A courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted and revealed several security weaknesses which were corrected by the supported command. As a result of the test a number of security guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. In addition a new magnetic coded badge was approved for purchase in FY 77. As a follow-up implementation of "lessons Learned" in the penetration test the ICIP Project Liaison Officer (PLO) and the HDL Security Officer prepared and delivered a series of lectures and classes to the HDL guard force on the penetration test. Additionally, the PLO delivered lectures on the penetration test to the faculty and students of the Counterintelligence Dept, US Army Intelligence Corps School, Fort Huachuca, AZ.

d. Operational Status

(1) During the reporting period 880 manhours were expended, 18 information reports were submitted and 41 memorandums were prepared and provided to the supported commander.

(2) No TDY or b1 were expended.

e. Comments

- (1) ICIP CENTAVO KID was approved by OACSI, DA, 18 Oct 73 and the supported commander was briefed on the implementation of the operation on 12 November 1973.
- (1) The mission of the HDL includes critical sensitive research and development activities in support of the US Army. Some of the more sensitive activities include research into the hardening of communications equipment against nuclear weapons radiation; tests of nuclear warhead and missile systems to determine their ability to withstand nuclear weapons radiation; develop fuses for use with nuclear warheads and conducts development and testing of radiation hardened systems for Minutemen and Poseidon Missiles.
- (3) The installation remains a potential target for HOIS and the hostile intelligence service have an interest in the research and development activities of the type conducted at HDL. However, the amount of significant information surfaced by the ICIP does not warrant the expenditure of manhours at this time to continue the ICIP.
- (4) The MI Group is reviewing the ICIP with a view of terminating the program and instead implementing an overt direct support counterintelligence program.
- f. Recommendation: That the ICIP CENTAVO KID be terminated and an overt direct support counterintelligence program be implemented.

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Vol 6 of 7 Vols

As of 18 Sep 85 all material included (Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently in effect.

18 Sep 85

Signature) (Date Signed

Delmar Smith GS5 (Printed Name) (Grade)

Proviewed for Retention
Criteria UP AR 381-10
Reviewer Coulty Date 401

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED FINSCOM FOUPO PARA 1-603 Don 5200.1-R CORUST CHITROL NUMBER ACTION SHEET OFFICE SYMBOL SUSPENSE DAMI-DOH Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) 21 May 76 To obtain approval/disapproval to USAREUR ICIP OPLAN on USASA Field erlin (USASAESB) (C) tions you encome. (Describe briefly the requirement, background and action taken or recommended. Must be sufficiently detailed to identify Background: - Since 1970, Project FILMAN has provided support to USASA Field Station Berlin (USASAFSB). FILMAN was designed to use sources from the local work force and personnel located in establishments frequented by the work force. Problems encountered from peripheral nature of sources and their difficulty in becoming accepted into USASA circles. See TAB B. -- Cdr, 766th MID proposed an Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) support arrangement for USASAFSB which would provide more direct source access and control of source coverage. -- In August 1975, Cdr USASAFSB and DCSSEC, HQ USASA concurred in proposal. September 1975, ACSI, DA and DCSI, USAREUR briefed and supported concept. In October 1975, Cdr, USASA concurred in cancellation of FILMAN and initiation of ADSAP. (See TAB C) Subsequently, concept discarded in favor of subject ICIP. -- By 1tr 28 April 1976, DCSI, USAREUR forwarded subject ICIP for ACSI approval. Discussion: -- Purpose of subject ICIP is to collect significant CI information through use of overt liaison contacts, casual sources and confidential recruited sources assigned to USASAFSB. Sources will be specifically targeted against Hostile Intelligence Services (HOIS) activities directed toward USASA and against security vulnerabilities of USASA personnel. -- On 14 May 1976, DCSSEC, HQ USASA, reviewed subject ICIP and concurred in OPLAN. The DCSSEC recommended deletion of coordination with Cdr, USASA Europe (Para 2b(4)(c), "in view of realignment of functions and need for compartmentation, coordination reflected in para 4e(2) is sufficient." (TAB A) (Continue on plain bond) MO [PRIM PROGS NO [YES 🔲 NO [COORDINATIONS APPROVALS PHONE DATE INITIALS 88 PIY 018 Ex DISPATCHED (OTO)

ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

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SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)


-- 3d Indorsement, $\underline{\text{TAB A}}$, the ACSI, DA informs DCSI, USAREUR that subject ICIP approved.

3. (U) Recommendation: That 3d Indorsement (TAB A) be approved and signed.

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1 9 SEP 1975

AEUMI-BCE

SUBJECT: Project Filman ()

Commander USASAFSB ATTN: S-2 APO 09742

1. (U) The purpose of this proposed action is to provide increased and improved counterintelligence support to the US Army Security Agency Field Station, Berlin (USASAFSB).

c) In 1970, a CI_operations plan was submitted by Berlin Field Station, 66th MI Group, to correspond with the activation of the USASAFSB site known as "Teurelsberg". The operations plan was designation provide counterintal ligence support to the project. through the utilization of sources, either energy the closel work Affice through personnel located in establishments Compuseted by the work force. Because the local work force one too tressient 12 moture to effectively insert a source before they completed work Ansaite. source recruitment efforts were concentrated on individuals you associated with ASA personnel at local entertainment establishnents and at social functions. Initially through coordination with the S-2, USASAFSB, a list of establishments frequented by USASAFSB personnel was prepared and attempts were made to introduce sources into some of the establishments. We presently have afternamenes. under the Filman project who have provided limited informations Hovever, to date these sources have provided routine information of low level CI significance, primarily of interest to US. Army. Berlin. Britande and not to USASAFSB. In approximately 1973; USASA withdraw Simencial support of Filmen and Miscal responsibility reverted to the book M. Group. The primary difficulty with the Pilman project has been the peripherial nature of the sources and their difficulty n becoming accepted into ASA circles, since ASA personnel expear. associate in fairly close knit ASA circles. In short, peripheral sources have provided only peripheral leads.

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1 9 SEP 1975

AMUMI-BCE SUBJECT: Project Filman ()

6 I propose that the Filman project be cancelled, that permission be granted to recruit ASA personnel within USASAF3B, and that the Aggresrive Defensive Course Acquisition Progress (ADSAP)-be-used-as-the vehicle to provide defensive counterespionage support to USASAFSB: A brief description of ADSAP and general ADSAP EEI is attached as Inclosure. This would enhance CI coverage of USASAFSB by providing more flexibility within the framework of one source program, access to the target areas and target personalities, a wider range of operations for sources, and more streamlined administrative procedures for the management of sources. Current Filman sources will be converted to the ADSAP program. Sources will be preferably recruited within the target activity to provide information on personalities and activities. Additional sources will be recruited on the periphery or outside of the target sites in order to enhance overall CI coverage. Once it has been determined where a possible shortfall of information occurs, a concerted effort will be made to obtain sources who can provide that information. Indiscriminsat selection and recruitment of sources will be avoided and emphasis will be placed on a prospective source's ability to fulfill the requirements levied on him. 766th MID will provide the S-2, USASAFSB with the desired qualifications for personnel to be utilized in the program and he will be requested to screen present personnel assigned to his unit to determine those best qualified for recruitment. ADSAP will not supplant the S-2, USASAFSB program of internal informants, but will augment his present activities. A target analysis will be prepared by this Detachment in coordination with the S-2, USASAFSB. Information solely-of-a-cuitability nature, will be reported directly to the S-2, USASATSB. All other information will be reported in accordance with reporting requirements, as outlined in LOI 6-TD, 66th MI Group.

b. Deputy discussions, conducted in August 1975, with the Commander, USASAFSB, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Security, USASA Headquarters, Arlington Hall, Virginia, and the Commander, 66th MI Group, indicated a favorable response to the above proposal.

5. This Detachment requests your comments, recommendations, and approval of the above proposal.

l Incl

ALLYN C. HOULTRY LTC, MI Commanding

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
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AGGRESSIVE DEFENSIVE SOURCE ACQUISITION PROGRAM (ADSAP)

ADSAP concerns itself with two categories of human sources as defined by 66th MI Group LOI Number 6-TD. These two source categories are Conventional and Confidential. The ADSAP is a CI threat information collection program and sources recruited under this program should not be recruited for coverage of a specific CE target. Sources are recruited within and on the periphery of sensitive installations and activities by combining both active and passive measures to counter the information collection capability of hostile intelligence services (HoIS) operating against US Forces. The passive measures are designed to protect defense information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, while the aggressive measures are designed to obtain information which will lead to the detection and neutralization of HoIS efforts directed against US Forces.

General ADSAP REI:

- a. Detection of suspicious activities, undue inquisitiveness or obvious lack of good security practices on the part of or involving US Forces personnel.
- b. Identification of US Forces personnel who closely and continually associate with foreign nationals having connections with Soviet Bloc countries.
- c. Identification of US forces personnel who make unauthorized or frequent authorized travel to Soviet Bloc countries.
- d. Identification of US Forces personnel who have continued contact with local national personnel.
 - e. Detection of disaffected personnel.
- f. Identification of US Forces personnel whose activities and/or character weaknesses either individually or in a combination constitute a clear and significant threat to US Forces in that they have rendered the US Forces connected personnel susceptible to exploitation by HoIS. Susceptibility to HoIS exploitation because of adverse suitability factors should be coupled with at least one of the foregoing indicators of possible HoIS interest. Specific suitability factors which could render US Forces personnel vulnerable to HoIS exploitation would be excessive indebtedness or recurring financial difficulties; unexplained affluence; conduct such as criminal, immoral or homosexual acts which could render

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the individual susceptible to pressure; current and past mental and emotional instability; unusual work habits that do not conform to the daily pattern of fellow employees, sudden unexplained changes in working or social habits; sexual misconduct; infidelity; marital problems; trading on the interzonal routes or otherwise utilizing linguistic capabilities with Soviet or other bloc personnel in unauthorized situations.

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7 OCT 1975

IAEB-I

SUBJECT: Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Progress (ADSAP) (U)

Commander
US Army Security Agency
ATTN: DCSSEC
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

1. (6) Attached is a copy of a letter received on 19 September 1975 from Commander, 766th Military Intelligence Detachment, 66th MI Group, entitled "Project FILMAN". The letter is self explanatory but can be summarised as follows: Counterintelligence support to USASAFE Berlin has been conducted since 1970 under the provisions of FILMAN. Although FILMAN was antisfactory in concept, it suffered from a lack of precise support definition, particularly in source acquisition and reporting.

2. (c) Cdr, 766th MID, proposes an ADSAP support arrangement which would provide more direct source access to USASA personnel and direct control of source coverage of actual or potential explonage approaches. Cdr, USASAFS Berlin concurrs in the concept and desires to implement the program. COL Holden was briefed on the program during his visit to Berlin in August 1975 and concurred in the proposal. KG Aaron, DA ACSI, and MG Dillard, USAREUR DCSI, were also briefed in September 1975 and supported the concept.

Request your concurrence in cancellation of Project FILMAN and adaption of the ADSAP by USASAFS Berlin/766th HID. Appropriate cafeguards will be maintained with regard to withdrawal of USASA sources should hostile intelligence interest focus on a USASA soldier. Request a reply as soon as possible so we can begin negotiating a new Resorandum of Understanding with 66th HI Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARN UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGL ... ARLINGTON HALL STATION ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212

IACG

20 OCT 1975

SUBJECT: Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) (U)

Commander
USASA Field Station, Berlin
APO New York 09742

1. (U) Reference IAEB-L Letter, dated 7 October 1975, Subject: Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) (U).

2. I concur in cancellation of Project FILMAN and initiation of the Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program by the 766th MID, 66th MI Group. A copy of the completed Memorandum of Understanding will be provided to this HQ, ATTN: DCSSEC.

WILLIAM I. ROLYA
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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3	Counterintellis	gence Program (IC	IP) (U)		May 1976	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
To obtai	To obtain approval/disapproval to terminate ODCSI, USAREUR ICIP CARELESS TOKEN (U).								
	MEMORAMBUM FOR MICORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, beckground and action taken or recommended. Must be sufficiently detailed to identify								
1 (22)	1 Background:								
1	ICIP CARELESS TOKEN approved by ACSI on 25 Feb 76.								
	ICIP designed to detect and counter vulnerability to espionage by USASA personnel assigned to Det N, USASA Field Station, Augsburg, (USASAFSA) FRG.								
2 (32)	2 <u>Discussion</u> :								
ODCSI, U	On 5 April 76, CDR 511th MI Bn recommended that ICIP be terminated On 9 Apr 76, ODCSI, USAREUR, and on 14 May 76 DCSSEC HQUSASA concurred in recommendation to terminate.								
R	Rationale for termination:								
o Dr	awdown of USASA	Det. Only seven	USASA person	nel now a	ssigned to	station.			
	o Drawdown precludes further expenditure of CI assets and efforts required by CARELESS TOKEN.								
	o NCOIC Det N appears completely competent to accomplish duties and control subordinates.								
PLO and ICIP. P	o Regular contact between PLO and NCOIC, and occasional casual contact between PLO and USASA Det N personnel on an opportunity basis can accomplish goals of this ICIP. Pertinent info derived from such contacts would be reported promptly to S2, USASAFS Augsburg.								
	3d Ind (Red TAB A) informs ODCSI, USAREUR that ACSI, DA approves termination of CARELESS TOKEN.								
	(Continue on plain bond)								
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DAMI-DOH

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

3. (U) Recommendation: That 3d Ind (Red TAB A) be approved and signed by the DO

for the ACSI.

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DAMI-DOH (9 Apr 76) 3d Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) 24 MAY 1976

Service of the service

HQDA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310

TO: Commander-in-Chief, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, ATTN: AEAGB-CI(SO), APO New York 09403

Your recognendation to terminate CARELESS TOKEN is approved.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

(sgd) Merrill T. Kelly

l Incl

MERRILL T. KELLY
Acting Director of Intelligence
Operations

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY APO. 09403

9 APR 1976

AEAGB-CI(SO)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH) WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References:

- a. Operations Plan, 66th MI Group, 5 May 1975, subject as above, with 5th Indorsement, DAMI-DOH, OACSI, DA, 25 February 1976
- b. Letter, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 10 February 1976, subject as above (2).
- 2. (U) Attached is the Quarterly Status Report pertaining to the ICIP CARELESS TOKEN for the period ending 1 April 1976.
- 3. This office concurs in the recommendation by the 51lth MI Battalion that this ICIP be terminated. The diminishing sensitivity of the target activity, and reduction in target personnel would appear not to justify the futher expenditure of counterintelligence assets and efforts required by this ICIP. Consequently this office is directing initiation of formal coordination with US Army Security Agency (USASA), Field Station Augsburg for the purpose of terminating CARELESS TOKEN.
- 4. (U) Request HQ, USASA be advised of USAREUR plans to terminate this ICIP. Comments in this regard by your office and HQ USASA would be appreciated.
- 5. (U) ODCSI, USAREUR, Action Officer is Mr David R. Smith, AEAGB-CI(SO), HM 7354 (AUTOSEVOCOM 6742).

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

l Incl

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY (

DECLASSIEY ON (APPROVAL OF AUL DA)

V. J. IADEROSA

Colonel, GS

Chief, Counterintelligence Division

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DAMI-DOH (9 Apr 76) 1st Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

DA, OACofS for Intelligence, ATTN: DAMI-DOH, Washington, DC 20310 1 3 MAY 19

TO: Commander, US Army Security Agency, ATTN: DCSSEC, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, VA 22212

This office concurs in the DCSI, USAREUR recommendation that the ICIP, CARELESS TOKEN, be terminated.

(U) Request your comments or concurrence.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

1 Incl nc (C)

JOHN L. HEISS
Colonel, GS
Chief, HUMINT Division

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Warning Notice. Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Method Involved

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IASEC-S (9 Apr 76) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Headquarters, US Army Security Agency, ATTN: DCSSEC, Arlington Hall

Station, Arlington, Virginia 22212

TO: HQDA, CACOFS for Intelligence, ATTN: DAMI-DOH, Washington, DC 20510

USASA concurs in recommendation to terminate CARELESS TOKEN.

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WILLIAM B. HOLDEN COL, GS DCSSEC


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
511TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
APO 109696

AEUMI-N-CE B03130-328-76 5 April 1976

SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)
(Quarterly Status Report)

Commander
66th Military Intelligence Group
ATTN: AEUMI-T-CI (EXCLUSIVE FOR ICIP CONTROL OFFICER)
APO 09108

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. OPLAN, 511th MI Battalion, AEUMI-N-CE, 1-75, 1 May 1975.
 - b. AEAGB-CI(SO), DTG 151640Z Jul 75, ICIP.
 - c. AEUMI-N-CE, B03130-061-76, 23 January 1976, CARELESS TOKEN (U).
 - d. AEAGB-CI(SO), DTG 091510Z Mar 76, CARELESS TOKEN (U).
- 2. (U) This Quarterly Status Report is submitted in accordance with the above references and covers the period 16 January 1 April 1976. A one-time adjustment in reporting dates has been made to allow the reporting period to coincide with each calendar quarter.
- 3. General:
- a. Company B, Forward Operations Battalion, terminated its operational mission at 2400 hours, 7 February 1976. During the period following, Company B personnel were engaged in transporting the classified operational files and equipment from the site to Augsburg. All Company B assigned or attached personnel have departed the target area. Destruction of all but two of the former Company B operations buildings is underway and is being performed by Facilities Engineers (FE) personnel from Regensburg and Grafenwoehr. Both of the two remaining buildings are to be removed under the Regensburg FE supervision under the same contract that will provide for landscaping the northern end of the compound, and removal of the rock at the northwestern end that presently blocks a portion of the antenna scanning area. The dismounted communications vans were not sold at the site as previously.

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
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


AEUMI-N-CE SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U) 5 April 1976

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b. Two members of Company B applied for European separations since
November 1975, but it was not determined whether or not the applications
had been approved, since both nersonnel had been transferred to Augsburg.
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b6 was scheduled for discharge on 20 May 1976. She had a US
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were unmarried.

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- d. Additional information concerning the physical plant at the target was obtained as follows:
- (1) Sewage service is provided by the firm Franz Lederer, St Sebastian Platz 1, Brueck (UQ0458). Water service is provided by the firm Hans Lober, Rauschstrasse, Nuernberg vorm Wald (UQ1069). The water is delivered by truck. The Comptroller Office, Seventh Army Training Center (SATC), Grafenwoehr advised that funds had been allotted to connect the target to the sewer and water systems of the adjacent French/Bundeswehr compound. The construction of those lines will be completed by July 1976 and will replace the septic and holding tanks now in use. Agency checks are being conducted on the abovementioned firms.





AEUMI-N-CE SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

- (2) OBAG (the Upper Bavaria Power Company) has declared the main power cable serving the target, the French/Bundeswehr compound and the nearby Bundespost (German postal system) TV relay tower to be inadequate. OBAG intends to lay a new power cable parallel to the present one, and has asked each using agency to contribute to the costs, on a pro-rata basis. As the situation now stands, loss of outside power would automatically put the LfV generator into operation. That generator is capable of supplying full electric power to both the operational and living areas of the target for a maximum of 206 hours. After that time, the generator must be shut down for refueling, oil and maintenance.
- (3) The SATC Military Community Fire Marshal recently inspected the target and indicated that some water must be made available for emergency fire use. The Neukirchen-Heilig Blut (UQ5258) Volunteer Fire Department indicated it had a 40-minute reaction time. The projected hookup to the French/Bundeswehr compound water system should make sufficient water available.
- e. Due to the staggered schedules of target personnel, they had decided against hiring a cook and will prepare their own meals as a community effort. Inquiries at the local Labor Office revealed an estimated monthly salary for a cook would amount to about DM 1300 and this had a major impact on their decision.

Operational Matters:

- a. Information provided in the previous Quarterly Status Report is corrected/clarified as follows: There will be no SI area at the target. The highest access/classification will be Secret/Crypto. A request for a technical inspection had been submitted through ASA channels several months previously, which was not known by target personnel. The entire area, including the common room, will be subjected to a technical inspection prior to 21 May 1976.
- b. Reference paragraph 4c of reference c: b6 closed the Hoherbogen Restaurant in late February 1976 and moved to the Augsburg area. Since his departure, the restaurant has remained closed. The entire file concerning b6 will be prepared for transfer to Special Operations Detachment, 66th Military Intelligence Group for monitoring of b6 activities in the Augsburg area.

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SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

5 April 1976

c. b6 owner of "Tina's Bar" in Furth-im-Wald (UQ4364), also intended to move to Augsburg. b6 reportedly was a girl friend of several of the Company B senior enlisted personnel. b6 claimed to have enough money to purchase or lease any type of establishment in the Augsburg area that she chose. Agency checks will be conducted concerning b6 and the information will be passed to Special Operations Detachment if she moves to Augsburg.

d. Target members have the following privately-owned vehicles:

<u>License Number</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Owner</u>
KS-8739 JA-9692 KH-8553 JT-8306	1975 Chev van 1964 VW sedan 1970 Opel 1967 Mercedes	b6

Additionally, SP5 Pack owns two motorcycles, neither of which is registered at the present time. He intends to register one of them and to store the other for shipment to CONUS when he is discharged in August 1976. SP4 b6 is buying a car from one of the civilian contractors in Augsburg and will pick it up soon.

e. Target members have had contact with three Americans in the area, at least two of whom are former Company B members. Barbara LNU was discharged in early 1976, is living in Koetzting (UQ4349) and is engaged to a German citizen. A check of recent Company B rosters identified SP4 b6

MOS: 98G2LRU and SP4 b6 NOS:

98G2LCX as two possible individuals involved. SP4 b6 of the target unit has been in contact with the American owner of "Fulsome's Club" in Koetzting. A third American, possibly formerly stationed at the site, but not yet identified, allegedly works in Cham (UQ3054).

(U) Source Activity:

- a. B58,786 has departed the target area for reassignment.
- b. PLO liaison contacts have revealed the following information concerning target personalities:

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AEUMI-N-CE SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U) 5 April 1976

- (1) SFC $\boxed{b6}$ is a dedicated NCO who appears to know his job. He attended nearly three months of specialized training in the LFV system and related activities and is very knowledgeable of the mechanics involved in operation of the system. His assessment of individual members of the team coincides with the observations of the PLO. $\boxed{b6}$ appears to enjoy a spirit of mutual cooperation with the PLO. $\boxed{b6}$ advised the PLO that he has had very little trouble with the six personnel under his supervision, but the personalities of the six are beginning to emerge and he wished he had more indications of leadership qualities (i.e., willingness to accept responsibilities) from them.
- (2) SP5 b6 nominally assistant NCOIC, is a quiet follower. He does his job, keeps his room very neatly, but is very non-assertive.
- (3) SP5 Pack is probably the most responsible of the team, has an excellent personality, gets along well with everyone, and appears satisfied with his job and his hobby of motorcycles. His easy-going responsibility is attributed to his background; he is married and has one child. Prior to entering the Army, he had a good job in civilian life, and he knows how to work and to get along with others.
- (4) SP4 b6 is a divorcee whose former wife is assigned to an ASA unit in West Berlin. He is a good worker but likes to enjoy himself after work. He has earned the respect of other team members because of his ability to separate work from play.
- (5) SP4 b6 is an unknown quantity, but he has not caused any problems and he works well with others.
- (6) SP4 b6 is an extrovert who enjoys being the center of attention. He does not get along well with SP4 b6

(7) SP4 b6 is an introvert and the complete opposite of b6	
b6 has an acid personality and only tolerates having other	
around him. He does not like his present assignment and has submitted	
requests to be returned to Augsburg. He appears to be able to sit in a	
room full of people and no one will notice he is there. PLO assessment	of:
b6 and b6 are that they are typical ASA "kids",	
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AEUMI-N-CE SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U) 5 April 1976

c. No problems of a security nature have arisen during the reporting period. There have been no indications of Hostile Intelligence targetting against target personnel during the reporting period. A vehicle from the Soviet Military Liaison Mission-Frankfurt was active in the target area on 6 March 1976. Four sightings were reported during a two hours period; three were non-PRA sightings and one was a shallow penetration of PRA #13 near Hoherbogen. One of the sightings was reported by Company B personnel.

6. Comments:

- a. In amplification of previous generalized comments concerning the continued viability of the operation at the target, it is recommended that this operation be terminated at its present location. Whether or not the operation should be moved to another location where more sensitive ASA operations are being conducted is beyond the purview of a recommendation by this Battalion. The recommendation to terminate the operation at its present location was discussed informally with the S2, USASAFSA on 18 March 1976 and was received with no serious objection. Rationale for the recommendation is as follows:
- (1) With the departure of Company B personnel from the target area, a total of seven personnel remain. The operations now being performed are far less sensitive and involve activity that is essentially automatic. LFV team members are essentially mechanics. It is less likely that a hostile intelligence service will devote the same priority as they did previously to exploit target personnel. Any confidential source recruited to cover the target "from within" would result in one individual watching the other six. It is not believed that a confidential source relationship with SFC Helus would be desirable nor appropriate; an effective liaison relationship with the PLO should be able to achieve the same results. Recruitment of another member of the team and targetting him against team members would necessarily include that source reporting on | b6 With the close working relationship of all team members, this type of activity could well lead to a gradual breakdown in the team effort and adversely affect b6 leadership effectiveness, as it would provide for an unofficial complaint channel and allow team members to "gang up" on the NCOIC. rather than fill the goals of the operation as indicated in reference a. Any compromise at the target of such confidential source activities would probably lead to a complete breakdown in effective liaison between b6 the PLO.

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SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

5 April 1976

(2) SFC b6 appears to be completely competent to do his job and to control his subordinates. His apparent leadership and management techniques, his insights into the various personalities of team personnel and his indicated awareness of potential problem areas all indicate that the PLO should be able to accomplish the goals of the plan through regular liaison with b6 and occasional casual contact with other target personnel on an opportunity basis.

- (3) The time and expense required to conduct confidential source operations to achieve the goals of the operation do not appear to be justified for the reasons stated above. It is believed the same results can be achieved through aggressive and effective liaison.
- (4) Termination of the OPLAN (reference a) presupposes that nothing would change outwardly regarding the PLO's relationship to the target; he would still visit as often as before, he would conduct himself in the same manner and he would continue to submit detailed reports on the results of each liaison visit. Any information obtained as a result of liaison that indicated a threat to the target or its personnel, or character or personality weaknesses of target personnel would be reported to the S2, USASAFSA without delay and coordination would be effected for appropriate investigative action.
- b. As an alternate proposal, if the recommendation in paragraph 6a is not favorably considered, recommend that the OPLAN remain in effect, but that it be changed to limit contact with target personnel to liaison, that further consideration to the recruitment of confidential sources be dropped, and that Quarterly Status Reports continue to be submitted.

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LTC, MT Commanding

Tel: NBG Mil (2621)-7165/Foss

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DAMI-DOH (9 Apr 76) lat Ind

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

DA, QACofS for Intelligence, ATTN: DAMI-DON, Washington, DC 20310

TO: Commander, US Army Security Agency, ATTH: DCSSEC, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, VA 22212

This office concurs in the DCSI, USAREUR recommendation that the ICIP, CARRIESS TORKN, be terminated.

2. (U) Request your comments or concurrence.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

l Incl nc (C) KARL V. HAENDUE Colonel, GS, USA JOHN L. HEISS III. Colonel, GS Chief, HUMINT Division

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AEÁGB-CI(SO)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH) WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References:

- a. Operations Plan, 66th MI Group, 5 May 1975, subject as above, with 5th Indorsement, DAMI-DOH, OACSI, DA, 25 February 1976
- b. Letter, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 10 February 1976, subject as above
- 2. (U) Attached is the Quarterly Status Report pertaining to the ICIP CARELESS TOKEN for the period ending 1 April 1976.
- 3. This office concurs in the recommendation by the 511th MI Battalion that this ICIP be terminated. The diminishing sensitivity of the target activity, and reduction in target personnel would appear not to justify the futher expenditure of counterintelligence assets and efforts required by this ICIP. Consequently this office is directing initiation of formal coordination with US Army Security Agency (USASA), Field Station Augsburg for the purpose of terminating CARELESS TOKEN.
- 4. (U) Request HQ, USASA be advised of USAREUR plans to terminate this ICIP. Comments in this regard by your office and HQ USASA would be appreciated.
- 5. (U) ODCSI, USAREUR, Action Officer is Mr David R. Smith, AEAGB-CI(SO), HM 7354 (AUTOSEVOCOM 6742).

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

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Chief, Counterintelligence
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STITH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP APC 09696

AEUMI-N-CE B03130-328-76

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(Quarterly Status Report)

Commander

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General:

Company B, Forward Operations Battalion, terminated its operational mission at 2400 hours, 7 February 1976. During the period following, Company B personnel were engaged in transporting the classified operational files and equipment from the site to Augsburg. All Company B assigned or attached personnel have departed the target area. Destruction of all but two of the former Company B operations buildings is underway and is being performed by Facilities Engineers (FE) personnel from Regensburg and Grafenwoehr. Both of the two remaining buildings are to be removed under the Regensburg FE supervision under the same contract that will provide for landscaping the northern end of the compound, and removal of the rock at the northwestern end that presently blocks a portion of the antenna scanning area. The dismounted communications vans were not sold at the site as previously

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- d. Additional information concerning the physical plant at the target was obtained as follows:
- (1) Sewage service is provided by the firm Franz Lederer, St Sebastian Platz 1, Brueck (UQ0458). Water service is provided by the firm Hans Lober, Rauschstrasse, Nuernberg vorm Wald (UQ1069). The water is delivered by truck. The Comptroller Office, Seventh Army Training Center (SATC), Grafenwoehr advised that funds had been allotted to connect the target to the sewer and water systems of the adjacent French Bundeswehr compound. The construction of those lines will be completed by July 1976 and will replace the septic and holding tanks now in use. Agency checks are being conducted on the abovementioned firms.

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4. (C) Operational Matters:

- a. Information provided in the previous Quarterly Status Report is corrected/clarified as follows: There will be no SI area at the target. The highest access/classification will be Secret/Crypto. A request for a technical inspection had been submitted through ASA channels several months previously, which was not known by target personnel. The entire area, including the common room, will be subjected to a technical inspection prior to 21 May 1976.
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<u>License Number</u>	<u>Type</u>	Owner
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5. Source Activity:

- a. B58,786 has departed the target area for reassignment.
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- (5) SP4 b6 is an unknown quantity, but he has not caused any problems and he works well with others.
- (6) SP4 $\boxed{b6}$ is an extrovert who enjoys being the center of attention. He does not get along well with SP4 $\boxed{b6}$
- (7) SP4 b6 is an introvert and the complete opposite of b6 has an acid personality and only tolerates having others around him. He does not like his present assignment and has submitted two requests to be returned to Augsburg. He appears to be able to sit in a room full of people and no one will notice he is there. PLO assessment of and b6 are that they are typical ASA "kids", intelligent, not particularly gregarious, and sarcastic as long as they can get away with it.

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
SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

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6. (Comments:

- a. In amplification of previous generalized comments concerning the continued viability of the operation at the target, it is recommended that this operation be terminated at its present location. Whether or not the operation should be moved to another location where more sensitive ASA operations are being conducted is beyond the purview of a recommendation by this Battalion. The recommendation to terminate the operation at its present location was discussed informally with the S2, USASAFSA on 18 March 1976 and was received with no serious objection. Rationale for the recommendation is as follows:
- (1) With the departure of Company B personnel from the target area, a total of seven personnel remain. The operations now being performed are far less sensitive and involve activity that is essentially automatic. LFV team members are essentially mechanics. It is less likely that a hostile intelligence service will devote the same priority as they did previously to exploit target personnel. Any confidential source recruited to cover the target "from within" would result in one individual watching the other six. It is not believed that a confidential source relationship with SFC Helus would be desirable nor appropriate; an effective liaison relationship with the PLO should be able to achieve the same results. Recruitment of another member of the team and targetting him against team members would necessarily include that source reporting on b6 activities. With the close working relationship of all team members, this type of activity could well lead to a gradual breakdown in the team effort and adversely leadership effectiveness, as it would provide for an unofficial complaint channel and allow team members to "gang up" on the NCOIC. rather than fill the goals of the operation as indicated in reference a. Any compromise at the target of such confidential source activities would probably lead to a complete breakdown in effective liaison between b6 the PLO.

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SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

- (2) SFC b6 appears to be completely competent to do his job and to control his subordinates. His apparent leadership and management techniques, his insights into the various personalities of team personnel and his indicated awareness of potential problem areas all indicate that the PLO should be able to accomplish the goals of the plan through regular liaison with b6 and occasional casual contact with other target personnel on an opportunity basis.
- (3) The time and expense required to conduct confidential source operations to achieve the goals of the operation do not appear to be justified for the reasons stated above. It is believed the same results can be achieved through aggressive and effective liaison.
- (4) Termination of the OPLAN (reference a) presupposes that nothing would change outwardly regarding the PLO's relationship to the target; he would still visit as often as before, he would conduct himself in the same manner and he would continue to submit detailed reports on the results of each liaison visit. Any information obtained as a result of liaison that indicated a threat to the target or its personnel, or character or personality weaknesses of target personnel would be reported to the S2, USASAFSA without delay and coordination would be effected for appropriate investigative action.
- b. As an alternate proposal, if the recommendation in paragraph 6a is not favorably considered, recommend that the OPLAN remain in effect, but that it be changed to limit contact with target personnel to liaison, that further consideration to the recruitment of confidential sources be dropped, and that Quarterly Status Reports continue to be submitted.

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Commanding

Tel: NBG Mil (2621)-7165/Foss

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DAMI-DOH (28 Apr 76) 1st Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

DA, QACofS for Intelligence, ATTN: DAMI-DOH, Washington, DC 20310

1975

TO: Commander, US Army Security Agency, ATTH: DCSSEC, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, VA 22212

- 1. (8) The attached Operations Plan for an Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) in support of the US Army Security Agency Field Station Berlin is forwarded for review by the Commander, US Army Security Agency.
- 2. (U) Request correspondence be returned to this office after approval or comment by your commender.


FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

l Incl nc (C) KARL V. HAENDLE
Colonel, CS. USA
JOHN L. HEISS III
Colonel, GS
Chief, HUMINT Division

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9 (APR 1976

AEAGB-CI(SO)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH) WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References:

- a. Message, DAMI-DOH, DA, 032115Z December 1975, subject as above (2).
- b. Message, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 061755Z January 1976, subject as above (S) (BOM).
- c. Message, DAMI-DOH, DA, 0921172 April 1976, subject as above (C) (BOM).

2. The attached Operations Plan for an Internal Counter-interligence Program (ICIP), in support of the US Army Security Agency Field Station Berlin (USASAFSB) is furnished for ACSI review and approval. The ICIP is designed to supplant Project FILMAN, and external CI support program, and to provide the Cdr, USASAFSB a more complete CI program for identifying and neutralizing the hostile intelligence threat to his activities and personnel.

3. Cdr, USASA, Arlington Hall, concurred in the proposed cancellation of Project FILMAN and initiation of an Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) (see inclosure 3 to basic OPLAN). However, the ADSAP concept was subsequently discarded in favor of an ICIP. Consequently, recommend the attached OPLAN be coordinated with Cdr, USASA, Arlington Hall.

4. (U) Recommend approval.

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AEAGB-CI(SO) SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

5. (U) ODCSI, USAREUR, Action Officer is Mr David R. Smith, AEAGB-CI(SO), HM 7354 (AUTOSEVOCOM 6742).

l Incl

OLIVER W. DILLARD Major General, GS Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence

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OPERATIONS PLAN

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence

Program (ICIP) (U)

REFERENCES: a. Letter, AEAGB-CI(SO), dated 27 December 1974, Subject: Internal Counterintellingers Trumma (ICIP) with ist Ind, AMOUI-T-OM, 15 January 1975

b. Group Regulation 381-10. Defensive Counterintelligence Sources, dated 4 February 1976.

c. FM 30-17A(8), Counterintelligence Special Operations, February 1973.

d. AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army and Deliberate Security Violations, 18 October 1974.

e. Letter, IACG, dated 20 October 1975, Subject: Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP)(U).



MISSION.

- Requirement: To collect significant counterintelligence information through the utilization of overt liaison contacts (OLC). Casual Sources (CS) and Confidential Recruited Sources (CRS) assigned to the US Army Security Agency Field Station Berlin (USASAFSB), hereafter referred to as ASA. The Sources will be specifically targetted against Hostile Intelligence Services (HoIS) activities directed toward. ASA and actings the security vulnerabilities of ASA personnel.
- b. Objective: To provide responsible commanders and supervisors in ASA with a concentrated program designed to detect, eliminate or neutralize:

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DATE: 13 February 1976

OPLAN NO: 01-76(BCE)BLN

PROJECT NO: 924184

Operations Plan,

- (1) espionage, sabotage, subversion or deliberate security violations against ASA or ASA personnel;
- (2) disloyalty, disaffection, and security weaknesses prevalent among personnel assigned to ASA;
- (3) individuals in sensitive positions who, by character weaknesses or personal conduct, render themselves vulnerable to coercion or blackmail by HolS, either while the individuals are in their present positions or when they are assigned later to another unit.
- c. Base of Operations: Berlin Field Office, 766th MI Detachment, West Berlin.

PERSONNEL.

- a. Source Personnel: Not yet selected. Spotting has started with the assistance of S-2, ASA, but no vetting or recruitment of Sources will be made prior to the approval of this OPLAN. To give adequate coverage of ASA, a minimum of 12 CS/CRS's will be required within ASA. The Sources must meet the following criteria:
 - (1) Reasonable amount of intelligence and high degree of common sense.
- (2) Above-average sense of loyalty to duty and country, and a strong dedication to duty assignment.
 - (3) Trustworthy, reliable and discreet.
 - (4) Ability to take directions.
 - (5) Clean record, to include no character deficiencies.
 - (6) DEROS not later than one year from recruitment.
 - b. US Army Intelligence Personnel:
- (1) <u>Project Liaison Officer (PLO)</u>: The PLO will be responsible for OLCs and the spotting, assessing and recruitment of Sources at ASA. The OIC, CE/SAR Team, will be the PLO.
- (2) Project Control Officer (PCO): The PCO will be responsible for the management and control of Sources in this operation. The OIC, CE Programs, will be the PCO.
- (3) Case Officers (CO): Only Special Agents (S/A) assigned to the Berlin Field Office will initially be tasked to act as CO's.


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Operations Plan,

(4) Other Supervision:

- (a) Supervision for the conduct and operating control of this operation will be vested in the OIC, CE Section.
- (b) Broad operational munity ship control and policy guidance are vested in the Berlin Field Office Dominander and Operations Officer.
- (c) The Director of Operations, Headquarters, 66th MI Group, will be responsible for the operational control of this ICIP, will coordinate all ICIP activities with the ICIP Control Officer, ODCSI, USAREUR, and with the Commander, USASA Europe, and will levy requirements on other subordinate counterintelligence (CI) elements of the 66th MI Group as appropriate.

3. ACT COVER AND DOCUMENTATION:



a. Background: The location and highly sensitive mission of ASA make it of logical interest to HoIS, particularly in this area to Soviet

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Operations Plan.

Intelligence Services (SIS) and Intelligence Services of the German Democratic Republic, whose technical and personal access to ASA areas are facilitated by the geographical location of ASA which is completely surrounded by a Communist country. HoIS can use some uncontrolled means of transportation to enter and leave the vicinities of ASA installations, and can use any of several official East Bloc representations in the area as cover for their activities. Past investigations and CI special operations have confirmed HoIS interest in ASA and in HoIS' collection of data on ASA personnel, to include personalia, character traits and weaknesses, and possible motivating points. Headquarters, USASA, Arlington Hall, Virginia, has approved the use of ASA personnel in ICIP.

b. Concept:

- (1) The cultivation and use of OLC's, and the spotting, assessing and recruitment of non-ASA personnel in the area will continue in effect and be expanded as necessary, without requiring prior approval under this OPLAN.
- (2) Upon approval of this OPLAN, coordination will be effected with S-2, ASA, for purposes of obtaining Leads and for facilitating screening of ASA personnel records. In addition, the PLO will develop other means of spotting and assessing Leads as described in paragraph 3a(2) above. PLO will also be the initial point of contact for those ICIP assets who have been transferred from another area to this area.
- c. Source Activities in the Target Area: Sources will perform their normal military duties while covertly and discreetly attempting to answer the following EEI, both from on-duty and off-duty contacts and experiences:
- (1) Identification of ASA personnel who closely and continuously associate with foreign nationals having connections with Communist countries;
- (2) Identification of ASA personnel who perform authorized or unauthorized travel to Communist countries;
 - (3) Detection of disaffected ASA personnel;
- (4) Detection of ASA personnel whose activities and/or character weaknesses render them vulnerable to blackmail or Hois exploitation:
- (5) Detection of ASA personnel whose activities are indicative of potential defection or desertion:
- (6) Detection of ASA personnel who have memberships in or associate with members of organizations, clubs, groups or other activities which pose actual or potential threats to the security of ASA.

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Operations Plan,

d. Security Considerations:

- (1) Individuals who are approached for recruitment who decline to function as Sources will be asked to sign security statements which clearly state that it is unleaful to make any unauthorized disclosure concerning the recruitment approach or the activities under this OPLAN.
- (2) Individuals who are approached for recruitment prior to their arrival at the ASA target area, and who decline to function as Sources, will be considered for assignment to some location other than the target area, if circumstances and military priorities permit.
- (3) No actual or potential Source will be made aware of the source relationship with any other individual in this program.
- (4) All CRS's will be met under covert conditions, away from the target area; under conditions that will provide maximum security against hadvertent disclosure of the source relationship.
- (5) Separate and plausible cover stories for status and for action will be arranged with each CRS to provide a logical reason for regular meetings between CRS and CO.
- (6) Each CRS will be provided sufficient training in security and meeting arrangements so as to minimize possibilities of compromise of the source relationship.
- (7) In the event of compromise of a CRS and/or the nature of this operation, termination of the source will follow under such conditions as are warranted by the circumstances of the compromise. In the event of a compromise, denial of US Army Intelligence involvement will be achieved where plausible.
- (6) Mon-US Local Wage Rate Investigators employed by the 66th MI Group will not be made aware of the existence of this OPLAN or of the Source relationship with any CRS.
- (9) Knowledgeability of this OPLAN, to include the identity of the target, will be kept to a strict minimum, the fully through duals with a strict "need to know" will at make our matter.
- (10) Upon the termination of a Source in this area, proper debriefing action will be taken in accordance with 66th MI Group Regulation 381-10 and consideration will be given to the transfer of Source to the appropriate CI element in the Source's new assignment area.

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- Operations Plan,

e. Production:

- (1) Operational information will be forwarded by Agent Report and/or other appropriate reporting means to Headquarters, 66th MI Group, ATTN: ASUMI-T-CL.
- (2) Suitability Information or security information having an immediate, significant impact on the command will be brought to the attention of the Commander, USASAFSS, through his S-2.
- (3) Information pertaining to or identifying overt or covert sources will not normally be passed as individual items to ASA without the specific approval of DCSI USAREUR, through Headquarters, 66th MI Group.
- (4) Once this OPLAN has been approved and placed into operation, progress reports will be submitted every 60 days.
- (5) Periodic briefings to ASA can be accomplished through OLC's by the PLO.

5. (C) COMMUNICATIONS:

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Operations Plan, **b**1 b1 b. **b1** d. b1 b1 b1 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS: Finance: **b**1 (1) b1 ·(2) **b1** (3)/**b1** (4) (5) b1

b. <u>logistics</u>: No special logistics or equipment requirements are foreseen at this time, which would require procurement of equipment not presently on hand. If such equipment requirements arise, appropriate requests will be submitted for approval and funding.

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Operations Plans,

c. <u>Estimates</u>: See attached Financial Annex for an estimate of overall expenses to be incurred by PLO, CO's and Sources, through the remainder of FY 76, and FY 77.

8. (y)

TERMINATION:

- a. The duration of this PLAN will be for an indefinite period, or until such time that it is determined that the sensitivity of the target and/or the drawdown of assigned personnel at the target, no longer warrant continuation of the operation.
- b. Termination of Sources will be in accordance with 66th MI Group Regulation 381-10, or other appropriate source directives.

(n)

COORDINATION:

- a. The purpose and objective of this OPLAN as outlined in <u>Mission</u> above has been coordinated with the Commander, USASAFSB.
- b. Preliminary coordination of the action which this OPLAN is to accomplish was initiated as indicated in ANNEX B (coordination background).
- c. EEI developed in and derived from this operation will be reviewed at all levels for acquisition and retention criteria contained in AR 380-13.

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ASTRICY	A		FINANCES	
ANNEX	Д	_	PINANCES	١

1. (e) <u>For</u>	urth Quarter - FY-76:	
a.	b1	
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2. (c) <u>FY</u> -	-76-T (July to 1 October	76):
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3. (e) <u>Fy</u>	77 (All four Quarters):	
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ANNEX A - FINANCES

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Information has been withheld in its accordance with the following exempti 5 USC 552 (b)(1)	
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Information pertains solely to another reference to you and/or the subject of	
Information originated with another g been referred to them for review and	
Information originated with one or moved we are coordinating to determine the information under their purview. Upon coordination, we will advise you of the second	releasability of the on completion of our
	DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

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ANNEX B - COORDINATION BACKGROUND

1. (a) CI support provided by the 766th MI Detachment to the US Army Security Agency Field Station. Berlin (USASAFSB) is in accordance with the provisions reflected in OPLAN titled project Filman. The proposal to improve CI support provided to USASAFSB by cancelling project Filman and replacing it with an existing Agarespive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) was presented to USASAFSB in a letter dated 19 September 1975, copy of which is attached to this Annex as Inclosure 1.

2. USASAFSB forwarded to Headquarters, US Army Security Agency, Arlington Hall Station, the above referenced letter (Inclosure 1) with a recommendation that project Filman be replaced with the 766th MT Detachment's ADSAP. Copy of the USASAESB letter is attached to this Annex as Inclosure 2.

3. In a letter dated 20 October 1975, the Commander of the US Army Security Agency concurred in the cancellation of project Filman and initiation of the 766th MI Detachment's ADSAP program. A copy of the letter is attached to this Annex as Inclosure 3.

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SUNJECT: Project Filman

Commander
USASAFSB
ATTN: S-2
APO 09742

1. (U) The purpose of this proposed action is to provide increased and improved counterintelligence support to the U3 Army Security Agency Field Station, Berlin (USASAFSB).

2. (4c) In 1970, a CI operations plan was submitted by Berlin Field Station, 66th MI Group, to correspond with the activation of the USASAFSB site known as "Teufelsberg". The operations plan was designed to provide counterintelligence support to the project through the utilization of sources, either among the local work force or through personnel located in establishments frequented by the work force. Because the local work force was too transient in nature to effectively insert a source before they completed work on site, source recruitment efforts were concentrated on individuals who associated with ASA personnel at local entertainment establishments and at social functions. Initially through coordination with the S-2; USASAFSB, a list of establishments frequented by UBASAFSB personnel was propured and attempts were made to introduce sources into some of the establishments. We presently have six sources under the Filman project who have provided limited information. However, to date these sources have provided routine information of low level CI significance, primarily of interest to US Army Berlin Brigade and not to USASAFSB. In approximately 1973, USASA withdrew financial support of Filman and fiscal responsibility reverted to the 66th MI Group. The primary difficulty with the Filman project has been the peripherial nature of the sources and their difficulty in becoming accepted into ASA circles, since ASA personnel appear to associate in fairly close knit ASA circles. In short, peripheral sources have provided only peripheral leads.

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1 9 SEP 1973

AEUNI-BCE SUBJECT: Project Filman (J)

I propose that the Filman project be cancelled, that permission be granted to recruit ASA personnel within USASAF3B, and that the Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) he used so the vehicle to provide infermente esupportante support to USASAFSB. A brief description of ADSAP and general ADSAP HET is attached as Inclosure. This would enhance CI coverage of USASAFSB by providing more flexibility within the framework of one source program, access to the target areas and target personalities, a wider range of operations for sources, and more streamlined administrative procedures for the management of sources. Current Filman sources will be converted to the ADSAP program. Sources will be preferably recruited within the target activity to provide information on personalities and activities. Additional sources vill be recruited on the periphery or outside of the target sites in order to enhance overall CI coverage. Once it has been determined where a possible shortfall of information occurs, a concerted effort will be made to obtain sources who can provide that information. Indiscriminant selection and recruitment of sources will be avoided and emphasis will be placed on a prospective source's ability to fulfill the requirements levied on him. 766th MID will provide the S-2, USASAFSB with the desired qualifications for personnel to be utilized in the program and he will be requested to screen present personnel assigned to his unit to determine those best qualified for recruitment. ADSAP will not supplant the S-2, USASAFSB program of internal informants, but will augment his present activities. A target analysis will be prepared by this Detachment in coordination with the S-2, USASAFSB. Information solely of a suitability nature, will be reported directly to the S-2, USASAFSB. All other information will be reported in accordance with reporting requirements, as outlined in LOI 6-TD, 66th MI Group.

Preliminary discussions, conducted in August 1975, with the Commander, USASAFSB, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Security, USASA Mosd-quarters, Arlington Hell, Mirginia, and the Commander, ooth MI Group, indicated a favorable response to the above proposal.

This Detachment requests your comments, recommendations, and approval of the above proposal.

l Incl

ALLYN C. HOULTRY LTC, MI Commanding

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AGGRESSIVE DEFENSIVE SOURCE ACQUISITION PROGRAM (ADSAP)

ADSAP concerns itself with two categories of human sources as defined by 85th MI Group LOI Number 6-TD. These two source categories are Conventional and Confidential. The ADJAP is a CI threat information collection program and sources recruited under this program should not be recruited for coverage of a specific CE target. Sources are recruited within and on the periphery of sensitive installations and activities by combining both active and passive measures to counter the information collection capability of hostile intelligence services (HoIS) operating against US Forces. The passive measures are designed to protect defense information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise, while the aggressive measures are designed to obtain information which will lead to the detection and neutralization of HoIS efforts directed against US Forces.

General ADSAP EEL:

- a. Detection of suspicious activities, undue inquisitiveness or obvious lack of good security practices on the part of or involving US Forces personnel.
- b. Identification of US Forces personnel who closely and continually associate with foreign nationals having connections with Soviet Bloc countries.
- c. Identification of US forces personnel who make unauthorized or frequent authorized travel to Soviet Bloc countries.
- d. Identification of US Forces personnel who have continued contact with local national personnel.
 - e. Detaction of disaffected personnel.
- f. Identification of US Forces personnel whose activities and/or character weaknesses either individually or in a combination constitute a clear and significant threat to US Forces in that they have rendered the US Forces connected personnel susceptible to exploitation by HoIS. Susceptibility to HoIS emploitation because of saverse suitability factors should be coupled with at least one of the foregoing indicators of possible HoIS interest. Specific suitability factors which could render US Forces personnel vulnerable to HoIS exploitation would be excessive indebtedness or recurring financial difficulties; unexplained affluence; conduct such as criminal, immoral or homosexual acts which could render

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the individual susceptible to pressure; current and past mental and emotional instability; unusual work habits that do not conform to the daily pattern of fellow employees, sudden unexplained changes in working or social habits; sexual misconduct; infidelity; marital problems; trading on the interzonal routes or otherwise alterialing linguistic capabilities with Soviet or other bloc personnel in unsuthorised situations.

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BURNACT: Active servative servat agenciation Tragram (ALLE) (9)

Commander US Army Security Agency ATTM: DOSEED Arlington Hall Station Arlington, Virginia 22212

Attached is a copy of a letter received on 19 September 1975 from Commander, 766th Military Intelligrace Retachment, 65th MI Group, entitled "Project FILMA". The latter in soil explanatory but can be summerised as follows: Counterintalligency support to MASAFS Barlin has been conducted since 1970 upder the provisions of FIIDAN. Although FILMAN was entisfactory in concept, it outliged from a lack of precise support definition, particularly in source acquisition and reporting.

 Cdr. 766th MID. proposes as ALSAP support arrangement which would provide some direct source access to USASA percouncil and direct control of source coverage of actual or potential employage approaches. Cdr. USASAFS Berlin concurso in the concept and desires to implement the program. COL Holden was briefed on the program during his vicit to Berlin in August 1975 and concurred in the proposal. 35 Asson. DA ASSI, and MI Billoud, FRANCE TOSE, word Akew broken, in Supremon 1975 and supported the concept.

languest your concurrence in canculation of Project FILMS and adaption of the ADSAP by USASAFS Berlin/785th MID. Appropriate safeguards will be maintained with regard to withdrawal of USASA sources should hostile intolliger or interest these and a Tibia soldier. Poquest a reply as soon as possible so we can begin regotiating a new Kesorandum of Understanding with 65th MI Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl

CERALD J. DETTINE Closelled by C. DK USASHASB April Adjunction 726



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY ARLINGTON WALL STATION ARLINGTON, 1 RGINIA 22212

IACG

20 OCT 1975

SUBJECT: Aggressive Defension Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) (U)

Commander USASA Field Station, Berlin APO New York 09742

1. (U) Reference IAEB-I Letter, dated 7 October 1975, Subject: Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program (ADSAP) (U).

I concur in cancellation of Project FILMAN and initiation of the Aggressive Defensive Source Acquisition Program by the 766th MID, 66th MI Group. A copy of the completed Memorandum of Understanding will be provided to this HQ, ATTN: DCSSEC.

> WILLIAM IN ROLYA Brigadier General, USA Commanding

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Request for	r Termination of ICIP Operat	ion CANTER RIDE		5 May 1976	
ACTION REQUIRED	formal ACSI approval for ter	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,			
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for ICIP Of Officer in Command (U) requested the extent	y ltr, 25 Feb 75, subject: PLAN CANTER RIDE (U). The O cover status into the Advan SAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, by CG, USAMICOM, to enhance , if any, of hostile intelli ed by the ACSI on 4 Mar 75.	PIAN provided for the Sensors Direct Alabama. This sp the security of t	r the in torate o pecializ the Dire	sertion of of the US And ed CI suppo ctorate and	an MI War rmy Missi: ort was d determin
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	fter a thorough review, it h	as been determine	ed that	subject IC	IP has suc
tully accou	mplished its objective.				
902d MI Gp	I security support is being Redstone Resident Office, u	nder the provision	MICOM by	the 902d 1 ts Direct :	MI Gp by Support Co
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ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71





BAMI-DOH (2 Apr 76) 2d Ind SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANTER RIDE (U) DA, CACOFS for Intelligence, ATTH: DAMI-DOH, Washington, DC 20310 : 1 Mar 2076 TO: Commander, US Army Intelligence Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland 20755 ICIP CANTER RIDE is formally terminated as recommended. FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

(Sed) John L. Heiss III

JOHN L. HEISS III Colonel, GS Chief, HUMINI Division

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 Dod #200.1-R



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2 April 1976

SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANTER RIDE (U)

Commander

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U. S. Army Intelligence Agency

ATTN: MIIA-90

Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

1 Wer After a thorough review, it has been determined that ICIP Operation CANTER RIDE has successfully accomplished its objective. To continue the operation utilizing SCOPI Source IC-B-083 would be an improper utilization of an MI warrant officer, and would increase the potential for compromise as long as the insert Source remains in the target area.

2. (e)— On 18 February 1976, I visited Major General Turnmeyer, Commander, U. S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. During the visit, Major General Turnmeyer requested a recommendation concerning the continuation of the operation. I indicated that there was no known indication of compromise, but in view of the above, recommended that the operation be terminated and Source extracted as soon as the personnel system would permit. Major General Turnmeyer expressed his deep appreciation for the information previously provided through the operation, and while expressing his complete concurrence that the operation had successfully met its objective, readily agreed that it should be terminated at once and the Source be extracted.

3. We The above information was passed by my staff to members of the Support Detachment, USAINTA, and LTC Grimes, Commander, Special Operations Detachment, USAINTA, on 19 February 1976. Brigadier General Thompson, Commander, USAINTA, was informed of the above on 20 February 1976 and Major General Aaron, ACSI, DA, on 23 February 1976.

4. Who on 23 and 27 February 1976, the 902d MI Group requested USAINTA assistance in the reassignment of Source IC-B-083. As a result of actions completed by the Support Detachment, USAINTA, Source is in receipt of reassignment orders with an expected PCS date of 8 April 1976.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD \$200.1-R

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CONFIDENTIAL

MILA-GPB-AC (SP)

2 April 1976

SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANTER RIDE (U)

5. Comprehensive counterintelligence security support is also being provided to the U. S. Army Missile Command by the Redstone Resident Office, 902d MI Group, under the provisions of 902d MI Group Pamphlet 381-3, subject: Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP) (U), to be published. The DSCCP, an all-source, multi-discipline threat concept which is being developed for use throughout the 902d MI Group, will continue in support of the U. S. Army Missile Command concurrent with the termination of the ICIP Operation.

6. In view of the above, request formal approval of the termination of ICIP Operation CANTER RIDE.

MASSEL L. PARKER Colonel, MI Commanding

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CONFIDENTIAL

MIIA-SO-SA (2 Apr 76) 1st Ind (C) SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANTER RIDE (U)

21.3

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

TO: HQDA (DAMI-DOH/LTC HAENDLE), WASH DC 20310

1. (c) As indicated by paragraph 2 of the basic letter, the 902d Military Intelligence Group and the Commanding General of the US Army Missile Command determined in February 1976 that the primary objective of ICIP CANTER RIDE had been accomplished and the operation should be terminated. On 20 February 1976 verbal approval of termination was given by the CDR, USAINTA- and by the ACSI on 23 February 1976.

2. Counterintelligence security support is being provided to the US Army Missile Command by the 902d MI Group under its Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP) as described in paragraph 5 of the basic letter. Arrangements have been made for the extraction and reassignment of the insert source used in this operation. Source will be debriefed and terminated subsequent to his 8 April 1976 reporting date by the 902d MI Group, which is also his new unit of assignment.

3. (U) Recommend formal approval of the termination of ICIP CANTER RIDE.

WILLIAM I. JENNINGS Special Assistant (OPS)

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11653

EXEMPTION CATALOGY

AUTHOR 31 Dec 2006

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DAMI-DOH

SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

d. This action provides formal approval to CDR, USAINTA to terminate ICIP CANARY EFFORT (U).

3. (U) Recommendation: That the 2d Ind, (TAB A) be approved and signed by the ACSI, DA.





DAMI-DOH (2 Apr 76) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

DA, GACofS for Intelligence, ATTN: DAMI-DOH, Washington, DC 20310

TO: Commander, US Army Intelligence Agency, Fort Mende, Maryland 20755

ICIP CAMARY EFFORT is formally terminated as recommended.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

2 Incl рc

JOHN L. HEISS III Colonel, GS Chief, HUMINT Division

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- CONTIL

MIIA-GPB-AC (SP)

2 April 1976

SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

Commander U. S. Army Intelligence Agency ATTN: MIIA-SO Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

1. (U) References:

a. USAINTA Letter, MITA-SO-SA, subject: Change in ICIP CNVARY LEFORE Support (U), dated 27 Jan 76, with 902d MI Group 1st Ind, MITA-CPD-AC(SP), dated 29 Jan 76.

b. 902d Hi Group Letter, MIIA-GPH-AC(SP), subject: Termination of ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT (U), dated 3 March 1976.

As outlined in the above references, copies of which have been provided under separate cover, I have chosen ICIP Operation CAWARY IFFORT to be replaced by an overt comprehensive all-source, multi-discipline security support concept as defined in 902d MI Group Pamphlet 381-3, subject: Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program, to be published. Toward this end, confidential ICIP sources previously supporting the operation were terminated without prejudice during the month of February 1976. The Great Skills Project Case Officer was released from duties in support of the operation on 1 March 1976.

3. The termination of the ICIP Operation was coordinated by my staff with LTC Grimes, Commander, Special Operations Detachment, USAINTA, on 19 February 1976. The oral approval of the termination was gained from Brigadier General Thompson, Commander, USAINTA, and Major General Aaron, ACSI, DA, on 20 and 23 February 1976 respectively. Supported commanders were briefed on the termination of the operation during March 1976 in conjunction with the regularly scheduled quarterly ICIP briefings, and assured that this action is no way relieved the 902d MI Group of the responsibility for continuing overt, all-source, multi-discipline support subsequent to 31 March 1976.

En Willy

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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

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MIIA-GPB-AC(SP) 2 April 1976 SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

4. (U) In view of the above, request formal approval of the termination of ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT.

HASSEL L. PARKER Colonel, MI Commanding

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MIIA-SO-SA (2 Apr 76) 1st Ind (0) SUBJECT: Request for Termination of ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT (U)

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Fort Meade, Maryland 20755

TO: HQDA (DAMI-DOH/LTC HARMDLE), WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References la smd lb of basic letter are attached as Enclosures 1 and 2, respectively.

2. As moted in paragraph 2 and 3 of basic letter, although ICIP Operation CANARY EFFORT was terminated effective 31 March 1976, counter-intelligence support will continue to be provided under the concepts of the 902d Military Intelligence Group Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program, to be published. Verbal approval of this termination was given by the CDR, USAINTA, on 20 February 1976, and the ACSI on 23 February 1976.

3. Ger Confidential sources utilized in this ICIP have been terminated.

4. (U) Recommend formal approval of the termination of ICIP CANARY EFFORT.

2 Incl

WILLIAM I. JENNINGS Special Assistant (OPS)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
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BY CDP SAINSOOM FOI/PO
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AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200 D. C. CALUSAILUTA

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

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•	Counterintelligenc	e Progr	am (IC	IP) (U)		DAT	26 Mar 76		
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b. I	Memorandum at <u>TAB A</u> nder Secretary of t	transo	nits sur y for s	mmaries of econd quan	ICI rter	P opera	ations thro	ough t	he VCSA
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ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

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DOCUMENT



DAMI-DOE

MEMORARDUM THRU: VICE CRIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)--

INFORMATION MEMORARDUM

During the past quarter, six of the currently active Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations provided information on incidents involving personnel suitability and conditions reflecting peor security practices or washnesses. Reports of these relatively minor conditions were furnished the commanders of the supported commands who took immediate corrective action.

2. (U) The total number of active ICIP operations remains at nine. Summaries of activity in these operations during the last quarter are inclosed.

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ON SEP -5 1997
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-DOH

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

NOTED USA DEPTINE

FOR: UNDER SEGRETARY OF THE ARMY

Date 12 AFR 13/6

COL John (d. Todd, Exec., SAUS

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) --

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

During the past quarter, six of the currently active Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations provided information on incidents involving personnel suitability and conditions reflecting poor security practices or weaknesses. Reports of these relatively minor conditions were furnished the commanders of the supported commands who took immediate corrective action.

2. (U) The total number of active ICIP operations remains at nine. Summaries of activity in these operations during the last quarter are inclosed.

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HAROLD R. AMION Major General, IS ACofs for Intelligence

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* OCT-DEC 75

Noted by the Under Secretary of the Army with comment: "On next quarter's review, please provide an analysis (of each ICIP for the past year) to include statistics."

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JOHN A. TODD Colonel, GS Executive

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MEMORANDUM TRIME: VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AUGY

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ECIP) (U) --

THYOMATION MEMORANDUM

1. (c) During the past quarter, six of the currently active Internal Counterintalligence Program (ICIP) operations provided information on incidents involving personnel suitability and conditions reflecting poor security practices or weaknesses. Reports of these relatively minor conditions were furnished the commanders of the supported commands who took immediate corrective action.

2. (U) The total number of active ICIP operations remains at nine. Summaries of activity in these operations during the last quarter are inclosed.

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
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


CANARY EFFORT: (CACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) During the reporting period, adverse suitability information (indebtedness, drug or alcohol abuse, moral improprieties and mental instability) was reported concerning 17 individuals assigned sensitive duties. Monitoring continues; a limited investigation has been requested on one of the individuals.
- (2) This ICIP had previously identified alleged users of narcotics. As a result of an investigation conducted by USACIDC, 13 of these individuals were apprehended and charged with drug violations. Eleven of these 13 had security clearances and had access to the Alternate Joint Command Center.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 18 December, the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) presented a Quarterly Progress Report to the Commander, US Army Communications Command (USACC). On 30 December 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to the Commander, Fort Ritchie; Commander, USACC Site R Telecommunications Center; and the Deputy ACSI&S, 7th Signal Command. All expressed appreciation and continued support for the ICIP.
- (2) At the request of the Director, Administrative Services, JCS, the portion of this operation in support of the Alternate National Military Command Center was terminated.

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2. CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained; None,
 - e. Operational Status:

During the period, one conventional source was terminated due to his transfer from the area. One source is under consideration for recruitment. He is in the Maintenance Division, Directorate for Special Weapons (DSW). DSW is the primary SAD activity being supported by this ICIP. On 21 December 1975, the PLO provided the Quarterly Briefing Report to COL Alden L. Cox, CDR, Seneca Army Depot.

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3. (W)

CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Adverse suitability information pertaining to a GS-12 civilian physicist with access to Secret information who was assigned to the Optical Guidance Technology Office (OGTO), indicated that he probably was the catalyst for the sexually-oriented gatherings of OGTO employees which prompted a Sep 74 AR 15-6 investigation of OGTO personnel ordered by the CG, USAMICOM. As a result of that investigation, the present ICIP operation was initiated. The employee, who is apparently obsessed with sex has had numerous extra-marital liaisons during the last five years. He transferred to the Infrared Technology Office, Advanced Sensors Directorate, a highly sensitive office, in Aug 74. The Source, who obtained information by elicitation, was successful in identifying him only in recent weeks. The employee's departure from OGTO apparently broke up the clique and Source could uncover no new evidence of such activities among remaining OGTO employees. Near the close of the reporting period, the employee applied for a position in Japan. The Commander, USAMICOM, was provided a summary of the information on the employee for appropriate command action.
- (2) Source identified an Army lLT who was attempting to civilianize his duty position. The individual is a naturalized citizen who was born in Shanghai, China. His security clearance was based on a favorable NAC only.
- e. Operational Status: On 10 October 1975, the Commander, 902d MI Group and the Project Liaison Officer briefed MG George E. Turnmeyer, the newly assigned Commander, USAMICOM. MG Turnmeyer affirmed his approval of the operation. In a subsequent briefing on 10 November 1975, MG Turnmeyer was apprised of the information reported in sub-paragraph d(1) above. It was concluded that since the operation had provided the information initially sought, it is now necessary to refocus the effort to emphasize security matters rather than suitability problems.

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4. (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), US Army Materiel Command, Herlong, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
 - e. Operational Status:

One individual is under assessment for use as a confidential source. The quarterly progress report to SIAD officials was delayed until after the Christmas holidays. It is expected that the report will be presented sometime in January 1976. The Commander and staff officers knowledgeable of the ICIP continue to provide their support.

* RPT SUBMITTED IN FOR 76; TO BE IN NEXT ICIP REPORT.

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5. CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) As a result of information gained concerning a suicide attempt by an Army NCO assigned to PTC a Limited Investigation was initiated. The investigation revealed that the NCO has a large number of outstanding debts, has lied on loan applications, and recently ordered a 1976 automobile which will cost in excess of five thousand dollars. Interviews concerning the NCO revealed alleged drug usage and homosexuality. USAINTA directed that the NCO be interviewed concerning the allegations against him. The NCO has been assigned to the Logistics Branch, PTC, pending results of the Limited Investigation.
- (2) Adverse suitability information was reported on two additional NCOs assigned to PTC. Based on medical reports and rebellious attitudes one NCO was released from the Army by board action. The second NCO was reassigned to another Branch within the command and his access to classified information was suspended for 90 days pending resolution of adverse suitability information. The NCO after a night of heavy drinking at the Ft Meyer NCO Club, began hitting his wife when she tried to arouse him after he had "passed out." The wife filed assault charges with the Military Police and withdrew them later. The PTC Commander counselled the NCO on his drinking and marital problems and assigned him duties where he has no access to classified information.

e. Operational Status:

On 18 Dec 1975, the Project Liaison Officer (PLO), CENSUS TIME, presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Donald E. Clark, CDR, PTC. The PLO, CANARY EFFORT, was also present at the briefing. In a re-evaluation of the target priorities within PTC, COL Clark requested that the PTC element of the Army Operations Center and the Hoffman Telecommunications Center be covered by ICIP sources. Accordingly, the OPLAN for CENSUS TIME will be changed to include these targets.

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CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Adelphi, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Suitability information concerning an employee of the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), a branch of HDL located in Woodbridge, VA, involved a problem of alcohol abuse. After counseling, the employee is undergoing a rehabilitation program.
- (2) From 7 October to 6 November 1975, a courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted. The penetrations succeeded in revealing several security weaknesses and the supported command has taken corrective actions to remedy them. A number of the Security Guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. A new magnetic coded badge has been approved for purchase in FY 77. The PLO will also give a lecture to the HDL Guard Force on the penetration test and ways to foil attempted penetrations.
 - e. Operational Status:

On 3 December 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to COL Thomas McGregor, CDR, HDL. Also present at the briefing were MAJ Kenneth F. Keller and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL.

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GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Revalidation - 11 Jul 75)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Aberdeen, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained.
- (1) Sources reported several instances of foreign contact by military and DOD civilian personnel in the supported activity. In one instance a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany was assigned on an exchange program to work in the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL) until Sep 76. The source, who provided information on an employee's travel to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1975, provided additional information on the employee's plans to travel to those countries again in 1976. A report of a civilian DOD employee at Edgewood Arsenal with some unexplained periods of time in his background prompted a request for a Limited Investigation from the supported command.
- (2) The source who reported on travel to the USSR in 1975 of a man and wife DOD employees of the supported activities at HEL and the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (USAMSAA) provided information on plans of the couple to take another tour to Russia in 1976.
- (3) Sources reported allegations of questionable suitability factors involving eight employees assigned to the supported command. These unsubstantiated allegations consisted of five incidents of extramarital relations, one suggestion of other immoral conduct, one case of mental instability and one allegation of a fraudulent claim on a TDY voucher. Efforts are underway to substantiate or refute the reported allegations.
- (4) Sources reported five instances of security weaknesses or poor security practices. These five instances consisted of two unattended offices in which security containers were left open, a CONFIDENTIAL document left unsecured over a three day weekend, poorly controlled access to a classified scientific conference at USAMSAA, and movement of the Ground Warfare Division of USAMSAA into a building in which no technical survey had been conducted prior to the move. These were brought to the attention of the appropriate security officials in the supported activities and corrective actions were taken.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 1 Dec 75, the PLO presented the initial ICIP briefing to MG Patrick W. Powers, CDR, US Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), and COL William H. Tucker, Jr., Chief of Staff, TECOM.

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- (2) On 18 Dec 75, the PLO gave the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Kenneth L. Stahl, CDR, Edgewood Arsenal, on those activities pertaining to the Edgewood Arsenal portion of the ICIP GONDOLA STAR.
- (3) On 19 Dec 75, the PLO presented a Quarterly Progress Report on those activities of the Aberdeen Proving Ground which are supported by the ICIP to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, CDR, APG. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG, was also present at the briefing.

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8. (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
 - e. Operational Status:

One individual is under assessment as a confidential source in USA Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate, WSMR. On 2 December 1975 the Project Liaison Officer presented the Quarterly Progress Report to MG O. L. Tobiason, CG, WSMR. The following personnel were also present at the briefing: LTC Charles I. Davis, Chief, Security Office, WSMR; CPT Marcel Hull, SAIC, Ft Bliss Resident Office, 525th MI Gp; GS 13 William F. Arket, Chief, Intelligence Division, WSMR; and GS 13 Shigeru Tsubota, Deputy Operations Officer, 525th MI Gp, Presidio of Monterey, California.

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- LENTIL MONKEY: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five confidential sources.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Two instructors of the Bulgarian Language Department who are man and wife, and who previously had been accused by other members of the Bulgarian Department of having contacts with the Bulgarian Intelligence Service have changed their status during the quarter. Details of their histories have been provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The husband has accepted a teaching position with the State Department and left DLI. The wife remained in DLI as an instructor.
- (2) An instructor of the Czechoslovakian Language Department reportedly is planning to resign from DLI in 1976, take her retirement pay in a lump sum and return to Czechoslovakia with her two sons.

b1 Per FBI

no indications that he intends to return to Czechoslovakia. This information has been passed to the FBI.

- (3) A DLI employee, presently involved with the Hebrew Project, is reported to be maintaining close contact with the Israeli Consulate in San Francisco. The employee, an alien with an impressive background, including possible intelligence activities, has also applied for employment with the National Security Agency (NSA). Information presently known to Army Intelligence has been made available to NSA.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) Five confidential sources were utilized during the quarter; one source was terminated due to graduation. A total of 12 individuals are under assessment as possible new sources, including two Technical Language Assistants. In addition to the five confidential sources, there are 23 confidential sources providing coverage of nine language departments and the DLI staff.

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(2) The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report on 16 Dec 75 to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI. Also attending the briefing were COL William F. Strobridge, CDR, 525th MI Group; CPT Brendon A. Xiques, SAIC, Ft Ord Resident Office, 525th MI Group; and Mr. James Green, Acting Security Officer, DLI.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-DOH

MEMORANDUM THRU: VICE CHIEF-OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

COL MAC (J. Tollis, Exer., SAUS

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) --

INFORMATION NEMORANDUM

(G) During the past quarter, six of the currently active Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations provided information on incidents involving personnel suitability and conditions reflecting poor security practices or weaknesses. Reports of these relatively minor conditions were furnished the commanders of the supported cormands who took immediate corrective action.

2. (U) The total number of active ICIP operations remains at nine. Summaries of activity in these operations during the last quarter are inclosed.

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TODD Colonel, GS Executive

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2. (2) CANINE PLATE: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Seneca Army Depot (SAD), Romulus, NY
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: During the period, one conventional source was terminated due to his transfer from the area. One source is under consideration for recruitment. He is in the Maintenance Division, Directorate for Special Weapons (DSW). DSW is the primary SAD activity being supported by this ICIP. On 21 December 1975, the PIO provided the Quarterly Briefing Report to COL Alden L. Cox, CDR, Seneca Army Depot.

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(U)
3. (C) CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 75)

- a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Adverse suitability information pertaining to a civilian employee indicates that the employee is possibly the central figure who was the catalyst for events and allegations which led to the AR 15-6 investigation and initiation of this ICIP operation.
 - (2) Source continues his observations of employee who is a Jordanianby birth and concerning who information was furnished last quarter, but no new information of significance was developed.
 - Source identified an Army ILT who was attempting to civilianize his duty position. The individual is a naturalized citizen who was born in Shanghai, China. His security clearance was based on a favorable NAC only.
 - e. Operational Status: On 10 October 1975, the Commander, 902d MI Group and the Project Liaison Officer briefed MG George E. Turnmeyer, the newly assigned Commander, USAMICOM. MG Turnmeyer affirmed his approval of the operation. In a subsequent briefing on 10 November 1975, MG Turnmeyer was apprised of the information reported in sub-paragraph d(1) above. It was concluded that since the operation had provided the information initially sought, it is now necessary to refocus the effort to emphasize security matters rather than suitability problems.

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Adverse suitability information pertaining to a civilian formation by elicitation, was successful in identifying him only in recent weeks.


The supplied to the Infrared Technology Office, Advanced Sensors Directorate in Aug 74 that the Source, who obtained information by elicitation, was successful in identifying him only in recent weeks.

Near the close of the reporting period, b6 applied for a position in Japan. The Commander, USAMICOM, was provided a summary of information on b6

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
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
CANVAS TAX: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- Location: Sierra Army Depot (SIAD), US Army Materiel Command, Herlong, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: One.
- Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: One individual is under assessment for use as a confidential source. The quarterly progress report to SIAD officials was delayed until after the Christmas holidays. It is expected that the report will be presented sometime in January 1976. The Commander and staff officers knowledgeable of the ICIP continue to provide their support.

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5. (CENSUS TIME: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

a. Location: Pentagon Telecommunications Center (PTC), US Army Communications Command (USACC), The Pentagon, Washington, DC.

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) As a result of information gained concerning a suicide attempt by an Army NCO assigned to PTC a Limited Investigation was initiated. The investigation revealed that the NCO has a large number of outstanding debts, has lied on loan applications, and recently ordered a 1976 automobile which will cost in excess of five thousand dollars. Interviews concerning the NCO revealed alleged drug usage and homosexuality. USAINTA directed that the NCO be interviewed concerning the allegations against him. The NCO has been assigned to the Logistics Branch, PTC, pending results of the Limited Investigation.
- (2) Adverse suitability information was reported on two additional NCOs assigned to PTC. Based on medical reports and rebellious attitudes one NCO was released from the Army by board action. The second NCO was reassigned to another Branch within the command and his access to classified information was suspended for 90 days pending resolution of adverse suitability information.
 - e. Operational Status:

On 18 December 1975, the Project Liaison Officer (PIO), CENSUS TIME, presented the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Donald E. Clark, CDR, PTC. The PIO, CANARY EFFORT, was also present at the briefing. In a re-evaluation of the target priorities within PTC, COL Clark requested that the PTC element of the Army Operations Center and the Hoffman Telecommunications Center be covered by ICIP sources. Accordingly, the OPLAN for CENSUS TIME will be changed to include these targets.

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(2) The NCO, after a night of heavy drinking at the Ft Meyer NCO Club, began hitting his wife when she tried to arouse him after he had "passed out." The wife filed assault charges with the Military Police and withdrew them later. The PTC Commander counselled the NCO on his drinking and marital problems and assigned him duties where he has no access to classified information.

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6. (M)

CENTAVO KID: (QACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Adelphi, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- * (1) Suitability information surfaced on a WRF) employee's problem with alcohol abuse. After counseling the employee is undergoing a rehabilitation program:
- (2) From 7 October to 6 November 1975, a courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted. The penetrations succeeded in revealing several security weaknesses and the supported command has taken corrective actions to remedy them. A number of the Security Guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. A new magnetic coded badge has been approved for purchase in FY 77. The PLO will also give a lecture to the HDL Guard Force on the penetration test and ways to foil attempted penetrations.
- e. Operational Status: On 3 December 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to COL Thomas McGregor, CDR, HDL. Also present at the briefing were MAJ Kenneth F. Keller and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL.

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CENTAVO KID (U)

6. d.

(1) Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), a branch of HDL located in Woodbridge, VA

of the Woodhidge Research Friendly (WKT), a branch of HDL breaked in Woodbridge, VA, involved a problem of aleshol abuse. After amuseling, the employee is undergoing a rehabilitation

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
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GONDOLA STAR: (QACSI Revalidation - 11 Jul 75)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Aberdeen, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
- d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Sources reported several instances of foreign contact by military and DOD civilian personnel in the supported activity. In one instance a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany was assigned on an exchange program to work in the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL) until Sep 76. The source, who provided information on an employee's travel to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1975, provided additional information on the employee's plans to travel to those countries again in 1976. A report of a civilian DOD employee at Edgewood Arsenal with some unexplained periods of time in his background prompted a request for a Limited Investigation from the supported command.
- (2) The source who reported on travel to the USSR in 1975 of a man and wife DOD employees of the supported activities at HEL and the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (USAMSAA) provided information on plans of the couple to take another tour to Russia in 1976.
- (3) Sources reported eight allegations of questionable sultability factors involving employees assigned to the supported activity. Due to the lack of substantive information, the behavior of the individuals will be monitored.
- (4) Sources reported five instances of security weaknesses or poor security practices. These were brought to the attention of the appropriate security officials in the supported activities for corrective action.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 1 Dec 75, the PLO presented the initial ICIP briefing to MG Patrick W. Powers, CDR, US Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), and COL William H. Tucker, Jr., Chief of Staff, TECOM.
- (2) On 18 Dec 75, the PLO gave the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Kenneth L. Stahl, CDR, Edgewood Arsenal, on those activities pertaining to the Edgewood Arsenal portion of the ICIP GONDOLA STAR.
- (3) On 19 Dec 75, the PLO presented a Quarterly Progress Report on those activities of the Aberdeen Proving Ground which are supported by the ICIP to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, CDR, APG. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG, was also present at the briefing.

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


GONDOLA STAR (U)

- 7. d.
- (3) Activities, US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (USAMSAA) and Edgewood Arsenal.
- (4) These five instances consisted of two unattended offices in which security containers were left open, a CONFIDENTIAL document left unsecured over a three day weekend, poorly controlled access to a classified scientific conference at USAMSAA, and movement of the Ground Warfare Division of USAMSAA into a building in which no technical survey had been conducted prior to the move. These were brought to the attention of the appropriate security officials in the supported activities and corrective actions were taken.

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
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8. LENS HOLDER: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: White Sands Missile Range (WSMR), NM
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Two confidential sources were utilized during the reporting period.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained: None.
- e. Operational Status: One individual is under assessment as a confidential source in USA Missile Test and Evaluation Directorate, WSMR. On 2 December 1975 the Project Liaison Officer presented the Quarterly Progress Report to MG O. L. Tobiason, CG, WSMR. The following personnel were also present at the briefing: LTC Charles I. Davis, Chief, Security Office, WSMR; CPT Marcel Hull, SAIC, Ft Bliss Resident Office, 525th MI Gp; GS 13 William F. Arket, Chief, Intelligence Division, WSMR; and GS 13 Shigeru Tsubota, Deputy Operations Officer, 525th MI Gp, Presidio of Monterey, California.

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9 (CACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five confidential sources.
 - c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Two instructors of the Bulgarian Language Department who are man and wife, and who previously had been accused by other members of the Bulgarian Department of having contacts with the Bulgarian Intelligence Service have changed their status during the quarter. Details of their histories have been provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The husband has accepted a teaching position with the State Department and left DLI. The wife remained in DLI as an instructor, but her contract was approached at the contract was
- (2) An instructor of the Czechoslovakian Language Department reportedly is planning to resign from DLI in 1976, take her retirement pay in a lump sum and return to Czechoslovakia with her two sons.

b1 Per FBI

There are

no indications that he intends to return to Czechoslovakia. This information has been passed to the FBI.


- (3) A DLI employee, presently involved with the Hebrew Project, is reported to be maintaining close contact with the Israeli Consulate in San Francisco. The employee, an alien with an impressive background, including possible intelligence activities, has also applied for employment with the National Security Agency (NSA). Information presently known to Army Intelligence has been made available to NSA.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) Five confidential sources were utilized during the quarter; one source was terminated due to graduation. A total of 12 individuals are under assessment as possible new sources, including two Technical Language Assistants. In addition to the five confidential sources, there are 23 confidential sources providing coverage of nine language departments and the DLI staff.

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


(2) The PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report on 16 Dec 75 to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI. Also attending the briefing were COL William F. Strobridge, CDR, 525th MI Group; CPT Brendon A. Xiques, SAIC, Ft Ord Resident Office, 525th MI Group; and Mr. James Green, Acting Security Officer, DLI.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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JAN 13 1976

SUBJECT: Quarterly Reporting of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH/LTC HAENDLE) WASH DC 20310

During the 2d Quarter, FY 1976, six of the currently active Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) operations provided information on incidents involving suitability and conditions reflecting poor security practices, hazards, or weaknesses. These reports, though they involved individual items of a relatively minor nature, were passed immediately to the supported commanders who have taken corrective action. The discovery of these conditions and actions taken have served to enhance the security of the supported facilities. The total number of active ICIP operations at the close of the period was nine.

2. (U) Summaries reflecting the details of the information reported and the status of each of the nine operations are inclosed.

9 Incl as WILLIAM I, JENNINGS Special Assistant (OPS)

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
(U) CANARY EFFORT: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Fort Ritchie, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Three confidential sources.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians:
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) During the reporting period adverse suitability information concerning 17 individuals assigned sensitive duties within the target areas was reported. The adverse information which involved indebtedness, alcohol abuse, drug abuse, moral improprieties, and mental instability, was brought to the attention of the ICIP Coordinator for CANARY EFFORT. Activities of all the individuals are being monitored, and the 7th Signal Command has requested a limited investigation of one of the individuals.
- During the period 13 military personnel assigned to Fort Ritchie were apprehended and charged with drug violations as a result of a drug investigation conducted by the US Army Criminal Investigation Division Command (USACIDC). Of the 13 individuals apprehended, 11 possessed security clearances and had access to the Alternate Joint Command Center (AJCC). Six of those apprehended were members of the 572d Military Police Company (Security) and performed sensitive duties at the AJCC. The Project Liaison Officer (PLO), CANARY EFFORT, had previously identified those individuals apprehended as alleged users of narcotics.
 - (3) The supported Command took action to suspend access to classified information of eight individuals based on information originally surfaced by the ICIP. These were all involved in suitability situations as outlined in d(1), above.
 - e. Operational Status:
 - (1) On 17 November 1975, a newly assigned Project Case Officer (PCO), a member of the GREAT SKILLS Program, began his duties in conjunction with CANARY EFFORT.
 - (2) On 9 December 1975, the PIO established a 902d MI Group Liaison Office at Fort Detrick, MD. This office will provide greater flexibility for the PIO in carrying out his duties in connection with the East Coast Telecommunications Directorate (ECTC), which is at Fort Detrick and is one of the activities supported by the ICIP.

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- (3) On 18 December 1975, the PIO of CANARY EFFORT presented the Quarterly Progress Report to COL Donald E. Clark, Commander, US Army Communications Command (USACC) Operations Command at the USACC Pentagon Telecommunications Center. The PIO for ICIP CENSUS TIME was also present at the briefing.
- (4) On 19 December 1975, the PLO presented a SAEDA/Threat/Security Awareness briefing to personnel assigned to the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC), Site R.
- (5) On 30 December 1975, the PLO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to the supported commands with the following in attendance: COL Harold G. deMoya, CDR, Ft Ritchie; COL John S. Eberle, CDR, USACC Site R Telecommunications Center; and Mr. Joseph J. Carroll, Deputy ACSI&S, 7th Signal Command and Ft Ritchie. Colonels Clark, deMoya, Eberle and Mr. Carroll expressed their appreciation and continued support for the ICIP.

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BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
CANTER RIDE: (OACSI Approval - 4 Mar 78UTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

a. Location: US Army Missile Command (USAMICOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL

- b. Confidential Source Utilization: One
- $\boldsymbol{c}_{\text{-}}$ Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) The source utilized in this operation has provided information of an adverse suitability nature on a civilian employee of the Optical Guidance Technology Office (OGTO), Advance Sensors Directorate (ASD), which indicate the employee is possibly the central figure who was the catalyst for the events and allegations during the Sep 74 AR 15-6 investigation which led to the initiation of the operation. This information has been provided the Commander, USAMICOM, in a Summary of Information. The CDR, USAMICOM, is considering what future action will be taken on the employee, if any. Evaluation of information provided on eight of the co-workers of the above employee indicates no further investigation with regards to their suitability is required at this time.
- (2) The source is continuing his observation of the ASD employee who is a Jordanian by birth but learned no new information of significance during the period. Information on this individual was reported previously in the 1st Qtr, FY 76.
- (3) Source identified an Army 1LT who was attempting to civilianize his duty position. The individual became of CI interest when it was learned that he is a naturalized citizen, born in Shanghai, China, with a security clearance granted on the basis of a favorable NAC only.

e. Operational Status:

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- (1) On 10 Oct 75, COL Stubblebine, CDR, 902d MI Group, accompanied by the PLO, MAJ Gipson, briefed the newly assigned CDR, USAMICOM, MG George E. Turnmeyer, on the operation with the USAMICOM Chief of Staff, COL Arthur G. Lange, Jr., in attendance. The USAMICOM officials were provided a copy of the EEI used in the operation and an update of the information provided by Source. MG Turnmeyer affirmed his approval of the operation.
- (2) In a separate session on 10 Oct 75, COL Stubblebine briefed COL William P. Gojsza, Deputy Director, US Army Missile Research, Development and Experimental Laboratory (USAMRDEL), on Source's role in the operation since COL Gojsza is Source's immediate supervisor in Source's "part-time" cover duty as the USAMRDEL Administrative Officer.

(3) On 10 Nov 75, COL Stubblebine and the PLO briefed MG Turnmeyer and Dr. McDaniel, Director, USAMRDEL, on an operational update and the 902d MI Group recommendations for continuation of the operation. After presenting the information contained in sub-paragraph d, above, conclusions were reached to the effect that since the operation had provided the information initially sought, it is now necessary to refocus the EEI, emphasizing security aspects rather than suitability matters. New EEI will be formulated with the supported command and the 902d MI Group.

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CENTAVO KID: (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Harry Diamond Laboratories (HDL), Adelphi, MD
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: None.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) The Technical Director, HDL, received a postcard request from a person unknown to him which asked for information on "Dirty Work," by the CIA. The card, with pertinent explanatory remarks, was provided to the Central Intelligence Agency.
- (2) No new incidents of aircraft overflights were reported at any HDL facilities during the reporting period. Two overflight incidents were reported at the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF), Woodbridge, VA, during the 1st Quarter, FY 76.

b1 Per FBI

- (3) Suitability information surfaced on a WRF employee's problem with alcohol abuse. After counseling the employee is undergoing a rehabilitation program.
- (4) From 7 October to 6 November 1975, a courtesy penetration test of HDL's Adelphi Facility was conducted. The penetrations succeeded in revealing several security weaknesses and the supported command has taken corrective actions to remedy them. A number of the Security Guards were transferred and guard procedures were changed. A new magnetic coded badge has been approved for purchase in FY 77. The PLO will also give a lecture to the HDL Guard Force on the penetration test and ways to foil attempted penetrations.
 - e. Operational Status:

On 3 December 1975, the PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Report to COL Thomas McGregor, CDR, HDL. Also present at the briefing were MAJ Kenneth F. Keller and Mr. James F. Yeick, Security Officer, HDL.

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7. GONDOLA STAR: (OACSI Revalidation - 11 Jul 75)

- a. Location: Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Aberdeen, MD.
- b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eight.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Sources reported several instances of foreign contact by military and DOD civilian personnel in the supported activity. In one instance a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany was assigned on an exchange program to work in the US Army Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL) until Sep 76. The source who provided information on an employee's travel to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1975 provided additional information on the employee's plans to travel to those countries again in 1976. USAINTA is debriefing the employee. A report of a visit by one British and three Canadians to Edgewood Arsenal in early Dec 75 was checked and it was determined that the visit had been properly cleared and coordinated. A report of a civilian DOD employee at Edgewood Arsenal with some unexplained periods of time in his background prompted a request for a Limited Investigation from the supported command.
- (2) The source who reported on travel to the USSR in 1975 of a man and wife DOD employees of the supported activities at HEL and the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (USAMSAA) provided information on plans of the couple to take another tour to Russia in 1976.
- (3) A source reported one instance in which the HEL received a request for bibliographies of HEL publications from the Institute of Experimental Psychology, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. The Director, HEL, advised the requester that copies of the bibliographies were no longer available for distribution to the public. HEL suggested that future requests be submitted through the Czechoslovakian Embassy to the National Technical Information Services, Springfield, VA.
- (4) Sources reported eight allegations of questionable suitability factors involving employees assigned to the supported activity. Due to the lack of substantive information to substantiate the reports, the behavior of the individuals will be monitored.
- (5) Sources reported five instances of security weaknesses or poor security practices. These were brought to the attention of the appropriate security officials in the supported activities for corrective action.

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- e. Operational Status:
- (1) On 1 Dec 75, the PLO presented the initial ICIP briefing to MG Patrick W. Powers, CDR, US Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), and COL William H. Tucker, Jr., Chief of Staff, TECOM.
- (2) On 18 Dec 75, the PLO gave the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Kenneth L. Stahl, CDR, Edgewood Arsenal, on those activities pertaining to the Edgewood Arsenal portion of the ICIP GONDOLA STAR.
- (3) On 19 Dec 75, the PIO presented a Quarterly Progress Report on those activities of the Aberdeen Proving Ground which are supported by the ICIP to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, CDR, APG. Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG, was also present at the briefing.

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.9 (OACSI Revalidation - 4 Feb 75)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Five confidential sources.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-Affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Two instructors of the Bulgarian Language Department who are man and wife, and who previously had been accused by other members of the Bulgarian Department of having contacts with the Bulgarian Intelligence Service have changed their status during the quarter. Details of their histories have been provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The husband has accepted a teaching position with the State Department and left DII. The wife remained in DLI as an instructor but her contract was to expire on 31 Dec 75.
- (2) An instructor of the Czechoslovakian Language Department reportedly is planning to resign from DLI in 1976, take her retirement pay in a lump sum and return to Czechoslovakia with her two sons.

b1 Per FBI

There are no indications that he intends to return to Czechoslovakia. This information has been passed to the FEI.

- (3) A DLT employee, presently involved with the Hebrew Project, is reported to be maintaining close contact with the Israeli Consulate in San Francisco. The employee, an alien with an impressive background, including possible intelligence activities, has also applied for employment with the National Security Agency (NSA). Information presently known to Army Intelligence has been made available to NSA.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) Five confidential sources were utilized during the quarter; one source was terminated due to graduation. No new sources have been recruited due to the Feb 76 departure of the PCO for an overseas assignment. No new PCO has been designated. A total of 12 individuals are under assessment as possible new sources, including two Technical Language Assistants. Formal recruitment is being delayed pending assignment of a new PCO. In addition to the five confidential sources, there are 23 conventional sources providing coverage of nine language departments and the DLI staff.

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- (2) The Commandant, DIJ, has established a security briefing program for all incoming students as part of their initial orientation. The PIO participates in this briefing, giving a lecture which emphasizes the lack of security clearances and the need-to-know of the instructors, previous cases of security incidents at DII, and examples of reportable security situations. Navy, Marine, Air Force, and civilian students attend these briefings as well as Army personnel. Two such briefings were given during the reporting period.
- (3) On 5 Dec 75, MAJ Richard Erickson, DLI Security Officer, departed DLI for a new assignment. His replacement will arrive in mid-Feb 76. Mr. James Green, DLI Personnel Security Specialist, is acting Security Officer pending arrival of the designated Security Officer.
- (4) The PIO presented the Quarterly Progress Report on 16 Dec 75 to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI. Also attending the briefing were COL William F. Strobridge, CDR, 525th MI Group; CPT Brendon A. Xiques, SAIC, Ft Ord Resident Office, 525th MI Group; and Mr. James Green, Acting Security Officer, DLI.

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of the e quarterl to perso ICIP CAR	xisting polic y reports to nally review ELESS TOKEN (schange of mestry pertaining the Under Secall new ICIP (U) for ACSI to USAREUR at (U)	to ICIP cretary 's, DCSI review.	's in CONUS of the Army , USAREUR d The operat	and the In I ecided ion is	he requireme light of the to forward	nt to furnish ACSI's polic the OPLAN for
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DAMI-DOH (30 Jun 75) 5th Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310

TO: Commander, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, ATTN: DCSI, APO New York 09403

- 1. (e) Continuation of your ICIP CARELESS TOKEN (U) under the May 1975 Operations Plan earlier approved at your Headquarters in support of US Army Security Agency, Field Station, Augsburg, is approved.
- 2. (U) As indicated in earlier correspondence, a Memorandum to the Under Secretary of the Army is prepared quarterly by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA Staff which includes a brief summary of developments and status of each ongoing ICIP. Field input is requested by the 15th of the month following the end of each calendar year quarter.

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY ARLINGTON HALL STATION ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212

3 0 JUN 1975

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Commander US Army Security Agency Field Station, Augsburg APO New York 09458

1. (U) Reference IAEASC Letter dated 10 June 1975, Subject: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (C).

I have reviewed the proposal to initiate an Internal Counterintelligence Plan within Detachment N by the 66th MI Group and approve. It is essential that this Headquarters and Deputy Commander USASA Europe be kept apprised of significant events which develop from this operation.

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1. Operations Flam (dup)

GEORGE A. GODDING Major General, USA Commanding

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IAEASC (30 Jun 75) 1st Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Headquarters, US Army Security Agency Field Station, Augsburg, APO New York 09458

TO: Chief, Beadquarters Det - CI, 66th MI Group, ATTN: Chief SOD, APO New York 09108

- 1. This command concurs with comments outlined in paragraph 2 of basic letter and recommends implementation of attached plan.
- 2. Per previous agreement, all major actions concerning the proposed plan will be discussed with the Field Station point of contact, LTC D. G. Schofield, S2.

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DONALD M. MOREAU COLONEL, MI COMMANDING

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AEUMI-M-SOD (30 Jun 1975) 2d Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

DA, Special Operations Detachment, 66th Military Intelligence Group, 11 July 1975 APO New York 09108

TO: Commander, 66th Military Intelligence Group, ATTN: AEUMI-T-CE, APO New York 09108

- SUBJECT Operations Plan has been coordinated with and approved by US ASA, Arlington Hall Station and USASA Field Station Augsburg. Attention is invited to paragraph 2 of 1st indorsement designating LTC.D. G. Schofield, S2, USASA Field Station Augsburg as the ASA point of contact.

The following members of Special Operations Detachment are knowledgeable of the OPLAN:

- Harold L. Roberts, GS-13, 19 May 1975
- Philip D. Wimsatt, Major, 19 May 1975
- Ben Davis, GS-12, 20 Hay 1975
- Ted R. Snediker, GS-12, 21 May 1975

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HAROLD L. ROBERTS GS-12 ESP Chief Detachment

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18 JUL 1975

AEUMI-T-CE (30 Jun 1975) 3rd Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Headquarters, 66th Military Intelligence Group, APO 09108

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAREUR and Seventh Army, ATTN: AEAGB-CI(80) (Mr. Roseto), APO 09403

1. (U) References:

- a. Message, ARAGB-CI(SO), DCSI, USAREUR, DTG 151640Z Jul 75 (U), Subject as above.
- b. Hessage, SSO Intelligence Agency, DTG 0115402 Jul 75 (C), Subject as above, retransmitted.
- c. FONECON, Mr. Roseto (DCSI USAREUR) and Mr. Kirk (this headquarters), 15 July 1975, concerning Subject.
- d. Message, ARUMI-T-CE, this headquarters, DTG 0716222 Feb 75 (C), Subject as above.
- 2. (2) In accordance with references la and b, above, and provisions of the attached approved Operations Plan (OPLAN), coverage of the target facility will be implemented immediately. Routine liaison visits to the target facility have revealed that the expected drawdown of personnel for reasons stated in reference ld, above, is already underway and personnel strength is expected to be reduced by 50% by October 1975; therefore, as discussed in reference lc, above, prompt implementation of the ICIP OPLAN is considered assential in reducing possible adverse effects of the above and resulting personnel turbulence.
- 3. (U) A copy of the Quarterly Status Report will be provided to your head-quarters in accordance with paragraph 2 of reference la, above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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ROBERT T. BROWNE

COL. MI

Director of Operations

CF: CDR, 511th MI Bn, ATTN: AEUMI-N-CE (Mr. Foss) (w/incls less OPLAN) Chief, SOD (w/o incls)

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AUTH PARAGE - CI (SO) (30 Jun 75) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Internal (SO) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army, Office of the Deputy Chicf of Staff, Intelligence, New York 09403

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TO: HODA (DAMI-DOH), WASH DC 20310

(U) References:

- a. Message, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 171231Z September 1974, subject: Former ASA Personnel (C) (BOM).
- b. Message, USAINTA, 1821382 September 1974, subject: Former ASA Personnel (2) (BOM).
- c. Message, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 191755Z June 1975, subject as above (2) (BOM).
- d. Message, USAINTA, 011540Z July 1975, subject as above (C) (BOM).
- Message, DAMI-DOH, DA, 032115Z December 1975, subject e. as above (C).
- f. Message, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 061755Z January 1975, subject as above (8),
- In accordance with your request in reference le, the attached Operations Plan for the Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP), CARELESS TOKEN, in support of Detachment N, US Army Security Agency, Field Station Augsburg, is furnished for ACSI review and approval. This plan was approved for implementation by ODCSI, USAREUR on 15 July 1975, prior to receipt of the new DA policy for ICIP reflected in reference le.
- Ouarterly status reports pertaining to CARELESS TOKEN will be forwarded under separate cover.
- (U) ODCSI, USAREUR, Action Officer is Mr David R. Smith, AEAGR-CI(SO), HM 7354 (AUTOSEVOCOM 6742).

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

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Colonel, GS

Chief, Counterintelligence Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY FIELD STATION, AUGSBURG APO NEW YORK 09458

3 y 69, 1975

·IAEASC

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

Commander
US Army Security Agency
ATTN: DCSSEC
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212

- 1. (U) Reference IASEC Letter 😂 3 March 1975 w/control #75 IASEC 00123.
- 2. (U) Inclosure 1 contains introductory letter and plan for ICIP within this command and is forwarded per paragraph 4, reference above.
- 3. This command acknowledges the requirement for a program such as is outlined in the plan attached and recommends approval by CG, USASA. It has long been a recognized fact that US forces in Europe operate within a hostile intelligence environment, this being particularly true for USASA with its sensitive product. Initiation of the attached ICIP would provide a valuable asset in upgrading this command's internal security posture. On the negative side, the short period of continued operations at Detachment N, where the plan is to be utilized, raises the question that the effort could be better expended at another detachment or at FSA.

4. (U) Request an expeditious reply in order to inform the 66th MI Group.

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DONALD M. MOREAU

COL, MI

Commanding

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OPERATIONS PLAN

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)(U)

REFERENCES: a. Letter, AEAGB-CI(SO), dated 27 December 1974, subject: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP), with ist Ind; AEUMITT-CE, 15 January 1975

b. Letter of Instruction (LOI) 6-TD, Source Management, HQ 66th Mr Group; 14 January 1974

dated 16 April 1973, subject: LA FAIRE VITE Security Requirements (U), with 1st Ind, AEAGB-CI(GS), 25 April 1973 and 2d Ind, AEUMI-ISC, 21 May 1973

d. FM 30-17A (27, Gounterintelligence Special Operations, February 1973

e. AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army and Deliberate Security Violations, 18 October 1974

HISSION.

a. Requirement: To collect significant counterintelligence information through the utilization of overt liaison contacts and Confidential Recruited Sources (CRS) assigned to Detachment N, US Army Security Agency Field Station Augsburg (USASAUSA), located at Rimboch (USASS5), Vederal Republic of Germany (FRG) (hereafter referred as the target), and who are specifically targetted against personnel security vulnerabilities of amigned target personnel and hostile intelligence activities directed against the target.

b. Objective: To provide responsible commanders and supervisors of US Army Security Agency Europe (USASAE) a concentrated program designed to detect, aliminate or neutralize:

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REPORT NO: B03130-079-7

DATE:

PROJECT NO:

OPLAN NO: 1-75

Operations Plan, 305130-079-75

- (1) Espionage, sabotage, subversion or deliberate security violations against the rarget or the personnel assigned thereto.
- (2) Disloyalty, disaffection and security weatherses provalent among personnel assigned to the larget.
- of personal conduct, render themselves vulnerable to coercion or blackmail by a Hostile Intelligence Service (USIS), either in their present assignment or that a later date. The foregoing includes drug and alcohol abuse.
- Partalion, Fuerth (PV4402), TNG.

PERSONNEL.

- commenced, however, no selections will be made prior to approval of this Plan.
- and serving most of the following uniteria, will be required: .-
 - (a) laie, between the eros of 21 and 25 years
 - (b) Wamarried (or "geographical bachelor")
 - (c) Have own Privately Owned Vehicle (POV) or the intent and independent seems to purchase one shortly
 - (d) Have a desire and agree to a regular pattern of travelling mean from the immediate target area during extended breaks from duty
 - (e) Friendly and likeable disposition, and ability to make friends, and to relate to and enjoy the confidences of co-workers
 - (f) Trustworthy, reliable and discreet
 - (a) Ability to take directions
 - (b) Willing to consume alcoholic beverages without habitually becoming inforicated
 - (i) No record of devogatory information, to include character deficiencies

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Operations Plan, B03130-079-75

- (j) Reasonable amount of intelligence and a high degree of
- (k) Above average sense of loyalry to duty and country and a strong dedication to duty assignment
 - (1) Career-oriented, or not yet decided whether to remain in
 - (m) DEROS not earlier than one year from recruitment as a CRS
- (2) Support Sources: It is not anticipated that any support sources will be required in this operation. If the operation develops to a degree of complexity requiring support sources, this Plan will be revised according by

b. US Army Intelligence (USAI) Personnel:

(1) Project Lisison Officer (PLO):

- (a). The PLO will be responsible for Overt Maison Contacts and the sporting and assessing of potential CRS at the target. A Special Agent lassingned to Resident Office Regensburg (ROM), 511th MI Battalion, will function as PLO consistent with ROR having area responsibility for the target area and lisison responsibility to the target.
- (h) <u>Designoe</u>: SAA Ronald Grawford, who has experience in both counterintelligence and collection activities, to include source handling; his DEFOS is 1978.

(2) Project Control Officer (PCO):

- (a) The PCO will be responsible for the recruitment and controlling of CRS engaged in this operation. The PCO will be assisted by an Assistant PCO as required.
- (b) Designee: PCO S/A John W. Carpenter, CE Section, 511th MI Battalion, who is an experienced counterintelligence operative with prior source handling duties. His DEROS is October 1975. A qualified replacement as PCO will be selected well in advance.
- (3) Additional Special Agents assigned to the 511th MI Battalion, or other elements of the 66th MI Group, may from time to time be required during the tenure of this operation for the assessment and/or recruitments of selected CRS.

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Operations Plan, B03130-079-75

- (4) Supervision for the conduct and operating control of this operation within the 51lth MI Battalion will be vested in the Chief, Counterespionage (CE) Section. <u>Designee</u>: S/A Donald A. Foss, Chief, CE Section, will also be the 51lth MI Battalion's designated representative for any coordination with Commander, USASAFSA, Augsburg (PC4060), FRG, as may be needed.
- (5) Broad Battalion operational monitorship control and policy guidance are vested in the Battalion Operations Officer/Assistant Operations Officer.
- (6) The Director of Operations, Hendquarters, 66th MI Group, will be responsible for the operational control of this ICIP, will coordinate all ICIP activities with the ICIP Control Officer, ODCSI, USAREUR, and with the Commander, USASAFSA, and will levy requirements on other subordinate counterintelligence (CI) elements of the 66th MI Group regarding this operation as may be appropriate. The ICIP Control Officer, Headquarters, 66th MI Group, will be Mr. Earl L. Kirk, Section Chief, CE Branch, Director of Operations.
- 3. (e) COVER AND DOCUMENTATION:

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Operations Plan, B03130-079-75

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4 (U)(C) EXECUTION:

a. Background:

- (1) The geographic location, isolation and highly sensitive mission of the target make it of logical interest to Hols, particularly the GSGR Intelligence Service (CIS). Some magnitude of this threat is revealed in recent activities involving former ASA personnel travelling to the GSSR shortly after release from active duty, the association of target personnel with Sacch nationals residing in the target area, and the presence of semi-official Cacch representatives, e.g., Skoda automobile firm, in the target area.
- (2) Past lavestimations and constantalligance regular operations concerning the terrier and assigned personnel have resulted in the conclusion that the very nature of the farget, through its remote location, and Its assigned personnel, the frequently keep to themselves during effected hours, requires a member of the target unit itself to answer the BET covered by this Plan. There are no other US installations in the Vicinity, and all target personnel live on the economy or in leased wover read generate, and frequent local public establishments and hopocicle with local residents to a predominate degree. Many residents I the target area have Camilly or ethnic hies with recidents of the CSSR dud to be in considerable legal travel across the border in the target oven, both by PMS and USON residents. Shift work at the target provides for periodic long breaks by assigned personnel between shifts, and their activities and thereshouts during these break seriods are virtually impossible to ascertain and are practically unknown to the target facility communide: .
- (3) Note are known to collect data, including personalia, character traits, weaknesses and possible motiviting points on UCASA personnel wherever they can be located for possible use at a later date when the individual may be assigned to a location or bondquarters facility affording a high degree of access to sensitive information.
- (4) Headquarters, USASA, Arlington Hall, Virginia has erpressed amonability to use of Abl personnel by cloments of the 66th HL Group for purposes of counteristelligence support to USASAE.

Operations Plan, B03130-079-75

(5) Reference a provided information concerning the scheduled automation of the target and the subsequent withdrawal of all but five to ten maintenance personnel and security guards. The construction and equipment installation was originally scheduled to be completed and the automated site operational by 1 July 1975, with a possible additional delay of 60 days beyond that date.

4 Concept:

- (1). The cultivation and use of overt lisison contacts and the spotting, assessing and recruiting of non-ASA assigned personnel in the target area will continue in effect and be expanded as necessary and require no prior approval under this Plan. Recruitment and utilization of any ASA-assigned personnel as CRS will be initiated on approval of this Plan. No CRS will be recruited under this Plan prior to the recompletion of appropriate name traces, to include the USAIRR.
- (2) Two separate and distinct methods of spotting, assessing and recruiting of CBS will be employed simultaneously, as follows:
- (a) The PLO will spot and assess potential sources assigned to the target during visits to the rayest described in paragraph 3a(2), above. The PLO will mass notential lead information to the PCO, and will continue to furnish any additional available information concernating the individual or his status, as determined. Appropriate name traces and agency checks will be conducted on target members prior to contact by the PLO. Additional checks deemed desirable on target personnel by the PLO will be initiated by the PLO. The PCO will prepare LDR on each potential CDS and on approval will arrange to meet the potential source. The PCO will prepare LDR on each potential CDS and on approval will arrange to meet the potential source. The PCO will be conducted under secure, for further assessment and possible securitment. All subsequent meetings between the LD and the PCO will be conducted under secure, covert conditions and will be now from the target area.
- (h) Coordination with and arrangement for S-2, USASAFSA, assistance in screening records of newly arrived personnel scheduled for assignment to the target, in order to identify those individuals of possible interest to have selected individuals available for assessment by representatives of the 51lth MI Battalion or other elements of the 66th MI Group, prior to their assignment to the target; and to assist in necessary personnel actions to delay or reassign selected individuals in order that source coverage of the target can be effected. It time permits, sources recruited in this memorr prior to actual arrival at the target will be given initial training and briefing concerning security implications, and arrange for bonafides and meeting arrangements with the PGO at a later date.

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Operations Plan, 503130-079-75

- normal military duties while coverty and discreetly attempting to answer the following EEI, both from on-dury contacts and experience and from off-duty associates:
- - (1) Identification of trapet personnel who closely and continuously associate with foreign nationals having connection with Communist comparing of the world.
- (2) Identification of target nersonnel the perform authorized or unauthorized travel to Communist countries of the world, including those who may travel after they are released from active duty.
 - (3) Detection of disaffected target personnel.
- (4) Detection of carret personnal whose activities and/or character weaknesses render them with table to blackmail or Well exploitation.
- (3) Percetion of terror personnel chose activities are indirective of potential defection or desertion.
- (6) betection of personnel who have memberships in or associates with members of organizations, clubs, groups or activities which nose actual or potential threats on the accurity of the target activity.

d. Security Considerations:

- (1) Individuals sho are approached for recruitment who decline to traction as CRS will be asked to sign security statements which clearly state that it is unless at to make any unauthorized disclosure concerning the recruitment approach on the activity under this Plan.
- (2) Individuals who are approached for recruitment prior to their arrival at the target, and who decline to function as CRS, will be consideved for assignment to some location other than the target, if circumstances and military priorities permit.
- (3) No CRO not potential CDS will be made aware of the source relationship with any other individual in this operation.
- (4) All CRS will be met under covert conditions, away from the target area; under conditions that will provide maximum recority against inadvertent disclosure of the course relationship.
- (5) Separate and plausible cover stories for status and for action REGRADED WINCLASSFERED with each CRS to provide a logical reason for regular ON SER :5 1997.

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Operations Plan, B03130-079-75

- (6) Each CRS will be provided sufficient training in security and meeting arrangements so as to minimize possibilities of compromise of the source relationship.
- (7) In the event of compromise of a CRS and/or the nature of this operation, termination of the source will follow under such conditions as are warranted by the circumstances of the compromise. In the event of a compromise, denial of USAI involvement will be achieved where plausible.
- (8) Under no circumstances will the command element at the target activity be made aware of the existence of this operation or of the source relationship between any CRS and the PCO.
- (9) Local National Investigators (LNI) employed by the 66th MI Group will not be made aware of the existence of this Plan, nor of the source relationship with any CRS.
- (10) Knowledgeability of this Plan, to include the identity of the target, will be kept to a strict minimum, and only those individuals with a strict "need to know" will be made cognizant. A knowledgeability roster of all persons with knowledge of this operation will be maintained.
- (11) Under no circumstances will the PLO reveal USAI recruitment interest to any target personnel, nor will be offer any recruitment assistance to any prospective CRS.

e. Production:

- (1) The Commander, USASAFS Augsburg will be informed of all credible information developed within the target, except as indicated in (2) and (3) below.
- (2) Suitability information will be evaluated in light of the tenor of information and the status of the individual to whom it pertains, and if considered of major importance or of significance to this operation, will be forwarded by Agent Report to the Commander, 66th MI Group, ATIN: AEUNI-T-CE.
- (3) Information pertaining to or identifying overt or covert sources will not normally be passed as individual items to the supported command without specific DCS1 USAREUR approval.
- (4) Commander, 511th MI Battalion will submit to the Commander, 66th MI Group, ATTN: AEUMI-T-CE, a Quarterly Status Report containing a summary of the operational progress and source activity covered in this Plan.

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Operations Plan, B03130-079-75

(5) Periodic briefings of the Commander, USASARS Augsburg concerning the operational highlights and progress of the program will be conducted by designated personnel from Readquarters, 66th MI Group.

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
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8: TERMINATION

e. The duration of this Plan will be for an indestinate period, or until such time that it is determined that the sensitivity of the target



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Operations Plan, B03130-079-75

and/or the drawdown of assigned personnel at the target no longer warrants continuation of the operation.

b. Termination of CRS will be in accordance with current source regulations.

g COORDINATION

- a. This Plan will be coordinated with Chief, Special Operations
 Detachment, 66th MI Group prior to coordination with Commander, USASAFS
 Augsburg.
- b. This Plan will be coordinated with Commander, USASAFS Augsburg prior to submission to DCSI, USAREUR and Headquarters, USASA for concurrence.
- C. Coordination of this Plan with Headquarters, USASA will be accompanied by the US Army Intelligence Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland prior to final approval for implementation of this Plan by DCSI, USAREUR.

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BY COR USAINSCOM FOUPO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R.

LANTETTIAL

OPLAN 1-75, Subject: ICIP (U) ADMEX A - FINANCE

1. (4)	<u> 4th Gtr - FY 75</u>	
a.	b1	
b.	b1	
C.	b1	
d.	b 1	
e.	b1	
2. 45	YY 76	
a •	b1	
b.	b1	
c.	b1	

1 802 Director

OPLAN 1-75; Subject: ICIP (U) ANNEX A - MINANCE

b1

3. Additionally, the following will apply:

b1 b.

CONTIDENTIAL

Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

DAMI-DOH

20 February 1976

To acquire ACSI approved of GPLAN for ICET CARRLESS TOKEN (U) by eignature on approving correspondence.

- a. (C) From correspondence between FRANKA and MCSI, USARIUR, it was learned that the Mich All Cross was providing ICIV support to Detachment H, US Army Security Assery Field Station, Augustus, FRS. The support and been requested by the Commander, WRAM Field Station, Augustus and approved by DCSI, USARIUR and the Commander, USASA, Arithmeton Mail, W.,
- b. (U) In an exchange of measures with DCSI, USARRUR, DAMI-DCH advised the DCSI of the existing policy pertaining to ICIP's in CCHUS and the requirement to furnish quarterly reports to the Under Secretary of the Army. In light of the ACSI's policy to personally review all new ICIP's, DCSI, USARRUR decided to forward the OPIAN for ICIP CARRIESS TOKES (U) for ACSI review. The operation is already ongoing and approved by appropriate USARRUR and USASA officials.

2. Color procussion: (v)

- a. (C) The OPIAN for ICIP CARRLESS TORRS (U) is designed to detect and counter walnerability to espionage by USASA personnel assigned to an isolated USASA detachment in the vicinity of the PRG/CSSR border. Standard ICIP procedures have been employed using recruited sources, a Project Lisison Officer and a Project Control Officer.
- b. (U) By separate action, a policy latter to all Army Intelligence commands will be prepared to assure that ICIP policy is established and reporting requirements to the Under Secretary are met.
- 3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That the 5th Indorsement approving the OPIAN at TAB A be signed by the ACSI.

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SEP -5 1997

ON
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUPO

AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Classified by ACSI, DA

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE CERDER 1:652

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CONTENT

CONFIDENTIAL

DAMI-DOH (30 Jun 75) 5th Ind SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U) # 5 FEB 1976

HQDA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310

TO: Commander, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, ATTM: BCBI, APO New York 09403

1. Continuation of your ICIP CARELESS TORER (U) under the May 1975 Operations Plan earlier approved at your Readquarters in support of US Army Security Again, Field Station, Augsburg, is approved.

2. (8) At indicated in earlier correspondence, a Memorandum to the Under Secretary of the Army is prepared quarterly by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA Staff which includes a brief summary of developments and status of each ongoing ICIP. Field input is requested by the 15th of the month following the end of each calendar year quarter.

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IRRA VANCOUNT

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ON SEP -5 1997
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD \$200.1-R

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE APO 09403

1 J FFR 1908

AEAGB-CI(SO)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH) WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References:

- a. Operations Plan, 66th MI Group, 5 May 1975, subject as above (2).
- b. Message, DAMI-DOH, DA, 032115Z December 1975, subject as above (C).
- Message, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 061755Z January 1976, subject as above (S).
- Attached are two Quarterly Status Reports pertaining to the Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) CARELESS TOKEN in support of Detachment N, US Army Security Agency, Field Station Augsburg. Copies have been provided the S2 of the support unit.
- (U) ODCSI, USAREUR, Action Officer is Mr David R. Smith, AEAGB-CI(SO), HM 7354 (AUTOSEVOCOM 6742).

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

2 Incl

J. IADEROSA

Colonel, GS

Chief, Counterintelligence

Division

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1 G FEE 1976

AEAGB-CI (SO)

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOH) WASH DC 20310

1. (U) References:

- a. Operations Plan, 66th MI Group, 5 May 1975, subject as above (e).
- b. Message, DAMI-DOH, DA, 032115Z December 1975, subject as above (27.
- c. Message, AEAGB-CI(SO), USAREUR, 061755Z January 1976, subject as above (8).
- 2. Attached are two Quarterly Status Reports pertaining to the Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) CARELESS TOKEN in support of Detachment N, US Army Security Agency, Field Station Augsburg. Copies have been provided the S2 of the support unit.
- 3. (U) ODCSI, USAREUR, Action Officer is Mr David R. Smith, AEAGB-CI(SO), HM 7354 (AUTOSEVOCOM 6742).

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE:

2 Incl

A. J. IADEROSA
Colonel, GS
Chief, Counterintelligence
Division

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

511TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP APO 09696

AFUMI-N-CE B03130-518-75 24 October 1975

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

(QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT) (QSR)

Commander

66th Military Intelligence Group

ATTN: AEUMI-T-CI (EXCLUSIVE FOR ICIP CONTROL OFFICER)

APO 09108

1. (U) References:

- a. OPLAN, 511th MI Battalion, AEUMI-N-CE, 1-75, 1 May 1975
- b. AEAGB-CI(SO), DTG 151640Z July 1975, ICIP
- 2. (U) This is the first ICIP Quarterly Status Report, in accordance with references, covering the period ending 15 October 1975.

General:

- a. Activity at the target is in the drawdown stage, pending automation in early 1976 under the LA FAIRE VITE Program. Since 1 July 1975, personnel manning has been reduced to about 50 percent of previous target strength; most personnel have been reassigned to USASAFS Augsburg. In June 1975, an official release was made by letter to the Buergermeister (mayor) of Rimbach, which provided details of the withdrawal. Portions of the letter were reportedly published in area newspapers. A copy of the English translation of the letter to the mayor's office is attached as Inclosure 1.
- b. Contrary to the letter inclosure, it appears that some target personnel in excess of the programmed approximately seven (7) individuals who will maintain and guard the automated site, may remain in the area for varying periods up to 1 July 1976. These include all personnel who

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AEUMI-N-CE

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

24 October 1975


are scheduled for DEROS or ETS in FY76 as funding is not available for two PCS moves in a single fiscal year. No figures were available at the time of the QSR preparation as to how many personnel would be affected, nor had it been determined what would be their duties during the approximate period 1 March-30 June 1976.

- c. The USAF communications site (6913th USAF Security Squadron) located in the same area is scheduled to close at about the same time the target is automated; no USAF personnel will remain in the area. As far as can be determined, the French and Bundeswehr sites will continue to operate.
- d. The seven or eight personnel scheduled to remain at the target permanently will be billeted at the top of Mount Hoherbogen, in a newly constructed building, adjacent to the present operational area. The senior individual will be an NCO, grade E6 or E7, who will probably have one of the supervisory communications equipment maintenance MOS's. Other personnel stationed there will be equipment and antenna array repair and maintenance specialists and guards. All personnel will be single or unaccompanied. At the writing of this report, none of the permanent party had been selected.

4. (4.4) Operational Matters:

- a. SMLM-F makes a reconnaissance of the Rimbach area approximately once a month. The sightings usually involve travel along the PRA perimeter roading leading north and south out of Rimbach. Perimeter roads of PRAs, excluding Autobahnen, are off limits to SMLM-F vehicles. On 3 June 1974, a SMLM-F vehicle was disabled on the access road leading to the target operational site, well within a PRA, and was assisted by a Chief Warrant Officer assigned to the target, who was not aware of the correct PRA boundary. There have been no SMLM-F detentions in the area, and none are likely, since the closest Military Police are located at Hohenfels Training Area (HTA), 80 kilometers away.
- c. In April 1975, SP4 b6 reported a possible SAEDA incident (Group Case 75-061P); during the subsequent investigation it was determined she had reported to Field Office Augsburg a similar approach by the same individual a year earlier. Target personnel were dubious as to the veracity of statements made by b6 who was transferred to USASAFS, Augsburg on 1 August 1975.

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AEUMI-N-CE SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) 24 October 1975


d. In May 1975, MAJ Douma advised the PLO that some of the target
personnel had a tendency to talk too openly about their jobs in public,
and that his solution had been constant reiteration to unit personnel
on the dangers of loose talk. No specifics were provided on individuals
concerned. The PLO did not press for details as he considered it a
command matter. MAJ Douma believed the security posture of the target
was steadily improving.

- e. The preliminary investigation of b6 |continued, however, in low key due to the lack of credible specific allegations. | b6 operates the Hoherbogen Restaurant, situated near the target administrative area. He allegedly travels regularly to CSSR to visit relatives and to attend dog shows. Target personnel patronize the restaurant regularly, primarily because of its convenient location. b6 was never reliably reported to have shown undue curiosity about target operations and personalities, but remains, nevertheless, well-informed because of overheard conversations of target personnel-customers. In June 1975, b6 told the PLO he was not looking forward to the departure of the Americans because he would have to "put up" with local German customers, who were much more troublesome than target personnel. In October 1975, b6 remarked to MAJ Douma that he had made several trips to Augsburg to negotiate the purchase of a tavern there. b6 said he intended to sell the Hoherbogen Restaurant and move to Augsburg, where he will open a tavern/restaurant two kilometers from the "ASA kaserne." Activity of b6 will continue to be monitored in the Rimbach area, and if he moves to Augsburg, he should be made a target of continuing interest by Field Office Augsburg.
- f. In July 1975, CPT (Chap) b6 Protestant Chaplain at HTA, advised that an individual assigned to the target had sought his spiritual guidance as a result of extreme emotional anxiety, due to his/her involvement with a group of USASA personnel who were engaged in satanic religious practices at the target. b6 revealed no details nor identities, due to the sensitivity of communications to a chaplain, however, the identity of the individual involved is believed to have been established (see para 4j, below).
- g. In July 1975, two target personnel applied for Military Intelligence duties in ACGP-97. One (SP5 b6) was assisted in completion of required forms and processing/interview is in progress. The other individual (SP4 b6) will not be able to apply until December 1975, when he has 12 months remaining to DEROS. He expects to be transferred to USASAFS, Augsburg prior to that time and has been advised to initiate his processing at Field Office Augsburg.

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24 October 1975

AEUMI-N-CE SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

h. In July 1975, USASAFS, Augsburg requested agency checks on the
German national intended spouse and relatives of SP4 b6
Subsequently, during a subject interview, b6 stated that his fiancee had contact, through an acquaintance, with b6 a photographer/
had contact, through an acquaintance, with b6 a photographer/
reporter for a Furth-im-Wald newspaper and that he suspected b6 was
receiving money from the CSSR for photographs of facilities in the Rimbach
area. b6 had no specific reason to back up his suspicion and said
it was common knowledge among target personnel. (b6 was the subject
of a bilateral MI/MAD investigation in 1973 and 1974, during which none
of the allegations of possible intelligence activity were substantiated.)
b6 also said he personally was suspicious of fnu b6 a former
member of the target unit, who operates b6 Club" in Koetzting.
b6 is curious as to the status of US installations at Rimbach and
uses his US citizenship and former Army service as a method of gaining
access to information from US Forces members who patronize his establishmen
b6 and his activity was previously known to MI/MAD during the b6
investigation and not determined to warrant further investigation. b6
is a non-DoD affiliated US citizen.)
is a non-bob diffilated of Citizen.
i In July 2076 USASAE Augsburg requested agency shocks in
Vootating on be and be and be who were friendly with towart
i. In July 1975, USASAE, Augsburg requested agency checks in Koetzting on $\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
personner and who had become knowledgeable of classified detense informa-
tion as a result of this relationship. There was no indication any of
the b6 had attempted to elicit defense information. Agency checks
failed to reveal any derogatory information concerning the b6 family;
b6 was a practicing dentist in Koetzting. In early August 1975,
MAJ Douma advised the PLO that in early 1975, SP4 b6 and her
dependent husband, b6 a US citizen, had attempted to establish a German-American Club between target personnel and the local communities.
a German-American Club between target personnel and the local communities.
In this connection, the $b6$ mentioned being acquainted with a dentist
in Koetzting, nfi. Nothing of consequence ever came of the attempt to
form an organization. Later, date unknown, Douma was advised by Commander,
Forward Operations Battalion, Augsburg (his supervisor) of a report that
b6 had discussed classified information with German acquaintances.
In an interview of b6 by Douma, she admitted having discussed
details of LA FAIRE VITE with her husband in early 1975, and to have
mentioned the project in the presence of one $b6$ a German
national acquaintance residing in Munich. b6 was sub <u>seque</u> ntly given
mentioned the project in the presence of one $\begin{array}{c} b6 \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ $
nothing about any other German acquaintances, and denied compromising any
classified information to any other foreign nationals. No information
was made available to Douma when he was tasked by his higher headquarters
to investigate the incident, as to the identity of the German acquaintances
who were supposed to have received the classified defense information.
b6 departed the target on 19 July 1975 for CONUS and separation
from active duty.

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AEUMI-N-CE SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

	j. In August 1975, MAJ Douma advised the PLO that SP4 b6
	attached to the target from the 502d ASA Group as a Czech linguist Voice
	Intercept Specialist (98G2LCX), had exhibited severe mental trauma imme-
	diately following the departure of a close female acquaintance from the
_	target on 30 June 1975, and had been placed on extended leave status.
	b6 consulted CPT (Chap) b6 at HTA and the USASAFS Augsburg
	staff chaplain, but had allegedly declined psychiatric counselling. On
	her return from leave, her access to classified material was to be sus-
	pended and Douma could direct b6 to receive counselling, as he was
	very concerned about her emotional stability. b6 had a DEROS of
	September 1975.

- k. In August 1975, the PLO advised MAJ Douma that a German agency had reported a US soldier named $\boxed{b6}$ was trafficking in drugs in Koetzting. After the PLO provided descriptive data obtained from a FRG agency, Douma identified $\boxed{b6}$ as SP4 $\boxed{b6}$ a Russian-linguist Voice Intercept Specialist, attached from the 502d ASA Group. Douma was requested to watch $\boxed{b6}$ activities closely and pass any information to CID at HTA. $\boxed{b6}$ DEROS is June 1976, putting him in the category of those mentioned in paragraph 3b, above, who may remain at the target without any specific duties.
- m. No specific information has been reported to indicate that Hostile Intelligence agencies are in contact with any target personnel.

5. (c) Source Activity:

- a. One potential source (B58,786), has been spotted at the target and is being assessed. Name traces are not yet complete. He is scheduled for reassignment to USASAFS, Augsburg on approximately 15 December 1975. In accordance with paragraph 3b of reference a, a Lead Development Report is being prepared and will be forwarded separately, recommending his possible utilization as a defensive installation source in Augsburg.
- b. The lack of identification of any personnel who will make up the permanent party at the target has inhibited any meaningful spotting/ assessing activity to date.

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BY CORUSAINSCOM 5200.1-R

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CONTIDENTIAL

AEUMI-N-CE

SUBJECT: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

24 October 1975

6. (c) Comments:

- a. The PLO was indoctrinated for SI on 9 October 1975. Request Special Operations Detachment determine if any more Quarterly Security Inspections are scheduled for target, and arrange for prior notification and coordination so that the PLO may accompany the inspecting team. Any insight gained into security problem areas not evident from routine liaison contacts would be of great value to the PLO in accomplishment of his mission.
- b. The PLO has reported that he is unable to pursue a more aggressive approach with the target commander concerning identities of personnel who will remain at the target, without arousing suspicion as to his true motives. Request Special Operations Detachment attempt to identify those individuals as soon as the determination is made.
- c. The short period remaining of continued operations at the target raises the question as to whether the project would be justified at that location in the long term. As presently visualized, according to available information, any source recruited at the target would be primarily reporting on six or seven other personnel, with whom he is living in a very close, restrictive environment. It can be expected the majority of the information reported will be of an adverse suitability nature. Further, it can be expected that with target automation, Hostile Intelligence efforts at the target will take a lower priority inasmuch as product expolitation through the human exploitable factor will no longer be present. The Commander, USASAFS, Augsburg raised some of these points when reference a was staffed through his office.

l Incl

Tel: Nbg Mil (2621)-6446/Foss

FADLO M. MASSABNI

LTC, MI Commanding

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BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUPO
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY COMMUNITY APO ROW YORK D9173


TARACE-H-A

5 June 1975

herr survermeister Bachl Community of Rimbach

T

- The purpose of this letter is to advise you, and therefore all nimbles community officials and businessmen, of a projected change in the US and bresence in the community of Rimbach, Lount honerbogen, and the surrounding area.
- 2. The american military community in this area now consists of elements of both the United States Arm; and the United States Air Force, as well as a significant number of wives and dependent children. The total American population currently is just over three number people.
- 3. Commencing in August 1975, the American community will decrease in size, with the largest majority of our people departing on or about 1 November and 15 December respectively. By 1 harch 1976 there will be approximately seven US Army personnel and probably no wives and children remaining in the area. They will live in a US Army owned facility on top of hount hoherbogen (on Eckstein Ridge).
- 4. This transformation is the result of a programmed technical change in the American communications function located in this area.
- 5. At this time, and with this announcement, please accept my personal gratitude, as well as that of the US Army and the US Air Force, for the understanding and warmth which has been so graciously extended to the american military forces and their families over these many years by you, the Rimbach Community Official Staff, and the entire community of himbach. We will do all that we can to insure that the small force remaining continues to appreciate and help maintain the relationship that we have enjoyed.





DEPARIMENT OF THE ARMY

511TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION 66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP APO 09696

AEUMI-N-CE B03130-061-76 23 January 1976

SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

(Quarterly Status Report)

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE
INTELLICENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED (WNINTEL)

Commander

66th Military Intelligence Group

ATTN: AEUMI-T-CI (EXCLUSIVE FOR ICIP CONTROL OFFICER)

APO 09108

- 1. (U) References:
 - a. OPLAN, 511th MI Battalion, AEUMI-N-CE, 1-75, 1 May 1975.
 - b. AEAGB-CI(SO), DTG 151640Z Jul 75, ICIP.
 - c. AEUMI-N-CE, B03130-518-75, 24 October 1975, ICIP.
- 2. (U) This Quarterly Status Report is submitted in accordance with references a and b and covers the period ending 15 January 1976.

3.(*U*)(C) General:

Operational activity continues in the drawdown stage, on schedule. The transfer of the first increment of Company B and attached operational personnel to USASAFS Augsburg (USASAFSA) has been completed, reducing the strength on 15 January 1976 to 63 assigned, 22 attached, 3 TDY and 20 dependent wives and children. In addition, 22 personnel will depart the target during January and an additional 34 will depart by mid-February. All Company B personnel will have departed by 31 March. During the latter part of February and March 1976, Company B personnel will shut down the present operations, service and prepare equipment for shipment and perform general repair and utility duties relating to present operations. Action by USASAFSA to move all Company B personnel when essential duties are completed has alleviated a potential problem of having sensitive personnel remaining in the area with much free time. The final day of operation of the snack bar was to be 17 January, and the small PX and commissary annexes are to close by mid-February. With these closures, the closest shopping facilities are in Regensburg, Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr.

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ON SEP 1997
BY USAINSOOM POUPA
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SCHEDULS UPPORT TO COURT 11652

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AEUMI-N-CE

SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

- b. Due to the shortage of PCS funds and DA reassignment restrictions, USASAFSA offered curtailment or extension options to those personnel scheduled for discharge or separation prior to 31 March 1976. Many chose curtailment, and some of those requested European separations. Identities of those to be separated in USAREUR have not been determined, pending approval of the requests.
- c. Eight dismounted vans remain at the target and the Seventh Army Training Center (SATC) Engineer Office, Grafenwoehr (QA0911) has announced bids for their removal or destruction. The vans represent a total present value of \$40,000 to the US Government and Property Disposal officials are reluctant to destroy the vans as they have a high resale value in Europe. It is expected that in the near future a contractor will have personnel at the target, either removing or dismantling the vans,

d. All of the IA FAIRE VITE (LFV) personnel have arrived at the target.
The Monto de SECT 106 ALL team members are assigned
to the cumply and Maintenance Company (SMC), Support Battallon, USASARSA.
The lie - Counteguarhic Equipment Renair Supervisor (MUS 320), NOS UVEL IS
years service with USASA, is married (no children) and resides with his wife,
ha lneed ha llis citizen, atl po
be lis 35 years old, a native of Colorado and expects to remain
at the target until his normal DEROS in November 1978 b6
methon is a naturalized US citizen, born in Germany, her tather is employed
as a Systems Engineer at American Forces Network (AFN), Frankfurt (MA//49).
he lapposes to be highly proficient and has exhibited a positive accident
toward his assignment. PlO contacts to date have indicated Helus Will be
visit to the target (15 January 1976), 66 was reportedly on TDY attending an unidentified training course at USASAFSA. He is scheduled to return to
an unidentified training course at USASAFSA. He is scheduled to return to
the target by mid-February 1976.

e. Other members of the LFV team are identified as follows:

(1)	SP5 Terry P. Pack, b6	DEROS February 1978
(2)	sp5 b6	DEROS/ETS April 1978
(3)	SP4 b6	DERCS/ETS February 1977
(4)	SP4 b6	DEROS/ETS April 1978
(5)	SP4 b6	DEROS/ETS April 1978
(6)	\$P4 b6	

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ON
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23 January 1976

- f. The team began on-site training on 13 December 1975. All of the personnel in paragraph 3e above, are Intercept Receiving System Repairmen (MOS 33C) or Intercept Recording System Repairmen (MOS 33D). All are single or unaccompanied; none admitted to having any girl friends living in the target area, or any that they intended to have move into the area. In general, the LFV team members appear to be security conscious. They have been at the target long enough to become familiar with some of the USASA "haunts" (Hoherbogen Restaurant in Rimbach (UQ4553) and the Ratskeller and Ambergerhof Restaurants in Furth-im-Wald (UQ4364)), and have been eager to acquire information on places of intelligence interest or with a bad reputation.
- g. The target has a German shepard dog, "Sam" which is partially attack-trained and does not react well to strangers, females and blond males (SP5 Pack has particular difficulty in getting close to the dog). "Sam" reportedly was beaten and generally mistreated by previous owners, and his attack training has given him just enough knowledge to be dangerous.
- h. Electrical power at the target will continue to be provided by the Pilsen Power Grid. Once activated, the site will have a 22 Kilovolt self-regulating generator with a 14-day gasoline supply for backup/emergency use. Water must be trucked to the site and sewage removed from a holding tank. Both water and sewage tanks are planned for 14-day capacity. A German firm, as yet unidentified, from Brueck (UQ0458) has contracted to service the holding tank and to truck in water from the Rimbach public water works. Emergency fire service will be provided by the Neukirchen-Heilig Blut (UQ5258) Volunteer Fire Department, 15 kilometers away, with an unknown reaction time. Medical assistance will be provided by the German civilian hospital in Koetzting (UQ4349); air evacuation by helicopter is possible through the MEDIVAC capability at SATC, Grafenwoehr. APO mail will be addressed to Post Office boxes at USASAFSA, will be re-packaged and sent through German mail channels to: Remote Site LFV, SFC b6 8491 Rimbach. b6 will pick up mail daily from the Rimbach post office.
 - i. The site will have three communications channels:
 - (1) Direct AUTOSEVOCOM to USASAFSA Control Center
 - (2) Non-Secure "order wire" to USASAFSA Control Center
- (3) German commercial phone (Class B) (09947-302) through the Neukirchen-Heilig Blut exchange.

3

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


- j. Target personnel will live in the "Chateau" located adjacent to the Operations Building. The newly constructed "Chateau" consists of a common area: living room, kitchen and recreation facilities, with couches, television, stereo and a pool table; and adjacent sleeping quarters. Personnel will be allowed guests in the common area. The Commander, SMC has advised be he may hire a local cook if the team members agree.

 be would like to hire his wife for this activity, as she will otherwise be unemployed. This solution appears to have a distinct advantage over hiring a local area national.
- k. Two team members will be on duty at the site, 24 hours a day. Present plans call for the issue of .45 caliber pistols and ammunition, but it has not yet been determined where the weapons and ammunition will be stored. In the event of attempted penetrations of the area, personnel have been instructed to lock all entrances and remain inside the building. b6 has been advised that elements of the 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (2ACR) at Camp May, Regen (UQ6326), 43 kilometers, may have a reaction capability, reaction time unknown. 2ACR elements patrol the CSSR border area near the site and may be capable of a short reaction time. Joint defense plans have been discussed with two other military units in the same immediate area, Fernmeldesektor F of the FRG Armed Forces and Detachment D of the French Forces. Both counterparts appeared eager to form joint defense plans, but the non-NATO status of the French precluded USASA from negotiating at the local level. The problem reportedly was identified to USASAFSA. Each member of the team will have one key to the entrance gate which will be kept locked at all times after the German contractor personnel have departed the site. The operations building, a SI-area, is equipped with heat and sound-sensitive alarm systems and alarms also sound in the event of power loss or equipment malfunction. The German contractor engaged in construction work at the site will remove approximately 1.5 meters of rock from the end of the ridge near the tower to enlarge the antenna scanning area. This work cannot be completed during the winter months and is expected to be finished by May 1976. Explosives cannot be used due to the sensitivity of installed equipment in the immediate area.
- 1. On 15 January 1976, the PLO met the LFV Project Officer from the USASA Systems Agency, Vint Hill Farms, Warrenton, Virginia, who was visiting the target. He explained that the following relay towers in the LFV system are unmanned by USASA personnel:

Seibersdorf	TQ97624600
Landshut	TP94688240
Bonstetten	PU26906739
Dachau	PU80735466
Wasserkuppe*	NA66489456
Wildflecken*	NA56258478
Brandhof**	PV26258873

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AEUMI-N-CE

SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

23 January 1976

Heidenheim**
Schwanberg**

PV28953095 NA91890879

*Army location occupied by non-USASA personnel

** USAF installation


The present SOP gives little information on the remote towers as far as security is concerned. In general, the remote towers are tall antennas with small buildings at the base. Each building has a door that is supposed to be kept locked. If someone enters one of the buildings an alarm light goes on in the central control area at USASAFSA. Telephoneswith open speakers are located in each building, so that if the alarm lights go on in the central area, duty personnel can pick up a phone and ask who is there. Arrangements have reportedly been made with local police, details unknown, to keep a close watch on all the remote towers, but the Project Officer was unaware what action the police were to take concerning trespassers. Anyone gaining access to the building at a remote tower could, with the proper equipment, tap the open service line and the scrambled traffic lines, While tapping the traffic lines would yield nothing but meaningless letter/number groups, they might have some value to a Hostile Intelligence Service. The isolation of several of the remote towers makes them susceptible to sabotage as the loss of a tower in the relay system renders that segment of the system useless.

4. (e) Operational Matters:

- a. Reference paragraph 3j, above: USASA has not planned any electronic sweep of the SI area or the common room now that the German contractor has completed installation of the wiring. $\boxed{b6}$ asked if the PLO could arrange for an electronic sweep of the entire area as future visitors may want to use the common area for conferences. The PLO was non-committal and no action will be taken unless a formal request is received.
- b. Reference paragraph 4g of reference c: On 8 December 1975, the First Sergeant of Company B advised that SP5 $\boxed{b6}$ was no longer interested in ACGP-97 duties and that his application papers should be destroyed. SP4 $\boxed{b6}$ the other individual interested in ACGP-97 will remain at the target until February 1976 and his application is being processed with PLO assistance.
- c. Reference paragraph 4e, reference c: b6 is moving to Augsburg on about 1 February 1976 and will be operating the Cafe-Restaurant "Sonne", 9 Hauptstrasse, Augsburg-Bergheim (PU3554), telephone: 97524.

 b6 has passed out the name and address of his new establishment to target

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SUBJECT: CARELESS TOKEN (U)

23 January 1976

personnel who are moving to Augsburg, and he has been actively soliciting their future patronage. There have been no indications that $\boxed{b6}$ has attempted to elicit information from target personnel, however his proximity to the target and the regular customers from the target at his establishment, the Hoherbogen Restaurant, have resulted in him being well-informed about ongoing transfers, the drawdown and future operations in the target area. All members of the LFV team are aware of MI interest in $\boxed{b6}$ It is expected that the Hoherbogen Restaurant will be leased by another party and remain open. No information is presently available on the new lessee.

- d. Reference paragraphs 4f and 4j, reference c, the information provided is clarified as follows: SP4 $\boxed{b6}$ formerly attached to the target from the 502d ASA Group, contacted the Army Chaplain at the Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) for spiritual guidance when she became depressed after developing a strong emotional attachment to another female soldier who had departed the target. $\boxed{b6}$ was counselled and subsequently reassigned to USASAFSA. $\boxed{b6}$ had nothing to do with the "satanic religious practices" referenced in paragraph 4f, reference c. That matter was not known to involve any target personnel and all personnel known to be involved with alleged "satanic religious practices" are assigned or attached to the 207th ASA Company, HTA and discussion of the incident is not germane to this report.
- e. Reference paragraph 4k, reference c: SP4 b6 , due to be transferred to USASAFSA is considered by his supervisors to be a potential troublemaker in the organization. He has been behaving strangely, which may be attributable to injuries he received in a 1974 motorcycle accident. b6 was reprimanded by the Company B Commander for signing a guard property receipt with the name "Mickey F--King Mouse." He has also been involved in a questionable transaction with a German national involving a motorcycle.
- f. Target personnel reported no SMLM activity in the area since approximately September 1975. The PLO will recommend that the nearby German Army unit advise target personnel whenever a SMLM vehicle is reported in the area. It is known that German Military Counterintelligence (MAD) advises Fernmeldesektor F whenever a SMLM vehicle is reported in the area. The PLO will provide assistance to the LFV team in formulating a SMLM SOP. One team member had no SMLM card and none of the team members contacted on 15 January 1976 were certain of what action to take if a SMLM vehicle was sighted in the target area. None of those individuals could recall having received a meaningful SMLM briefing since arriving in USAREUR.

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23 January 1976

q. The PLO gave a short SAEDA briefing to LFV team members (less b6 on 15 January 1976 and requested their cooperation in identifying risk spots, suspicious incidents, undue curiosity and other SAEDA-related matters.

- h. In October or November 1975, date unknown, an individual was sighted measuring the perimeter fence of the target from the outside. He was challenged and he rapidly retreated into the wooded area and could not be located. The incident was allegedly reported to USASAFSA and it was later concluded that the individual probably was a <u>Bundespost</u> (German Post Office) employee, since a <u>Bundespost</u> truck had been seen near the site that day, and the matter was considered settled. The incident was not reported to MI when it occurred, and only became known on 15 January 1976 during casual conversation. It was emphasized to LFV team members that available MI support can only be effective if all incidents, however minor, are reported in a timely manner. In the above instance, it was not determined how the unidentified individual was concluded to be a Post Office employee, but in any event, it appeared from information available that the activities as described were suspicious and warranted further investigation.
- On 16 November 1975, two ranking representatives of the CSSR firm SEMEX, a subsidiary of the state-owned auto manufacturing firm SKODA visited the SEMEX offices in Furth-im-Wald concerning a planned program to import CSSR tractors into the FRG via SEMEX. Despite the fact that their business was in Furth-im-Wald and there was an abundance of hotel rooms in that town, the two individuals made reservations at the Hotel Kolmerhof in Rimbach for the night of 16-17 November. They departed for Munich (PU9135), FRG the following day. Nothing of a suspicious nature was noted during the visit, but representatives from SEMEX have been identified in the past engaged in low-level intelligence activity on tehalf of the CSSR Intelligence Service. On 25 November 1975, inquiries at the target revealed that no unit personnel regularly patronized the Kolmerhof Hotel, although it was located directly across the street from the Company B administrative area. because of its higher prices and it catered to a clientele able to spend more money than most target members. On occasion, the hotel did hold dances and some target personnel had been known to attend.
- j. On 13 December 1975, SSG b6 Company B, was reported as missing after spending an evening drinking at a tavern in Voggendorf (UQ4453). Unit personnel, assisted by local police, searched the area thoroughly and he was finally found the following day after having reportedly spend the night in the quarters of a female member of the unit. The incident was reported to MI by the target in a timely manner and close coordination was maintained with unit supervisory personnel, Military Police, and the local police during the search action.

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5. (2) Source Activity:


- a. B58,786 advised that the behavior of b6 (paragraph 4e, above) had deteriorated, possibly due to physical problems arising from his 1974 motorcycle accident. In the accident, b6 was gored by a wire fence and his neck was heavily scarred despite several plastic surgery operations. Some spinal damage also occurred and b6 was on medication and frequently complained of headaches. He could not concentrate, argued with supervisors and had developed a short attention span. Lead questioned b6 suitability for continued assignment to sensitive duties.
- b. B58,786 was encouraged to patronize the Hoberbogen Restaurant more often, in order to maintain continuity to the limited investigation, pending $\boxed{b6}$ intended move to Augsburg. Lead was to determine if $\boxed{b6}$ acted in a suspicious manner. This activity was designed to assist in the assessment of the Lead's potential. This action was not out of character as Lead patronized the restaurant occasionally and knows $\boxed{b6}$. Lead was not targetted against $\boxed{b6}$ nor was MI committed to reimburse Lead for any expenses incurred.
- c. Local agency and 201 file checks on LFV team members are being submitted as a separate action. Name traces will be conducted on all team members.

Comments:

- a. No support is required from Special Operations Detachment, except for a portion of the actions outlined in paragraph 5c, above (to be submitted).
- b. Reference paragraph 3b, above, if members of Company B obtain European separations, whether or not they remain in the target area, they could pose a similar situation to that which occurred in July 1974 when a former member of Company B, who had a post-separation travel restriction, travelled to CSSR within a few days after his European separation. The PLO will arrange with Commander, Company B for SAEDA briefings and appropriate warnings on travel restrictions to all target personnel receiving European separations.
- c. Reference paragraph 3 1 above, local police having jurisdiction over the areas of the LFV remote towers within the 511th MI Battalion area will be contacted to determine what they have been told about the towers and what measures they are taking pertaining to tower security.

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d. That portion of the comments in paragraph 6c, reference c that pertain to the possible limited results of this operation after target automation, remain valid. Considering these limitations, the thrust of the operation will be directed at developing threat information directed against the target and target personnel.

FADLO M. MASSABNI

Commanding

Tel: Nbg Mil (2621)-7165/Foss

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ON CORPERATA 1-603 DOD \$200.1-R

BY THPARA 1-603 DOD \$200.1-R

DAMI-DOH

ICIP GONDOLA STAR (U)

DAMI-DOH

Cdr, USAINTA ATTN: MILA-SO

LTC Haendle/gr/56159

- 1. Reference MF, this office, subject: Quarter ICIP Reports, dated 17 Dec 75.
- 2. Attached for your information and appropriate action is a copy of ACSI Form 28 (less tabled inclosures), dated 14 Jan 76, which reflects ACSI, DA approval for the continuation of ICIP GONDOLA STAR (U) as an ongoing operation.
- 3. Request the Commander, 902d MI Group inform interested parties at the installation supported by the ICIP of the ACSI's decision to continue the operation.

(are) to the con-

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

1 Incl as (CONFIDENTIAL) L. A. SPIRITO Colonel, GS Chief, HUMINT Division

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 19 OCT 2000
BY USAENSEUM 1-31:PA
Anth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

	ACTION SHEET			TROL NUMBER	
SUBJECT			OFFX	E SYMBOL	SUSPEMSE
	•		DA	MI-DOH	
Review o	f Internal Counterintelligence Pr	ogram (ICIP)	DATE		
GONDOLA STAR (U)					
ACTION REQUIRED					
	n ACSI decision for continuation				
	R RECORD. (Describe briefly the requirement, backgro recourse to other sources.)	and and action taken	er recommende	id. Must be suffi	ciently detailed to identify
1 (M)	BACKGROUND: (U)				į
	(,,				
a. 19uring the last quarter of calendar year 1974, the ACSI directed the termination of 19 ongoing ICIP operations. The operations terminated were those which were less productive or conducted at installations of lesser sensitivity. Among those terminated was the ICIP GONDOLA STAR at Aberdeen Proving Ground/Edgewood Arsenal, MD. (A subsequent new operation increased the total ongoing ICIPs to eight.)					
b. After reviewing correspondence initiated by the Commander, APG and indorsed by the Commander, Test and Evaluation Command and the Commander, Army Materiel Command, which recommended the ICIP GONDOLA STAR be continued, the ACSI reinstated the operation for a period of six months on 11 Jul 75 (TAB B).					
provided the ACSI	In a memorandum for the Under Section the quarterly ICIP report for the reinstated the operation for a pation would be made in January 19. DISCUSSION: (U)	ne second qua period of six	rter calc months	endar year and indica	1975 (<u>TAB C)</u> , ated a final
a. (U) At TAR A the Special Assistant to the Commander, USAINTA, provided an analysis of the ICIP GONDOLA STAR covering the period July thru December 1975. He recommended that the operation be retained as a meaningful adjunct to the security program at Aberdeen Proving Ground/Edgewood Arsenal, MD.					
bute: Three of the activities targeted by the ICIP are designated Critical Sensitive by USAINTA: Edgewood Arsenal, US Army Ballistics Laboratory and the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity. During the six month period under review, two new confidential sources were recruited within these activities. Additional casual sources and CIRLS were also identifications on plain bond.					
IMPLICATIONS	CINFO YES NO PRIM PR		NO 🗌	BUDGET	YES MO
	COORDINATIONS		<u> </u>	APPRO	VALS
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BY US (DISCOM POMPA DISPATCHED (DTG)					
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LTC Haen	dle/56159 N.V. Haendle	8 2 5 DECLAS	SIFY ON 3	i alic	3006

ACSI FORM 28, 13 Sep 71

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


DAMI-DOH SUBJECT: Review of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) GONDOLA STAR (U)

- Much of the information reported in this operation continues to be related to personnel security activities with emphasis on personnel character weaknesses. However, although the ICIP did not uncover meaningful counterespionage information during the period under review, overall, GONDOLA STAR compares favorably to the other eight ongoing operations in scope and coverage of the Critical Sensitive activities at the installation.
- 3. (U) Recommendation: That the ACSI approve the continuation of ICIP GONDOLA STAR as an ongoing operation.

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CMT 2 (C)

MIIA-SO-SA (17 Dec 75)

SUBJECT: ICIP GONDOLA STAR (U)

TO HQDA (DAMI-DOH/ LTC HAENDLE) WASH DC 20310

FROM CDR, USAINTA

DATE & State of the Special Operations Mr Hime/2401/id

Detachment

Ft Meade, MD 20755

1. (U) References:


a. ACSI DA Letter, DAMI-DOH, subject: Retention of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U), 11 July 1975.

b. Draft ACSI letter, DAMI-DOH, subject same as ref la, submitted with 902d MI Group request for reinstatement of GONDOLA STAR in June 1975.

In compliance with paragraph 4, CMT 1, comments and recommendations concerning ICIP GONDOLA STAR are submitted herewith. Subsequent to the ACSI revalidation of ICIP Operation GONDOIA STAR (U), as provided by reference la above, the following actions have been taken:

- a. A thorough study and review of the operation was conducted. As a result of that study, it was determined that Edgewood Arsenal (EA), the US Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL), and the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) were Critical Sensitive (CS) activities in that order of priority; with the US Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), US Army Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL) and the Materiel Testing Directorate (MTD), Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), having a sensitivity of Highly Sensitive (HS), and so designated in that priority of support. It was the goal of the operation during the last six months to provide confidential source personnel support to the three CS target areas. With the recruitment of two additional confidential sources in AMSAA during the last six months, this short-range objective was met.
- b. Additionally, ten casual sources and five counterintelligence recruitment leads have been identified. Although it is the long-range objective of the operation to provide confidential source coverage to all of the targets presently identified, it is the short-range goal to recruit additional confidential sources within the Critical Sensitive targets while concurrently spotting for additional leads during the next six months. The 902d MI Group has manpower resources, to include an experienced "Great Skills" Agent Handler, to support this operation.
- c. Items of counterintelligence interest reported to the supported activities in response to established EEI by source personnel have included seven incidents of foreign contact of military and DOD civilian personnel, six incidents of foreign travel by military and DOD civilian personnel, one report of solicitation by a foreign organization, three reports of identification of alien enlistees, fourteen reports of possible unsuitability of personnel in positions with access to classified

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MILA-SO-SA

SUBJECT: ICIP GONDOLA STAR (U)

material, and eighteen reports of possible security weaknesses, violations or hazards. The above information has provided five leads for the CE Branch, Special Operations Detachment, USAINTA; has led to the request for two limited investigations by the supported commands; has caused one DOD civilian to undergo a "fitness for duty" examination to include a psychiatric evaluation; and has caused reviews of security procedures and the issuance of security warnings by security officials at APG/EA. Details of the above reports are contained in Quarterly Progress Reports (attached as Inclosures 1 and 2).

3. COL Ungerleider, CDR, APG; COL Stahl, CDR, Edgewood Arsenal, and MG Powers, CDR, US Army Test and Evaluation Command, APG, have received separate briefings on the status of ICIP Operation GONDOLA STAR. All have indicated their complete satisfaction with the support provided by the operation, and have enthusiastically indicated their desire that the operation be continued.

4. The previously reported threat to APG/EA as contained in the report of the 1974 SAVE conducted at BRL and the threat to CBR information, equipment and weapons as outlined in reference 1b above remain valid.

5. The operational objectives are being met. The operation is providing the information required and desired.

6. Recommendation: Retain ICIP Operation GONDOLA STAR as a meaningful adjunct to the security program at Aberdeen Proving Ground/ Edgewood Arsenal, MD.

2 Incl as WILLIAM I. JENNINGS
Special Assistant (OPS)

REGNADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON SEP -5 1997
ON FOMPO

BY COR USAINSCOM FOMPO

BY COR USAINSCOM 5200.1-R

AUTH PARA 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

disposition form

Foi use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The All And Foliable Office

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

DAMI-DOH

Quarterly ICIP Reports (U)

CDR, USAINTA

DAMI-DOH

17 DEC 1975

ATTN: MIIA-SO

FT MEADE MD 20755

LTC Haendle/mjb/56159_

- Reference, message, DAMI-DOH, 032115Z Dec 75.
- Attached for your files is a copy of the INFORMATION MEMORANDUM to the Under Secrétary of the Army (less inclosures) which forwarded summaries of the nine ongoing CONUS ICIP operations as submitted by your headquarters. The summary pertaining to a proposed ICIP by the 66th MI Group in support of USASA was not included in this submission. Upon receipt of a response to the above referenced message, a decision will be made whether to include that operation in the next quarterly report.
- In staffing the Quarterly ICIP Report within OACSI, the Acting Director of Intelligence Operations noted that many of the summaries of on-going actions contained too many details of individual character/behavior issues. In future quarterly reports suitability-type information pertaining to individuals covered by the ICIP project should be either eliminated or summarized in general comments.
- On a separate matter, when the ACSI reinstated the ICIP CONDOLA STAR in July 1975, he indicated he would review the ICIP in six months to determine if significant information had been developed to warrant continuation of the project. It is requested that your headquarters conduct a review of this ICIP and furnish your comments and recommendations to this office by 9 January 1975.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

1 Incl a s

L. A. SPIRITO Colonel, GS

Chief, HUMINT Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY — HEADQUARTERS, 902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP FORT MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4

Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

- 1. (U) Identity: GONDOLA STAR (U).
- 2. W(c) Supported Command: HQ, Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD, and critical sensitive (CS) and highly sensitive (HS) tenant activities at APG subordinate to the major command, US Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, VA.

3. (c) Targets:

- a. Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood Area, APG.
- b. US Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Area, APG.
- c. US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Area, APG.
- d. HQ, US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Area, APG.
- e. US Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Area, APG.
- f. Materiel Testing Directorate of APG, Aberdeen Area, APG.

4. (2) Coverage:

a.	Source	Target Covered	Contacts	Reports Produced
(1)	Confidential Sources		·	
(a)	IC-B-005	3c	3	2 Contact reports
(b)	IC-B-010	3a	5	4 Contact reports 1 Agent Report
(c)	IC-B-030	3e	4	3 Contact reports 6 Agent reports
(d)	IC-B-032	3a	9	6 Contact reports 7 Agent reports

Classified by USAINTA Rog 381-100-1 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION GAYEGORY 2 PECLASSIFY ON 31 December 2005

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ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4
Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

(e)	IC-B-053	3a	4	3 Contact reports
(f)	IC-B-064	3ь	4	3 Contact reports
(g)	IC-B-079	3 a	4	3 Contact reports 2 Agent reports
(h)	IC-B-080	3с	5	4 Contact reports 3 Agent reports

(2) Conventional Sources: Conventional sources utilized during the reporting period consisted of those casual and official contacts made by the Project Liaison Officer in the furtherance of his ICIP duties. These contacts consisted of, but were not limited to, those reported in paragraphs. 4a(3), 4b and 4c below. The Project Liaison Officer also had limited or one-time contact with other individuals of the supported activity's workforce. These contacts did not significantly contribute to the counterintelligence coverage of the supported activities, but did serve to project the presence of Military Intelligence in the area. These contacts also contributed significantly to the establishment of a pool from which conventional and confidential sources can be developed. No conventional sources have been tasked to gather specific essential elements of information. However, all conventional sources are made aware of the Project Liaison Officer's overt ("Military Intelligence Special Agent") duties and the type of information of interest to all security officials. No conventional sources have been key-sheeted. Those individuals who provide reportable information and express a desire to remain anonymous will be key-sheeted at the time they make their desire known.

(3) <u>Casual Sources</u>:

(a) b7(d)	3f	3	0
(b) b 7(d)	3ъ	3	0 .
(c) b7(d)		2	o
(d) b7(d)	3а	1	0,
b. <u>Liaison Contacts</u>	Agency	Contacts	Reports Produced
(1) Aberdeen RO	FBI	8	0
(2) Barracks D	MD State Police	5	0 .

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ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4
Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

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CI LOG.	1 0019 1/1/ 00 %	, potoc	WINOT 1/1/			- ++ +
(3)	Sheriff's Ofc	Harfo	ord County	5	2 Agen	t reports
(4)	Sheriff's Ofc	Cecil	County	1	0	
(5)	Police Dept	Aberd	een, MD	4	2 Agen	t reports
(6)	Police Dept	Bel A	ir, MD	2	2 Agen	t reports
(7)	Police Dept	Havre	de Grace, MD	. 3	2 Agen	t reports
(8)	Provost Marshal	PMO,	APG	12	0	
(9)	CID	· APG		39	0	
(10)	Intel Office	APG	n e is a	.57	2 Agen	t reports
(n)	MPI	PMO,	APG .	21	o	
(12)	Security Ofc	EA, A	PG .	14	· O	
(13)	Security Ofc	BRL,	APG	7	l Agen	t report
(14)	Security Ofc	AMSAA	, APG	6 -	1 Agent	t report
(15)	Security Ofc	TECOM	, APG	3	0	
(16)	Security Ofc	HEL,	APG	2	0	
(17)	Security Ofc	MTD,	APG	9	0	•
(18)	СРО	HQ, A	PG	13	2 Agent	report
c.	CIRIS					
	Name		Phase of Deve	lopment	Placement	/Access
(1)	b6]	Vetting start	ed	3a	· .
(2)	b6		Vetting start	ed	3a	
. (Fouc) Statistice:					
a.	ICIP Reports:		Furnished Group HQs	Furnished Sptd Cmd	Subtota	1 FY Total
(1)	Spot Reports:		0	0	0	.
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ICIP QUARTERLY PROCRESS REPORT NUMBER 4 Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

(2)	SOI:	0	0	0	Ō
(3)	IIR:	0	0	0	0
(4)	Agent Reports:	35	N/A	35	35
(5)	Lead Development Reports:	1	n/A	1 .	ĺ.
(6) .	Contact Reports:	28	N/A	28	28
(7)	Basic Source Data Reports:	2	N/A	2	2
(8)	Other:		· ~~		
	MFR:	. 8	N/A .	8	8

Various items of information passed by word of mouth to the supported command/activities.

b.	b1	PCO	PLO ·	Other	Subtotal	FY Total
	-		b1			
c.	TDY Funds:	0	. 0	0	0	0
d.	Manhours:				•	*
(1)	ICIP (CASR):	494	267	0	761	761
(2)	Other ICIP:	144	0	O	144	144
(3)	Non-ICIP:	16	354	0	370	370

^{6. (}C) Remarks: No information was reported concerning non-affiliated civilians or organizations.

7. (C) Quarterly Priefing of Supported Command:

a. Circumstances:

(1) On 22 August 1975 COL Kenneth L. Stahl, Commander, Edgewood Arsenal (EA), Aberdeen Proving Cround (APG), MD, was brought up to date on the status of the ICIP at EA. He was informed that GONDOIA STAR had been reviewed by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department





ICIP QUARTERLY PROCRESS REPORT NUMBER 4
Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975


of the Army and revalidated for another six months. At the end of the six month period, January 1976, the operation would again be reviewed. COL Stahl was reminded that MAJ Walter W. Stansberry, Former Security Officer, EA had been the ICIP Coordinator for EA and now that he had departed for reassignment a new ICIP Coordinator had to be selected and given an ICIP briefing. COL Stahl advised that he desired MAJ Stansberry's replacement, CPT Vincent J. Falconio, Security Officer, EA, be the ICIP Coordinator. COL Stahl also advised that a new deputy commander, COL Burt NMN Dall, had been assigned and he desired that COL Dall be briefed on the ICIP at EA.

- (2) On 22 August 1975 CPT Vincent J. Falconio was given the initial ICIP briefing and a current status report concerning operation GCNDOIA STAR (U). Falconio acknowledged his understanding of the source program and readily grasped the overall concept of ICIP. He indicated a desire to establish the best possible working relationship with the PLO. At the conclusion of the briefing Falconio executed a Security Certificate,
- (3) On 17 September 1975 COL Burt NMN Dall, Deputy Commander, Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, was given the initial Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) briefing. CPT Vincent J. Falconio, ICIP Coordinator, was also present during the briefing. Because COL Stahl, Commander, Edgewood Arsenal, was on annual leave, COL Dall and CPT Falconio were also given the Quarterly Progress Briefing at this time.
- (4) On 24 September 1975 a Quarterly Progress Briefing was given to COL Alvin D. Ungerleider, Commander, APG, and to Mr. Harry A. Mencke, Installation Intelligence Officer, APG, the ICIP Coordinator for the Aberdeen Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD.

b. Recapitulation of Operational Progress During the Period:

(1) During the first quarter of FY 1976, considerable effort was expended to reactivate and expand ICIP coverage at APG following the termination of Project GONDOIA STAR on 31 March 1975 and subsequent revalidation of the Project by the ACSI on 11 July 1975. During the latter half of July 1975, the six confidential sources which were being utilized prior to 31 March 1975 were recontacted and reactivated; one confidential source, whose recruitment had been postponed because of the termination of the project, was recruited on 5 August 1975; a Lead Development Report on an additional confidential source was submitted and approved, and this source was recruited on 4 September 1975. These two confidential sources were the first recruited in the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, a critical sensitive activity at APG.

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
ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4
Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

(2) The Project Maison Officer (PLO) re-established liaison contacts in local, state and federal agencies in addition to maintenance of his contacts with the ICIP coordinators and security officers of those activities receiving ICIP support at APG. The PLO also established new casual sources in critical areas of the ICIP-supported activities at APG and vetted two new CIRLs to the point of submission of NAC requests. Some progress was made in improving the ratio of ICIP to non-ICIP duties of the PLO, who is also—during this reporting period—the only special agent of the Aberdeen RO; this ICIP to non-ICIP ratio has been a weak area of Project GONDOLA STAR since its reactivation in 1972. A favorable trend was established as the quarter progressed, as reflected by the fact that during July 1975 the PLO's duty hours were 45 ICIP and 172 non-ICIP, during August 1975 they were 94 ICIP and 115 non-ICIP, and during September 1975, 122 ICIP and 67 non-ICIP.

c. Significent Counterintelligence Information Developed:

- (1) Under the EEI, "Identification and extent of foreign contacts of military and DoD civilian personnel, with particular emphasis on Sino-Soviet bloc countries" (paragraph 1, Appendix 1 to Annex J to OP-OOL-74-109), the following information was developed:
- (a) Source IC-B-064 reported that an unknown number of Swedish citizens would visit the US Army Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL), APG, on 13 August 1975. Follow-up by the PLO determined that the visit had been properly coordinated.
- (b) Source IC-B-080 reported that seven Swedish citizens would visit the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA), APG, on 26 September 1975. Follow-up by the PLO determined that the visit had not been properly coordinated, but that AMSAA had taken action to insure that the Swedish visitors would not be given access to classified information until definitive guidance was received from HQ, US Army Materiel Command.
- (2) Under the EEI, "Foreign travel of military and civilian personnel, either intended or completed, to Communist controlled countries, or attendance at social and official functions at which Communist country personnel are present" (paragraph 2, Appendix 1 to Annex J to CP-001-74-109), the following information was developed:
- (a) Source IC-R-OlO reported that CS-12 b6 a pharmocologist employed in the Bicmedical Laboratory, Edgewood Arsenal, APG, had, at HER own expense, attended the Sixth Congress of the International Union of Pharmocologists (IUPHAR) which was held in Helsinki,

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ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4
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Finland, 20 through 25 July 1975. During the Congress, 66 attended a luncheon hosted by a representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), who was also an official of the IUPHAR. Following the Congress, 66 took part in a five-day, IUPHAR-sponsored tour to Leningrad, USSR. Follow-up by the PIO is in progress.
(b) Source IC-B-030 reported that GS-12 b6 an employee of Human Engineering Laboratory, APG, intended to participate in a two-week tour of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics scheduled to begin on 2 October 1975. Follow-up by the PLC determined that b6 was participating in a National Geographic Society tour and that HE had coordinated the tour with appropriate security officials.
(c) Source IC-B-032 reported that GS-12 b6 an employee of Development and Engineering Directorate, Edgewood Arsenal, APG, had visited Poland and Czechoslovakia for approximately one month in June 1975. During this visit, b6 and HIS spouse had allegedly visited relatives in Poland and Czechoslovakia. No follow-up was conducted per instructions from HQ, USAINTA.
(3) Under the EEI, "Identification of Alien Enlistees" (paragraph 6, Appendix 1 to Annex J to OP-001-74-109), the following information was developed:
(a) Source IC-B-O30 reported that PFC b6 born in b6 assigned to Human Engineering Laboratory, APG, was not a citizen of the US and did not have a security clearance. Follow-up by the PIO confirmed the information and determined that the Installation Intelligence Officer (IIO), APG, was aware of b6 status.
(b) Source IC-B-030 reported that SP4 b6 born in b6 assigned to Human Engineering Laboratory, APG, was not a US citizen, did not have a security clearance, and allegedly suffered from periods of amnesia. Follow-up by the PIO confirmed the information and determined that the IIO was aware of b6 status.
(c) Source IC-P-030 reported that PFC b6 believed to have been born in b6 assigned to Human Engineering Laboratory, APG, was not a US citizen and did not have a security clearance. Follow-up by the PLO is in progress.
(4) Under the EEI, "Early detection of persons whose activities and character weaknesses render them vulnerable to hostile intelligence exploitation" (paragraph 8, Appendix 1 to Annex J to OP-OO1-74-109), the following information was developed:

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Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

<u></u>	
(a) Source IC-B-032 reported that GS-5 b6 married,	
a secretary in Technical Support Directorate, Edgewood Arsenal, APG, was	
allegedly involved in an extramarital relationship with WS-7 b6	
b6 married, an employee of Technical Support Directorate. The	
situation is being monitored.	-
	,
(b) Source IC-B-032 reported that GS-12 b6 married,	
employed in Development and Engineering Directorate, Edgewood Arsenal, APG,	-
was allegedly involved in an extramarital relationship with GS-9 b6	
b6 a widow, also employed in Development and Engineering Direc-	-
torate. The situation is being monitored.	_
A STATISTICAL TO ROTTING MALIEURA AND MALIEU	·
(c) Source IC-B-032 reported that CS-6 b6 married,	
a secretary in Technical Support Directorate, Edgewood Arsenal, APG, was	
allegedly involved in an extramarital relationship with GS-9 b6	
b6 separated from his wife, employed in US Army Materiel Systems	- `
Analysis Activity, APG. The situation is being monitored.	
MINISTER WEST TO STOWNSTON TO DETTE WONT OF CAR	
(d) An official source of the PLO who did not want to be identified	
because of fear that he would lose his job, reported that LTC b6	
b6 formerly assigned to US Army Materiel Systems Analysis	
Activity (AMSAA), now assigned to Concepts Analysis Activity (CAA), Bethesda	
MD, was allegedly an alcoholic, was allegedly cohabiting with GS-8 b6	· y ~
b6 an employee of AMSAA, and allegedly had had sexual intercourse	
with a female Captain in the Isreali Defense Forces who had been assigned	
as b6 interpreter when b6 was on TDY to Israel in October 1974.	
No follow-up action has been taken because of b6 transfer from AMSAA.	
no rotton up doubter has occur outen because of bo bransier from historical	
(e) Source IC-B-064 reported that GS-8 b6 an employee	
of AMSAA, APG, had allegedly been involved in an extramarital relationship	
with PL 313 federal employee, b6 Director, AMSAA, at	
approximately the time of the accidental death of b6 wife. The	
situation is being monitored.	
	-
(f) Source IC-B-079 reported that an individual, later identified	-
as b6 a physical scientist employed in the Chemical Laboratory	
Edgewood Arsenal, APG, had allegedly exhibited mental or emotional instabili	
Follow-up by the PLO determined that b6 had been directed to undergo a	
"fitness for duty" physical examination which would include a psychiatric	
evaluation.	
	-
(5) Under the EEI, "Security violations or hazards" (paragraph 9,	
Appendix 1 to Annex J to OP-001-74-109), the following information was	
developed:	
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ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4 Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

- (a) Source IC-B-030 reported that GS-14 b6 an employee of Human Engineering Laboratory, APG, had brought HIS eight-year-old son into a controlled access area where a classified test was being conducted and remained overnight. Follow-up by the PLO determined that b6 had been counselled by HIS supervisor.
- (b) Source IC-B-030 reported that carbon paper and one-time typewriter ribbon used to type classified reports in Human Engineering Laboratory, APG, had not been treated as classified waste. Follow-up by the PLO brought the situation to the attention of the security officer, HEL, who promised to take care of the situation; monitoring through IC-B-030 has not determined that any such action was taken.
- (c) Source IC-B-080 reported ten(10) separate situations which constituted security violations or hazards at AMSAA. These were brought to the attention of the Security Officer, ANSAA, by the PIO.
- (6) In response to the EEI, "Conduct rendering the individual vulnerable to pressure, such as homosexual, criminal, or immoral acts" (paragraph 8c, Appendix 1 to Annex J to OP-001-74-109), and "Sudden, unexplained or inadequately explained absence from work by personnel in excess of 24 hours" (paragraph 9, Appendix 2 to Annex J to OP-001-74-109), the following information was developed: The PLO was advised by an official. Source at the US Army Ballistics Research Laboratories, APG, of unconfirmed an employee of BRL, had rumors to the effect that b6 been involved in trouble with the police. Follow-up by the PLO determined that seven charges ranging from possession of marijuana to grand larceny and assault and battery were on file at the Havre de Grace Police Department, Havre de Grace, MD, concerning b6 and that | b6 without leave.
- 8. (C) Actions implemented or taken by the supported command based upon the information submitted:

Subject	Type Information Developed	nformation Developed Action Taken Dat	
b6	Foreign travel Foreign travel Foreign travel Enlisted alien Enlisted alien/	None. Mone. None. None. Denied clearan	ce Unknown
b6	amnesia Rulisted alien Suitability Suitability	None. Monitor Monitor	

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ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 4
Period: 1 July 1975 to 30 September 1975

Monitor Suitability Monitor Suitability Suitability Unknown Monitor Suitability 11 Aug 75 Suitability "Fitness for duty" physical -Security weakness Counseled Unknown 2.Sep 75 Security weaknesses, HEL, various Correct Security weaknesses, AMSAA, various 9 Sep 75 Correct 16 Sep 75 Suitability Investigate

9(U)(C) Comments, Remarks and Recommendations: Both COL Stahl and COL Ungerleider expressed their pleasure that ICIP Project CONDOIA STAR had been reinstated by the ACSI for an additional six months. Both Commanders and their designated ICIP Coordinators continue to cooperate fully with the Project Liaison Officer and his Military Intelligence chain of command. The progress of ICIP Project GONDOIA STAR, as reflected above, is directly proportional to the amount of time the PLO's other duties permit him to devote to the ICIP.

WILLIAM B. HALL Project Case Officer

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ARERDELM RESIDENT OFFICE 902D FALLTARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP AREPDELY PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND 21005

ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2

Period 1 October 1975 to 31 December 1975

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

- 1. (U) Identity: COMDONA STAR (U).
- 2. (3) Supported Command: IC, Aberdeen Proving Ground (APO), ID, and critical sensitive (CS) and highly sensitive (NS) tenant activities at APO subordinate to the major command; US Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, VA.

3. (2) Targets:

- a. Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood Area, APG.
- b. US Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Area, APG.
- c. WE army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Wordeen Area, AFC.
- d. BO, US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Area, AFG.
- e. US Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Area, AFC.
- f. Fateriel Testing Directorate of APG, Aberdeen Area, APG.

l. (%) Coverage:

a.	Source	Target Covered	Sontacts	Hudber/Type of leports Froduced
(1)	Confidential Sources	•		
(a)	10-2-005	. 3с	3	3 Contact Reports 5 Agent Reports
(b)	10-2-010	3 a	3	3 Contact Reports 6 Agent Reports
(c)	IC-R-030	3e	14	4 Contact Reports 8 Agent Reports
(a)	IC-E-032	3a		5 Contact Reports 5 Agent Reports

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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
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ECIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2

Period 1 October 1975 to 31 December 1975

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

- 1. (U) Identity: COMEOLA STAR (U).
- 2. (3) Supported Command: EC, Aberdeen Proving Ground (APO), ED, and critical sensitive (CS) and highly sensitive (MS) tenant activities at APO subordinate to the major command; US Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, VA.

3. (2) Targets:

- a. Magewood Arsenal, Edgewood Area, APG.
- b. US Army Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Area, ARG.
- c. WE Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Wordeen Area, ARG.
- d. BO, US Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Area, AFG.
- e. US Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Area, APC.
- f. Hateriel Testing Directorate of APC, Aberdeen Area, APC.

l. (2) Coverage:

a.	Source	Target Covered	Sontacts	Number/Type of Reports Froduced
(1)	Confidential Sources			
(a)	10-1-005	3c	3	3 Contact Reports 5 Agent Reports
(b)	10-2-010	3a	3	3 Contact Reports 6 Agent Reports
(c)	IC-R-030	3e	<u>1</u> ;	4 Contact Reports 8 Agent Reports
(a)	IC-E-032	3a	8	5 Contact Reports 5 Agent Reports

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
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(e) IC-B-05	3	3a	3	3 Contact Reports 2 Agent Reports
(f) IC-E-06	4	3ъ	3	3 Contact Reports
(g) lC-D-07	9	3a	3	3 Contact Reports 1 Agent Reports
(h) IC-E-08	0	3c	5	4 Contact Reports 5 Agent Reports

(2) Conventional Sources: As in previous quarters the conventional sources utilized during the reporting period consisted of those casual and official contacts made by the Project Maison Officer in the furtherance of his ICIP duties. These contacts consisted of, but were not limited to, those reported in paragraphs 4a(3), 4b and 4c below. The Project Liaison Officer also had limited or one-time contact with other individuals of the supported activities. These contacts did not significantly contribute to the counterintelligence coverage of the supported activities, but did serve to project the presence of Military Intelligence in the area. Those contacts also contributed significantly to the establishment of a pool from which conventional and confidential sources can be developed. To conventional sources have been tasked to gather specific essential elements of information. However, all conventional sources are made aware of the Project Liaison (fficer's overt ("Lilitary Intelligence Special Agent") duties and the type of information of interest to all security officials; information which denotes a security weakness or vulnerability. He conventional sources have been key-shected. These individuals the provide reportable information and express a desire to remain anonymous will be key-shosted at the time they make their desire known.

(3) Casual Sources:

(a)	b1	За	1	C
(b)	b1	3a	2	С
(c)	b1	За	2	С
(d)	b1	3a	1	0
(e)	b1	<i>3</i> 6	С	O
(f)	b1	3b	1	С
(g)	b1	3 c	1	Ū



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(h)	b1	3f	2	0
(i)	b1	3 £	41	0
(j)	b1	3a	.5	0
b. <u>L</u>	iaison Contacts	Agency	Contact:	s Reports Produced
(1)	Aberdeen RO	FIL	6	0
(2)	Barracks D	ld State Police	3	0 .
(3)	Sheriff's (fc	Tarford County	4	l Agent Report
(4)	Sheriff's Ufc	Cecil County	1	0
(5)	Police Dept	Aberdeen, Md.	5	1 Agent Report
(6)	Police Dept	Bel Air, Md.	3	l Agent Report
(7)	Folice Dept	Havre de Grace, I	id. 2	l Agent Report
(8)	Provest Marshal	PIO, APG	114	0
(9)	CIP	APG	36	1 Agent Teport
(10)	Intel Ofc	AIG	59	1 Agent Report
(11)	EPI .	Pro, APG	31	I Agent lagort
(12)	Security Ofc	UA, APG	15	0
(23)	Security Ofc	LRL, AFG	2	0
(J_i^{\dagger})	Security dic	Alisaa, Arg	7	l Aped deport
(15)	lecarity Ufc	Hq, TEGGL, AFG	ij	С
(16)	Security (fe	FEIL, APG	4	1 Agent Report
(17)	Security Cfc	FTD, APG	9	0
(18)	GPO	HQ, APG	ć	3 Agent Reports
(19)	Baltimore 70	DIS	24	1 Agent Report
c. <u>C</u>	IRLS			
<u> </u>	ane	Phase of Lev		Placement/Access
(1)	b1	LDR Submitte	RITCHIE FO	3a


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ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT N Period: 1 October 1975 to 31 De	UMBER 2 cember 1975	
(2) b1	Half Vetted	3a ,
(3) b1	LDR Started	За
(4) b1	Vetting Started	3a _.
(5) b1	Spotted	. 3a
5. (FOUP) Statistics:		• •

a.	ICIP Reports:	Furnished Group HQs		Subtotal	FY Tota
(1)	Spot Reports:	0	0	Ο.	. 0
(2).	50I:	0	0	0	0
(3)	IIR:	0	0	0	0
·(4)	Agent Reports	142	ìi/A	45	80
	Lead Development Reports:	1	N/A	1	. 2 ·
(6)	Contact Reports:	28 *	R/A	28 -	56
(7)	Rasic Source Data Reports:	ı	H/A	ı	. 3
(8)	(ther:		•		<u>.</u>
	ेडा सः	. 7	· M/A	7	<u> 15</u>

All information for the supported activities was passed by word of mouth from the PLO.

b1	FCC	TIC	Other	Subtotal	FY Total
	k	01			··
TDY Funds:	0	0	0	. 0	. 0
anhours:	•			2	•
ICIP (CASE):	1,06	475	О	881	1642
Cther TCIP	116	0,	O	116	260
Non-16IP:	72	187	0	259	629
	Canhours: ICIP (CASE): Other ICIP	TDY Funds: 0 Canhours: ICIP (GASE): h06 Cther ICIP 116	D1 D1 D1 D1 D1 D1 D1 D1	b1 TDY Funds: 0 0 0 Canhours: IGIP (GASE): 106 475 0 Cther IGIP 116 0 0	b1 TDY Funds: 0 0 0 0 Canhours: IGIF (GASE): 1:06 475 0 361 Cther IGIP 116 0 0 116



ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2 Feriod: 1 October 1975 to 31 December 1975

6. (U) Remarks: No information was reported concerning non-affiliated civilians or organizations.

7. Quarterly Briefing of Supported Command:

a. Circumstances:

- (1) On 1 December 1975 the initial ICIP briefing was given to ME Patrick W. Powers, Commander, US Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) and CCL William H. Tucker Jr., Chief of Staff, TECOM. The status of TECOM in relation to receiving ICIP support was also included in the briefing. It was pointed out that due to the limitation of resources GOMEOLA STAR (U) was concentrating on three higher priority activities at APG. This was due to the three activities having a greater degree of sensitivity. Should the resource problem improve to the point where TECOM could be covered beyond routine liaison then TECOM would be immediately notified. MG Powers acknowledged his understanding of the current status of GCIDOLA STAR (U).
- (2) On 17 December 1975 COL Henneth L. Stahl, Gommander, Edgewood Arsenal, APG was given a Quarterly Progress Report Friefing as pertains to the Edgewood Arsenal portion of Operation GOMEOLA STAR (U).
- (3) On 19 December 1975 OCL Alvin D. Ungerleider, Corrender, AFO was given a Quarterly Frogress Report briefing as pertains to those activities located in the Aberdeen Area, AFO which are supported by GCMBOLA STAR (U). Fr. Harry A. Mencke Installation Intelligence Officer, AFO, the ICIP Goordinator for the Aberdeen Area, AFO, was also present for this briefing.
- b. Recapitulation of Operational Progress During the Period: Turing the first quarter of M 1976 SCMEAUA STAR (8) was reactivated, two new confidential sources were recruited and efforts started to increase the 10IF coverage. In the second quarter PI 1976 efforts were made to broaden the 10IP coverage of the three priority activities designated STATLOAD SINSITIVE; Edgewood Arsenal, US Arry Pallistic Research Laboratories and US Array Pateriel Systems Analysis Activity. In this regard significant progress was made. Training and development of the two newly recruited confidential sources (10-8-005 and 10-4-080) progressed and their production increased accordingly. Again during this quarter the PLA had additional time available to devote to 101P duties. This allowed the PLA to more than double the time of his presence in the supported activities, as compared to previous quarters. Consequently, there was an increase in CITLS, casual sources and the activity cited in paragraph ha(2) above.
 - c. Significant Counterintelligence Information Developed:

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ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2 Feriod: 1 October 1975 to 31 December 1975

(1) Under the EdI, "Identification and extent of foreign contacts of military and DCD Civilian personnel, with particular emphasis on Sino-Soviet bloc countries" (paragraph 1, Appendix 1 to Annex J to OF-OO1-74-109), the following information was developed:
(a) Source 10-D-030 reported Mr. b6 a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany was assigned on an exchange program to work in the US Army Human Ungineering Laboratory until September 1976. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed, no additional action is expected.
(b) Source 10-N-005 reported SGT b6 assigned to the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, had a former wife and two children residing in the Federal Mepublic of Germany. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed and local files were checked.
(c) Source 10-F-032 reported additional information concerning travel by 0S-12 b6 to Czechoslovakia and Poland during the summer of 1975. Additional information was also provided concerning b6 plans for another trip to those countries. 1CIP Coordinator was briefed and the information was also brought to the attention of another USATHTA element. The ICIP Coordinator expects 1CIP to continue to monitor b6 activities.
(d) Source 16-2-010 reported one British and three Canadian personnel visited Edgewood Arsenal during the period 1-5 December 1975. A check with the ICIF Coordinator determined the visit had been properly cleared.
(e) Source IC-I-OlO reported GS-15 b6 of Edgewood-Arsenal was a medical student at the American University, Heirut, Lebanon during EMTI and raised the question of how b6 was able to avoid mulitary service with the German Army during the war. The ICIF Coordinator was briefed. The ICIF Coordinator asked to have b6 USAIRR doswier reviewed in order to attempt to answer the question. This action is yending. b6 MMA-CM-21, was indicated 41/104 on LI was neguented by AFG/DE, 2006CFS
(2) Under the E.I., "Intended foreign travel of military and DOD civilian personnel to Sino-Soviet bloc countries or attendance at social and official functions at which Sino-Soviet bloc personnel are present" (paragraph 2, Appendix 1 to Annex J to CF-COL-74-109), the following information was developed:
(a) Source 13-D-030 reported 65-12 b6 an employee of the Human incincering Laboratory, and his wife, b6 an employee of the 63 Army Hateriel Systems Analysis Activity, took a 10 to 14 day tour to Poscow and Leningrad which was sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution in Mashington, BC. Since the FLC was already aware of the b6 giving notification of the trip through their chain of corrand and the information having already come to the attention of another element of USALMTA, no action was taken. FLC did make mention to the ICIP Coordinator that the information had also been developed through ICIAEGARDED UNCLASSIFIED
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- (b) In a separate report source IC-B-030 reported the b6 intend to take another tour to Russia during the summer of 1976. This information was passed to the ICIP Coordinator.
- (3) Under the EEI, "Solicitation by foreign nationals or organizations of personal and/or official information through official or non-efficial channels" (paragraph 4, Appendix 1 to Annex J to CP-001-7h-109), the following information was developed:
- (a) Source IC-1-030 reported the Human Engineering Laboratory received a written request for bibliographies of HEL publications from b6

 [b6] Institute of Experimental Psychology, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Mocelova 17, Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. The Lirector, HEL, sent a letter to b6 advising HEU no longer had copies of the bibliographies available for distribution to the public. The Director of HEL suggested b6 initiate contact through the Czechoslovak Embassy with the National Technical Information Services, 5285 Fort Acyal Road, Springfield, VA 22151. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed, no action is pending.
- (4) Under the BEI, "Tarly detection of persons whose activities and character weaknesses render them vulnerable to hostile intelligence exploitation" (paragraph 8, Appendix 1 to Annex J to CP-CVI-74-109), the following information was developed:
- (a) Source 10-B-005 reported MAJ b6 US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, was divorced and cohabitating with GS-9 b6 b6 also divorced. b6 had also defaulted in support payments to make former wife. The TCIF Coordinator was briefed and ICIF is continuing to nomitor the b6 situation.
- (b) Source 10-B-032 reported information concerning a possible entramarital relationship between 03-14 b6 and 02-3 b6

 b6 Loth employees of Edgewood Arsenal. The 101P Goordinator was
 briefed and IGIF was asked to continue to monitor the situation.
- (c) Source IC-D-032 reported being told by a coworder that a "go-go dancer" at the MCC Slub performed the function of sexual partner, presumably in exchange for monetary renumeration, for high-ranking visitors to Edgewood Arsenal. Local inquiry by the PEC determined the go-go dancer was no longer employed by the APC Slub system. No information was developed to confirm or refute the information from source's coworker. The information was passed to the FCTP Coordinator who requested additional information as it becomes available.

(<u>(d) -So</u>	urce]	<u> </u>	reported	informat	ion which	could	tend to	indicate
GŞ-15	b6			was mei	ntally un	stable.	The ICL	P Coord:	inator
was bi	riefed	and a	Limited	investig	ntally un ation was	requeste	d.	uni Un	Mountait
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
is pending.

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1CIF QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2 Period: 1 October 1975 to 31 December 1975

(e) Source 1C-B-053 reported GS-12 b6 Edgewood Arsenal, took a woman (NFI) who was not his wife to lunch almost every day since 1 November 1975. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed; no action is pending.
(f) Source IC-E-053 reported GS-14 b6 Edgewood Arsenal, was observed on approximately a dozen occasions taking a woman, not his wife, to lunch. b6 was observed taking three or four different woman to lunch since 1 September 1975. The ICIF Coordinator was briefed; no action is rending.
(g) Source IC-E-032 reported SS-13 b6 Edgewood Arsenal, had a reputation of a "mad scientist". Also that b6 had bragged about having intercourse with an alleged prostitute. On a date b6 took source to his home and offerred to take care of her financially if she would take care of his sexual needs; source declined. The ICIF Coordinator was briefed. The ICIF Coordinator is making a local inquiry in advance of requesting a Limited Investigation.
(h) Source FG-B-CO5 reported MAJ b6 US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, claimed 04.00 for a tip to a baggage handler on his ThY voucher when he did not give a \$4.00 tip. The lOIF Occadinator was briefed, follow up action is yet to be determined.
(5) Under the EdT, "Security violations or hazards" (paragraph 9, Appendix 1 to Armex J to CP-001-74-109), the following information was developed:
(a) Source IC-B-OCC reported a CONFIDENTIAL document had been left unsecured over a three day weekend. The FCIP Coordinator was briefed; follow up action is pending. (AMSAA Security Officer away TLY until 15 Dec)
(b) Source IC-E-080 reported a security container had been left open during duty hours in an unattended office at the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity. The ICIP Scordinator was briefed, follow up action is pending.
(c) Source IC-B-080 reported b6 a secretary in the US Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity left her office unsecured and her security container open for puriods of five to ten rinutes while performing chores away from her office. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed, follow up action

- (d) Source IC-P-030 reported attending a scientific conference at the US Army Material Systems Analysis Activity which had been anounced as classified. Access to the conference had not been properly controlled; however, the portion of the conference attended by source was believed to have been unclassified. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed, follow up action is pending.
 - (e) Source IC-B-080 reported the Ground Warfare Division of the US



ICIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2 Period: 1 October 1975 to 31 December 1975


Materiel Systems Analysis Activity had moved to different office space. Prior to the move no technical survey was conducted to determine if there were electronic surveillance devices in the new office space. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed, follow up action is pending.

- (f) Source IC-E-Olo reported information relative to an adverse morale situation in the Pio-Medical Laboratory of Edgewood Arsenal. The situation was alleged to have been created by DA-level officials unjustly letting b6 take the blame publicly for DA-directed research in hallucinogenic drugs, and that LA was in fact offering b6 as a "sacrificial lamb". This information was inmediately passed to the ICIP Coordinator and the Commander of Edgewood Arsenal. The commander raised several questions concerning the personalities involved and the cause of adverse morale situation. These questions were covered at the next meeting with this source and the answers were provided to the commander. The commander asked that ICIP continue to monitor the situation.
- (6) In response to the objective of identifying and neutralizing threats of espionage, sabotage and subversion, Source IC-B-030 reported the Funan Engineering Laboratory's receipt of two unsolicited requests for information. The requests were from the president of a company which claimed to be involved in the national effort to reduce and prevent crime. The information requested was unclassified. HEL provided the information asked for in the first request, but did not have the information to satisfy the second request. Initial investigation failed to confirm the existence of the company identified in the request. The ICIP Coordinator was briefed and HAL will not know any further requests from this company until all process by HA have been completed.

3. (6) Actions implemented or taken by the supported corrand based upon the information submitted:

Sulfect	Type Information Leveloped	Action Taken	Late of Action		
b6	Toreign Connection Foreign Travel Foreign Connection &	Monitor Monitor Monitor			
<u> </u>	switability	investigate	23 December 1975		
	Foreign Travel	Mone.			
	Foreign Travel	None.			
	Suitability	Monitor	•		
b6	Cuitability	None			
	Saitability	Hone			
	Suitability	Conitor .			
	Suitability	·Not yet determ	ined		
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1CIP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT NUMBER 2 Period: \1 October 1975 to 31 December 1975

9. Comments, Remarks and Recommendations: Both commanders and their ICTP Coordinators continue to consider GONDOLA STAR (U) a significant adjunct to their security program. This Project Liaison Officer continues to receive the complete cooperation of all associated personnel of the supported activities.

Kickard Kicker WOHARD L. GREIDER Project Liaison Officer

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As of 18 Sep 85 all material included (Date)

in this file conforms with DA policies currently in effect.

(Signature) (Date Signed)

Delmar Smith GS5
(Printed Name) (Grade)

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
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IA (HQ) Form 2214 (1 Sep 78)

Replaces MIIA Fm 315, 1 Jun 75, which may be used until supplies are exhausted.

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					ken or recomme	nded. Must be suf	ficiently detailed to ide
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


DAMI-CIC

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operation Operation (U)

- e. The general concept and recommendation to replace LENTIL MONKEY (U) with a DOSSP have been discussed and concurred in by Cdr, SOD, INSCOM, the Commandant and Security Officer at DLI, and 902d MI Group.
- f. Basis for termination of subject ICIP and replacement by DOSSP is that information obtained from LENTIL MONKEY (U) is general in nature and can be obtained through normal security assistance to installation; INSCOM SOD's current investigative and reporting authority and most important the lack of a clear definition of physical suiveillance which has caused those working the operation much concern (TAB D).
- g. By 1st Ind (TAB A) authority granted INSCOM-SOD for termination of LENTIL MONKEY (U).
- 3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That 1st Ind (TAB A) be approved and signed.

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ON SEP 5 1997
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LENTIL MONKEY: (QSR, 1st QTR FY 79)


- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Sixteen
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) An instructor of the German Language Department (GLD) who visited East Berlin while on a trip to Europe, failed to comply with DLT regulations directing prior reporting of such visits. Two other GLD instructors may have also visited East Germany during the quarter without reporting the event.
- (2) Instructors of the Polish Language Department encouraged students to attend a dance sponsored by a Polish ethnic organization in Oakland, CA in January 1979. It was stipulated, however, that the students must attend the dance in uniform.
- (3) According to a report from another government investigative agency, a recently hired Russian Language Department (RLD) instructor had previously been of interest to a Yugoslavian intelligence agent working out of the Yugoslavian Consulate in San Francisco while the instructor was attending DLI as part of an exchange program in the law 1960's.
- (4) Several instructors in the Chinese Mandarin Language Department (CMLD) are opposing the new Interagency Course Curriculum. Instructors have been reported to be inflating exam grades in order to present a false impression of student abilities. The students lack of language capability will be manifested once they reach field assignments and thus discredit the new course.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) Sixteen confidential sources were active during the quarter. Four sources were terminated and one new source recruited. Ten conventional sources also provided information during the quarter.
- (2) During the reporting period, information obtained from all sources, including that acquired from overt liaison activities, resulted in production of two Summaries of Information, 35 Contact Reports, 65 oral reports to the DLI Commandant and/or designated representatives, one Source Lead Development Report, and 40 Agent Reports. A total of 1148 manhours were expended on the ICIP during the 1st quarter.

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
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(4) As a result of the quarterly briefing and based on information reported during the quarter, the DLI Commandant directed the Security Officer to prepare a letter to be sent through channels to the GLD instructor who visited East Berlin (para d(1)) requesting an explanation for his failure to comply with DLI policy. Additionally, the Security Officer will intensify efforts to develop policy concerning appropriate instructor-student relationships/behavior. The Commandant also directed the DLI Information Officer to publish a notice emphasizing restrictions on military personnel participating in political and certain other events while in uniform, and the Security Officer will insure DLI unit commanders emphasize military regulations governing participation in such functions to their units.

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DAMI-CIC

Emport of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

7 March 1979

To obtain ACSI approval for termination of TCIP.

1. CF BACKGROUND: INSCOM-SOR on 9 Feb 79, requested authority to terminate ICIP - LENTIL MONKEY (U) located at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA. The ICIP is an OACSI, DA program.

DISCUSSION:

- a. The ICIP is a special operational security service employing timely, effective and coordinated use of overt and covert CI sources and techniques to detect elements or factors which are detrimental to security. The primary factor which distinguishes the ICIP operation from CI support normally provided to an installation or unit by MI groups is the use of confidential sources as covert assets in the conduct of the operation.
- b. Command security threats covered by the ICIP include acts of aspionage, substate, substate, subversion, and the activities of hostile foreign intelligence directed against or face-within the supported command.
- c. INSCOM-SOD's status report, 1st Quarter, FY 79, for ICIP Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U) reveals that the operation utilized 15 confidential sources, produced two Summaries of Information, one Source Lead Development Report, 35 Contact Reports and 40 Agent Reports. Further, a total of 1148 manhours were expended on the operation (TAB B).
- d. INSCOM-SOD has suggested that a different type program would be better suited to provide the required security assistance for the DLI, i.e., a Dedicated Operations Security Support Program (ACCST), which does not use confidential sources and which can be readily implemented by the 902d MI Group with existing personnel assets. A DOSSP is described at TAB C. The DOSSP for DLI would be tailored to satisfy local security requirements unique to DLI.

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DAMI- IC

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICII) Operation Operation (U)

- e. The general concept and recommendation to replace LENTIL MONKEY (U) with a DOSSP have been discussed and concurred in by Cdr, SOD, INSCOM, the Commandant and Security Officer at DLI and 902d MI Group.
- f. Basis for termination of subject ICIP and replacement by DOSSP is that information obtained from LENTIL MONKEY (U) is general in nature and can be obtained through normal security assistance to installation; INSCOM-SOD's current investigative and reporting authority and most important the lack of a clear definition of physical surveillance which has caused those working the operation much concern (TAB D).
- g. By 1st Ind (TAB A) authority granted INSCOM-SOD for termination of LENTIL MONKEY (U).
- 3. (U) RECOMMENDATION: That 1st Ind (TAB A) be approved and signed.

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DAMI-CIC (9 Feb 79) let Ind SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) Operation (U)

HQDA, ACSI, Washington, DC 20310

TO: Commander, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, ATTN: IASO-SA, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755

Authority to terminate ICIP, LENTIL MONKEY (U) is granted.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

FEB 9 1979

IASO-SA

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

Operation (V)

HQDA (DAMI-CIC/Ms Brannan) WASH DC 20310

1. Submitted herewith is the status report, 1st Quarter, FY 79, for ICIP Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U). During the reporting period the operation produced two Summaries of Information, one Source Lead Development Report, 35 Contact Reports and 40 Agent Reports.

2. (c) LENTIL MONKEY (U), supporting the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), Presidio of Monterey, CA, is the only CONUS ICIP being conducted. However, the type information generally developed from the project, and this Command's current investigative and reporting authority, suggest that a different type program would be better suited to provide the required security assistance for DLIFLC. A Dedicated Operations Security Support Program (DOSSP) could effectively replace the ICIP without employing confidential sources and be readily implemented by the 902d Military Intelligence Group with existing personnel assets. At inclosure two is an extract from the USAINSCOM OPSEC Support Procedures Manual which describes the DOSSP.

3. The general concept and recommendations to replace ICIP LENTIL MONKEY (U) with a DOSSP have been discussed and concurred in by the Commandant and Security Officer at DLIFLC. The operational concept would be tailored to satisfy local security requirements unique to DLIFLC.

4. In view of the above, request authority to terminate ICIP LENTIL MONKEY (U). Concurrent with termination of the ICIP, a DOSSP for DLIFLC will be implemented.

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WILLIAM I. ENNINGS Special Assistant (OPS)

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III. TYPES OF SUPPORT

1. GENERAL: This section discusses the various types of OPSEC support that are available within USAINSCOM. It should be noted that operations security is a command responsibility. Therefore, any improvements in the supported commands' OPSEC posture must be accomplished by the supported commander. USAINSCOM is unique in that the present organization integrates many of the counterintelligence/security skills that formerly were assigned to separate Army commands. As such, the Commander, USAINSCOM, has the capability to conduct a multidisciplined security evaluation of a project, activity or facility. With the divergence of skills integral to the USAINSCOM organization, the majority of problem areas that have been historically associated with OPSEC can be addressed, and with the multidisciplined approach, USAINSCOM units are able to assist supported commanders by evaluating their OPSEC posture and recommending means of improvement. This should enable the achievement of a much better security posture. The following paragraphs describe the types of support which USAINSCOM units provide.

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- 2-1. The DOSSP Concept: The DOSSP is a systematic, ongoing, dynamic approach to providing the local commander, operations security officials, project managers and security managers of US Army installations/units/activities/projects with meaningful operations security support in the form of timely, accurate, all source intelligence information pertaining to the real-time, multidisciplined threat posed by hostile intelligence; observed vulnerabilities of the supported element to that threat; and recommendations for appropriate corrective action to enhance operations security. This program is based on a Covering Agent (CA) in an overt continuous role of acquiring information about the supported activity and the threat thereto and providing it to the supported activity in a timely manner, while concurrently recommending practical "fixes" to reduce observed vulnerabilities.
- 2-2. Responsibilities: Implementation of the Dedicated Operations Security Support Program is the responsibility of each individual field element (RO/FO/Detachment) within the policies provided by the HQ, USAINSCOM. Responsibility for supervision, guidance, and comprehensiveness, rests with the Field Offices, Detachments, and Battalions within their respective areas of responsibility. Group Headquarters will provide guidance, as appropriate, monitor the overall program, acquire and disseminate threat data, and, in the case of certain key projects/activities which stretch beyond local boundaries, will provide centralized management of the overall DOSSP effort.
- 2-3. Target/Project Selection: Determination of who should be a recipient of DOSSP support is a continuous process of initiative, investigation, and evaluation. Such documents as the ACSI Sensitive Installation and

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Unit List and other sensitive activities listings are helpful, but not comprehensive. Each field element must do all within its capabilities to insure they are aware of all significant Army activities in their AOR. Once this grasp of the local environment is obtained, prioritization based on available manpower, desires of supported activities, information from intelligence channels, and perceived security sensitivity of the supported activity is made to determine if DOSSP support is appropriate. Security sensitivity is the most important aspect in determining if an activity requires support. Determination of security sensitivity must be based on the importance of the activity to US national security as well as the potential benefit to be derived by a hostile element if they were to obtain details about the activity.

2-4. Covering Agent Functions:

- a. Threat: The Covering Agent must be an expert in the threat to the activity he has been detailed to support. This can be accomplished only by thorough study of national threat data, review of periodic intelligence updates, and liaison with local, state, and federal agencies, as well as their foreign equivalents, where appropriate, in order to develop local threat. Refinement of this threat to manageable size is based on a thorough knowledge of the supported command.
- b. Knowledge: OPSEC support to an activity is predicated upon a thorough knowledge of that activity. There is no easy way to obtain this knowledge other than extensive research into the organization's mission, functions, and organization. An initial step in this direction is the reading of Army Regulations and Field Manuals pertaining to the activity. Briefings from activity personnel, study of organization and functions manuals, test plans, contingency and operations plans, and related documents are the means for building a comprehensive data base. Even after building this initial base, a systematic plan for obtaining data on an on going basis should be instituted, i.e., daily bulletins, test schedules, briefings, and test plan changes. While expertise in SIGSEC and IMAGERY Security by CI Agents is not required, familiarity with basic concepts is. A primary goal of the USAINSCOM OPSEC Support Program is to provide Army elements a single point of contact for obtaining MI support, be it SIGSEC, IMAGERY Security, or Counterintelligence.
- c. Execution: Success in the OPSEC support area is based on the willingness of the covering agent to cast himself in the role of an all source agent and his innovative application of investigative skills in developing threat and vulnerability data, use of deductive reasoning, common sense, and gaining the confidence and respect of the personnel of the supported command. If the confidence of workers at all echelons of the supported command can be gained, their willingness to provide candid assessments of vulnerabilities within the activity will become the Covering Agent's best asset. The CA may know a lot about an activity,

but the actual workers know a great deal more. Their experience makes them much more able to relate security weaknesses if they appreciate the threat.

- d. Recording: Methodical recording of threat, vulnerabilities, unusual incidents, ideas, and recommendations is essential in building a successful DOSSP. This allows the CA to evaluate comprehensiveness of local hostile intelligence targeting, determine patterns, and fit together isolated incidents, and provides continuity of support as personnel are transferred. A sample workbook is included as Figure 1.
- e. Reporting: Other than the maintenance of workbooks, no formal reporting requirements are imposed on covering agents except in extenuating circumstance of intense, critical stages of support. CA's will keep the chain of command informed of significant activities.



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SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)
Operation (U)

HQDA (DAMI-CIC/Ms Brannan) WASH DC 20310

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
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WILLIAM I. JENNINGS
Special Assistant (OPS)

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902d MI Group Pamphlet 381~3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Headquarters, 902d Military Intelligence Group Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

902d MI Group Pamphlet No. 381-3

22 April 1976

Military Intelligence DIRECT SUPPORT COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (DSCCP) (U)

- REFERENCES: See APPENDIX A.
- (U) PURPOSE: This pamphlet establishes policy, guidance, and standardized procedures for the conduct of all-source, multi-discipline counterintelligence support within the 902d MI Group's area of operation.

(U) GENERAL:

- The Commander, 902d MI Group, has the responsibility to notify commanders of Army installations and units in the group's area of operation
- (1) Any situation or condition exists that poses a threat to the internal security of that Army element.
- (2) Any situation exists that might adversely affect the commander's capability to perform his mission.
- (3) Information indicates a probable employement of military resources to counter a threat to the installation.

In order to acquire information of situations or conditions that may pose a threat to the supported commander, field elements must aggressively seek it and not wait for it to be reported through normal sequence of events. This is particularly essential for those units/installations declared to be critical sensitive.

The DSCCP is one of a series of graduated intensity counterintelligence programs designed to provide the proper coverage based on the security vulnerability of a particular installation. In relationship to other graduated counterintelligence programs listed in USAINTA Regulation 381-100, the DSCCP would, in certain instances, serve as a means of identifying the need for programs of greater intensity such as SVAs, or SAVEs, or, in other instances, may serve as follow-up support subsequent to such intensified services. It provides the broad spectrum of coverage to include a multidiscipline approach with provisions that the information gathered be reported expeditiously to the responsible commander. The program systematically focuses on providing threat information on the most critical area within the target installation in order to provide the required information to the supported commander. CLASSIFEED BY: COR USALN'TH

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
c. This program is not synonymous with, nor is it identifiable with, the Internal Counterintelligence Program, Special Operations as defined in FM 30-17A, or the Special Covert Operational Personnel Insertion (SCOPI) as defined in USAINTA Regulation 381-100.

4. (U) CONCEPT:

- a. The Direct Support Comprehensive Counterintelligence Program (DSCCP) is an overt, dedicated counterintelligence Security support program with the objective of detecting or anticipating situations and factors from any source (HMINT/SIGNT/PHOTINY) which are or may become detrimental to the security posture of the supported installation. It is a direct Support Special Agent (DSSA) in an overt continuous role of acquiring information and providing it to the commander in a timely manner, while concurrently providing sound recommendations for the reduction and/or elimination of security hazards, vulnerabilities on threats posed by hostile factors.
- b. The DSSA obtains the required information from overt investigative activities and from a number and variety of sources and contacts within and in the vicinity of the supported installation. Confidential sources are not utilized. He is fully supported in this task by the intervening echelons at Field Offices, Group, and USAINTA.
- c. The DSCCP is a complementary service provided to the supported commander to assist him in improving the security posture of his installation. It is not intended to duplicate nor to usurp the functions and responsibilities of the G-2 or of the Security Manager.

5. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES:

- a. The Commander, 902d MI Group, is the approving authority for all DSCCP operations conducted within the group's area of operation.
 - b. The S3, 902d MI Group is responsible for the following:
- (1) Coordinating the selection of units/installations as candidates for DSCCP with the appropriate USAINTA staff elements.
- (2) Monitoring DSCCP operations on a continuing basis and periodically informing appropriate USAINTA staff elements of their progress.
- (3) Conducting an annual review of each DSCCP operation to determine if it is still necessary and if so, to asure that it remains viable.
 - c. Pield Office Commanders are responsible for the following:
- (1) Initiating proposed DSCCP operations for installations located within their areas of operation.



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- (2) Conducting DSCCP operations within their area after approval by the Group Commander and coordination with the supported commanders.
- (3) Designating the DSSA for each DSCCP operation, providing followup support, and arranging for DSSA clearance and access to compartmented information as required.
- (4) Briefing of the supported commanders on the results of DSCCP operation at regular intervals per mutual agreements.
- (5) Establish procedures to maintain continuity of the program during absences of the DSSA. When possible, an alternate DSSA will be assigned: 🏬

PROCEDURES AND SCOPE:

- The designation of installations or Army elements as candidates for the DSCCP will be a coordinated action between the Field Office Commander and the supported commander. In some cases, the action may be directed by the Group Commander or USAINTA following a request for special counterintelligence support from a major commander. Regardless of the origin of the request, DSCCP operations will always be conducted with the full consent and knowledge of the supported commander.
- The selection of installations to be considered for the DSCCP must be discriminatory and based on a genuine need for this manpower intensive service in order to avoid over-commitment of assets. The target installation must be one that is on the ACSI Sensitive Installation and Unit List (SIUL) and one that is a potential or actual target of hostile intelligence services. It is recognized that some field offices and resident offices have numerous sensitive installations in their area, many of which may be categorized as critical. Therefore, it is essential that each FO/RO maintain a listing of these installations in order of priority. In determining the order of priority, factors such as mission sensitivity, and impact of compromise on the security of the United States, etc., will all have to be analyzed and a value judgement must be made based upon actual knowledge of the local conditions, as to which installation has a greater need for special The installations heading the list will get first consideration.
- Proposed concept will be submitted to the Group Commander by letter for approval. The letter will indicate the installation commander's concurrence in the program. The concept will contain a listing of missions, sensitivities, and those internal and external factors which may pose a threat to the installation. Vulnerabilities to human sources,

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communications intercept, overhead and ground photography, and other appropriate technical/scientific factors will be included if known. This information will be extracted from the target analysis (Para 7a) or from the SVA if one has been completed. The concept must address actions to be taken to detect and counter these threats.

- d. (U) Occasional expenditures of ICF in support of this program is authorized and will be processed in compliance with the provisions of AR 381-141 and USAINTA Regulation 381-1. Recurring expenditures will be supported by a formal request for authority if such expenditures are anticipated.
- concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense are prohibited unless authorized under the provisions of AR 180-13.

7(U) GUIDELINES:

The actions listed below are considered to be minimum essential for the implementation of this program and are not to be considered as all-encompassing. They should be modified as appropriate to meet situations and needs peculiar to the supported installation. Common sense and experience will likely dictate additional or supplementary means to be employed in order to successfully attain the objective.

- a. (U) Conduct a target analysis of the unit/installation to identify, in order of priority, the most critical and vulnerable areas and the multi-discipline threats to which they are exposed. Reference will be made to the following: USAINTA Security Support Bulletins, "THREAT" Manuals, completed SVA/SAVE Reports, CI Survey and Inspection Reports, PM/MP Crime Statistics and Incident Reports, and Communications Security Reports, when available and applicable. The original copy of the analysis will be maintained at the PO/RO level. Appropriate data will be extracted and included in the initial Quarterly Progress Report. The analysis should be reviewed and updated periodically in subsequent Quarterly Progress Reports.
- b. (U) Assign a mature, experienced MI Special Agent as a Direct Support Special Agent (DSSA) to provide all-source direct support to the supported commander or his designated representative. The DSSA must become intimately knowledgeable of the supported command's mission, functions, security status and vulnerabilities. As the program will be overt in nature, the DSSA will be known as the primary USAINTA point of contact to all within the supported units/installations. The DSSA will require a TOP SECRET clearance and an SI/SAO special access.

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c. The task of the DSSA is to develop a sufficient number of sources of information to provide the best possible coverage to the unit/installation and personnel of the element to detect security vulnerabilities, and make sound recommendations for their reduction and/or elimination. The DSSA should work closely with the security manager to coordinate appropriate matters and to avoid duplication of effort. However, care should be taken not to duplicate or usurp functions and responsibilities rightfully assigned to the security manager.

- (1) Human sources of information will include Conventional Sources (Incidental, Casual, and Official) and Liaison Contacts as described in Chapter 6, FM 30-17. Confidential Human Sources will not be utilized. Anonymity may be provided through the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 when the source so requests. The association between the DSSA and Conventional Sources or Liaison Contacts will not normally be classified.
- (2) Maximum use will also be made of Documentary and Technical/Materiel Sources to include, but not be limited to, SATRAN Messages, Department of the Army intelligence publications and/or bulletins;
 -USAINTA Security Support Bulletins and "THREAT" Manuals; SAVE/SVA reports; Military Police Reports, and Serious Incident Reports. Special attention should be paid to message traffic concerning alerts, advisories or warnings concerning events or situations affecting the supported command.

d. A contact card file will be maintained at the supporting office to identify conventional sources and liaison contacts. This file will be integrated into the existing contact card file already established for use in the routine mission of the FO/RO. It must be readily available for DSSA personnel at all times. Individual cards will be annotated when the contact is in support of a specific DSCCP operation. IACs will be conducted on casual sources with the results reflected in the contact card file.

atic review of the dossiers of personnel occupying key and sensitive positions to insure that all such personnel have been properly cleared and to determine if unresolved security matters exist. This issue will be discussed with the supported commander if such a review is deemed necessary, the DSSA should recommend that the commander undertake the action. If the commander requests that the review be conducted by the DSSA, then the matter will be referred to group headquarters where resolution will be made in conjunction with the appropriate USAINTA staff elements. The DSSA may assist the supported command in the review of dossiers but may not take any investigative action to resolve issues. He will advise the supported command to submit requests to USAINTA whenever investigative action is indicated.

No. 381-3



Reporting of Information:

- To the local commander: Information of counterintelligence interest affecting the security posture of the unit/installation will be reported to the supported commander or his designated representative in a timely and complete manner. The information may be reported orally, by Agent Report format, or by Summary of Information (SOI) format, as appropriate. While most items of information will be passed on an oral basis only, there may be certain instances when the commander will desire written reports from the DSSA to be later attached as backup information to his Request for Investigation. In these instances, ARs containing the adverse allegation may be passed when the full consent of the sources of the information has been obtained. Bowever, when a source of information desires confidentiality, to protect the source, the DSSA can then pass in the information only on an oral basis or by SOI format. Regardless of the manner in which the information was passed to the supported command, a report of the information provided to the supported command will be summarized in the Quarterly Progress Report to this headquarters with an indication of the actions taken by the supported command (see Para 7h below).
- (2) (U) Other: Information of counterintelligence interest to the intelligence community or other agencies will be reported in accordance with established procedures utilizing normal reporting vehicles such as oral reports, Agent Reports, Spot Reports or Summaries of Information as appropriate. Information reports will be classified according to their content. Such reports will indicate when and to whom the information was passed and what action the command has taken or plans to take. Subject blocks, special warning notices and Privacy Act caveats, etc., will be those utilized in established investigative activity procedures. (AR 381-20 and USAINTA Reg 381-100).
- (3) (U) When fragmentary information of counterintelligence interest is initially surfaced, the DSSA will attempt to determine whether or not the information is credible prior to reporting it to the supported Commander. Preliminary checks may be made only to the extent authorized in para 3-6, USAINTA Reg 380-100. Should this prove to be insufficient to establish the credibility of the information, the DSSA will then refer the matter to group headquarters for coordination with USAINTA. Credible information concerning a member of the supported command should be used to support a formal Request for Investigation to USAINTA.
- (4) The supported commander or his designated representative will be orally briefed on all items of threat information concerning his command, or be provided written reports as appropriate. Examples of the types of threat information include satellite overflights, Soviet bloc

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country commercial overflights, communications intercept capabilities/
vulnerabilities from air, ground or water, personnel security vulnerabilities and others as listed below. Depending upon the source of the
information and its previous distribution within the intelligence community, the information may be passed laterally or to higher echelons in
accordance with established reporting requirements. All information
gleaned from the operation will be briefly summarized in the Quarterly
Progress Report.

- g. (U) A list of EEI will be developed by the DSSA in order to focus specialized coverage on the specific requirements of the local situation and the supported commander. Examples of EEI are attached at APPENDIX B. It should be noted that the EEI contain items of specific interest to the supported commander and other items that pertain to lead material for use by the US Army intelligence community. A copy of the developed EEI list will be attached to the initial Quarterly Progress Report.
- h. (U) A Quarterly Status Report in the format contained at APPENDIX C will be submitted to Group Headquarters no later than 10 working days following each calendar quarter. The first report will be due after the completion of the first full quarter of operation after initiation. The report should reflect the developments and progress of the operation, problems encountered, information obtained during the reporting period, future actions contemplated and lessons learned or recommendations as appropriate.
- Reducing Vulnerabilities: Once a security weakness or hazard has been identified, the DSSA then has the responsibility to make sound recommendations for corrective actions to be taken by the supported commander to reduce or eliminate them. In making these recommendations, the DSSA must use good judgement based upon his background and experience, cost verses absolute security, knowledge of similar instances, common sense, and an intimate knowledge of those technical and/or specialized security services and/or investigations available to the supported commander from other USAINTA elements. Each corrective action must be viable, made on its own merit, be practical and be within the capability of the supported command. USAINTA Security Support Bulletins contain excellent examples of "quick-fix" solutions. In those rare instances when corrective actions cannot be accomplished due to cost restrictions or limited resources available to the command, the commander must be made aware of, and accept the possible security risk(s) involved.
- 9. It is visualized that situations, incidents or conditions may be uncovered which could have serious deleterious effect on the security

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posture of the installation and could not be resolved through the techniques of the DSCCP. In these cases, the matter should be expeditiously referred to Group Headquarters where it will be brought to USAINTA's attention for resolution, considering ICIPs, SCOPIs, Special Operations, or other more sophisticated methods.

- 10. (U) The application of the DSCCP to a supported installation is a special effort and will probably require the services of the DSSA on a near full time basis with additional manhours of support furnished by FO and Group Headquarters. Consequently, FO Commanders and RO SAICs should proceed with caution in offering this service to commanders to prevent over-extending their resources. Nevertheless, the DSSA approach of the DSCCP is sound and could well be applied to other installations in the area of operations but to a much lesser degree than in the DSCCP. This should be done as a routine matter and no formal approval is required. Thus, one MI Special Agent could become the DSSA to several installations of lower priority.
- 11. (U) This pamphlet provides policy and guidance for 902d MT Group personnel in the conduct of all-source, multi-discipline counterintelligence support within the area of responsibility of the 902d MT Group. It complements existing US Army Regulations, USAINTA Regulations and USAINTA policy and guidance. Nothing in this pamphlet shall be construed to contravene or to be in conflict with existing US Army or USAINTA policy. In the event that possible conflicts may arise, the provisions of existing US Army and/or USAINTA policy will apply. Any questions pertaining to possible conflict of the provisions of this pamphlet with existing policy will be addressed to this headquarters, ATTN: MIIA-GPB-AC, for further staffing with appropriate USAINTA staff elements. Comments and recommendations are encouraged and should be submitted on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) to this headquarters for consideration and staffing.

3 Incl

Appendix A - References

Appendix B - EEI

Appendix C - Quarterly Report

HASSEL L. PARK Colonel, MI

Commanding

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10-S3, 902d MI Group

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APPENDIX A TO 902D MI GROUP PAMPHLET 381-3

REFERENCES


1. Army Regulations:

- a. AR 18-7, Army Information and Data Systems, Data Processing Installation Management, Procedures, and Standards.
 - b. AR 190-13, the Army Physical Security Program
 - c. AR 340-21, Office Management, The Army Privacy Program.
- 5200.1-R (DODISPR).
- e. (C) AR 380-10, Department of the Army Policy for Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments (U).
- f. AR 380-13, Security, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations.
 - g. AR 380-150, Access to and Dissemination of Restricted Data.
 - h. (6) AR 381-3, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) (U).
 - i. AR 381-11, Military Intelligence, Threat Analysis.
- j. AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations (Short Title: SAEDA).
 - k. (2) AR 381-12-1, Processing of SAEDA Incidents (U).
- 1. AR 381-14, Counterintelligence Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (U).
- m. AR 381-15, Military Intelligence, Domestic Exploitation Program (U)
- n. AR 381-20, Military Intelligence, US Army Counterintelligence (CI) Activities.
- o. AR 381-141, Military Intelligence, Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control and use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF): (U)


- AR 530-1, Operational Security (U).
- q. (U) AR 530-2, Communications Security (U).
- r. We AR 530-3, Electronics Security (U).
- s.(U) AR 530-4, Control of Compromising Emanations (U).
- t. AR 604-5, Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and Material.
 - u. AR 604-10, Military Personnel Security Program.

DOD Publications:

- a. DOD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation.
- b. (SI) DOD 5200.1F (M-2) Special Security Manual
- c. DOD 5200.28-M, ADP Security Manual
- d. DOD 5220-22-M, Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information.
- e. DIAM 50-3, Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.
- 3. Field Manuals:
 - a. FM 19-30, Physical Security.
 - b. FM 30-17, Counterintelligence Operations.
- 4. ACSI, DA Publications.
 - a. OACSI Sensitive Installation and Unit List (SIUL).
 - b. AARGRAMs (as applicable).
- 5. USAINTA Publications.
 - a. USAINTA Reg 10-2, Organization and Functions Manual.
 - b. V(g) USAINTA Reg 381-1, ICF (U)
 - c. USAINTA Reg 381-100, Counterintelligence Activities and Procedures.
 - d. Vs/ USAINTA Security Support Bulletins (U).



- e. (5) USAINTA Security Support Program Manual "THREAT" (U)
- f. 7(c) USAINTA Security Support Program Manual "Operations" (U)
- g. USAINTA Security Support Program Computer Security Manual.
- h. USAINTA Daily Operational Reports (as applicable).
- i. USAINTA Supplement to AR 380-5.
- 6. 902d MI Group Publications:
- a. 95) 902d MI Group Pamphlet 380-2, Security, SATRAN Reports (U).
 - b. 902d MI Group Daily Operational Reports (as applicable).



APPENDIX B TO 902D MI GROUP PAMPHLET 381-3

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI)

GENERAL: In devising EEI applicable to the supported installation, each one of the multi-discipline threats must be examined in conjunction with the mission and situation of the particular target. The actual or potential vulnerabilities thereby conceived become REI affecting the supported installation. Since each installation has its own specific situation, it is imperative that the DSSA work very closely with a representative of the supported installation in order to arrive at an EEI listing tailored to the specific needs of the command. The references listed at APPENDIX A provide background information and guidance in devising EEI. Many of the areas covered by these references, which heretofore have been of little concern to the Special Agent, are now essential elements of knowledge to the DSSA if he is to successfully accomplish his mission under the DSCCP concept. This is particularly necessary in the areas of SIGINT, PHOTINT, OPSEC and Computer Security, Listed below are sample EEI for each category. These EEI are basic and are only a partial listing provided as an aid in developing a list peculiar to the supported command. Some of the items may not be germane to every DSSA but are included as nuclei for possible development of new or related ideas. The final EEI list prepared by the DSSA should include the source or sources that can provide the required information.

2. HUMINT: The following elements are those normally attributed to collection or exploitation by human intelligence sources. The information will usually be obtained by various HUMINT sources, personal observation by the DSSA and liaison contacts:

- a. HOIS subscriptions or regular acquisition of local and post newspapers and periodicals. Sources: LNO contacts and USAINTA.
- b. Deliberate compromise of classified information or unauthorized release of military information to representatives of foreign governments (ARs 380-5, 380-10, 381-12 and 381-12-1)
- c. Public information releases and local newspaper articles revealing unclassified but useful (to HOIS) information regarding the command.
- d. Theft, suspected theft, or unauthorized reproduction of classified documents and or material.
- e. Reported or suspected blackmail or coercion of individuals employed within the supported command.

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- f. Actual or attempted physical breaches of restricted area perimeter security, external or internal.
- g. Barly detection of persons whose activities and/or character weaknesses may render them vulnerable to hostile intelligence exploitation. Suitability factors may include:
 - (1) Breasive indebtedness or recurring financial difficulties.
 - (2) Unexplained affluence.
- (3) Conduct rendering the individual vulnerable to pressure, such as homosexual, criminal or immoral acts.
- (4) Excessive use of alcoholic beverages or improper use of drugs or marcotics.
 - (5) Mental or emotional instability or history thereof.
 - (6) Those who attempt to commit suicide.
- (7) Drastic changes in behavior to indicate possible unexplained pressures being brought to bear.
- h. Personnel who regularly and voluntarily work during non-duty hours when unobserved access to classified data is possible.
- i. Sudden unexplained or inadequately explained absences from work.
- j. Membership in, or association with members of organizations constituting a local threat against the US Army as defined in AR 380-13.
- k. Unsolicited correspondence from individuals, organizations or addressees known to be a threat to the US Army.
- 1. Allegations or denunciations of espionage or sabotage on the part of sensitive installation personnel.
- 3. PHOTINT: This pertains to intelligence obtained by means of photography, mainly through HOIS satellites or HOIS commercial aircraft. Also included must be threats posed by hand-held cameras operated from low-flying private aircraft and ground-level photography conducted from areas outside the perimeter of the installation. Photography from seaborne platforms should be considered at installations located near international waters. Sources of information for this type of data are documentary sources such as SATRAN messages, schedules of tests, operations and troop movements, as well as results of liaison contacts and personal observations. Some sample EEI are as follows:

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- a. Following activities during periods of scheduled overflights by HOIS satellites and commercial aircraft:
 - (1) Large and significant training exercises.
 - (2) Testing of equipment and/or techniques in the open.
 - (3) Uncamouflaged new or sensitive equipment.
 - (4) Other significant movements and activities.
- (5) Concentration of transportation equipment, i.e., transports, etc.
 - b. Build up of major item stockpiles in the open.
 - c. Gradual build up of facilities at a test site.
- d. Repeated violation of air restricted zones by commercial/private planes.
- e. Appearance of private aircraft during classified, or significant tests/demonstrations.
- f. Placing, operating or testing of new, significant or classified equipment in areas exposed to the public.
- g. Sudden appearance of camera-carrying "tourists" in the vicinity, coinciding with the scheduling of new, unusual and/or classified activity.
- h. Unobstructed windows and apertures in areas where classified matters are handled, permitting observation and photography from uncontrolled areas.
- i. Foreign Vessels, particularly from East Bloc Countries, appearing off-coast of installations near international waters.
- 4. SIGINT: Signal intelligence is derived from the intercept and analysis of communications, COMINT, and from communications electromagnetic radiations, ELINT. HOIS SIGINT collection against US facilities is accomplished from air-borne, sea-borne, and land-based platforms. HOIS capabilities in this field are described in the USAINTA Threat Manual and additional information as to specific threat to the supported installation may be found in reports of SVAs and SAVEs and/or requested from USAINTA. The field of SIGINT is a very complex and specialized one. Adequate protection of a command/installation from HOIS SIGINT collection requires.

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the application of Signal Security (SIGSEC) which includes Communications Security (COMSEC), and Electronic Security (ELSEC). COMSEC measures are applied to telecommunications systems and has four components; crypto security, physical security, transmission security and emmission security. ELSEC pertains to protective measures applied to electromagnetic radiation of non-communications equipment and systems to prevent the interception, analysis or exploitation of those radiations by foreign intelligence. The DSSA must become sufficiently familiar with the above subjects in order to recognize vulnerabilities, and know when to recommend a request for technical assistance. References lh, l, p, q, r, s, and 5d and e in APPENDIX'A will provide additional information. Purthermore, the DSSA must work closely with the staff element having responsibility for SIGSEC of the supported installation. The EEI selected will be the type that can be fulfilled by human sources, preferably located in communication/electronics work areas. Some EEI common to SIGINT are located in para lc, Appendix to AR 530-1. Other sample EEI follow:

- a. Conducting tests on new or sensitive radars and other non-communication emmitters within range of land based, air-borne or sea-borne HOIS ELINT platforms.
- b. Installing and operating electrically operated, informationprocessing equipment which handles classified information without the application of compromising emanations control measures.
 - c. Poor telephone security to include:
- · (1) Discussion of classified matters over Autovon and commercial telephone systems.
- (2) Discussions of upcoming events which can provide tipoffs to classified activities.
 - (3) Use of double talk in reference to classified messages.


(4) Reading/quoting verbatim portions of classified matters.


5. OTHER EEI: The following items are of interest to the US Army intelligence community and will be forwarded to this headquarters by

Agent Report format for appropriate action. A statement in Agents Notes will indicate if and how the information has been reported through other appropriate channels. As the information will be passed to USAINTA for possible exploitation bt the Special Operations Detachment or the Director of Operations as appropriate, the Agent Reports will be classified CONFIDENTIAL-NO FOREIGN DISSEM. Normally this information is not passed to the local commander other than to insure that other proper reporting

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procedures are being followed by the command.

- a. Identification and extent of foreign contacts of military and DOD civilian personnel, with emphasis on Soviet bloc countries.
- b. Intended foreign travel of military or DOD civilian personnel to Soviet bloc countries or attendance at social or official functions at which Soviet bloc countries are present.
- c. Foreign business or professional connections and the extent thereof of military and DOD civilian personnel and their families, with emphasis on Soviet bloc countries.
- d. Solicitation by foreign national or organizations of personal or official information through official or unofficial channels.
- e. Invitations by non-US Government organizations or individuals to members of the supported command to Participate in conferences or symposia or to submit papers for publications in professional journals on activities related to their government employment.

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APPENDIX C TO 902D MI GROUP PAMPHLET 381-3

DSCCP QUARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT

- 1. (U) IDENTIFY: (Name of 902d MI Group Field Element providing support).
- 2. (U) SUPPORTED COMMAND: (The activity(ies) receiving the support and the major command(s) involved.)
- 3. () TARGET ANALYSIS: (In the initial report summarize the results of target analyses conducted for all activities, installations, or separate elements designated and included in the program, by order of priority of support. Subordinate elements large enough to be designated sub-targets will be listed in subparagraphs. In subsequent reports, indicate only changes as they occur.)

4. () QUARTERLY BRIEFING OF SUPPORTED COMMAND

- a. Circumstances: In brief narrative form, cite date(s), identities of all persons present, and subjects discussed and results of the briefing(s).
- b. Recapitulation of Operational Progress During the Period: In as many subparagraphs as may be required, cite significant developments as pertain to development of the program, improvements in target coverage, and any operational readjustments made during the period. In citing specific items of interest, identify each by making reference to the appropriate reports made during the reporting period which contained details of the topic discussed with the commanders, if applicable.
- c. Significant Counterintelligence Information Developed: In as many subparagraphs as may be required, cite identities of personalities, incidents, or groups discussed with reference to the report previously submitted.

5. () INFORMATION SUBMITTED:

a. To the local commander and actions implemented or taken as a result:

Subject Type Information Developed Action Taken Date of Action

b. To the intelligence community;

Subject Type Information Developed To whom reported

6. () COMMENTS, REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

In this paragraph, indicate any general remarks or indications of special

interest shown by the supported command that are not covered in above paragraphs. These remarks should reflect the commander's assessment of the viability of the program, whether it is meeting the objectives and achievements as he sees them, and any problems and/or recommendations. Also indicated the extent with which the commander or his representative has cooperated with the FO/RO and/or this group and any pertinent remarks which could serve to improve the DSCCP support to the command. Where problem areas have been encountered, findings and recommended solutions will be provided. Lessons learned should be included to assist in the planning and implementation of other operations. A statement will be entered as to whether any information concerning non-affiliated DOD civilians or organizations was reported (AR 380-13). If affirmative, reference specific report or attach copy. Utilize subparagraphs to explain or amplify information or data reported.

NOTE: Classify each paragraph according to its content. Because of the distribution of this report, care must be taken to insure that the contents of the report do not reveal SI/SAO access material. An example of this would be to include the Statement "three items of PHOTINT information, reference messages _____, and _____, were received and passed to the supported command. Appropriate actions were taken", without revealing the SI/SAO information contained within the reference messages.

2 January 1979

MEMORANIUM FOR DIRECTOR, COUNTERINTELLICENCE

SUBJECT: Lentil Monkey (U) ICIP (U)

- 1. Attached at TAR A is Operation Plan for ICIP, Lentil Monkey (U), located at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
- 2. Attached at TAB B are the Quarterly Summaries on Lentil Monkey (U) for FI 78.
- 3. Attached at TAB C is an FBI report on an individual who in 1977 being considered for employment at DLI.
- 4. In December 1978, discussion with SOD personnel concerning this ICIP revealed that subject ICIP would be terminated in early 1979.

 As you know, Bob Wright has an action before "higher authority" regarding a change in the definition of surveillamence. My concern has been whether or not ICIP violates the definition used in the E.O. The DOD IN appears to be satisfied that it does not. With the termination of Lentil Monkey the question from my concern becomes academic. According to SOD, Lentil Monkey (U) will be replaced with another plan that will be administered by the 902d MIN and will eliminate the area of concern.

Mr. Brannan

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INTERNAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (ICIP)

- 1. Mission, Background, Objectives, & Base of Operations
- e. Mission. To provide counterintelligence support, security support and operations security support to the Defense Language Institute (DLI), located at the Presidio of Monterey, CA.
- Executive Agent for the Defense Language Program and Tasked the Department of the Army to control the program. Military Intelligence received the above stated mission. The Commandant, DLI requested by ref j, the implementation of an Aggressive Counterintelligence Program. This program is now known as an Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP). A target vulnerability analysis, conducted by the 115th MI Group in March 1968, indicated the request was fully justified. Additionally, information antained in ref h continues to support this determination.
 - c. Objectives.
- (!) To attempt to identify as early as possible specific hostile intelligence collection operations or threats to the DLI to allow neutralization or exploitation of offensive counterintelligence operations of such hostile threats and/or operations.
- (2) To identify those activities, practices and/or personnel within DLI that pose potential or existent security threats and to neutralize threats so identified. Specific target areas are identified by priority in Annex B.
 - d. Base of DLI Operations.
 - (1) Project Case Officer (PC(): A day office is located at the US Navy Post Graduate School in proximity to, but, physically separated from the Presidio of Monterey.
 - (2) Project Liairon Officer (PLO): Presidio of Monterey.

2 U Personnel:

- a. Project Case Officer.
- b. Project Lisison Officer.

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OPERATION PLAN LENTIL MONKEY (U)

- c. Sources: To be recruited as available from members of the student body, staff and faculty of DLI.
 - d. Control Personnel: See Annex C, (Knowledgeability List).
- 3, (2) Cover and Documentation:


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4/Ww Execution:

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- a. Concept of Operations:
- (1) The ICIP operation will be implemented by the coordinated utilization of overt liaison contacts, conventional sources and confidential sources. Priority of source recruitment will be in accordance with the target priorities estab lished in Annex B and based on expressed or demonstrated needs of the DLI Commandant. The PLO will constantly spot, assess and recruit potential Confidential Sources for utilization in priority target areas.
- (2) Each individual and source involved in the conduct or control of this ICIP will be briefed on and comply with current policies and constraints pertaining to counterincelligence operations and other activities as they concern persons and organizations not affiliated with Department of Defense (references a, c, i). Upon recruitment (or earlier if deemed appropriate), each Confidential Source will be briefed on these constraints and will sign a certificate to this effect. A copy of the certificate will be included in the source data forwarded to higher Headquarters.



OPERATION PLAN LENTIL MONKEY (U)

- (3) The scope of this operation will not be expanded to cover offpost targets not affiliated with the Department of Defense without prior approval in compliance with reference c.
- (6) Artivities and duties of the PCO and PLO are contained in reference f. The PLO, in exceptional cases, based on the nature of the DLI environment, may serve as a PCO for selected Confidential Sources.
 - b. Essential Elements of Information (EEI): AnnexyD.
 - c. Target Area: Annex B.
 - d. Implementation by Phases:
- (1) Overt phase is on-going as approved and validated by DA ACSI Letter dated 14 July 1976, subject: Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP) (U). The overt phase is a primary responsibility of the PLO.
 - (2) The objectives of the overt phase are:
 - (a) Spotting and assessing potential Confidential Sources.
- (b) Establishment and maintenance of a professional and cooperative relationship with the DLI Commandant and his staff, with emphasis on the DLI Security Officer and other personnel in key positions involving priority targets.
- (c) Further apprising the DLI Commandant of the ICIP, its objectives, capabilities and limitations.
- (d) Establishment and maintenance of a liaison link through the DLI Security Officer with the DLI Commandant to facilitate the passage of perishable and critical information.
- (e) Accomplishment of selected local investigative requirements relative to both overt and other sources.
- (f) Development and maintenance of liaison contacts with local and Federal law enforcement, security, and investigative personnel.
 - (3) Covert Phase.
- (a) The covert phase is initiated upon the recruitment of a Confidential Source and will continue for the duration of the utilization of such source, or until the operation is terminated.

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OPERATION PLAN LENTIL MONKEY (U)

- (b) The objectives of the covert phase, which are the responsibility of the PCO's are:
- (1) Development and timely reporting of credible information relating to the detection, neutralization or exploitation of factors or individuals who pose a direct threat to the security of DLI and the United States.
- (2) Training and exploitation of in-place Confidential Sources who have placement and access within the selected priority target areas, and who are capable of developing and reporting information not available through overt means.
- 6. Security Considerations: All personnel will comply with the administrative and operational security procedures set forth in reference 1.
- f. Technical Requirements: Utilization of technical equipment is not anticipated. If, during the course of the operation, such a requirement develops, supplementary correspondence will be initiated.

5. (0)	Communications:	1	
- a.	b1		
b.	b1	;	
c.	b1	<u></u>	
6. (C)	b1	· · ·] :
a.	b1	<u></u>	
<u> </u>		1885	

OPERATION PLAN LENTIL MONKEY (U) Finances and Logistics: b1 Termination:

- Termination With and Without Prejudice: Sources recruited for these operations will be terminated when their use to the operation ceases, they show indications of insecure practices which could compromise the operation, they are no longer amenable to control, or the operation is terminated. Circumstances under which termination is effected will determine whether termination is with or without preju-Security debriefing and severance statements will be obtained at the time of termination when practicable.
- b. Commitments: The only commitments to be made to Sources will be assurance of protection of their identity and of reimbursement of expenses incurred at the direction of the PCO or PLO.
- c. Knowledgeability: Knowledgeability of Confidential Sources will be limited to names of the PCO and PLO; vehicles and license plates; meeting sites; training, EFI and other modus operandi acquired by a Source in the course of his utilization in an operation. Knowledgeability of Conventional Sources, witting, or unwitting, will generally be less than that of Confidential Sources; however, they will be met and debriefed whenever practical, with the same operational techniques and procedures utilized with Confidential Sources.

Coordination and Liaison:

Coordination of this operation has been effected with the Commandant, DII,

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OPERATION PLAN LENTIL MONKEY (U)

and appropriate staff officers. Liaison will continue to be conducted with these officials. Liaison has also been established and maintained with appropriate local and Federal law enforcement and investigative agencies.

10. (U) Reports:

- a. Source administration and operational reports will be submitted in accordance with USAINTA Regulation 381-100 & 1 and FM 30-17A. The following reports are required.
- (1) Quarterly Status Report (See example in USAINTA Regulation 381-100-1, Appendix A)
 - (2) Lead Development Report (See example in FM 30-17A, Appendix D)
 - (3) Contact Report (See example in FM 3C-17A, Appendix D)
- (4) Agent Report (See example in USAINTA Regulation 381-100, Appendix A)
- b. Quarterly status reports will be submitted so as to arrive at Special Operations Detachment, HQ, USAINSCOM, NLT three working days after the end of the reporting period.

ANNEX: A - References

- B Target list and Priorities
- C Knowledgeability List
- D Essential Elements of Information
- E Finance and Logistics

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ANNEX A: References

- a. Executive Order 11905, United States Foreign Intelligence Activities (U), 18 Feb 76.
- b. DOD Directive 5160-41, dated 5 Oct 68, Subject: Defense
- e. AR 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning on-Affiliated Persons and Organizations (U), 30 Sep 74.
 - d. AR 381-141, Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control Use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (U), 7 Jul 76.
- e. DA Letter, ACSI-CIPR, dated 8 Oct 69, Subject: Counterintelli-
- f. USAINTC Regulation 381-100-1, Counterintelligence Special Operations (U), dated 8 Jun 74.
- g. USAINTC Regulation 381-1, Provisions for Administration, Supervision, Control and Use of Intelligence Contingency Funds (U), 24 Aug 74.
- h. USAINTA Report, A Security Incident Review, Defense Language Institute (U), dated Jan 1977.
 - 1. Letter, ICDO-OP, dated 12 Apr 74, Subject: Umbrella OPLAN (U).
- j. Letter, CDT, DLIWC, dated 11 Sep 67, Subject: Request for Aggressive Counterintelligence Support (U), with 1st Indorsement, DLI, dated 14 Sep 67.
- k. Letter, MlIA-GPA-CO, dated 6 Jan 77, Subject: Administration of Internal Counterintelligence Program (U).

ANNEX B: Target Areas (U)

Priority I targets linclude the following DLI Language Departments:

Russian

Czech

Polish

Romanian

Bulgarian

Serbo-Croatian

Chinese - Cantonese

Chinese - Mandarin

Albanian

Priority II targets include the following DLI Language Departments:

Arabic

French

German ¢.

d. Italian

Indonesian

Korean

Persian

Portugese

Spanish

Thai j.

Turkish

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ANNEX B: Target Areas (U)

3. Priority III targets include the following Non-Academic Directoratis:

- a. Directorate of Support
- b. Directorate of Training
- c. Directorate of Evaluation
- d. Directorate of Training Development
- e. Theresident Training
 - Troop Command

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ANNEX C: Knowledgesbility List (U)

SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGEABILITY ROSTER (26 August 1977)*

	ICIP LENTIL MONKEY (U)	DATE OF ACCESS
	:	5. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
MANE	POSITION	
LTC Russell R. Cooley	Commander	Jul 1977
LTC Joseph E. Bawkins	Executive Officer	Nov 1976
MAJ Leonard A. Kostelnik	\$2/3	Jul 1977
MAJ Carl L. Biemiller	Chief Operations Branch	Aug 1977
\$5G Richard L. McCauley	Operations Branch	Feb 1977
Jeremy H. Hughes	PLO	Apr 1974
Ronald M. Olson	PCO	Fec 1976
John Carstens	Pco	Aug. 1974
LTC Archur D. McQueen	Special Assistant	Sep 1974

^{*} All Personnel Listed Are Assigned to the 93D MI BN (Prov)

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GENERAL KNOWLEDGEABULITY ROSTER (1 AUG 7))

ICIP LENGIL MONKEY (U)

NAME	POSITION	DATE OF ACCESS
COL Samuel L. Stapleton	Commendant, Defense Language Institute (DLT)	Sep 1975
COL R. Jaanson	Deputy Commandant, PLI	Jul 1977
LTC R. P. Kelly	XO, DLI	Sep 1977
LTC P. R. Burger, Jr.	Lirector, Support, DLI	Sep 1975
LTC Waldo Webb	Security Officer, DLI	Ncv 1977
James R. Green	Security Officer, DLI	Jan 1974
MAJ Williem A. Sensenderfer	Chief, OPSEC Team, 93d MI Bn (Prcv)	յա1 1977
CPT Van B. Lowry, Jr.	Adjutant, 93d MI Bn (Prov	Sep 1.975
CPT Brendon A. Xiques	CDR, F: Ord Field Office	Aug 1975
Jesse Eoone	S/A Ft Ord FO	Jan 1975
Max Dolan	b/A Ft Ord FO	Jan 1975
b1 Per FBI		Jul 1974
b1 Per FBI		Sep 1976
2. 101131		Зер 1970
MG H. R. Aarn	ACST, DA	Jul 1977
MAJ (FNU) Morgan	ACSI, DA taff Officer	Jul 1977
CPT Edward F. Alves	S-4, 93d MI Bn (Prov)	Jul 1977
CLT Ashton Grmes	CDR, TSCM leam	Tul 1977
CPT John F. Roe	Action Officer, Si-5 93d MI Bn (Prov)	Jul 1977
CPT Fred A. Kinnan	TEMPEST Officer, 93d MI Bn (Prov)	Jul 1977

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ANNEX D: Essential Elements of Information

Consistent with the stated mission and objectives of ICIP LENTIL MONKEY, the following Essential Elements of Information (EEI) are established. These EEI apply to all military and DOD civilian personnel assigned to or associated with DLI activities to include students, permanent party, staff and faculty, and visitors:

- 1. Identification and extent of foreign contacts and business or professional connections, particularly those with communist bloc countries.
- 2. Foreign travel, intended or completed, to communist bloc countries; recurring trips to Mexico and Canada.
- 3. Attendance at social and official functions at which communist
- 4. Solicitation by foreign nationals or organizations of official or personal information through either official or non-official channels.
- 5. Identification of personnel corresponding or associating with communist bloc embassies or receiving unsolicited correspondence from individuals, organizations or addresses known to be a threat to the US Army.
- 6. Identification of personnel whose activities and character weaknesses render them potentially vulnerable to pressure, blackmail, coercion, and exploitation by foreign intelligence. Such information includes:
 - a. Excessive indebtedness or recurring financial difficulties.
 - b. Unexplained affluence inconsistent with income.
- c. Commitment or solicitation to commit immoral or illegal acts in CONUS or in foreign countries where such acts could be considered illegal.
- d. Drastic changes in or acts of personal behavior to indicate possible unexplained pressures being trought to bear.
- e. Excessive use of alcoholic beverages or improper use or abuse of drugs we narcotics.
- f. Mental or emotional instability or illness of sufficient seriousness to affect materially the individual's duty performance.

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- 7. Identification of violations of established installation and/or personnel security policy and procedures.
- 8. Identification of individuals displaying unusual interest in anothers personal and military background and future assignment; attempting to identify individuals on orders to classified and foreign command and general staff assignments; photographing apparently selected individuals.
 - 9. Allegations or denunciations of aspionage or sabotage activities.
 - 10. Sudden unexplained or inadequately explained absences from work.
 - 11. Identification of unofficial visitors to DLI.

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LENTIL MANKEY - 1CIP-DLI

C)		. <u>-</u>	
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1301	118	#2	34	3d General
1142	23	55	43	4 Donner
5211	404	194	150	TOTALS
	749			



LENTIL MONKEY: (QSR, 1st QTR FY 78)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI). Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Seventeen.
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) During the quarter, sources continued to report contacts between Russian Language Department (RLD) instructors and friends and relatives in the USSR. In addition to written correspondence, packages containing clothing, books and other articles have been sent to individuals in the USSR: sometimes through third parties. One RLD instructor has received both standard and military dictionaries from a friend in the USSR, to include a copy of the Warsaw Pact Military Terminology. An RLD instructor has sent over \$4,000, in increments over a period of several years, to friends and relatives in the USSR. The instructor refused to reveal the method/system used to transmit the money that he had borrowed while in the USSR in order to emigrate to the US. An RLD instructor who visited the USSR during the quarter was questioned while there by an individual who identified himself as a Soviet Army officer. The instructor was asked for the names of DLI personnel, students' branches of service, and the purpose of their language studies. The instructor reported that she had refused to answer the questions.
- (2) A Polish Language Department (PLD) instructor obtained a visa from the Polish Embassy in London while on leave in July 1977 and proceeded to visit Poland. The instructor failed to comply with DLI regulations in that he did not report his intent to visit a Communist Bloc country and receive the required briefing from the DLI Security Officer. This instructor has taken past trips to Poland, but had always complied with DLI regulations. A PLD instructor who has been employed at DLI since 1955 is reportedly planning to retire in the near future and move to Poland. He stated he would be able to live better in Poland because of lower living costs. This same instructor had visited Poland last May, and had photographed DLI students from the Polish and Serbo-Croatin Language Departments during a class picnic in November 1977. A PLD instructor who last visited Poland in June 1977, was visited by friends, a man and woman, from Poland during late September, early October. The instructor took his guests to the Ft Ord Officers' Club on 1 October 1977.


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- (3) A female instructor of the Serbo-Croatin Language Department (SCLD) has developed a close association with a US Army Captain, and former DLI student, now attending the Yugoslavian Staff College. Since his departure from DLI in June 1977, the instructor has corresponded with the Captain and has sent packages to him for delivery to her relatives in Yugoslavia. She plans to visit the captain during her programmed visit/TDY to Yugoslavia in April 1978. The captain is allegedly gathering data for her that can be used by the SCLD. The instructor, a former Yugoslav citizen, is now a permanent resident of the US, and her husband is a US Army enlisted man stationed at Ft Ord.
- (4) An instructor of the Hungarian Language Department (HLD) required his students to complete, in English, a Hungarian visa application as homework assignment. When filled in, the application provides considerable biographic data. The application was printed in four languages, Hungarian, German, French and English.

e. Operational Status:

- (1) Seventeen confidential sources were active during the quarter. Four sources were terminated, three due to graduation and one due to unexpected reassignment, and three new sources were recruited. Four other individuals, including one instructor, are currently under assessment as potential confidential sources. In addition to the confidential source coverage, twelve conventional sources also provided coverage at DLI.
- (2) During the reporting period, information obtained from all sources, including that acquired from overt liaison activities with other services, resulted in the production of two Summaries of Information, 32 Contact Reports, 48 oral reports to the DLI Commandant, eight Source Lead Development Reports (SLDR), and 109 Agent Reports. A total of 1,320 manhours were expended during the 1st Quarter.
- (3) On 20 December 1977, the Project Liaison Officer (PLO) provided the Quarterly Progress Briefing to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI, with LTC Richard P. Kelly, XO, DLI and LTC Waldo R. Webb, Security Officer, DLI, also present. COL Stapleton directed that significant information in the briefing also be furnished the Deputy DLI Commandant, COL R. Jansson, USAF. This was accomplished on 21 December 1977.
- (4) As a result of the Quarterly Briefing and items presented to the Commandant and his staff as developed by the ICIP during the quarter, the DLI Security Officer denied permission for an ASA enlisted student to reside in the home of an RLD instructor. The instructor has had extensive contacts with individuals in the USSR, reportedly attempted to obtain the release of family members from the USSR, and has had alleged contacts with the Soviet Consulate. The DLI Commandant has tasked the Security Officer to determine what restrictions could be placed on foreign visitors to DLI,



and what actions can be taken against the PLD instructor who visited Poland without complying with DLI regulations. Further, the Security Officer was tasked to follow-up on the visa application homework assigned by an instructor of the HLD. Such assignments appear out-of-line and without academic basis.

(5) Special Operations Detachment, USAINSCOM, is closely monitoring the reports concerning the relationship between the SCLD instructor and US Army Captain. Should substantive information develop as a result of this relationship, necessary investigative or other appropriate action will be initiated.

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
(C) LENTIL MONKEY: (QSR, 2d QTR FY 78)


- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Seventeen
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) A Russian Language Department (RLD) instructor revealed that her mother, who resides in the USSR, had been recently questioned by KGB officials when she unsuccessfully attempted to have a manuscript smuggled out of the USSR by an American tourist for delivery to her daughter. The manuscript was allegedly the instructor's translation of some of the works of an ancient Greek philosopher. The tourist, a male student (not further identified), was apprehended and the package confiscated by airport officials. An RLD instructor revealed that while a resident of the USSR he had been approached by the KGB to be an informer. At the time, 1974, the instructor was teaching English language to Soviet Jews. Through the advice of an acquaintance, he allegedly told everyone he knew about the KGB approach and was never a former bothered by them again. The acquaintance was b6 NSA employee who defected to the Soviet Union in 1960. The RLD instructor has been attempting for some time to foster a language teaching method at DLI that he developed while in the USSR at the Pavlov Institute on Physiology. The method has a physiological-psychological basis. Three RLD instructors received unsolicited offers to purchase Soviet publications from an alleged Communist controlled bookstore in New York City.
- (2) During a visit to Czechoslovakia this past Christmas season, a Czech Language Department (CLD) instructor mentioned to students that while there she was surveilled by unidentified person(s) on two separate occasions. The instructor had not reported this fact to the DLI Security Officer upon her return as required by DLI regulations. During a DLI sponsored trip to the Stanford University Library, students were approached by an unidentified man and invited to attend a Czech sponsored social function in the local area. An official invitation was later received by the CLD chairman.
- (3) A Chinese Mandarin Language Department (CMLD) instructor visited the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) during January 1978, without complying with DLI regulations concerning reporting of such trips. This is the instructor's second visit to the PRC; she had complied with appropriate regulations prior to her first visit.

- (4) According to an unsubstantiated statement of a former Egyptian citizen, an instructor in the Arabic Language Department was reportedly a fund raiser for "El Fatah" and avid supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization when he resided in Egypt.
- (5) Through several instructors in the Hungarian Language Department (HLD), the president of a local Hungarian club requested a student volunteer to present a speech in Hungarian at a forthcoming club ceremony. A USAF enlisted student expressed willingness to present the requested speech.

e. Operational Status:

- (1) Seventeen confidential sources were active during the quarter. Four sources were terminated and four new sources recruited. Five individuals are currently under assessment as potential confidential sources. In addition to confidential source coverage, ten conventional sources provided coverage at DLI.
- (2) During the reporting period, information obtained from all sources, including that acquired from overt liaison activities, resulted in production of five Summaries of Information, 41 Contact Reports, 49 oral reports to the DLI Commandant and or designated representatives, five Source Lead Development Reports, and 112 Agent Reports. A total of 1448 manhours were expended on the ICIP during the 2d Quarter.
- (3) On 13 March 1978, the required quarterly briefing was presented to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI. LTC Waldo R. Webb, DLI Security Officer, also attended the briefing. At the Commandant's request, on 20 March 1978, the Deputy Commandant and Executive Officer were also briefed on the progress of the ICIP.
- (4) As a result of the quarterly briefing and items reported to the DLI Commandant and his staff as developed by the ICIP during the quarter, the Commandant directed that letters, requiring written replys of explanation, be sent to the DLI instructors who travelled to Communist bloc countries and did not comply with established DLI policy. He further directed the DLI Information Officer to contact the student discussed in para d(5) above, and advise him of applicable DOD, USAF and DLI regulations regarding military personnel participation in off post political rallies and activities. Such appearances, speeches or other participation by DLI staff, faculty and student personnel must be cleared through the Public Affairs Office. The DLI Security Officer was directed to determine what action can be taken concerning instructors whose actions or backgrounds indicate they may be possible security risks (reference para d(1) wherein an RLD instructor revealed contacts with the KGB and a known US defector while residing in the USSR. SOD, USAINSCOM, has been and will continue to closely monitor the instructor's teaching methods and activities.),






LENTIL MONKEY: (QSR, 3d QTR FY 78)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Fifteen
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) A Russian Language Department (RLD) supervisor entertained a Soviet citizen as his house guest for a period of over a month. The Soviet citizen, an engineer, was in Monterey awaiting settlement of his uncle's will. He returned to Moscow in mid-April following partial settlement, and has arranged with the RLD supervisor to have remaining funds sent to him through banks in the USSR and Western Europe. An RLD instructor has been selected by the US Coast Guard in Monterey to serve as a Russian Language interpreter when needed in cases involving Russian ships or personnel.
- (2) An instructor in the Arabic Language Department (ALD) is reportedly subjecting his students to Palestinian Liberation Organization propaganda.
- (3) An instructor in the Polish Language Department (PLD) required students to fill out a questionnaire covering such subjects as the students' military specialty; prior language training; life goals, leisure time activities; and how he/she plans to take advantage of language proficiency in future personal career.
- (4) An instructor in the German Language Department (GLD) presented lectures to various GLD classes concerning his recently completed trip to East Berlin and East Germany. The instructor failed to comply with DLI regulations concerning prior reporting of trips to Communist bloc countries.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) Fifteen confidential sources were active during the quarter. Five sources were terminated and three new sources recruited. Seven individuals are currently under assessment as potential confidential sources. In addition to confidential source coverage, ten conventional sources provided coverage at DLI.
- (2) During the reporting period, information obtained from all sources, including that acquired from overt liaison activities, resulted in production of seven Summaries of Information, 34 Contact Reports, 42 oral reports to the DLI Commandant and/or designated representatives, eight Source Lead Development Reports, and 118 Agent Reports. A total of 1301 manhours were expended on the ICIP during the 3d quarter.

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- (3) On 22 June 1978, the required quarterly briefing was presented to COL Samuel L. Stapleton, Commandant, DLI. LTC Richard P. Kelly, DLI Executive Officer, and LTC Waldo R. Webb, DLI Security Officer, also attended the briefing.
- (4) As a result of the quarterly briefing and items reported to the DLI Commandant and staff as developed by the ICIP during the quarter, the Commandant directed that DLI visitor control procedures be strengthened through greater coordination between the Security and Information Offices. Procedures for the direct, expeditious reporting of the arrival of visitors and monitoring of their activities at DLI are being established. The Commandant directed that a letter of reprimand be sent to the GLD instructor who visited East Berlin and East Germany without complying with appropriate DLI regulations. The Commandant directed the Security Officer to ascertain the details concerning the PLD instructor's requirement for students to complete a questionnaire soliciting biographic, professional and personal information on the students. The Commandant commented that appropriate attention must be paid to the ALD since any attempts to sabotage Arabic language teaching efforts would have serious effect on various "JS Aid Agreements with Arabic speaking countries. He does not wish to see the improvement in morale and efficiency of the ALD that has occurred over the past few years negated by outside interference by either pro or anti-Arab elements.

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


(C) LENTIL MONKEY: (QSR, 4th QTR FY 78)

- a. Location: Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, CA.
 - b. Confidential Source Utilization: Eighteen
- c. Information Obtained or Reported on Non-affiliated Civilians: None.
 - d. Useful Information Obtained:
- (1) Unauthorized visitors to the Polish, Serbo-Croatian and Arabic Language Departments were reported during the quarter. The visitor to the Arabic Language Department (ALD), a newspaperman of unknown citizenship, allegedly plans to write an article about DLI and solicited information from the Public Affairs/Visitor Support Division (PAVSD) after he had already visited ALD.
- (2) A student in the German Language Department (GLD) attending DLI in civilian cover status was questioned by a substitute instructor regarding his status, type job, assignment upon graduation, and whether he knew, and/or would be working with a former civilian GLD student now in Germany. To determine if a trend exists or is developing, attempts will be made to ascertain if any special attention or undue curiosity is shown to "civilian" personnel attending language training by the DLI instructors.
 - e. Operational Status:
- (1) Eighteen confidential sources were active during the quarter. Two sources were terminated and eight new sources recruited. Four individuals are currently under assessment as potential confidential sources. In addition to confidential source coverage, ten conventional sources provided coverage at DLI.
- (2) During the reporting period, information obtained from all sources, including that acquired from overt liaison activities, resulted in production of three Summaries of Information, 43 Contact Reports, 55 oral reports to the DLI Commandant and/or designated representatives, six Source Lead Development Reports, and 65 Agent Reports. A total of 1142 manhours were expended on the ICIP during the 4th quarter.
- (3) On 20 September 1978, the required quarterly briefing was presented to LTC Waldo R. Webb, Security Officer, DLI. A comprehensive briefing on the operation will be presented to the newly assigned (22 Sep 78) DLI Commandant in the near future.

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ON SEP -5 1997
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- (4) Based on information reported to the DLI Commandant and staff during the quarter the following actions were initiated:
- (a) During their initial security briefing, it is emphasized to all incoming student personnel that neither DLI language instructors nor their relatives have security clearances. This action was based on information that relatives of instructors, citizens of Communist bloc countries, have attended social functions sponsored by language departments and met and conversed with students.
- (b) The Security Officer and Chief, PAVSD are working together to implement and enforce effective visitor control procedures. Personnel of the ALD, see para d(1), were admonished for permitting a visitor access to that department without first coordinating with the PAVSD.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

IASO-SA

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

2)

Operations (U)

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HQDA (DAMI-DOS/Miss Brannan) WASH DC 20310

1. Submitted herewith is the status report for the 1st Quarter, FY 78, for ICIP Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U). During the reporting period, the operation produced two Summaries of Information, eight Source Lead Development Reports, 32 Contact Reports, and 109 Agent Reports.

2. (e) LENTIL MONKEY (U), supporting the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, CA, is the only CONUS ICIP being conducted.

3. At Inclosure 2 is an updated OPLAN for LENTIL MONKEY (U). There are no significant changes to the operational concept and objectives reflected in the original OPLAN, dated 22 September 1971. The primary intent of the revision is to update terminology and references, refine Essential Elements of Information, and incorporate appropriate provisions of AR 380-13, EO 11905 and EO 12036.

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
WILLIAM I. JENNINGS
Special Assistant (OPS)

CDR USAINSCOM

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

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IASO-SA

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)
Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-DOS/Miss Brannan) WASH DC 20310

1. Submitted herewith is the status report, 2d Quarter, FY 78, for/ICIP Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U). During the reporting period, the operation produced five Summaries of Information, five Source Lead Development Reports, 41 Contact Reports, and 112 Agent Reports.

2. LENTIL MONKEY (U), supporting the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, CA, is the only CONUS ICIP being conducted.

l Incl as WILLIAM I. JENNINGS
Special Assistant (OPS)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

IASO-SA

OCT 3 9 1978

SUBJECT:

Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)

HQDA (DAMI-CIC/Miss Brannan) WASH DC 20310

1. Submitted herewith is the status report, 4th Quarter, FY 78, for ICIP Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U). During the reporting period the operation produced three Summaries of Information, six Source Lead Development Reports, 43 Contact Reports and 65 Agent Reports.

2. LENTIL MONKEY (U), supporting the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, CA, is the only CONUS

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WILLIAM I. JENNINGS
Special Asistant (OPS)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

JUL 24 1978

IASO-SA

SUBJECT: Report of Internal Counterintelligence Program (ICIP)
Operations (U)

HQDA (DAMI-BOS/Miss Brannan)
WASH DC 20310

1. Submitted herewith is the status report, 3d Quarter, FY 78, for ICIP Operation LENTIL MONKEY (U). During the reporting period, the operation produced seven Summaries of Information, eight Source Lead Development Reports, 34 Contact Reports and 118 Agent Reports.

2. LENTIL MONKEY (U), supporting the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, CA, is the only CONUS ICIP being conducted.

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WILLIAM I. JENNINGS / Special Assistant (OPS)

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

b1 Per FBI

BY LIAISON

Date:

May 11, 1978

To:

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Department of the Army INSCOM LNO (IAINTA-SO-L)

Room 1J073, Forrestal Building

1000 Independence Avenue, Southwest

Washington, D.C.

From:

William H. Webster, Director

Subject:

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CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 7006

Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3 Date of Declassification Indefinite





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X	Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s): USC 552 (b)(1) PLY FOI
	It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.
	Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.
	Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.
	Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.
	DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

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Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army

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You will be kept advised of all pertinent developments. (U)

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